



INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

An editorial

An article by J POSADAS

A declaration

*Editorials on: MOSCOW AND PEKIN; ALGERIA; JAPAN; ITALY;
CONGO CRISIS; BRITISH LABOR MOVEMENT*

The "History of the CP of the U R S S"

By ERNEST GERMAIN

A MEETING WITH TROTSKY'S SON

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Ten Decisive Years for India (II)

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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

By PIERRE FRANK

Draft Resolution for the Sixth World Congress of the Fourth International

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Declaration of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International

Free Comrades Santen and Raptis!

NEWS FROM THE WORLD WORKERS' MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL

SUMMER 1960

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35 CENTS

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Number 10

Summer 1960

Editorial

THE POST - SUMMIT SITUATION

From the failure of the summit conference to the tremendous movements of the Japanese masses, a whole series of events have marked new developments in the international situation.

Those of our readers who recall the previous editorials in this magazine are aware that we never had any illusions about the outcome of the Paris conference. We wrote, in particular, in the Spring issue:

Thus in the best of cases the summit conference might end without an abrupt break, by keeping up the dialogue even without any real agreement on any essential question.

In drawing up a balance sheet a posteriori, we have almost nothing to add. Fundamentally, the conference failed because no real agreement was possible on any important problem. The only exception might have been disarmament — on this level also negotiations have now ended — but absolutely not in the sense that total or even a quite advanced degree of disarmament could have been achieved, for this was and continues to be impossible. An agreement on a completely limited basis was not and is not excluded, for the joint purpose of bringing about, not disarmament, but a rationalization, so to speak, in armaments, with a possible elimination of henceforth useless or excessive costs.

The impossibility of reaching any agreement whatever at the May conference obviously explains Khrushchev's attitude — all the more so in that on the very eve of the conference the imperialists had clearly manifested their decision to make no serious concession, and had even organized the spectacular provocation of the U-2.

Long-time apostle of "peaceful coexistence" and of "summit" diplomacy, Khrushchev could not reach the end of the conference — viz, the con-

clusion of the whole operation that he had so patiently prepared and so animatedly defended against every sort of adversary — with empty hands. That would have meant for him to accept a confirmation of the bankruptcy of his policy, which would unquestionably have brought about a very serious weakening of his position, if not indeed his fall from power. It must not be forgotten that, in the camp of the workers' states, he was quite roughly attacked by the Chinese, whose theses very likely have a serious audience, among other places, in the circles of the cadres and leaders of the Soviet Communist Party.

There has been a lot of discussion in the worker's movement about the formal attitude adopted by Khrushchev in Paris. This, however, is a secondary question. The essential point is that an objective basis for agreement did not exist, that the imperialists were not ready for any concessions, and that, under these conditions, Khrushchev would have seen his line publicly compromised, with no offsetting advantage. Furthermore, if anyone is to form a judgment about the repercussions of the attitude of the head of the Soviet government and of certain declarations of Malinovsky, he must not limit himself to the rather negative reactions of certain worker or petty-bourgeois sectors in Western Europe (the PSI in Italy, the PSU in France, etc); he must consider the problem from all points of view, including that of the alarm which even the leading strata of certain countries have not concealed about the use made of American bases on their territory. One may be sure that henceforth countries like Pakistan will be much more prudent before offering their hospitality to airplanes of the U-2 type and similar devices.

But the fundamental characteristic of the current international situation consists of the new aggravation of the class struggle on the world scale and of the new revolutionary crises that have opened up, especially in Asia. The events in Korea, Turkey, and Japan show, without any possible ambiguity, that a new revolutionary wave has begun and that new earthquakes must be expected. The Japanese movement in particular has demonstrated how intrinsically fragile are certain pillars of the world imperialist system even when, in certain aspects, their relative stability might have been believed.

The recent revolutionary movements — where generally the masses mobilized themselves to an extent far beyond what their traditional leaderships desired, and where there was even to be observed the visibly vanguard role played by forces outside the control of these leaderships — have marked in general the irruption of new generations into the political arena. What we have here are young people born during or even after the war, who have not known disappointments, who have not been worn out, who do not want to accept a gangrened society in which their prospects seem to be pretty sombre, who have something to say and to put forward, and who are determined to fight with extreme energy. So far, this experience has not yet become generalized; but advance signs exist that in old Europe too the new generation will not be willing to rub along in a “prosperity” that is after all pretty limited and precarious, but will know how to follow the example of the youth of Turkey, Korea, and Japan.

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That all the events of these last months, from the U-2 affair to the struggle in Tokyo, have meant new and quite severe blows to the prestige and even the strength of American imperialism, nobody could question. The problem which now arises, and which is of capital importance in all its future implications, is the following: how are the rulers of the United States going to act in face of the increasing deterioration of the relationship of forces in their disfavor?

A situation of disarray and genuine crisis obviously reigns in Washington, the confusion and uncertainty being increased by the fact it is now almost the eve of the elections, with the paralysis that an outdated political system normally involves on this occasion. But there is no doubt that imperialism's most responsible men realize perfectly that the game from now on will be very closely fought, and that deadlines lie not far ahead.

In reality, the imperialist rulers more than ever find themselves faced by a dramatic dilemma: on the one hand, they know that time is irreversibly working against them, but also, on the other, they are not unaware that a possible war unleashed today would begin under political conditions unfavorable to them and from a position of visible inferiority concerning the most homicidal weapons.

It is therefore true that very serious obstacles stand in the way of imperialism's march toward war. But it is also true that, just because of the later increased deterioration in its position, imperialism might be driven to war by despair or by panic (quite apart from the always existent risk of a conflict “by accident”). With all the more reason, it might be tempted to try, by new partial wars, to dyke any new advances of the revolution in Asia or Latin America.

This is why the international workers' movement must more than ever condemn the lamentable illusions about a “coexistence” that could be described as “peaceful” only by a misuse of words. In particular, the idea that a basic agreement could be found between the imperialists on the one hand, and the workers' states and the revolution in all its forms on the other, and that the so-called “spirit of Camp David” could finally become a reality and force itself to be recognized is an untenable utopia. In other terms, if propaganda is spread about a possible conciliation with imperialism and, as a result, a “peaceful” transition to socialism, the workers' movement is disarmed for the most important tasks that it must accomplish in the period into which we have entered.

Even at the risk of being accused of “dogmatism” by open or camouflaged revisionists, we must constantly repeat this primary truth, that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war is not absolutely removed. And we must forcefully emphasize that a war, under the present conditions of nuclear armament, would have the most terrifyingly murderous consequences for all the inhabitants of our planet.

It must not be feared that such a constant reminder of reality may demoralize the masses. On the contrary, they will be all the more spurred on to a resolute fight against an enemy who, although condemned to inevitable defeat, still has redoubtable means at his disposal. In the last analysis, it is only by such a struggle — in which the problem of the destruction of the capitalist system itself will be posed — that it is possible to check the danger of war, which no summit meeting or spirit of Camp David could in any way exorcize.

Editorial Notes

POLEMICS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKIN

Far from lessening, the polemics of the Chinese Communists against certain Khrushchevian positions, to which we already drew attention in our Spring issue, have developed in a more open and acute form. After the series of articles that appeared in different party organs and leaders' speeches, either at mass meetings or at official receptions, in June there was noted the massive attack by the Chinese delegates at the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, held in Peking. In both the plenary sessions and the commissions, these delegates criticized the Khrushchev line, and, despite the final formal vote, remained practically in opposition by rejecting the idea of the report shared by the delegations from the U S S R, the people's democracies, and most of the other countries. Only the representative of the strong Indonesian trade unions lined up on the Chinese side.

On the Soviet side, as is known, the answer to the Chinese was given by certain more or less overt articles, especially in the one devoted to the anniversary of the publication of Lenin's celebrated pamphlet, *Left Communism, an Infantile Disorder*. The choice could not speak for itself more clearly: basically it is of ultra-leftism that the Chinese are being accused today. Finally, at the Bucharest Congress, Khrushchev increased the dose, not only by reconfirming his theses, but also by clearly proclaiming that on such questions it would not be possible to have two different positions inside the Communist movement.

Due deliberation reveals that it is an important part of the theses of the XXth Congress that the Chinese are bringing back into discussion. True, they accept the idea that, under certain conditions, it might be possible to avoid war, but they constantly stress instead the other aspect, namely, the fact that imperialism has not changed its nature and that consequently, as long as it continues to exist, the war danger will not be absolutely eliminated. But above all, they argue against the possibility that the imperialists may really accept the idea of a general "peaceful coexistence," they never believed in "the spirit of Camp David," and they condemned any attempt to present Eisenhower as a friend of peace. On this last point in particular, the contrast with certain attitudes of the French and Italian Communist Parties is very clear.

The Chinese leaders do not seem enthusiastic either about the Soviet campaign in favor of disarmament. Granted, they declare themselves completely in agreement with Khrushchev's proposals, but they hasten to add that they are convinced that the imperialists will not accept them — which will permit unmasking them even further in the eyes of the entire world. It must be admitted that this is a very special kind of "support."

Another idea of the XXth Congress — the possibility of a "peaceful" and even parliamentary transition to socialism — is in substance rejected by the Chinese. Though they do not exclude "the extremely rare possibility" of such a transition (they pretend to be basing themselves on a quotation from Lenin), they nevertheless lay stress rather on the need for a revolutionary break, referring, among other things, to their own experience. At the same time they take, toward the national bourgeoisie of certain colonial countries, a much more critical attitude than do Khrushchev and certain Communist Parties: it suffices to recall their present hostility toward the Nehrus and Sukarnos. Nor is it possible to forget the Chinese position concerning the Algerian revolution, which they now very vigorously support — at least politically. Whereas Moscow has not yet recognized the G P R A — in the hope of getting on with de Gaulle — an official representation of that same G P R A will henceforth be established in Peking. It must also be recalled that on the question of the communes, the disagreement between Khrushchev and the Chinese — to which we have already referred on other occasions — is far from being overcome, and that it has not failed to have an influence on all the attitudes of the leaders of the Chinese C P.

The polemics opened up by the Chinese therefore have considerable scope, and in fact it is a matter of the most important polemics occurring in the workers' movement in recent years — because of a whole series of factors (the might of China and the powerful influence of its revolution, the objective context and the very terrain of the debate), it is far more important than that begun in 1948 between the Kominform and the Yugoslav C P. It is self-evident that a whole series of the Chinese criticisms are

drawing near the criticisms which our movement has constantly developed, and which through these new channels are being spread on a much wider scale, even though in a deformed way. We may add that the idea sometimes put forward by the Chinese leaders — that, to hit at imperialism, the workers' states should try to profit more by the present favorable conditions — is fully justified.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the Chinese positions are not exempt from a certain schematism, and that many times when the grounds of their reasoning is correct, their way of proceeding is absolutely non-dialectical. There is something that recalls the old Stalinist school, in which the dogmatic form covered up a basic empiricism. Only the future will prove whether the present Chinese attitudes are not dictated by the exigencies of particular contingencies, however well-founded these exigencies may be when taken by themselves (for example, their opposition to their being excluded from summit conferences).

As for the war question, apart from any other consideration, the impression is given that in any case the Chinese underestimate the possible consequences of a nuclear conflict, which would be extremely grave also for those who emerged as victors (as we point out in the editorial in this issue, the consciousness of the extent of the danger should not necessarily demoralize the masses, but on the contrary push them to fight harder against imperialism and war).

But the most negative side of the Chinese polemics is their attitude toward the Yugoslav communists. We have for a long time now criticized a whole series of positions of the Yugoslavs about international policy, and we do not share certain judgments made at Belgrade after the failure of the summit conference. But the Chinese pull the polemics down to an essentially Stalinist level, viz, that Tito and his

“clique” are agents of imperialism, and as such must be fought. In other terms, despite all that they themselves wrote in 1956-57, the Chinese are trying still once more to explain what may be the dialectic inside the workers' movement as if it were determined by the doings of the imperialists or of their agents. This attitude toward the Yugoslavs must be all the more condemned in that, in most cases, when they criticize Tito, it is in reality Khrushchev they are aiming at. For the Chinese leaders do not forget their bureaucratic habits: they avoid direct and frank polemics — which, in the communist movement, should be normal practice with absolutely nothing scandalous or ruinous about it — by preferring deformations, reticences, and procedures of a very Byzantine savor.

Despite all reservations, it should not be forgotten that the theses put forward by the Chinese leaders are, in the last analysis, the reflection of a profound reality. This is the reality of the Asian revolution, of the colonial revolution in general, which cannot accept positions that are not those of a fundamental fight against imperialism, and which cannot be satisfied either with yarns about « peaceful coexistence » which might from now on be possible, about the spirit of Camp David, and about an irreversible détente. What that revolution needs is recourse to the inexhaustible springs of the dialectical and revolutionary thought of Leninism; and the polemics of the Chinese leaders — despite the whole bureaucratic strait-jacket — confirms this in its own way. It may be believed, in any case, that these polemics, which will continue, will have very important repercussions in the workers' movement, where they will in particular stimulate more and more critical attitudes on the part of Communist militants and cadres. It is the task of revolutionary Marxists to aid and promote this process by their intervention, more active than ever, in their respective sectors of work.

TURNING-POINT IN THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

The Cuban revolution has reached a crucial point in its development. As a result of the advances already achieved, it has gone considerably beyond bourgeois-democratic limits by adopting measures that affect the capitalist regime itself.

By basing itself on a peasant mobilization begun before the fall of Batista, it is not only carrying out an agrarian reform, but also organizing production on the basis of peasant co-operatives. In this direction it has gone farther

than the Guatemalan and Bolivian revolutions, which limited themselves to the distribution of the land, thus halting the reform midway.

Furthermore, by employing as cadres the officers and soldiers of the revolutionary army, the Cuban revolution is developing a policy of struggle against illiteracy, of construction of dwelling-houses, and of raising the living level of the people.

Against the pressure of capitalist encirclement and interior counter-revolution, Castro has taken

measures such as the expropriation (with large long-term indemnizations) of big U S farm properties, the expropriation of American-owned hotels, the confiscation of newspapers financed by the Batista government, a beginning of monopoly of foreign trade (by an orientation of imports toward the articles most necessary for the development of the country at this stage), etc.

The trade unions, on their side, have stepped up their political role — as appears from the resolutions of the CTC (national trade-union federation) — organized their militia of peasants, workers, and students (despite Castro's initial hostility toward such an extension of arming the people), and have asserted the principles of workers' control, as has been the case with the newspaper printers' and reporters' unions.

Granted, all this development that goes past bourgeois limits has been carried out by a petty-bourgeois leadership — with a structure and ideology that are bourgeois rather than socialist — such as the leadership of Fidel Castro himself.

At this moment the revolution has reached a stage where, the agrarian reform having been largely carried out, the peasants cease to play a vanguard role, and this role is transferred to the cities, to the proletariat. The peasant, now master of his own land, is going to begin to consider the revolution from the point of view of the market, from the point of view of what the city can give him in exchange for his products. On this factor the extent of his support will more and more depend.

Hence the problem of the country's industrialization is taking first place. In this industrialization, and in the measures and methods adopted to give it impetus in a backward country, the tasks of the proletariat are in their turn moving into the foreground.

The Cuban revolution must tackle a programme of nationalization of the main industries, nationalization of the banks, under workers' control and even workers' administration, of planning of industrial development on the basis of state monopoly of foreign trade, and of a balanced correlation between the prices for industrial products and the prices for farm products.

The achievement of such a programme is impossible without an extraordinary expansion of the participation of the masses in the administration of society, of the economy, of the enterprises, and of plans for development.

In this field the Fidel Castro leadership is advancing in an empirical way. It is taking steps forward under the pressure of the masses, but it remains prisoner to its own conception of "humanist capitalism." There is a permanent

contradiction between its underlying paternalism concerning the participation of the masses, and the impact made on it from below by those same masses who would like to control and even run the economy. At this level, when the centre of the tasks of the revolution is shifting from the countryside to the cities, it is evident that the revolutionary army cannot be the only source of cadres for the revolution, the only "party" that organizes the masses.

Hence an acute need is arising for a workers' leadership, for proletarian cadres endowed with a proletarian and revolutionary ideology, for organs of a soviet type, in order to set and accomplish the tasks of the revolution. In the 26 July Movement there is an entire tendency which is heading in this direction, which is demanding a conscious combination of socialist measures with the bourgeois-democratic measures in order to make the revolution go forward.

This combination has been begun, but in an elementary, empirical, non-conscious form, determined by the permanent character of the Cuban revolution, which began as a campaign for administrative moralization carried out by an idealist petty-bourgeois grouping but which spread out into a revolutionary transformation of the country's entire life.

Imperialism has understood the permanent development of the revolution; it is this that basically explains the extreme violence of its attacks. While there are still imperialist commentators who compare Castro with Nasser and call for an attitude aimed at neutralizing him, the conscious leadership of imperialism has understood that the development of the Cuban revolution is escaping from any possible control by its present leadership, that its repercussions throughout Latin America are immense and revolutionary, that the examples of the farm coöperatives, armed militia, etc. are spreading, and are undermining the whole foundations of imperialism in Latin America. Imperialism understands empirically that in Cuba it is a question of permanent revolution that cannot stop at a given stage, and in consequence imperialism's policy is to crush it rather than to negotiate with its present leadership.

It is precisely on the international plane that the advances of the Cuban revolution have been so far the most spectacular, and the blows to imperialist prestige and domination the heaviest.

Cuba has proved that it is possible to resist imperialism "right in the monster's jaws," as a French journalist phrased it. It has countered the imperialist attacks blow for blow. It sprang to break economic encirclement and strangling

of foreign trade (in addition to the withdrawal of the aid extended to Batista), by setting up diplomatic and trade relations with the workers' states and the semi-colonial countries of Asia.

To the U S boycott of Cuban sugar (on whose sale the island's economy now depends), it answered by accepting a credit of \$100 million from the Soviet Union and by signing with it an agreement for the annual sale of a million tons of sugar for the next five years (20% paid in dollars and 80% in goods, including Soviet oil). It signed an agreement with Japan, selling 450,000 tons of sugar as against the purchase of Japanese goods for \$18 million. It is now making deals with the United Arab Republic, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, India, Poland, and Indonesia. It is sending delegates to the workers' states; People's China is opening a press agency in Cuba. And all this right under the nose of Yankee imperialism! This is an example that is making an immense impression on all the peoples of Latin America. It is certain that, if imperialism has not engaged in military intervention in Cuba, it is because it knows that this would cause a revolutionary storm of incalculable consequences in all Latin America.

Cuba is receiving this popular support in spite of the open hostility of all the Latin American bourgeois governments, even if one of them, such as Venezuela, is obliged to moderate its criticisms so as not to collide with its own masses. During the latest trip of a Cuban delegation in Latin America, Cuban President Dorticós was able to verify the warm popular reception in all countries, and the cold and hostile official reception by the governments of Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.

All the Latin American bourgeoisies join with imperialism in a common fear about the revolutionary repercussions of the Cuban revolution in their own countries. A very sharp line of division, which is more and more coinciding with the anti-imperialist and class line, divides all Latin America on the question of support to Cuba. The cry of the Latin American masses — "In the Cuban way!" — is terrifying the bourgeoisies there and their allies.

International developments are emphasizing the urgency of the workers' tasks in the Cuban revolution. The coming diplomatic recognition of China, the invitation to Khrushchev and to Chou En-Lai to visit Cuba, mark — on the plane of international policy — the objective shift of the revolution toward proletarian tasks. For it is undeniable that all these attitudes have a much deeper meaning right in Latin America — not many miles away from the United States, and with a consciousness of very grave repercussions on the very foundations of Yankee imperialism — than in Asia or the Middle East.

In the 26 July Movement, in the trade unions, there is a left tendency that is heading towards an understanding of the turning-point that the revolution is reaching. This tendency is posing itself the task of building, on revolutionary Marxist bases, a leadership that will apply in a conscious way a workers' programme for the purpose of overcoming the revolution's national and international contradictions, and ensuring a Latin American extension of the Cuban revolution: an organizational and militant alliance with the whole workers' and anti-imperialist movement of Latin America and the prospect of the Socialist United States of Latin America.

The action of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Cuban Section of the Fourth International, has as its aim to aid the development of this tendency, to speed up the building of a workers' leadership for the revolution, and to orient, by means of a workers' programme, the course of the revolution and the formation of the leading cadres of the next stage. At the same time it supports all progressive measures taken by the Cuban government and backs up anti-imperialist resistance and measures.

International support for the Cuban revolution at this moment must be an active support for its anti-imperialist struggle and for its anti-capitalist measures, for the strengthening of its ties with the workers' states and with the international workers' movement, on which the fate of the revolution is going more and more to depend.

NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ALGERIA

It was on the first of November 1954 that the armed struggle of the Algerian people, the Algerian revolution, began. At that time France had a government led by Mendès-France, with — as Minister of the Interior (responsible for Algeria, French departments) — Mitterand. These two champions then made statements that

the ultras have several times since picked up: "France is Algeria" and "The only negotiation is war." It was Mendès-France who named Soustelle governor-general of Algeria.

What a long road has been traveled in the six years of this struggle begun in the name of an entire people by a phalanx of two to three thou-

sand men, fed up with the rivalries within a powerless leadership!

French imperialism has since 1956 mobilized more than half a million men to hold a country of nine million inhabitants: history has never known a colonial expedition of this scope. About a million and a half Algerians have been "regrouped" in camps, under scandalous conditions, so that they may not aid the fellaghas. Military works like the Morice Line have been constructed at great cost to render Algeria a country sealed off from its neighbors. The most cruel means, the most monstrous tortures and brutalities, have become everyday matters during this "pacification." In France itself, some 400,000 Algerians, indispensable to the economy as manpower, have been subjected to a regime of unconstitutionality and to violences raised to the level of a system.

Compared to the means at the disposal of French imperialism, the Algerian revolution has received only very slight aid from the Arab countries. Aid from the workers' states? From the U S S R, nothing. From China, very little, whatever the world press may say. As for the French workers' movement, it is well known that its leaderships did everything to break up the natural outburst of the masses against the war: it was the Guy Mollet government, with the vote of special powers, in which the Communist deputies participated, that sent the draftees to Algeria and set up a regime of terror against the Algerians in Algeria and in France; it was those leaders who abandoned the demonstrations of the called-up soldiers in April-May 1956; it was also those leaders who supported Pflimlin in May 1958, when the latter, exploiting the threat of a coup de force in Algeria, ensured de Gaulle's arrival in power.

How does it happen that it has been possible to begin negotiations? The Algerians have engaged in nothing resembling a capitulation. It is de Gaulle who, after various declarations in varying and often equivocal terms, ended up by uttering, on 14 June 1960, words that enabled the G P R A, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, to undertake formal engagements on a level of equality. The reactionaries in France are not mistaken: they know that French imperialism has retreated and they would like to call a halt to a process at the end of which they foresee defeat for imperialism.

What decided de Gaulle to half-open the door to negotiations was, on the one hand, a reënförment of the Algerian positions on the international plane, especially the fact that 1960 has proved to be Africa's year by the achievement of independence by many African countries, and

that the United States has given a discreet signal through the recognition of the G P R A by the government of Liberia; and, on the other hand — since the failure of the January 1960 fascist Putsch in Algiers and a declaration by de Gaulle that the war would go on for years longer — a reänimation of the masses in France itself, a growing interest in the Algerian question, and, above all, increasing demonstrations among university youth against this war, going as far as refusal of military service and aid to the F L N. In order not to be outstripped by events, de Gaulle uttered a few words which the G P R A seized on to send a preliminary delegation to France.

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The distance between the two sides in the negotiation is very great. There can be no doubt that — if the Algerian people have the possibility of expressing themselves freely, without pressure from the French administration or the French army, if the men of the F L N can freely advocate their positions in Algeria — the result would be an overwhelming majority in favor of an independent Algerian republic. De Gaulle, defender of the interests of French capitalism, while talking about an "Algerian Algeria," is not ready to accept an Algerian republic, even if it were for a time to remain within the "Communauté." The real problem is not that of the Europeans in Algeria, a problem that has been blown up disproportionately and kept alive artificially, in order to hinder the independence of Algeria. The problem is, on the one hand, the effect on the French army of having to evacuate Algeria after a succession of defeats over twenty years; that would undermine it without its being able to find its reason for existence in the "striking force" that de Gaulle has been dangling in front of it. The problem is, on the other hand, the absence of guarantees for the maintenance of capitalism in a country where six years of revolution and the lack of a real native bourgeoisie make national independence almost coincide with the most daring social liberation. Algeria threatens to go far beyond Cuba and Guinea, and to give an irresistible stimulus to the socialist revolution throughout the whole Maghreb.

With the very first contacts, the considerable distance separating the power in France from the G P R A became visible. There is hardly need to stress the absolutely unheard-of attitude of de Gaulle (for only imbeciles can still try to see a real opposition between Debré and de Gaulle, where there is only a division of labor). The G P R A delegates would have to accept the conditions accorded the defeated and rely on the good will and generosity of his high-and-mightiness! It is obvious that such conditions will

not be accepted and that the French government will have to tone down its pretensions enormously. The word "break" will perhaps not be pronounced by either side, they will perhaps go on facing each other for weeks and even months without budging, but it will finally be necessary for the French government to form a more realistic estimate of the real correlation of forces.

But the Algerian revolution, at the moment when it is beginning to glimpse the first results of its struggle, has greater need than ever of the aid of all the anti-imperialist forces in the world. There is no doubt that the peoples who are coming out from under the colonial yoke will do their duty. The break-up of the summit conference is also, to a certain extent, favorable to a more substantial aid from the workers' states. But what is most important, what can play the decisive role in the events that will follow, is the hostility of the toiling masses of France toward the war in Algeria. It is likely that de Gaulle is hoping to lull the masses once more by permitting the negotiations to open. His valet Guy Mollet immediately hastened to say that it was necessary to allow de Gaulle quietly to continue the negotiations. But, in the face of these manoeuvres and these ruses, it is permissible to think that the reanimation that has been unanimously noted among the toiling masses in France, and especially the determination expressed

by the university youth that an end be put to the war, far from disappearing, are going to be spurred by the pretensions of French imperialism, and will, after a certain time, give rise to great demonstrations aimed against the war and against the regime.

What give rise to the greatest hopes are various signs testifying to a very profound evolution within the masses. A desire for unity in action is appearing even in Guy Mollet's Socialist Party and in the reformist trade unions of Force Ouvrière, which certain leaders are grudgingly accepting, while Guy Mollet is launching a manoeuvre to distract attention by proposing a cartel of the left without the Communist Party and the Confédération Générale du Travail. Among the youth, a draft-resisting vanguard, going over to the side of the colonial revolution, is drawing its courage from the more and more clearly expressed sympathy of the broadest sectors.

The Algerian revolution is beginning to win the battle; but, after so many years when it was the reaction that held the initiative, it is necessary to profit by the reversal of trends to take rapid and strong action so that Algeria may become independent and that the social aspect of the Algerian revolution may become as complete as possible.

THE REVOLUTIONARY DAYS IN TOKYO

The entire world intensely followed and instinctively grasped the tremendous events in Japan, the demonstrations — ardent and systematically carried on for weeks on end — which had as their culminating points Haggerty's running away in a helicopter and Eisenhower's abandoning his trip to Japan. Everyone saw therein a mighty blow struck at U S imperialism in particular, and more generally at the whole structure the capitalists have erected against the rising revolution throughout the world.

The events in Japan unquestionably had their sources in the atrocious crimes committed against that country's masses who, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had served as guinea-pigs for atomic war. Fifteen years could not wipe out such memories, especially at a moment when it was a question of preparing new holocausts.

The fact that, in spite of everything, the Japanese-American pact was later signed, proves that the imperialists have no intention of giving up their plans, even if they have to introduce changes in them to take into account conditions that are becoming more and more disadvantageous for themselves. It cannot be forgotten that the pact was signed literally in hiding, which shows how limited a value it has in case of war.

The events in Japan, occurring soon after those in South Korea that forced the hangman Syngman Rhee to let go of power, are a direct blow against the whole U S combat

system in the Pacific. The lackeys of South Vietnam, of Thailand, of Laos, and that "great friend" Chiang Kai-Shek, have felt these days the fear of death. It is well to recall also that after having given up going to Japan, Eisenhower got such a reception at Okinawa that he hastened to get out by the back stairs.

But the events in Japan have an importance that goes far beyond the question of relations between the East and West solely from the strategic and military angle. They were preliminary fights in a social situation which in Japan is gravid with revolutionary explosions against the capitalist order. We have not space in an editorial note to develop all the characteristics of the situation in Japan (we refer our readers to news notes on Japan in our issues 2, 3, and 8, and especially to the two-part article, "The Situation and Tasks in Present-Day Japan." by T K, in our issues 6 and 7, Spring and Summer 1959). Here it will suffice to recall that Japan combines both the characteristics of an economically very developed capitalist country and, in certain fields, characteristics bordering on those of other Asiatic countries. This rather contradictory combination basically explains the explosive, tumultuous, and powerful nature of the demonstrations and struggles through which the social contradictions tend to work themselves out. Essentially Japan contains contradictions reminiscent of those of

Czarist Russia at the beginning of the XXth century but raised to a much higher level.

The Japan events were the first steps of the revolution on the march. This revolution cannot be other than proletarian, on account of its leading force and its broadest objectives. The Japanese Communist Party, which was blathering the Stalinist asinities about the democratic revolution — and this in face of a China which, for the Japanese, was a century behind and was taking giant strides thanks to a victorious proletarian revolution — found itself outstripped by events: it began by opposing them and then made a turn when visibly it could not do otherwise if it was to remain in the movement of the masses.

A very important characteristic of the Japanese workers' movement is that its great majority and even its cadres are not controlled by a CP dependent on Moscow or Peking. The main political force therein is the Left Socialist Party, which, in these last years, has experienced an internal political life which is stormy and in which there are great potentialities for a revolutionary Marxist tendency. This party, through its trade-union cadres, leads the SOHYO labor federation, which played an immense part in the June 1960 revolutionary days by mobilizing the workers who formed the active mass therein.

One characteristic that it would be impossible to minimize is the role — glorious, heroic, and in every way deserving of admiration — of the student youth and its great organization, the Zengakuren. Three hundred fifty thousand members strong, it has been led since its last congress by a coalition of "leftist" Communists who have broken away from the CP, and Trotskyists — a coalition that had eliminated the Stalinists from the

leadership. By their example, the Japanese students have struck serious blows against the Stalino-Khrushchevian conception of the march to socialism by peaceful parliamentary paths. It can be easily understood that the temperature that has for months been rising in Japan has considerably contributed to affecting the Chinese, and thus, indirectly, stirring up the divergences between the Chinese and the Soviets.

The Japanese revolution has made a very promising start. But the whole revolutionary process — for both the time it takes and the result it achieves — depends on the existence of a revolutionary Marxist leadership. On this particular point the situation — as we have just pointed out above — is also promising. But it were well to avoid thoughtless optimism. It is known that the Japanese labor and socialist movement has in these last years gone through numerous crises, and it would seem from the latest information in the newspapers that, after these recent events, new differentiations are appearing. However regrettable this aspect of things may be, we must be only half-surprised. The explosive contradictions in Japan make their way even into the labor and socialist movement. A genuine revolutionary Marxist leadership will be one which on both the political and organizational levels will have succeeded in solving them inside its own organization, and which in addition will have acquired mass influence and strength. However difficult this task may be, we have no doubt that, in all the possibilities that June 1960 has revealed in Japan, there are also the worker and intellectual elements who, with the aid of the whole international Marxist vanguard grouped by the Fourth International, will build the revolutionary party that will guide the proletariat and toiling masses of Japan to the conquest of power.

REVIVAL OF ITALIAN WORKERS' MILITANCY

Italy has been recently shaken by a series of pitched battles and a political strike. In Genoa the threat of an openly provocative neo-fascist congress aroused an impressive popular reaction that ended in a violent battle against police mobilized in the fascists' defense. At the Porta San Paolo in Rome, there next occurred a real battle in the streets, in which several thousand determined militants took part. At Reggio Emilia, in the North, the masses fiercely fought back against overt police provocation, and turned out a hundred thousand strong for the funeral of its victims. In Palermo, in Sicily, the workers have repeatedly come out in highly combative demonstrations against their state of destitution. On 8 July the upsurge was topped by a general strike in which the workers of big industry (except FIAT), of municipal services, and, in many cities, of transportation services, took part.

These events are exceptionally important in that this is the first time since 1953 that there has been a political strike of this scope, and the first time since the 1948-51 period that the masses, taking to the streets, have run smack up against government repression.

It should be particularly emphasized that, side-by-side with experienced political and trade-union militants, there came into the arena for the first time large numbers of

youth, of the generation too young to have known either the Resistance or the 1945-53 period. The mobilization of this youth was important not only quantitatively, but also because these young militants — not exclusively workers and often not organized in the mass parties — were the most combative vanguard in these popular struggles. They have a bellyful of so-called "prosperity," and, as always, they turn first to the left. If the left fails to give them clear revolutionary leadership . . .

However justified the immediate motives of the Genoa protest, the real causes of the popular upsurge lie deeper, in profound economic-social factors that the "prosperity" so vaunted by the spokesmen of the ruling classes has nowise eliminated. Despite developments in recent years, social imbalances in Italy, far from diminishing, have increased: most of the proletarian masses have gone on living in hard precarious circumstances, while profits have soared.

The governmental trend had gone rightward, politically and morally, till it ended up in the Tambroni cabinet backed by the neo-fascists. And this occurred within an international situation of increasing crisis for imperialism, resounding successes for the workers' states, and turbulent upsurge for the colonial revolution. Even in a "prosperous" advanced capitalist state like Japan, students

and workers had triumphantly erupted — an example without which perhaps Genoa and all that followed would not have been possible.

These July events in Italy have shown that vast sectors of the workers' movement are again ready to take action when the stakes are worth it and when the capitalist state is visibly heading for authoritarian and semi-fascist forms. It has become more apparent than ever that the pseudo-Marxist supposition that there is a mechanical relationship between economic situations and political trends, such that "prosperity" excludes militancy, is false, and that even in a period of high conjuncture, sudden flash-fires show a tinderlike inflammability suggestive of new prospects for the workers' movement.

The July movements had positive results: an unquestionable success in Genoa; and, in the fall of the Tambroni cabinet, a worker-imposed collapse of a particularly reactionary attempt at government. But the traditional leaderships of the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties once more failed to take advantage of the situation, and precipitately retreated to the parliamentary level.

Since the collapse of the summit conference, whereas the Italian S P has stepped up its trend toward the Social-Democracy, the Italian C P has shown some "leftish" tendencies. During the struggles, some federations and sectors began to take the initiative in favor of carrying the movement forward. But there was a quick retreat to the old positions, a dubious "truce" was quickly accepted, everything was done to limit the mobilization of the workers during the general strike, and further demonstrations in Rome and Milan for more advanced objectives were silently called off.

The whole C P policy fizzled out in parliamentary manoeuvres about a new left-centre government — "justified" of course, by the alleged need to avoid "isolation" and "to broaden alliances."

The effects of the recent popular explosions on the complex Italian parliamentary and governmental situations have clearly analyzed in a fourpage leaflet issued by the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari, Italian Section of the Fourth International, and the folly — even on the parliamentary plane — of the Communist Party policy duly stressed. But, as this leaflet correctly points out.

it is not a question of favoring a certain bourgeois

tendency against another, but of posing a genuine class alternative: the struggle must hit the adversary at every level, wresting from him economic and trade-union concessions, forcing him to abandon the odious forms of repression which have been on the increase for years now, obliging him to restore in the enterprises the democratic rights of the workers, [...] and preventing him from putting military bases for aggression at the disposal of the imperialists.

Such a struggle can have as its general objective only that of an entirely new government, a government based on the workers' parties and their trade unions, from which the representatives of capitalism would be excluded.

The Italian section also launches the timely slogan for the dissolution of the "Celere." The G C R leaflet correctly points out that they are "not a body of normal police to maintain public order — as has been seen once more in these recent days — but a real armed corps organized for class repression against the workers."

The G C R suggest that a new form of mobilization and organization at the present phase may well be the setting up of Resistance Committees in the factories, wards, and villages. While appealing to the unity motives of the Resistance, these committees would in reality have a much more advanced class content than those of the C L N in those days. They should be composed of representatives of the various categories of workers, partisans, youth, and women. In no case, the G C R warn, should they be reduced to organizations run from the top, which would represent nobody and be reduced to Sunday oratory and the ambitions of certain "public figures." It should be a question rather of creating new organizations of struggle which would channel the masses' aspirations toward new class goals. The G C R also warn that haste is essential, without leaving time for the opportunist policy of the traditional workers' leaderships to disperse the fighting potential that has spontaneously burgeoned in these recent days. As its leaflet very correctly says, "The working class has not sacrificed ten of its militants only to bring about an *n*th deal in parliament!"

We hope that the Italian workers, who have just shown that "prosperity" has not dulled their fighting temper, will heed this sound appeal.

THE CONGO CRISIS

When the Belgian Congo attained independence on 30 June 1960, the Belgian bourgeoisie prided itself on an outstanding achievement of transition from direct to indirect rule. Barely three years ago there were in the Congo — notwithstanding a good rate of industrialization and the fact that one third of all adult males were already wage-earners — not a single political party, not a single trade union, and not a single university graduate. With breathtaking speed, fifty years of deliberate stifling of the Congo peoples' democratic rights and intellectual potentialities were undone — in order to prevent a revolution and to safeguard more than £ 1,500 million (\$ 5,750 million) of fixed capital investment. And all signs seemed to point out that this audacious manoeuvre — granting independence as a means of preventing a growing political consciousness

or even a revolutionary outburst of the masses — would be successful.

Nevertheless, scarcely one week after the 30 June rejoicings, it became evident that the experiment had failed. The central government, which had been elected before the transfer of power, did not succeed in immediately imposing its authority on many areas filled with tribal strife. The Belgian-led mercenaries of the Force Publique — the very pride of Belgian imperialism, thought to be the most solid armed force in all Negro Africa — broke down through a series of rebellions, of quite a diversified nature, but powerful enough to break the central government's only hold on the country.

And the most aggressive faction of Belgian capitalism profited from these events to attempt to carve out of the

Congo a new "faithful" empire under its stooge Tchombé, prime minister of the rich Katanga province. Ostensibly Belgian paratroopers were sent to the Congo in order to defend Belgian women against rape and violence; but, as if by accident, most of them were dropped around the rich copper, uranium, and diamond fields of South and South-East Congo.

The most important reason for the failure of "peaceful" transition from direct to indirect rule was the absence of a nationally united party or at least a united national movement in the Congo. In the short time during which the African population had been allowed any legal political activity whatsoever, such a party had not yet emerged. All the existing formations which gained the biggest number of seats in the first general elections were based on one single tribal group, or a coalition of a few tribes. Even Patrice Lumumba's "National Congo Movement" (M N C), the only party to put up candidates in nearly all provinces, won its essential successes on a tribal basis.

This situation led to the formation of a coalition government among nearly a dozen tribal "parties," disunited from the start and nearly powerless to act quickly against the outbreak of tribal strife, some of which clearly was encouraged by Belgian settlers or colonial companies. This strife spread to the Force Publique and was one of the main causes of the mutiny. It should be noted that, contrary to what was stated in the imperialist press, the mutiny was directed at the start against the Lumumba government, and that it became the decisive factor in the breakdown of the unity of the country — the biggest blow yet against the unfolding African revolution.

One should of course not draw the hasty conclusion that the revolt of the Force Publique was a purely reactionary affair. It was a very mixed kettle of fish. In some places it was openly tribal and anti-national; in some other places, it was purely economic and had been triggered off by the demand for more pay and shorter working hours. In still other places — especially at Thysville, where it first broke out — it had a clearly revolutionary trend, putting forward the demand for removal of all Belgian officers and for the election of the officers by the soldiers.

But nowhere did it become integrated in a broader mass movement merged with the toiling people. The reason for this is again typical: everywhere the locally stationed Force Publique was formed of different tribes from the local

population, and no national party was able to overcome this gap.

A powerful wave of strikes had at the same time spread over the country, the workers demanding big wage increases, and asking for "independence for themselves and not only for the parliamentarians" (who had served themselves exceedingly well, granting one another annual pay of \$ 13,300 or £ 3,500!). But except for one small incident, nowhere did the strikers and revolting soldiers join ranks; on the contrary, there were many clashes between them. Permanent revolution was present only in an embryonic state; it never was born.

While the Brussels government wavered under the conflicting pressure of the aggressive right-wing tendencies of the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and of the working-class organizations on the other, the military and the "strong men" of some colonial companies started out on their Katanga adventure. As a result of the general breakdown of administration, they hoped, not only would the cause of freedom and independence become discredited in the whole of Negro Africa, but it also would be possible to "save" the richest part of the Congo itself. Around the Quisling prime minister of Katanga, Tchombé, some other provinces of the country were to be grouped, and to be opposed to the "communist-led" government of Patrice Lumumba.

This project is born out of a completely wrong estimate of the relationship of forces, in the Congo as well as in Belgium and in the rest of the world. It could very rapidly involve Belgium in a full-scale colonial war which would become the very motor of political consciousness and revolutionary mobilization of the Congo people which Belgian capitalism had wanted by all means to suppress. It would run up against overwhelming opposition from nearly all great powers, capitalist and workers' states alike. It would arouse the violent opposition of the Belgian working class, which, after a first moment of disorientation, stood up surprisingly well under chauvinistic pressure.

Under these circumstances, the most probable variant will be a gradual retreat of Belgian imperialism from these "extremist" schemes, and a slow process of reunification of the Congo, under military occupation by the United Nations, which will shield it from both Belgian intervention and the first rumblings of revolution.

LEFTWARD TREND IN BRITISH LABOR MOVEMENT

After the last elections, the revisionist extreme-right of the British Labour Party — Messrs Crosland, Jay, & C^o — opened up a full-scale offensive against the party's programme and traditions. This programme is far from being Marxist: it is a mixture of syndicalist and Social-Democratic doctrine, with a clearly visible Fabian label; its authors were people like the Webbs, G D H Cole, et al. But it includes, in its famous Clause 4, a profession of socialist faith in favor of the collective appropriation of all the means of production, distribution, and exchange. It was that profession of faith that it was aimed to eliminate, so as to "modernize" the Labour Party, i.e., to transform it into a sort of left liberal-conservative party.

The extreme-right's offensive was ill-received, not only by the mass of members of the Labour Party, but even by a good part of the trade-union bureaucracy who remained attached to the tradition of the movement and sensi-

tive to the feelings of the workers. Gaitskell made the mistake of identifying himself with the revisionists. He was on the point of being put in a minority at the Labour Party Conference that was to analyze the causes of the electoral defeat. The centrist formula of Bevan, according to whom it was necessary to nationalize "the dominant positions of the economy," rallied most of those who were hesitating.

Finally the Party Executive worked out a compromise. Clause 4 would be kept as it was. But this "Old Testament" would be completed by a "New Testament" which would state that, though it was necessary to nationalize the famous "dominant positions," a socialist economy ought at the same time to keep a broad private sector controlled by the state. This compromise was vigorously backed by Bevan and his closest friends. Nevertheless, as the months went by, it turned out that the rank and

file both of the constituency parties and of the trade unions were farther left than the left wing of the Executive, and rejected the compromise. One after another, the trade-union conferences took their stand in favor of just plain keeping Clause 4 without any amendment or complement of any sort. (For details of this whole foregoing process, see the "News" section, p 73.) Finally, in the beginning of July, the Executive recognized its defeat. It decided to withdraw the complement to the party Constitution from the agenda of the next Labor Party Conference, while reserving the right to present it at a later conference.

Paralleling this debate, a discussion was going on about the party's military policy. It will be recalled that in 1958 Bevan prevented the Labour Party Conference from taking a stand in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament by Great Britain by stating that he did not want "to appear naked at the summit conference." Since then, supporters of unilateral disarmament have been considerably reinforced. First there was the amazing success of the March from Aldermaston to London, organized by the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (there were 100,000 demonstrators at Trafalgar Square on Easter 1960 in the greatest political demonstration that London had witnessed in a century). Then came the failure of the "Blue Streak," the nuclear-headed missile manufactured in Great Britain. The Macmillan government had to admit that the country had been incapable of ensuring its own nuclear-missile armament and had to borrow its weapons of mass destruction from U S imperialism.

As a result, those favoring unilateral nuclear disarmament opened up a powerful offensive inside the Labour Party. They received the support of several big unions, especially the Transport and General Workers Union (T & G W U), the metal trades union (Amalgamated Engineering Union), the miners' union, and the National Union of Railwaymen (N U R). Seeing that the left was about to carry the day on this field as well, Gaitskell retreated to a compromise position. This stated that Great Britain must itself stop making nuclear weapons, and that it must no longer tolerate launching ramps for nuclear missiles within its territory. At the same time, this motion comes out in favor of the Atlantic alliance. In fact the Labour Party right is taking refuge "under the U S nuclear umbrella"; it is adopting the "centrist" position that Gaitskell so vigorously condemned as "hypocritical" a few months ago.

This compromise is unlikely to be adopted. Though it has the backing of the miners' union, the metal-workers by a small majority came out for unilateral disarmament, and the T & G W U, led by Frank Cousins, is leading the fight of the unilateralists.

Gaitskell's position as party leader is thus badly shaken, even if his compromise on military policy squeezes through. If it is rejected like his amendment of Clause 4, it is hard to see how he could retain his post. In reality, the question of who will succeed him is already open. If he succeeds at all in hanging on, it is because it is difficult to find his successor. Bevan, who might have maintained party unity, died just at the moment when his ambitions were about to be realized. Robens, the most serious candidate that the Labour Party apparatus could put forward, preferred to accept a well-paid post as president of the National Coal Board. Brown and Callahan, the other candidates of the right, lack scope and have little influence on the rank and file. As for the left, it has only one candidate: Hugh Wilson, who is far from having the popularity of a Bevan. Cousins, Bevan's real successor at the head of the Labour Party left, refuses any political mandate. He wants to be king-maker rather than king.

The left trend in the labor movement, an impressive historical phenomenon that began about ten years ago and has continued slowly but surely almost without interrup-

tion, thus reveals a crisis in Social-Democratic doctrine and leadership, both left and right. Bevan's death takes on the significance of a symbol. Bevan personified the best qualities of the old Social-Democracy, which, let us not forget, developed as a mass movement in Great Britain 20 to 30 years behind that on the European continent. Rising out of the working class, it never lost contact with it; it thus kept a certain disdain for the morality, usages, and customs of the bourgeois world. It found the words to express the spirit of rebellion and the will to rebuild society on a socialist basis which are latent in the hearts of most British workers. With all the differences of period and of place, Bevan was, as it were, the Bebel and the Jaurès of the British proletariat, the heir of Keir Hardie, contemporary of the great leaders of the pre-1914 Second International, who did not have at his disposal a party of the strength of the present Labour Party.

Bevan was, at the same time, the faithful mirror of all the weaknesses and inadequacies of the old Social-Democracy. He had no doctrine. He was a pure empiricist, who was satisfied to solve problems as they came up. He was not opposed to national defense under the capitalist regime; he protested only against excessively high military budgets. He did not want to break with the Atlantic alliance, but only to obtain a greater independence within that alliance. He did not want to overthrow capitalism in a revolutionary way, but only to speed up the rhythm of socialist-type reforms. His incomprehension of organizational problems made him in practice an individualist, an "outsider," a "trouble-shooter," whom others accepted as a leader but who obstinately refused to build a tendency. Hence Bevanism died with Bevan. What remains is a vast unorganized current, with very broad foundations both in the working class and among young intellectuals, that Frank Cousins will try to lead.

The fundamental weakness of a Gaitskell is his total lack of traditions and of ties with the workers' movement, his inability to foresee and to sense the reaction of thousands of trade-union and Labour Party militants. He could, at a pinch, lead the party if it had fallen into a state of lethargy, where the working class was completely passive. He cannot lead it when political activity is growing in the ranks and they are steadily moving left.

This steady leftward trend, together with Gaitskell's failure and Bevan's death, threaten to overturn the whole political system on which bourgeois order in Great Britain is based. The bourgeoisie has understood this very well. It advises Gaitskell to come out in open conflict with the annual Labour Party Conference, to refuse to be bound by conference decisions. It predicts that the minority of the parliamentary group that is "faithful" to the conference will not get many votes in the country. It is in fact speculating on a deep split in the labor movement, which is the only chance for its own salvation in the long run.

Its calculation, however, seems to be erroneous. The British M P - candidates have to be designated by the trade unions and the constituencies; if M P s refuse to recognize decisions of the annual conferences which are the emanations of the trade unions and the constituencies, they will no longer be chosen as candidates. The great mass of the Labour voters would follow the candidates of the unions and the party, not some individual candidacies. Such a split à la MacDonald might prolong the Tory domination for a few terms of Parliament; but it would create a Labour Party much more radicalized and in the long run more dangerous for British capitalism.

It is the duty of British revolutionary Marxists to penetrate more and more into the left current in the trade unions and the Labour Party, and to offer this current a programme of transitional demands capable of unifying it and leading it to victory against both the Tories and the Labour Party right wing.

THIRTY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

about the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"

By ERNEST GERMAIN

At the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan stated in passing that the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, published in 1938 by a "commission of the Central Committee" of that party, was neither adequate nor truly Marxist. Other speakers followed in his footsteps, quoting specific examples. The historian Pankratova for her part boldly stated that the *Short Course* contained historical falsifications, and demanded that a scientific new version of the party history be published. In his secret report, Khrushchev made fun of the way in which Stalin had had his own eulogy drafted in this history.

After three years of efforts, the new version of the history of the Soviet CP has just seen the light of day. It is a work of collective authorship, namely: Ponomarov, Volkov, Volin, Zaintsez, Kuckin, Mints, Slepov, Sobolev, Timofeievski, Khovtov, and Chiataghin. Most of these authors are little known, apart from Ponomarov, who is one of the chiefs of the "Agitprop" Section of the Central Committee of the Soviet CP. A first translation of this long work has just appeared in Italy (Editori Riuniti); it comes to no less than 812 pages. It is this translation which we are here subjecting to a critical examination.

The new *History* differs from the former Stalinist *Short Course* in three main aspects, of which two are matters of form and one of substance. It lengthens the analysis of certain phenomena, both objective phenomena and the principal works of Lenin, and goes back in greater detail over the prehistory of the Russian workers' movement. It continues the history of the USSR, which in the *Short Course* ended in 1938, up till the XXIIst Congress, i e, till the beginning of 1959. It modifies (and partly upsets) the judgments made in the Stalinist version about the nature of certain political and economic problems faced by the Soviet state and the CP between 1918 and 1938, suppressing the most monstrous of the Stalinist falsifications. The biggest "turn" concerns the Moscow Trials, to which the 1938 *Short Course* had devoted an entire sub-chapter. The new version does not rehabilitate the Old Bolsheviks, leaders of the party, members of Lenin's Central Committee,

creators of the Soviet state, who during these trials were falsely and ignominiously accused of the worst crimes. Nor does it state that these trials were infamous staged productions. It simply passes in silence over this whole significant episode of what "official" opinion in the U R S S today calls "the personality cult." The Moscow Trials thus become — to use George Orwell's terminology — a "un-fact."

This phenomenon reflects a tragic paradox: setting out to erase a historical falsification, the above-mentioned collective authors have finally replaced it by a new falsification. Granted, this new one is less monstrous than the old one. It remains, nonetheless, a falsification. It is typical of this work as a whole, in which abusive interpretations, lies by omission, if not pure and simple falsifications, can still be counted by the hundreds — even though one timid step has been taken in the direction of truth.

But in taking this timid step while still keeping many forgeries or manufacturing new ones, the authors have got entangled in inextricable contradictions.

The Stalinist version of the history of the Bolshevik Party was coherent. History was frankly Manichæan. On the one side were the "good" people, essentially Stalin and his "faithful companions" (with, in a back seat, Lenin). On the other side were the "bad" people, traitors and spies, who had sold out to the capitalist powers and wanted to restore capitalism from 1918 on: all those who had been opposed to Stalin at any moment during his rise toward power.

To cram history into this simplistic diagramme, it was of course necessary to carve up facts as if they were some sort of plastic. Dates, persons, and events were all pitilessly transformed — not to speak of ideas. This "history" resembles real history the way a nightmare resembles reality itself. Its actors borrow from reality the pallid features of the living and the external forms of things; and there evident connections between truth and mythology end. Nevertheless, apart from a few gross contradictions,¹ this *Short*

¹ The *Short Course* asserts on the one hand that the "Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Bukharinists," et al were transformed from an ideological current into a "counter-revolutionary band" beginning in 1932; it asserts on the other hand that they were foreign spies as early as 1918.

Course cannot be denied the virtue of internal consistency.

The new *History* has kept most of its vices. But at the same time it has lost this sole virtue. Manichæism has disappeared; it was, however, the labyrinthine thread through this demonological interpretation of history, peculiar to Stalin and Stalinism. It has not been replaced by any other thread through the labyrinth. Hence the new version appears as an omnium-gatherum of contradictions.

It is no longer Stalin who is the hero of the history of the U S S R; it is the "Leninist Central Committee." But the authors carefully refrain from naming the members of this Central Committee, either in 1917, in 1920, in 1923, or even in 1927. And with good reason! Most of them died, murdered by the Stalinist terror.

The various oppositionals are no longer spies, paid agents of imperialism. They become "opportunists," "revisionists," "implacable adversaries of Leninism." As a result, they appear as representatives of *ideological currents*. But the authors carefully refrain from specifying what their ideas were, from quoting their works, their platforms, their articles. And with good reason! The correctness of these ideas, in the light of the revelations of Khrushchev's secret report to the XXth Congress, would be dazzlingly evident to all Soviet citizens.

The worst excesses of the Stalinist period are no longer passed over in silence, concerning either the "violation of Soviet legality," or the catastrophic errors in economic policy (especially the evident failure of agrarian policy). But these events — which upset the fate of millions of human beings, which cost the Soviet people completely avoidable inhuman sacrifices, and which brought about the disappearance of this whole famous "Leninist Central Committee" which was claimed to be the real creator of the Soviet state — these events were explained by just a reference to "the personality cult," and even partially excused! Here are strange Marxists indeed, who interpret one of the most poignant dramas of the history of our epoch without any reference to the class struggle, to the struggles among social groups, to economic and social problems, but exclusively by an appeal to psychopathology.

And so it is not necessary to be a prophet to predict that, though the former *Short Course* was considered as the "bible" of the Communist Parties for only 15 years (1938-1953), it will certainly not take as many years for the new *History* to join this *Short Course* on the heap of works improvised for an occasion and now forgotten and contemned, if not just chucked straight into the old-paper

baler. Other "histories" will appear, each taking the same path to oblivion, until there appears a history without falsifications or forgeries, whatever may be the political judgment of its authors concerning the various events reported on.

This evolution is all the more ineluctable in that, little by little, the veil of silence is beginning to be lifted in the U S S R about the first phases of the history of the Soviet Republic. The minutes of the 1917 meetings of the Central Committee have been republished; those of 1918 are in course of publication. The celebrated work of John Reed, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, the memoirs of Antonov-Ovseyenko, and eyewitness reports of the October Revolution have finally been reprinted. Lenin's testament, the letters and notes scandalously suppressed in the first editions of his *Complete Works* by Stalin,² have seen the light of day. Under these conditions, it is enough for young historians, young economists, and just simply young communists, in the U S S R and elsewhere, to compare these originals with the current version of the *History*, to catch its authors immediately in flagrante delicto of deformation. And they will not fail to do so, from the moment that the police have lost their power to prevent them or to punish by deportation this crime of lèse-bureaucratie.

The reconstitution of historical truth is, in the U S S R, a necessary and inevitable corollary of the abolition of the bureaucratic regime. Necessary, because the renaissance of Marxist thought cannot take place in a vacuum and must take as its point of departure the best that has been acquired in the past (which does not at all mean that it identifies itself therewith). Inevitable, because, in the struggle for genuine soviet democracy, the young generation of communists will begin by condemning the violations of this democracy committed in regard to all communist, soviet, tendencies during the Stalinist period.

And so the hybrid character of *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* — halfway between Stalinist falsifications and historical truth — is after all only the reflection of the Soviet reality of today, where the pressure of the masses and of objective conditions has obliged the bureaucracy to abolish the most

² In the introduction to Volume XXXVI of Lenin's *Complete Works*, it is written:

By decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism is publishing five volumes (36 to 40) as an addition to the fourth edition of Lenin's *Works*. Volume 36 includes works which formed part of the third edition, but which were not included in the fourth, as well as texts of Lenin published subsequent to [!] the fourth edition of his [complete!] works. [Our italics.]

monstrous aspects of the Stalinist dictatorship, but where at the same time the fundamental characteristics of bureaucratic degeneration continue to exist.

One of the most typical aspects of Stalinist ideology was to bring into question the nature and utility of objective science — at least concerning the social sciences. History, it was claimed, must be an instrument of the class struggle. And it, in order to preserve the Soviet state, ensure the future of mankind, defend the interests of millions of proletarians, it was necessary to falsify a few “minor” historical facts, only “petty-bourgeois objectivists” could get up in arms about it. Even today this theory is not entirely abandoned in Stalinist cadre circles.

In reality, Marxists affirm specifically that *historical truth* is a weapon in the class struggle — at least in the hands of progressive classes or social formations. It is conservative or reactionary historical formations, having privileges to defend or vices to hide, who must conceal or deform truth.

Granted, in the class struggle, the proletariat or its party cannot guarantee under all circumstances to tell the truth to *the enemy*. No commander will reveal the exact state of his forces or his projects to the adversary on the eve of a battle; no serious trade-union leader will, at the beginning of a strike, reveal to the bosses his intentions, his strategy, or the state of his strike relief funds. But here it is a question of neither science nor history. To deform history *toward one's own class or one's own party* is to botch a theoretical tool indispensable for present and future combats and victories. To lie to one's own class is to lower its level of consciousness. Lenin expressed himself with all the clarity that could be desired on this point when he stated, in *Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder*, that it is necessary to know how to apply every tactic “in such a way as to *raise*, not lower, the general level of consciousness of the proletariat, its revolutionary spirit, its capacity to fight and to win.”

Now when anyone falsifies history, when he lies to his own class, when he puts it in a position to discover these lies sooner or later, he can only sow demoralization, skepticism, and cynicism toward the party and Marxism in general. If the Marxist method is transformed from an instrument for the critical analysis of objective reality into an instrument for servile apologetics for this or that subjective “tactic” of a “genial chief,” victim of the “cult of his own personality,” if, instead of analyzing reality, anyone makes a gross travesty of it, he becomes incapable of working up a correct strategy and tactic, which have to

take reality as their starting point. He also undermines the confidence of the toilers in their own forces and in those of their party.

Were it only for this reason, the rectification of a few of the most striking historical falsifications contained in the new *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, which we are undertaking in the following pages, is highly useful and necessary. Some will say that all that is already “old hat” and “outlived.” But whoever is ignorant of the history of his own movement and his own class is not armed to correct old or new errors. He will be incapable of solving the tasks posed to him by the coming battles.

The rectification of the forgeries and lies by omission contained in the new *History* not only helps a cause which is particularly close to our hearts: the full and complete rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky, of the Left Opposition of the U S S R, of all the Old Bolsheviks. It also provides extremely important political teachings for revolutionaries in the backward countries, the militants of the colonial revolution, who find themselves faced with strategic and tactical problems comparable to those which confronted the Bolsheviks before and after 1917. Study of the *real* history of the C P of the Soviet Union would help them immensely in solving these problems. Whereas, just like the *Short Course* of 1938, the new *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* is an obstacle to be cleared on the road to such a study.³

I. DEVELOPMENT AND TEACHINGS OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Question 1: All through this *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the “Leninist Central Committee” is presented as the genuine inspirer, organizer, and guarantor of the victory of the great October Revolution. But the composition of this Leninist Central Committee is carefully concealed from the reader. Who were the members of this Central Committee before, during, and after the victory of October, and what was their later fate?

³ At the XXth Congress of the C P of the Soviet Union, Pankratova declared:

If historical reality is presented in a way that is not in conformance with truth, the efforts of our cadres and our friends abroad to apply correctly the valuable experiences of the struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union may be hindered. Unfortunately, we are not carrying on a resolute struggle against deviation from the way in which Lenin judged historical events, against all anti-historical and oversimplifying elements, against a subjectivist attitude toward history, against the modernization [!] of history and a conception of history adapted [!] to each given and purely conjunctural [!] situation.

Answer: In August 1917, 21 Bolsheviks were elected members of the Central Committee. Out of these 21, seven died natural deaths: Sverdlov, Lenin, Djerjinsky, Nogin, Artem, Kolontai, and Stalin. Two were murdered by the counter-revolution: Uritzki and Chaumian. Eleven fell victims to the Stalinist terror — one was assassinated abroad by an agent of the G.P.U.: Trotsky; and ten died in Stalinist jails: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Miliutin, Krestinsky, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, Smilga, Berzin; the twenty-first, Muranov, disappeared without trace, and was probably also liquidated in 1938.

Between 1918 and 1921, 31 Bolsheviks were members of the Central Committee. Out of these 31, nine died natural deaths: Lenin, Djerjinsky, Uritzky, Sverdlov, Artem, Nogin, Stutchka, Stalin, Kalinin. One was driven to suicide: Tomsy. Eighteen were assassinated under the Stalinist terror: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yevdokimov, Smirnov, Trotsky, Radek, Serebriakov, Sokolnikov, Rykov, Bukharin, Rakovsky, Bielogorodov, Smilga, Krestinsky, Rudzutak, Bubnov, Miliutin, and Preobrazhensky. One was victimized by the Stalinist terror, but survived: Stassova. One disappeared without trace: Muranov. One is still alive and still a member of the Central Committee: Andreyev.

In October 1917, for the first time, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee was elected. It was composed of seven members: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Bubnov, and Stalin. Two of these seven members died natural deaths; the other five were killed by the Stalinist terror. Up till 1923, the following served on the Political Bureau: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Stalin, Preobrazhensky, Serebriakov, Tomsy, and Rykov. Out of these ten persons, eight were victims of the Stalinist terror.

The conclusion is clear: the great majority of the members of the "Leninist Central Committee" were killed under the reign of Stalin. In the old version of the history of the party history (the *Short Course* of 1938), it is explained that these revolutionaries were, underneath, really counter-revolutionaries, agents of imperialism, spies, and even fascists and "Hitlerites." Inevitably Lenin's merits were diminished thereby: what indeed is one to think of a revolutionary leader who surrounds himself with a majority of counter-revolutionaries as his most faithful collaborators?

Today, Lenin was been "rehabilitated": "his" Central Committee is praised to the skies. But how is one not to conclude that the extermination of the majority of the members of this Central Committee could not be either a

"regrettable accident" or a simple caprice by a psychopath ("the personality cult"), but provides the most tangible proof of a colossal political transformation that took place in the U.S.S.R. between the period of Lenin and the triumph of Stalin? How is one not to conclude that there was a counter-revolution, and, more exactly, a *political* counter-revolution, as we shall specify further on?

Question 2: Does The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union speak of the role played by the members of this "Leninist Central Committee" in the history of the Russian workers' movement prior to 1917?

Answer: It does, but exclusively to speak ill of them! When the "eminent collaborators of Lenin," the "organizers of the party," are being quoted, they are scarcely mentioned. Their names are quoted only when it is a matter of uttering spiteful criticisms of them. There is something quite illogical here. We lack the space to examine all these criticisms. But even if they were true, there would still be a lie by omission. How is it to be supposed indeed that Lenin would have proposed all through the revolution and the first years of Soviet power a Central Committee whose members had to their credit nothing but errors?

Sometimes these lies by omission reach the extreme of the grotesque. Thus the book "forgets" to mention (vol I, p 193) that Kamenev was sent to Russia by the Central Committee in 1914 to lead the Duma fraction and *Pravda*. It "forgets" to mention that Zinoviev was elected president of the Communist International at its Founding Congress, and was to occupy that post until 1926. It "forgets" to mention even the composition of the Bolshevik delegation to that congress, and with good reason: it was composed of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin, and Chicherin. It "forgets" to point out that the Soviet members of the Communist International were: Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek. It "forgets" to indicate that it was Trotsky who spoke in the name of the Bolshevik fraction at the Preparliament, in order to announce that this fraction was going to leave that assembly (vol I, pp 253-4). It "forgets" to mention that Trotsky was the first Bolshevik president of the Petrograd soviet and that as such he also presided over that soviet's Revolutionary Military Committee, entrusted with preparing the insurrection. It "forgets" to give the composition of the first revolutionary government (the Council of People's Commissars, presided over by Lenin, elected at the Second Pan-Russian Soviet Congress) (vol I, p 260).

This can, however, be found in John Reed's book, currently on sale in the U S S R: Lenin, Miliutin, Shliapnikov, Antonov-Ovseyenko, Krylenko, Dybenko, Nogin, Lunacharsky, Stepanov, Trotsky, Lomov, Teodorovich, Avilov, Stalin.

Question 3: What were the tasks of the Russian Revolution of 1917?

Answer: The Russian Revolution overthrew the power of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and opened the road to the expropriation of the capitalists and the nationalization of the means of production. At the same time, it solved the principal tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which the bourgeoisie had turned out to be incapable of solving: the question of radical agrarian reform, the question of the nationalities, the question of the unification of the country, etc.

On this subject, however, *the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, sows extreme confusion. This confusion arises from the fact that the authors of the work do not always want to admit the evidence, namely, that Lenin (and after him the majority of the Bolshevik Party) modified Bolshevik strategy in April 1917, and that he adopted, in its essentials, the theory of the permanent revolution.

At the time of the Russian revolution of 1905, three positions faced one another in the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party:

a) the position of the Mensheviks, which, taking as its starting point the observation of the fact that Russia had not yet gone through a victorious bourgeois revolution, claimed that the revolution had essentially for its goal the overthrow of Czarism and the elimination of semi-feudal vestiges from the Russian economy and society. The proletariat was to give critical support to the liberal bourgeoisie, in order to force it to carry out this revolution in the most radical way, while at the same time fighting for its own immediate demands (right to strike, universal suffrage, eight-hour day, etc).

b) The position of the Bolsheviks, who took as their starting point the observation that the bourgeoisie in the contemporary period, faced by a highly concentrated and conscious industrial proletariat, organized in Marxist parties, was unable to carry out the classic tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, for fear of the revolutionary action of the masses. At the same time, Lenin observed that, in view of the limited number of the proletariat in society, and of the weakness of the capitalist substructure in the country, the party of the proletariat could

not hope alone to conquer power. If the revolution were pushed to the end, it would end up in a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," within which the workers' party could participate in a coalition government together with a peasant party. This victorious revolution would be only a radical bourgeois-democratic revolution, and would not immediately take the form of a socialist revolution.

c) The position of Trotsky: like the Mensheviks and Lenin, Trotsky understood that the key question was the agrarian question. But whereas the Mensheviks believed that the liberal bourgeoisie could carry out a radical agrarian reform, and Lenin believed that this reform could be the labor of a coalition government between a workers' party and a peasant party, Trotsky stated that only the proletariat is capable of giving the land to the peasants in a radical way. He specified, in effect, that history had shown that the peasantry was unable to form great national "really peasant" parties, and that it always followed the lead of either a bourgeois or workers' party.

The History of the October Revolution proved Trotsky right, since it was only at the moment when the Bolshevik government was formed, that the decree on the distribution of land to the peasants was voted.

In order to make the victory of October possible, Lenin changed the orientation of the party at the April 1917 Conference, modified the party programme which called for setting up only a democratic republic, and had written in it the goal of setting up immediately the dictatorship of the proletariat, a soviet state.

All that is very clear today. But *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* tries to wriggle out of it in various ways. It tries to deny that there was a change in the Bolshevik Party's strategy in April 1917. To do so, it indicates that the aim of the April Theses drafted by Lenin and the decision of the Bolshevik Party's April Conference was "the struggle for the passage from the bourgeois-democratic revolution over to the socialist revolution [vol I, p 225]." We shall return later to what is erroneous in this formula. But we may already observe that it is in opposition to the "strategic goal" of the Bolsheviks in 1905, as the *History* itself defines it, since it correctly states (vol I, p 92) that the "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants" foreseen by Lenin in 1905 was not a socialist dictatorship but only a "democratic" dictatorship. Do the authors of the *History* want to contest the fact that the October Revolution set up a proletarian, socialist, dictatorship in Russia?

This desperate attempt to deny Lenin's 1917 change in strategic orientation — an attempt which obscures the whole problem of the strategy of the revolutionary party in a backward country, especially in colonial countries — is indicted as false by innumerable witnesses of the period. Let us quote two, which the authors of the *History* will find hard to challenge.

In 1924, Molotov published an article titled "Lenin and the Party at the Period of the February Revolution," from which we extract the following passage:

But it is necessary to say openly that the party did not have that clarity of vision and that spirit of decision which were required by the revolutionary moment. It did not have them *because it did not have a clear attitude of orientation toward the socialist revolution*. In general the agitation and the entire practice of the revolutionary party lacked a solid foundation, for its thought had not gone forward right up to the bold conclusion of the need for an immediate struggle for socialism and for the socialist revolution.

Trotsky's thought had drawn this "bold conclusion" already in 1905. Lenin reached it beginning with the February revolution. That is the historical truth.

Volume XX of Lenin's *Complete Works* appeared in 1928. It was edited by the Lenin Institute under the control of the Central Committee. The first part of this volume is concerned especially with the Bolshevik Party's April 1917 Conference. Here is what is stated in a note on page 557-8 (German edition) on the subject of this conference:

At this conference there was a small group, composed essentially of part of the delegates of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Region (Nogin, Rykov, Smidovich, Ovsiannikov, Angarski, and others); its conception of the revolution *corresponds roughly to the position of the Bolsheviks in 1905* (the formula, "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"). [...] Kamenev, who had a position close to that of this group, was entrusted by them with the presentation of a counter-report. [Our italics.]

It was to this "Moscow" position that Lenin refers in *setting up in opposition to it* the thesis of the conquest of power by the soviets (pp 334-6). It is true that he considers that this power will be "not yet" socialist, while still being "more than bourgeois-democratic." But on this point history has corrected Comrade Lenin. Nobody

today will deny the *socialist* character of the October Revolution. To be unwilling to understand this problem is to block any possibility of helping the Communist Parties of colonial countries to work up a correct strategy. It is to lose sight of the teachings, not only of the October Revolution, but also of the Yugoslav revolution and the Chinese revolution — not to mention, alas, the dozens of *negative* lessons wherever the Communist Parties clung to the outlived theses of 1905 and refused to head toward the dictatorship of the proletariat backed up by the poor peasantry.

Question 4: What is the general teaching of the October Revolution in this matter?

Answer: The teaching of the October Revolution in the matter of the main motive forces of the revolution in countries that have not yet experienced a completed bourgeois-democratic revolution is that the alliance between the workers and peasants, the only one capable of completing the radical agrarian reform, can be brought about only by the dictatorship of the proletariat (the conquest of power by the proletariat). This teaching is confirmed by the history of the Russian Revolution, the history of the Chinese Revolution, and the history of the Yugoslav revolution. There is no example in the history of the last 40 years of any country that succeeded in accomplishing the classic tasks of the bourgeois revolution without passing through the conquest of power by the proletariat.

There are, on the contrary, innumerable examples of revolutions which, because of the fact that they did not end up in the dictatorship of the proletariat, stopped after the conquest of political independence (India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, Morocco, Tunis, etc) or the overthrow of the political agents of imperialism (Iraq, Venezuela), but did not succeed in solving the agrarian problem, not to speak of that of the industrialization of the country. The history of the second Chinese revolution (1925-27) confirms the same teaching.

Question 5: Have the authors of *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* formulated this teaching?

Answer: They have not done so, although it is nevertheless to be found recorded in numerous documents of the Communist International, as well as in the following text by Lenin:

We know from our own experience — and we see confirmation of it in the development of all revolutions, if we take the modern epoch, a hundred and fifty years, say, all over the world — that the result has

been the same everywhere: every attempt on the part of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and of the peasants in particular, to realize their strength, to direct economics and politics in their own way, has failed. Either under the leadership of the proletariat, or under the leadership of the capitalists — there is no middle course. All who hanker after this middle course are empty dreamers, fantasists. [“Speech Delivered to the All-Russian Congress of Transport Workers,” March 27, 1921, in *Selected Works*, Moscow 1947 edition, p 691.]

Now that is exactly the same idea that guided Trotsky in working up his theory of the permanent revolution. Trotsky wrote in 1905:

The Russian Revolution prevents [. . .] the setting up of any bourgeois-constitutional regime whatever which might be able to solve the most primitive tasks of democracy. [. . .] For this reason, the fate of the most elementary revolutionary interests of the peasantry — even of the peasantry as a whole as a stratum — is tied up with the fate of the revolution as a whole, i.e., with the fate of the proletariat. The proletariat in power will appear to the peasants as the class that frees them.

But will the peasantry perhaps push out the proletariat and occupy its place itself? That is impossible. All historical experience rises up against such a hypothesis. It shows that the peasantry is absolutely unable to play an independent political role.

The Russian bourgeoisie has bequeathed all revolutionary positions to the proletariat. It will have to abandon to it revolutionary hegemony over the peasantry as well.

Instead of admitting, or at least sketching out, this identity of views, the authors of the *History* drivel away about the alleged fact that “Trotsky wanted to jump over the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution” and that he wanted “to isolate the proletariat from the peasantry [vol. I, p 95].” It suffices to compare this “analysis” of the theory of the permanent revolution with the definition thereof given by its author himself, which we have just quoted, to understand how it is deformed, if not falsified.

Question 6: Did the Stalinists and Khrushchevians at least follow this teaching in practice even if they snapped their fingers at it in theory?

Answer: Nothing of the sort, unfortunately. In all cases where Communist Parties have been faced

with powerful revolutionary movements in the colonies, far from struggling for the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and heading toward the dictatorship of the proletariat, they have idealized the national bourgeoisie, formed lasting alliances with it, subordinated the mass movement to it, and ended up by— being brutally repressed by that selfsame bourgeoisie. That began with the tragic experience with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1925-27; it continued in Iran under Mossadegh, in Guatemala under Arbenz, in Egypt under Nasser, in Argentina under Frondizi, and in Morocco under King Mohammed V. It is currently continuing in Iraq under Kassem, in India under Nehru, and in Indonesia under Sukarno. The outcome there will be no more brilliant than elsewhere.

True, it is not a question of requiring a Communist Party to fight for power under no matter what conditions or correlation of forces, or of forbidding it to grant critical support to a bourgeois-national movement as long as this movement is effectively leading a mass movement against imperialism. Unfortunately, all the above-mentioned cases show that, under Khrushchev as under Stalin, the Communists have thrown away immense opportunities to become in the immediate or middle future the dominant force among the people, because they subjected themselves in a servile way to the bourgeois-national leadership and contributed to laying its foundations among the masses.

The only striking exceptions are those of the Yugoslav and Chinese CPs, which, going against Stalin’s directives, engaged in and won the struggle for power. By establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, they solved “as they went along” the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, without being able to stop at this stage, but passing rapidly on to “collectivist measures,” just as Trotsky had foreseen— way back in 1905.

Question 7: What was the nature of the February revolution?

Answer: *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* characterizes the February 1917 revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution that it was necessary “to transform” into a proletarian revolution (vol I, p 220). It is true that a few sentences uttered by Lenin in April 1917 — sentences that are not to be found again in any later analysis of the Russian Revolution by Lenin — give weight to this definition. In reality, the data offered by the authors of the *History* themselves permit emphasizing this definition’s confused, or at least incomplete, character.

The February 1917 revolution, as a “bourgeois-democratic revolution,” was characterized by the

fact that *it did not solve its main task*. The authors of *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* indeed explain on page 214 of the first volume that the provisional government created by the February revolution was neither able nor willing to give the land to the peasants. They specify at the same time that the October Revolution, "which directly accomplished the socialist tasks, also carried through to its end the bourgeois-democratic revolution [vol I, p 273]." Now the *History* elsewhere states that the most burning task of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution was "the destruction of the power of the landowners" (p 78), or, better still, "the liquidation of every vestige of feudalism" (p 205). Obviously, these aims were not achieved in February 1917; if they had been, the peasantry would never have given its support to the October Revolution. By stating on page 212 that the February bourgeois-democratic revolution reached the first goal of the party, the overthrow of Czarism, and opened up the possibility of liquidating capitalism and installing socialism,

the authors of the *History* themselves *jump over the main task* of the "bourgeois-democratic stage," namely, the distribution of land, and themselves "ignore" the decisive weight of the peasantry! All these wretched contradictions result from the attempt to ignore the theory of the permanent revolution.

Question 8: Who led the October Revolution? when did it begin? and when did it triumph?

Answer: *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* repeats on this subject — while attenuating them — the gross falsifications of the *Short Course* published in 1938. The latter had the nerve to write that at the historic 10 October 1917 session of the Central Committee, which took the decision in favor of the insurrection,

Trotsky did not vote directly against the resolution, but he presented an amendment — which was to fail of acceptance — reducing the insurrection to nothing. He proposed not to begin the insurrection before the opening of the Second Congress of the Soviets; that would have dragged out the insurrection, announced its date in advance, and warned the Provisional Government.

Since, in the meantime, John Reed's celebrated work, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, has been republished, this outrageous falsification, which presents Trotsky, the main organizer and leader of the insurrection, as having wanted to cause it to fail (!), has had to be abandoned. John Reed's book is not just any old book. Its preface

was written by Lenin. Reproduced in volume XXXVI of his *Complete Works*, this preface characterizes John Reed's book as follows:

It is with all my heart that I recommend this work to the workers of all countries. I hope that this book may be distributed in millions of copies and translated into all languages, because it reports in a veracious and extraordinarily vivid way those events that are so important for understanding what the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, really is.

Now John Reed's book says that at this very meeting Lenin and Trotsky defended the idea of the insurrection; that, *the very next day*, Lenin published in the *Pravda* an article defending the idea of immediate insurrection; that the government, thus learning the "secret," immediately took measures; and — that the insurrection nevertheless took place finally, as Trotsky had proposed, at the moment of the convocation at Petrograd of the Second Pan-Russian Congress of the Soviets (Modern Library edition, pp 38 et seq). John Reed's book really does not leave a single word of the Stalinist falsification standing.

The new version of events offered by the authors of the *History* is, however, scarcely any more veracious. Seeing that it can be confronted by *all* Soviet readers (and all Communist readers in the entire world) with John Reed's work, it comes very close to the ridiculous.

It begins by picking up the passage mentioned above, correcting it as follows:

At the meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky did not vote against the resolution of the insurrection. But he insisted that the insurrection be put off until the convocation of the Second Congress of the Soviets — which meant in practice to cause the insurrection to fail, since the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks would have been able to delay the convocation of the congress and the government would have had the possibility, on the day it opened, of concentrating sufficient [!] forces for the defeat of the insurrection.

The author of this "correction" does not show much brilliance in the consistency of his ideas. He forgets to explain to us why the insurrection, which in fact did coincide with the convocation of the Second Pan-Russian Congress of the Soviets, did not fail "for that reason." He forgets to remind us that, if Trotsky proposed making the two things coincide, it was precisely because the military forces at the government's disposal were insufficient to cause the failure of the insurrection, since they came over, regiment after

regiment, to put themselves under the command of the Petrograd soviet. And he forgets to explain to us why the government, who were aware of the "date" of the insurrection, did not understand what Stalin, Ponomarev, and Company perceived—20 years later.

In the 1938 *Short Course*, it was said:

On October 16th a session of the enlarged Central Committee of the party was held. It elected a Party Centre to direct the insurrection, with Comrade Stalin at its head. It was this centre, the leading nucleus [sic] of the Revolutionary Military Committee connected with the Petrograd soviet, which in practice guided the insurrection.

In the new version, this falsification has been slightly corrected:

The organ entrusted with carrying out the insurrection in the capital was the Revolutionary Military Committee, created, at the proposal of the C C of the party, in connection with the Petrograd soviet [vol I, p 255].

It is true that this committee did carry out all the practical work of the insurrection. The one lie by omission committed here by the authors of this *History* is not to recall that its president was Leon Trotsky. On the next page, it is stated that, on October 16th,

At the end of the session there was elected a revolutionary military Centre to lead the insurrection, composed of Bubnov, Djerjinsky, Sverdlov, Stalin, and Uritzky. It was decided that this revolutionary military Centre should enter the *Revolutionary Military Committee of the Soviet* [p 256].

In other words, the organ that was "to lead" simply entered the already existing organism and did not modify either its work or its leading tasks, since Trotsky remained its president, and Antonov-Ovseyenko and Podvoisky his principal "technical" lieutenants. And to top off their clumsy "corrections," the authors add: "The entire work of organizing the insurrection was directed by Lenin [p 256]."

In John Reed, however (pp 60 et seq) it can be read that all the work of organization was carried out by the Revolutionary Military Committee. And to quote finally a witness little to be suspected of Trotskyist sympathies, here is what Stalin himself stated:

The entire labor of practical organization of the insurrection was placed under the immediate direction of the president of the Petrograd soviet, Comrade Trotsky. It can be stated with certainty, that the party owes the rapid coming over of the

garrison into the camp of the soviets and the skilful work of the Revolutionary Military Committee above all and essentially to Comrade Trotsky. [In *Pravda*, 6 November 1917.]

Question 9: Who created the Red Army? Who directed its operations during the Civil War?

Answer: Here also *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* gives proof of a mean and petty spirit of falsification. It does not point out that Leon Trotsky was the first People's Commissar for Defense, without even mentioning the fact that he was the creator of the Red Army and "the father of victory," as is attested by the decree which accorded him the Order of the Red Flag on 7 November 1919.

The *History* cites pell-mell a few of the main military and political leaders of the army: Frunze, Vorochilov, Budyenny, and others; S Kamenev, Karbichev, Chapochnikov, Stankievich, and Nicolaïev, on page 307 of volume I; Andreyev, Bubnov, Vorochilov, Gussec, Djerjinsky, Zhdanov (sic), Ziemliecka, Kalinin, Kirov, Kossior, Kuibychev, Mechlis, Mikoyan, Ordjonikidze, Petrovsky, Postychev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Frunze, Khrushchev (sic), Chvernik, Chiadenko, Yaroslavsky. But this list "forgets" the main communist chiefs of the army, such as the future marshals, Tukhachevski and Yegorov. It forgets *all* the Bolshevik leaders placed at the head of military operations.

The *History* informs us only in passing that there was "at one moment" a Revolutionary Council of War. It "forgets" that these military operations were directed by this Military Council of War of the Republic of the Soviets. When it was set up in 1918, this council was composed of Trotsky (president), Sklianski (vice-president), and of Vatzetis, I N Smirnov, Rosengoltz, Raskolnikov, Muralov, and Yureniev. Out of these eight members five were later "liquidated" by Stalin. In 1919 I N Smirnov, Rosengoltz, and Raskolnikov were replaced by Smilga and Gussev. To direct the operations in the Ukraine, the Central Committee detached especially Piatakov, Smilga, and Lachevich, all three of whom were to fall victims to the Stalinist terror.

The determinant role played by Trotsky as the creator of the Red Army can be attested by three witnesses that today's official circles in the U S S R will find it difficult to challenge: Jacques Sadoul, Gorki, and Lenin himself.

Taking the floor at the First Congress of the Communist International, Jacques Sadoul declared:

We owe much gratitude to the leaders

of this [Red] Army, but first of all to Comrade Trotsky, whose indomitable energy, united with high intelligence and genuine genius, was able to infuse a new vital force into the Russian army, which was totally falling apart. [Integral minutes in German, p 63.]

In the first edition of Lenin's *Complete Works* in Russian (volume XVI, page 73), Lenin extolled Trotsky because he had been able to create the Red Army "with the bricks left from the destroyed edifice of the former regime."

In his work, *Lenin and the Russian Peasant*, Gorki reports on an interview with Lenin, who said to him on the subject of Trotsky:

"Show me another man capable of organizing an almost model army in a single year, and to win the respect of military experts. We have a man of this calibre [pp 95-6]."

It is true that these two passages were eliminated (or softened down) in the later editions of the *Complete* (sic) *Works* of Lenin and the work of Gorki. But in this matter also it is not going to take long for historical truth to recover its rights.

Let us mention that the new *History* even adds one supplementary petty meanness to the falsifications of the former *Short Course*. The latter, speaking of the mishaps in foreign intervention against the Republic of the Soviets, notes: "It was thus, for example, that the French sailors, guided by André Marty, had revolted at Odessa." In the new *History* (vol. I, p. 316), the revolt remains, but the name of André Marty has disappeared.

As for the innumerable falsifications concerning the operations of the Red Army, it is impossible to rectify them here: too much space would be needed. The reader interested in this subject can easily consult the chapter relative thereto in Trotsky's own *My Life*, and especially in *The Prophet Armed* of Isaac Deutscher, who has gathered together an impressive bibliography to untangle the Stalinist legends.

II. ORIGINS AND STRUGGLES OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION IN THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY

Question 10: Did Trotsky favor the "militarization of labor" in Russia?

Answer: In order to distort the meaning of the systematic struggle carried on by the Left Opposition against the danger of the bureaucratic degeneration of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, following in the spoor of the *Short Courses* presents matters as if, on

the eve of the formation of the Opposition, Trotsky had

declared himself opposed to the development of trade-union democracy, preferring the military and administrative measures that he applied, furthermore, in the Railway and Internal Waterway Transport Workers' Union when he was the president of the central committee of that organization [vol I, p 354].

Two pages farther on, the *History* even accuses Trotsky of having urged the use of methods of coercion instead of methods of persuasion in the trade unions (p 356).

This is a matter of a gross deformation of historical truth. First of all, the formulæ of "militarization of the economy" and the use of "labor armies" are not at all formulæ invented by Trotsky in 1920; they are formulæ used by the entire party, as is attested to by a resolution of the IXth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, quoted on page 335 of the *History* itself! It was a question — at the end of the civil war, at a moment when the productive forces had fallen to their lowest level — of preventing the demobilization of the army from scattering this proletarian vanguard, from condemning it to unemployment or dispersing it over the countryside. It was necessary, on the contrary, to employ it on the tasks of economic reconstruction, by having it carry out great public works of urgent importance for the country's recovery. As military discipline itself, at this period, was a *communist* discipline, i e, very far from the present customs in the Soviet army, and as there was freedom of discussion within this army, with purely persuasive methods broadly used, even the formula of "labor armies" adopted by the whole party was not exactly synonymous with the "replacement of persuasion by coercion."

The real subject-matter of the 1921 debate on the trade-union question was something else again. It was a question of settling *the place of the trade unions and the working class within socialized industry*. Three theses confronted one another: the anarcho-syndicalist thesis, which wanted immediately to turn the administration of industry over to the trade unions and suppress any centralized administration; the thesis of Lenin and the trade-union leaders, who wanted to preserve trade-union independence toward the state, the unions being considered as instruments of defense of the consumers' interests of the workers, while not modifying the system of management of industry; and the thesis of Trotsky and Bukharin, which wanted to ensure a decisive participation of the unions and the workers in the management of nationalized industry.

If today we examine this debate in the light of later experience, we immediately observe that Lenin's and Trotsky's theses were, both of them, partly right and partly wrong. Lenin was certainly right when he insisted on the need to preserve trade-union independence toward a "bureaucratically deformed" (the formula is Lenin's) workers' state. But Trotsky was no less right when he specified that the fight against the bureaucracy was utopian as long as that bureaucracy had not been hit in the real solar plexus of its powers: the control of big industry.

The truth is, that the struggle against bureaucratic deformation of the workers' state, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, requires *both* independence of the trade unions (as the instrument of the workers *as consumers*), and a more and more active participation of the workers in the administration of industry (to defend their interests *as producers*). The most adequate instrument for ensuring this participation is, however, not the trade union itself, but the *workers' council* (factory council).

Question 11: What was the thesis advocated by Lenin concerning the administration of Soviet industry?

Answer: Wishing to justify the measures taken later, in 1930, by Stalin, which gathered together all the powers of the enterprise within the sole hands of the director, *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (vol I, p 291) summarizes Lenin's position on this subject in the following way:

The interests of socialism, Lenin taught, require the unconditional obedience of the masses to the sole will of the director of the labor process. For this reason, the direction of the economy had to be centralized, and directors named by the Soviet power had to be at the head of enterprises. The centralized direction on the part of the state and the unity of command had to be combined with the active and conscious participation of the masses in economic life and with a control in various forms by the rank and file.

It is useful to emphasize in passing that this last bit concerning the multiple forms of control from below is hardly to be found in the 1938 *Short Course*. And with good reason! Under the Stalinist regime, there was no longer any trace of such a "control" beginning with 1932-3. The administration of the economy and the direction of the factories were competely bureaucratized. And though Khrushchev's reforms have introduced a *semblance of control* from below, there are scarcely any examples of a ge-

nuine participation of the workers in the management of Soviet enterprises today. But that is another subject, to which we shall return farther on.

Is the new *History's* description of Lenin's conception in conformance with truth? It greatly sins by omission. Here is what Lenin wrote on this subject in *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power*:

The more resolutely that we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for dictatorship of individual persons, for definite processes of work for definite aspects of *purely executive* functions, the more varied must be the forms and methods of control from below in order to counteract every shadow of possibility of distorting the Soviet power, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to weed out bureaucracy. [*Selected Works*, Moscow 1947, vol II, p 339.]

First difference between Lenin and the new *History*: Lenin does not claim that the principle of "sole direction" is an absolute principle, but that it was valid only at that moment, i.e., that it flowed from the *special* conditions in which the soviet state and the Russian working class found themselves just after the victory of October. To transform a momentary and painful necessity into a general principle is already to commit an error of some size.

Second difference between Lenin and the new *History*: Lenin *frankly recognizes* that the momentary principle of "sole direction" implies a danger of bureaucratic deformation. *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* is silent on this subject. Now, in the same pamphlet Lenin takes a harsh stand against those who are silent about this sort of danger before the masses:

To conceal from the masses the fact that the enlistment of bourgeois specialists by means of extremely high salaries is a retreat from the principles of the Paris Commune would be tantamount to sinking to the level of bourgeois politicians and to deceiving the masses. Frankly explaining how and why we took this step backward, and then publicly discussing what means are available for making up for lost time, means educating the masses and learning from experience together with the masses how to build up socialism. [*Selected Works*, Moscow 1947, vol II, p 320.]

It is therefore to the level of "bourgeois politicians" who "deceive the masses" that the authors of the *History* have fallen in thus mutilating Lenin's thought.

Third difference between Lenin and these authors: Lenin implicitly indicates that if the

forms of control from below are not increased and broadened, bureaucratic deformation will be inevitable, or at least extremely probable. He affirms this explicitly, furthermore, on the subject of the temporarily high salaries accorded to "specialists":

The corrupting influence of high salaries upon the Soviet government [...] and upon the masses of the workers is indisputable. But every thinking honest worker and poor peasant will agree, will admit, that we cannot immediately rid ourselves of the bad heritage of capitalism, and that we can liberate the Soviet Republic from the duty of paying a "tribute" of fifty million or one hundred million rubles per annum (a tribute for own own backwardness in organizing *nation-wide* accounting and control *from below*), only by organizing ourselves, by tightening up discipline in our own ranks [...]. If the class-conscious advanced workers and poor peasants manage with the aid of the Soviet institutions, to organize, became disciplined, pull themselves together, create strong labor discipline in the course of one year [sic], then in a year's time we shall throw off this "tribute" [...]. [Ibidem, p 321.]

And Lenin even specifies:

There is a petty-bourgeois tendency to transform the members of the soviets into "Members of Parliament," or into bureaucrats. This must be combated by drawing *all* the members of the soviets into the practical work of administration. In

many places the departments of the soviets are gradually becoming merged with the commissariats. Our aim is draw *the whole of the poor* into the practical work of administration, and every step that is taken in this direction — the more varied they are, the better — should be carefully recorded, studied, systematized, tested by wider experience, and passed into law. Our aim is to ensure that *every* toiler, after having finished his eight hours' "lesson" in productive labor, shall perform state duties *gratis*: the transition to this is a particularly difficult one, but this transition alone can guarantee the final consolidation of socialism. [Ibidem, pp 337-8.]

Now during the entire 1930-1955 period, not only were the methods of control "from below" or of performance of "state duties *gratis*" by "every toiler" not multiplied, but completely abolished. The high salaries were not reduced; they were even extended to include members and leaders of the party (the famous demoralization foreseen by Lenin). The state functions were not performed *gratis* by *every* worker, not when they worked eight hours a day, nor when they worked seven hours or even six, as is now the case in certain Soviet industries. Consequently, socialism is not "finally consolidated," "bureaucracy" has not been "weeded out," but has developed in a monstrous way, and bureaucratic deformation has asserted itself until it has become degeneration. Such are the ineluctable conclusions from the very passage of Lenin "quoted" (in mutilated form) by the *History*.

[To be continued in our next issue]

A MEETING WITH TROTSKY'S SON

By P RICHARDS

PREFATORY NOTE

At the moment when, on the twentieth anniversary of the murder of Leon Trotsky, the Soviet authorities, using the Czechoslovak authorities as intermediaries, have given the murderer a passport, with a view to hindering any later researches (see on page 52 the declaration of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International on this subject), it is useful to recall that the blow struck directly at Trotsky came after a series of actions striking at Trotsky and his companion Natalia Sedov in the persons of those near to them—first of all, their children. Stalin, in his fight against the Bolsheviks who resisted bureaucratic degeneration, at the height of his terror proceeded to engage in a repression striking at the families of all the Bolsheviks whom he arrested.

One particularly cruel case was that of the younger son

of Trotsky and Natalia, Sergei Lvovitch Sedov; he had never engaged in the slightest political activity, had very soon led a life independent of his parents, and was a valuable technician employed in Soviet industry.

Sergei had disappeared, among many others, during the Stalinist terror. And when finally the camps were emptied, a very small number of Old Bolsheviks emerged therefrom after a long martyrdom, and the memory of those who had been swallowed up in them lives once more.

Our friend P Richards — who spent more than twenty years in that other world — had brought back for us the memory of a passing encounter with Sergei, the chance result of an investigation and transfers among prisons and camps. He has sent us this moving account for the twentieth anniversary of the murder of Leon Trotsky.

In February 1937 I was transferred back from the hospital to a cell in the Butyri prison for prisoners in process of indictment. From there I was transported — very late in the evening, as was the usual practice — to the Lubianka in a sealed cellular police van. It was customary to leave the thus transported prisoners for a long time, usually several hours, in small cages called sobatchniki, until — often in very late hours of the night — their turn came for examination. As a very disorderly activity was the rule in these places, various people were shut up together in these cells, without regard to the possibility — which should have been avoided since their cases were still under investigation — that prisoners involved in the same cases might in this way get together. Hence interesting encounters occurred here.

At one of these night hearings — it was on February 21st or one of the following days — just after I had been installed in a cell, its door reopened to admit a thick-set, blond, blue-eyed prisoner in a flannel jacket and trousers (which was the usual clothing of camp prisoners). The door was relocked, and we were left together.

The conversation began — as is usual when two total strangers find themselves in such a situation — by the general prisoners' questions: From where? Why? How? It appeared that the newcomer had, like me, been brought back from an I T L (labor camp), except that this had been my case several months before, whereas he had come directly from a camp beyond the Arctic circle, Vorkuta. I was immediately interested to learn whether he had not met some of my acquaintances of the 1935-6 period (I had

been at that time in Siberia, at the moment when, from prisons all over the country, those sentenced for "Trotskyist or Zinovievist activity" had been brought together at Kolyma or Vorkuta). It turned out that the newcomer knew the names of a few people with whom I had been together.

Through this we got to talking about the latest events in Vorkuta at the end of 1936 and beginning of 1937, and the prisoner with whom I was talking introduced himself as Sergei Lvovitch Sedov, sentenced in 1936 to five years of hard labor, and now brought back from the camp to the centre to have his case reexamined. We remained together for several hours; during this time Sedov related to me various episodes from his life, especially about the last years before his arrest and the months that had passed since then.

He had — according to what he said — voluntarily declined to accompany his parents and his brother when they were exiled in 1929. Indeed, he had always been completely apolitical, and in his childhood had been more interested in the circus profession and later in his studies. He had in fact at the beginning of the '30s obtained his diploma as civil engineer, and had been assigned to a big plant in Krasnoyarsk. In the years following the exile of his parents, he had remained in regular epistolary correspondence with them without anyone's molesting him on that account. It was only at the beginning of 1936 that he had been given to understand by the N K V D that — until further notice — he should break off the correspondence; then it was suggested to him that he should publicly, i e, by a letter to the newspapers, denounce his father's

activities, and to declare that he desolidarized himself from his parents.

Sergei Lvovitch declared that he had declined to take either action, on the grounds that he had never been politically active or even interested, and that his correspondence had always been of a purely family and personal nature. Thereupon persons, such as colleagues in his work, who had hitherto backed him up, underwent certain reprisals (warnings, discharges from work, arrests). Next, Sergei Lvovitch was himself transferred to another place, and then (at the beginning of 1936, it seems) arrested. As well as I recall from the description that Sergei Lvovitch gave of the charges that were brought against him, it was a matter of an alleged action prepared against the state, which was said to have been confirmed by depositions about conversations between him and his acquaintances. He stressed the fact that his correspondence with his parents was not brought up as a charge — probably because it had been carried on with the knowledge of the proper authorities. The investigation had been carried out rapidly and without resort to any violence against him. Sergei Lvovitch declared that he had not admitted guilt in any way. He was nevertheless condemned by the “Osoboye Sowjeschtschanye” and soon after transferred to Vorkuta.

He lived there under very hard conditions, fell ill, and finally — when the concentration of the “Trotskyists” began in the second half of 1936 — he was shut up with them. Sergei Lvovitch had never had, he said, any previous connections with Trotskyists, and had never known any of them. He now spoke of them — after having been together with them for several months — in words of the highest esteem and most deeply felt thanks, in which he emphasized that his good opinion did not extend to their political conceptions and actions, but that he was speaking from a purely human standpoint. He said that he maintained this particularly about the so-called “orthodox” ones (i e, the few participants in the 1925-7 campaign of the Left Opposition who had never “capitulated,” in spite of all persecutions — most of them had been for years in jails or camps, or transported — but had held fast to their programme), and who, in spite of their own desperate situation, had shown themselves to be extraordinarily sympathetic and ready to aid.

Sergei Lvovitch then explained that, involuntarily, he soon found himself at the centre of this group just at the moment when it got into a very sharp conflict with the camp authorities. As a whole series of their elementary demands

had not been satisfied (it was above all a question of separation from the common criminal prisoners, of suppression of various illegal vexations, of obtention of rights to some limited correspondence, etc), they began a mass hunger-strike of long duration, in which Sergei Lvovitch participated right from the beginning. He said that he could neither esteem nor approve the political grounds and background of this measure, but that — in view of their attitude toward himself and their human worth as prisoners who defended these elementary demands — he could not stand aside.

Sergei Lvovitch described the various phases of the hunger-strike that went on week after week (I do not remember the exact number of days that it lasted, but it was more than three months). The strikers were isolated, and after some time forcibly fed, despite which, according to Sergei Lvovitch, there were some cases of death, especially among the women. Sergei Lvovitch held out to the end, and, in his own words, came pretty close to death himself. The main demands of the strikers were satisfied by a special commission sent from the centre, and, according to the words of Sergei Lvovitch, after the end of the hunger-strike the whole regime was rendered more bearable.

(A remark in passing: some months after this mass hunger-strike described by Sergei Lvovitch, i e, toward the end of 1937, participation in it was taken as a pretext for a whole series of reprisals. A disciplinary commission also sent from the centre organized the annihilation of all persons who had taken part in the hunger-strike, as well as all those who had, really or allegedly, sympathized with it.)

A short time after these events the administration of the camp where Sergei Lvovitch was confined received the order to transport him urgently to the centre for a continuation of the investigation. As normal communications were not yet open, Sergei Lvovitch and his staff of guards traveled for weeks from village to village through the icy wastes. Sergei Lvovitch humorously described how, after the recent events, this otherwise not at all pleasant journey was a relief. He rested up from the camp regime and was very well fed. He related that during this trip he had not only made up for the losses of the hunger-strike, but had got quite fat and felt as well as in the best years of his youth.

(There followed here quite detailed reminiscences about his twenties: indications about controversies with his parents, romantic incidents, and so on. Sergei Lvovitch showed, during this talk, that he was a man of many-sided formation

and had a very cultivated taste in matters of art and the theatre.)

Among many persons whom he named in connection with his experience of prison-camp life at Vorkuta and the hunger-strike, Sergei Lvovitch mentioned in particular two persons who in his opinion played an outstanding role, Yenukidze and J Kossior. In addition he recalled with praise a group of youngsters from the Caucasus — mostly Armenians and Georgians — whom he had left behind there.

The conversation came around to what Sergei Lvovitch thought about the reopening of the investigation of his case, as well as his transfer to the Lubianka. He declared that he had no illusions about the possibility of a reconsideration of his case, or even a confirmation of his previous sentence to a camp. He spoke in detail about the methods used in investigations and opined that a well-read man must be a match for everything that was used with prisoners during interrogations. After a century things were little changed, for about a hundred years ago Balzac (Sergei Lvovitch mentioned specifically the novel *Splendeur et misère des courtisanes*) had described in their essentials all the ruses and tricks of the examining magistrate just as they still exist. Since, in his estimation, the political situation of the regime served by the investigating authorities seemed to be growing lastingly hardened, Sergei Lvovitch considered that he had little chance of drawing a new prison sentence — even a lengthened one — for he scarcely believed that he could escape the mass executions which had been prepared well beforehand and were now announced as immediate. Sergei Lvovitch declared he looked upon future events with complete calm, and that under no circumstances was he ready, even in the slightest degree, to accuse himself or others. (He supposed that, seeing that his fate could have been quickly sealed in Vorkuta, the purpose of transporting him to the centre was because they wanted to force him to make statements against various people whom they wanted to compromise through their acquaintance with him.)

From this Sergei Lvovitch went on to say that

he especially regretted that nobody would ever be in a position (because he assumed that not one of the people he had met or would meet in the next few weeks of prison would ever again see the light of the outside world) to tell his relatives (he spoke especially of his mother) about the changes in attitude which he had undergone.

He enquired further whether to my knowledge there would be, in these investigation cells, enough good reading matter, for the possibility that he had had, during the period of his earlier interrogations, to read books had been able to compensate for many of the painful things that he had to undergo.

In the midst of this conversation, Sergei Lvovitch was summoned from the cell: we said a brief good-bye; I never saw him again.

*

At the beginning of 1938 A Eichenwald — a philosopher, close friend and collaborator of Bukharin, imprisoned since 1933, who at the end of 1937 was sentenced to 15 years of prison — related the following, in a cell of the special prison of Solovki:

In a conversation with my investigating magistrate, Kogan — who was, among other things, conducting the investigation against the former members of the Central Committee — I asked for the grounds for severe reprisals, which were unknown in earlier practice, against the relatives of persons who were considered to be political enemies. Kogan opined that this was not only useful but inevitable. The conversation came to Sergei Lvovitch Sedov, who was, nevertheless, "apolitical." Kogan was just the person entrusted with the investigation against him.

A few weeks later the conversation came back to this case. Kogan declared that this case — this was the Autumn of 1937 — was as good as closed. Then he added: "If his « batjka » will give us a carload of gold, we'll turn him loose; if not, « koknjem »."

FOR SUPPORT AND EXTENSION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION¹

By J POSADAS

The Cuban revolution is passing through steadily increasing danger. Imperialism, particularly Yankee imperialism, is increasing military, economic, and political pressure. The Church has joined this campaign, and the front of the Curia, imperialism, Batistism, and the oligarchy operates coördinatedly under a single direction. It conceals itself behind the mask of an "anti-Communist front." But its purpose is not to combat the Communist Party, for this party has very scant influence on the Cuban masses, but rather to assemble all sectors who feel that the revolution, under the pressure of the masses, is going forward to measures whereby the workers more openly intervene in and control government policy, trying to spur it on to revolutionary anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist positions, since, despite the leadership's hesitations, fears, and raising of obstacles, the masses tend to seek the revolutionary channel toward measures of this sort.

Until lately there existed sectors of Yankee imperialism, of the North American press, that still believed in the possibility of "containing" the revolution by crushing the will and steadily increasing combativity of the Cuban masses, and thereby "containing" the Cuban government's policy and measures. But these sectors are now declaring that they have given up hope and that Cuba is heading for "communism." Under the pressure of masses unwilling to remain passive, the government is inclining to carry out a foreign policy of agreements, of commercial and even diplomatic relations, with the workers' states. The invitations to Khrushchev and to either Mao Tse-Tung or Chou En-Lai, really invitations to the workers' states as such, strike at and worry imperialism. Independently of the limited scope assigned to these measures by the Cuban government, they spur the Cuban and Latin American masses to seek their natural alliance with the workers' states and the world-wide colonial revolution (cf the Cuban government's support

of the Algerian revolution), to defend their own revolution and emerge from economic and commercial difficulties.

DORTICÓS'S TOUR

Cuban President Dorticós on his recent tour sought to obtain the support and "understanding" of the Latin American governments and bourgeoisies and also to spur and encourage support of the masses for the Cuban revolution. The result spoke volumes. The governments were frightened lest Dorticós's presence should influence their own masses, whose hatred for imperialism is deep and intense. All these governments tried in one way or another to impede, neutralize, and even sabotage Dorticós's trip and especially his contact with the masses.

By their inconsiderate behavior toward him, the governments showed their fear of "contamination" by the Cuban revolution and demonstrated to Yankee imperialism that they were on its side. No Latin American government (save perhaps the Mexican) will take a stand in support of the revolutionary democratic rights of the Cuban masses to follow the course of their revolutionary life as they wish and are doing, and support their government against imperialism's attempts to overthrow it. Venezuela and Colombia are really two bridgeheads against the Cuban revolution: Betancourt's attitude toward Dorticós was revelatory. Yankee imperialism is waiting for the opportunity to swap Santo Domingo for Cuba, to yield to the popular hatred of the Dominican dictatorship to obtain from the Latin American governments the offsetting support for invading or sabotaging Cuba, for besieging it economically, socially, and politically. Despite imperialist might, Latin American governments, under immense mass pressure, fear to show open support to Wall Street's proposals. But the furious campaign of Latin America's "democratic" press against the Cuban government and people is only a beginning, which will later move on to the economic, political, and military fields.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE WORLD AND LATIN AMERICAN MASSES

It is owing to the anti-imperialist hatred of the Latin American masses that their governments and imperialism have not gone even farther

¹ This article by Comrade Posadas (slightly shortened; for full text, see *Voz Proletaria*, fortnightly organ of the P O R [Trotskyist], of Argentina, first half of June, 1960) was written before the latest developments in the Cuban revolution referred to in the declaration of the International Secretariat on page 70. The latest measures adopted by imperialism and its corporations, and the answers made to them by the Cuban government and masses, fully confirm the line indicated in this article.

against the Cuban revolution. Imperialism is steadily losing the petty-bourgeois social support it could until recently count on. All over Latin America, to varying degrees (e.g., Paraguay, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina), the masses are effectively fighting against bourgeoisies and oligarchies, to expel imperialism and dictatorships.

When their struggle reaches an open anti-oligarchic level, it is carried out "in the Cuban way." The masses sense that this is the really fruitful way to achieve solution of economic and social problems, agrarian reform, industrialization, and democratic rights. It is the Cuban way that the masses in Korea, Turkey, and Japan have taken to expel imperialism, to fight against war and atomic armament, to defend democratic rights and social progress, the only way to fight for their own human dignity.

The Latin American bourgeoisies, as we have seen, are ready to obey imperialism in its plans against the Cuban revolution and the revolutionary movements of the masses in Latin America and throughout the world. But the Latin American masses, on the contrary, will continue to fight for their own just-mentioned goals, and the outlook is good that their struggles will grow stronger and their revolution will advance.

In Chile the striking coal-miners, despite terrible pressure from the consequences of the earthquakes — collapse of their houses, deaths of their families, and loss of everything they possessed — have refused to return to work if their demands are not met.

In Bolivia, where the Paz Estenssoro slate won the elections, there was enormous abstentionism and blank ballots. The reactionary and pro-imperialist right, led by Guevara Arze, got many votes, as did the ultra-rightist Falange. An important sector of the petty bourgeoisie, of well-to-do peasants, and of newly well-to-do peasants (also a backward sector) voted for Guevara. The votes for Paz Estenssoro - Lechín were only half the votes obtained by the M N R in previous elections, showing a deep crisis in the M N R. Important sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry are breaking away from the M N R, and Guevara and the Falange will tend to attract them on the basis of the Bolivian economic crisis. It is possible to foresee new and graver attempts at coups d'état, at uprisings by the M N R right wing (Guevara), and at a united front led by Guevara against the Paz-Lechín government.

The overwhelming majority of the worker and peasant masses and the poor sectors of the petty bourgeoisie who voted for the Paz-Lechín ticket were really voting for Lechín. Lechín will knuckle under to Paz, but in voting for him, the masses

were seeking a way to safeguard their conquests, to defend the nationalizations and extend the agrarian reform. Paz Estenssoro has no way out other than to follow along general lines the policy of Siles Suazo. This will bring him into more open clashes with the masses, who will bring pressure on Lechín to go forward, basing himself more openly on the C O B (the Bolivian Confederation of Labor), the Miners' Federation, and the peasants. For this purpose the workers and peasants will rely on their own class organizations. Hence it is to be foreseen that, either as their answer to attempts at coups d'état or on their own initiative, the Bolivian masses will tend to spur on the process, renewing it "in the Cuban way." The development of the struggles in Bolivia will soon raise the need for the Bolivian and Cuban masses to support each other mutually against imperialism.

DEPENDENCE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION ON THE WORLD AND LATIN AMERICAN MASSES

The Cuban revolution, government, unions, and masses must openly seek the support of the Latin American and world masses. The Cuban government can expect nothing from the capitalist governments of Latin America. On the contrary, it can and must count on the masses of Latin America and the world, appeal to them, connect up the extension and elevation of the Cuban revolution with the world revolution in general, and the Latin American revolution in particular. Those masses, plus the workers' states, have prevented Yankee imperialism and the Latin American governments from crushing the Cuban revolution.

Economic problems and unemployment are weighing and will continue to weigh on the Cuban revolution. The oil problem speaks for itself. Imperialism will step up economic and trade sabotage while it is preparing military invasion or an internal uprising combined therewith.

These attempts would be supported by the capitalist forces that in most cases continue overwhelmingly dominant in the ownership of land, telephones, electric light and power, transportation, etc. Dependent on the capitalist structure of the country, they are the bases for counter-revolution. The Cuban revolution's first measure of self-defense must be more advanced expropriation of imperialist- and Cuban-owned properties of national interest, nationalizing them and putting them under workers' control; planning nationalization and combined production in the national interest, in conformance with the people's needs in nourishment, employment, and support of living standards, combined with

export, trade exchanges, and industrialization; calling when necessary on technicians, professional men, and scientists from the whole world, and especially from Latin America, to collaborate in forwarding the Cuban revolution; increasing cultural, economic, and scientific ties and exchanges with the workers' states, recognizing them all (People's China, East Germany, etc); recognizing the government of the National Liberation Front in Algeria and giving it public and direct support; calling on the Bolivian and other Latin American governments to insist on propaganda for and preparation of the conference of underdeveloped states, but to carry it out on the basis of a programme made clear to the masses, of liberation from imperialism and increase in the participation and control of the masses in the economy and the government; calling for the establishment of a raw-materials pool and of joint purchasing in the name of all the countries of Latin America.

THE TRADE UNIONS, THE MASSES, AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

It is the masses who are the basis for a real support of the Cuban revolution. The Cuban Labor Federation should appeal directly, agitate, and send members on tours through all Latin American countries to call for the organization of an *Anti-Imperialist United Front* on the basis of agrarian reform and the expulsion of imperialism. It should call for a *Proletarian United Front* to fight for workers' and peasants' governments. It and its component unions should call on the masses of North America to fight for a programme in defense of the right of the peoples of Latin America to struggle against imperialism.

There exists an agreement among the labor federations of Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, and Bolivia, and between the Student Centres of Cuba and Argentina, etc, to defend the Cuban and Bolivian revolutions. These agreements must not remain mere resolutions: these organisms must function permanently, with a regular leadership that calls meetings and mobilizations and convokes a Latin American congress for the Latin American peoples' national and social liberation from imperialism and capitalism. This does not interest the leaders of the Peronists in Argentina, of the M N R in Bolivia, of the Acción Democrática in Venezuela, or of the Communist Parties anywhere, who all fear to lose control over the actions of the masses. The workers' control exercised by the printers of Cuba's capitalist newspapers should be extended to all the firms and factories inside and outside Cuba, for the experience of workers' control in Cuba and in

Bolivia clearly shows the road by which the revolution must in practice go forward

In each country, the workers' organizations should declare that they join and support the Cuban revolution, issue appeals to carry out manifestations, mobilizations, assemblies, meetings, and conferences in support of the action of the Cuban masses. The movement should discuss and learn from the experience of the action of the Cuban masses, their guerrilla, their present militia, and their struggle to the death against imperialism and for national and social liberation.

The workers from the factories, the unions, and the neighborhoods should discuss and organize commissions for concrete aid to the Cuban revolution, hold factory meetings to bring about a national congress of support and backing to the Cuban revolution, organize commissions for sending brigades of armed militiamen to Cuba. The most important aid that can and must be put into practice in favor of the Cuban revolution is the development of national anti-imperialist anti-capitalist struggles, the organization of the anti-imperialist united front and the anti-capitalist united front for the programme of national and social liberation.

A single Latin American labor federation is an urgent necessity. The conditions for creating it exist, but effective steps have to be taken. The Cuban Labor Federation (C T C) should take the initiative and organize the tasks, the appeals, the negotiations, and the measures for bringing about a Latin American conference for the creation of a single Latin American revolutionary worker and peasant federation on the basis of a programme of national and social liberation. This would be one of the pillars of the defense and support of the Cuban revolution. Such a single Latin American labor federation would have to include all workers' tendencies and rights to proportional representation on the basis of the revolutionary programme for national and social liberation.

ROLE OF THE CUBAN WORKING CLASS

The Cuban working class must be in the first ranks in defense of its revolution against Yankee imperialism, in appeals to the workers, peasants, and poor petty bourgeois of Latin America and the world to unify the struggle to expel imperialism, on the basis of revolutionary agrarian reform, and for the expropriation without indemnization of imperialism and industries of national interest. But it must do so directly and in a form *independent* of its own Cuban government. To support and defend the revolution at its present stage, it must be carried farther

forward. To carry it forward, the expropriations of imperialism must be extended and deepened, and workers' control, the monopoly of foreign trade, the nationalization of banking, and the planning of the economy, must be installed, in a struggle for a workers' and peasants' government in Cuba. To carry the revolution through, the Cuban masses need their own political class instrument, a Labor Party based on the trade unions. But at the same time there is needed the organization of the revolutionary Marxist, Trotskyist, party of the Fourth International.

The recent explosion of a powder-magazine shows that the counter-revolution, though without social forces, still has adequate means to make trouble. As long as the Cuban state remains capitalist, the counter-revolution — the Cuban oligarchy, the Batistists, Trujillo, and imperialism — will find the means for certain successes in its attempts. But if the masses intervene directly with their class organisms, it will be crushed and exterminated. The Cuban trade unions should fight to impose the direct military intervention of the labor movement in the form of people's militia. In case of any threat or danger they can directly crush the counter-revolutionaries. The people in arms is the only guarantee of checking and crushing the counter-revolution.

Recently the Cuban government organized an army of students controlled and directed by the state. This is a step backward. The unions must fight to have the student militia organized within the same framework as the workers' militia and under the control and direction of the trade unions. Student militia outside the control of the trade unions are at the present stage an embryo

of a capitalist army, because the state and the structure of society in Cuba continue to be capitalist.

The well-orchestrated campaign conducted by imperialism is immediately aimed at bringing pressure to paralyze the measures of expropriation, and of diplomatic and trade relations with the workers' states, etc.

To crush the plans of concealment, sabotage, infamy, and slanders against the Cuban revolution that are being carried on by imperialism and the Latin American bourgeoisies and governments, the masses must directly see and feel the independent class action, the appeals, the activity, and the action of the trade unions and the Cuban labor federation. These are what give the most confidence, have authority, and exert influence on the masses — not only the student masses, but the broad enormous worker and peasant masses of all Latin America and the world.

The defense and support of the Cuban revolution lies in this: that it must spread, broaden its social, economic, and political conquests, and rely on the revolutionary masses of Latin America and of the world. The present moment, the objective conditions, and the prospects all are favorable from every point of view. Imperialism is revealing its weakness when faced by the revolutionary impetus of the masses of the world, and by the advances of the workers' states. The Cuban revolution must base itself on these objective and subjective conditions to go forward on the road of national and social liberation, the only way to maintain and defend itself.

28 June 1960

TEN DECISIVE YEARS FOR INDIA

By LIVIO MAITAN

II¹

LIMITS OF AN AGRARIAN REFORM

The contradictions of rural India were and continue to be so great, the weight of parasitism so heavy, the living conditions of the great peasant masses so desperate, that the urgent need for an agrarian reform simply forced itself upon the country when it became independent. It was almost unanimously recognized that action had to be taken along the following main lines: eliminate intermediaries, guarantee stability to working peasants, limit landholding, and give the land to those who were unprovided with any. And it was indeed in this direction that the attempt was in fact made to take action, thanks to all the reforms carried out or projected in the different states of the Union² and by means of typically Indian movements such as the Sampattidan and the Bhooden Movement.

The first goal that was generally specified right from the beginning was the abolition of the zemindari system. All the Indian states have long since voted laws to this effect³.

But the parasitic classes that were directly threatened did not grow discouraged. They resorted to all legalistic and procedural tricks, first to postpone the vote of the laws that struck at them, and then to postpone their application. And though they did not succeed in completely blocking the reform movement, they did however almost always succeed in having the legislative measures formulated in such a way that they could be got around or permitted a return to the status quo from an economico-social if not from a juridical viewpoint.

Thorner, in his already mentioned essay, makes a detailed analysis of the agrarian reform in the different states. One example is particularly significant, that of the most populous Indian state, Uttar Pradesh, where the reform had a few results (in the majority of the other states, according to Thorner, the results were pretty insignificant).

In Uttar Pradesh the law for the abolition of the zemindari system was already decided on in

1946, but the final vote of the competent assembly did not take place till 1951 (in the Bihar, the overall procedure required not less than eight years!). The time that thus went by was skillfully profited by to set up various devices. But the law itself provided the zemindari with the possibility of saving themselves. In fact a part of their land — classified in the categories of unlet sir and khudhasht, characterized by the precarious conditions of the tenants — was exempted from the reform.⁴ It is true that this exception was made for the zemindari only on condition that they kept these lands as working farmers, but the criteria for defining "working farmers" were so broad that they made it very easy for landowners to be so considered.⁵ Hence very many zemindari were able to benefit by this exemption and thus be included in a new privileged category, that of the bhumidars. The old formula disappeared only in appearance; in fact, the same persons continued to own the land, and very often that part of the land that was far-and-away the most profitable. For the great majority of the peasants there had been no real change: conditions stayed the same — rent too, with the difference that it now had to be paid to the state in the form of taxes and no longer to the former zemindari.⁶ And lastly it must be added that, to the extent that expropriations did take place, they were also amply compensated by indemnizations.

For the zones covered by the ryotwari system (in the state of Bombay, for example), the reform tended above all to ensure the stability of the tenants and to establish a "fair rent." The effective modifications were still more modest, for the reason that, even from a formal viewpoint, the ancient hierarchy remained in place, and the law, in this case as well, was got around in various ways. The example of the Bombay region is, in this matter, very significant. One of the consequences has been quite exactly the

⁴ Before the reform law the unlet sir and khudkasht in Uttar Pradesh added up to 6 million acres, while lands of the other categories totaled a little over one million (cfr Thorner, *op cit*, p 20).

⁵ The four basic criteria concern not only manual labor properly so called, but also the use of wage-labor, the direction and control of agricultural operations, and the risk of undergoing losses. On the other hand, some measures foresee the prohibition of renting land, but not of turning it over to share-croppers (cfr Thorner, pp 20 and 22).

⁶ Cfr Thorner, pp 20 and 25.

¹ The first half of this study appeared in our Spring issue.

² According to the Indian Constitution, agrarian reform is a problem that concerns the individual states and not the Union.

³ Even the Congress Party was favorable to the reform, all the more so in that the zemindari had furnished one of the strongest supports for British domination.

opposite of what the law was attempting to bring about: the area reserved to the tenants under more advantageous conditions of stability diminished and often even the tenants were eliminated.⁷

Measures of limitation of holdings are at an even more backward stage: it is in only part of the states that legislation for this purpose has been adopted. Where the law has been proclaimed, it most often concerns holdings that might be set up in the future and does not intervene in the status quo. And when the limitation has concerned also existing holdings, the privileged class has not failed to make its usual discovery of wangles to conserve essentially its own positions. Even the law that was adopted in Kerala by the Namboodiripad government — not long before it was dissolved — contains clauses which quite obviously play into the hands of the landowners.⁸

The redistribution of land has also taken another form quite peculiar to this country. One of Gandhi's disciples, Vinoba Bhave, in 1951 launched a movement whose goal was to get the big landowners to make a gift of part of their lands to the landless peasants. According to this reformer's calculations, if every landowner had given, on the average, one sixth of what he possessed, all the disinherited would have been able to have, on the average, a property of one acre. The authorities decided to back up this movement which had its obvious inspiration in ideas that were in a certain sense traditional for the Indian bourgeoisie.

It is useless to insist on the obvious limits of a movement of a humanitarian nature which counts on the "generosity" of the owning classes rather than on the will to struggle of the disinherited.⁹ Suffice it to say that in June 1958 the acres "given away" did not reach four and a half million, half of them, incidentally, in a single state (where Vinoba had developed his personal activity). In many cases, what is more, it was a matter of "well-arranged charity": the philanthropists preferred to get rid of rocky or practically untillable land. In addition, at the moment of the distribution of these lands, grave difficulties arose: to such a degree that in June

1958 only 782,000 acres had been distributed.¹⁰

What is called the Community Development Programme, officially launched in 1952, did not even have a modification of the structure of the rural regions as its goal, which was rather to create certain substructures and render possible more decent living conditions in the countryside. In view of the fact that the plans were absolutely insufficient, the results even on this level have been pretty meagre. Even the good will of certain government agents collapsed when faced with the mass resistance of a peasant society whose most reactionary elements can still today exert a crushing control.

Hence what is ancient — and even archaic — continues to block the path to renovation in the rural regions of India. And the basic structures have at the most only been shaken a little, without having been really touched in what is essential. It is true that the first cut has certainly been made into the remains of pre-capitalism and feudalism, and that the position of the big absentee landowners has certainly been weakened. But the great mass of the peasants has not derived any advantage therefrom and still remains in the same position of instability and dependence, in the same situation of finding it impossible to bring about the elementary improvements without which a perceptible increase in production cannot be obtained.

In reality the genuine aim of the reform has been to create a solid stratum of enterprise landowners of the capitalist type or a capitalist tendency, and rich peasants. That was a requirement of the capitalist development, however slow, of a society like Indian society. It was and still is a political requirement for the ruling class, to the degree that the crystallization of a stratum of this type might be able to fulfil a function of relative stabilization, avoiding the risks connected with the permanence of forms that were *historically outlived* and incapable of ensuring the slightest improvement in the masses' living conditions.¹¹ But this goal has been reached only partially because of the weight that the parasitic landowners continue to have in

¹⁰ Cfr *India 1959*, p 278, and *The Agrarian Prospect in India*, pp 74-75. The Gramdam is a movement similar to the Bhoodan, and consists of donating entire villages. The Sampattidan, on the contrary, consists of donations in money or of other types.

¹¹ On the subject of this evaluation, two tendencies in the workers' movement are in agreement even though they have fundamental divergences about other questions — those represented by the Indian Communist Party and by the Revolutionary Workers' Party of India, very close to the Fourth International (cfr the already mentioned books, *Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question* and *The Programme of the R W P I*). The evaluations of a specialist like Thorner (cfr op cit) are similar.

⁷ In Bombay this reduction seems to have been 50%, and even more in the Hyderabad. In the state of Andhra, the majority of the tenants seem to have been expelled (cfr *Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question*, 1958, pp 67-67).

⁸ Cfr *Agrarian Relations Bill, 1959*. The limit of holdings is set between 15 and 25 acres according to the case.

⁹ A criticism from a Marxist viewpoint may be found in the pamphlet of C G Shah, *Sampattidan and the Bhoodan Movement*, 1955. It is fundamentally correct, but a little schematic.

Indian society and because of the links that exist between them and the capitalist sectors. The results of this state of affairs on the strictly productive level have already been pointed out. A new experimental confirmation has thus been obtained of the lesson that could have been derived for other countries or other continents: in a backward country, in the historical phase through which we are now passing, the bourgeoisie is incapable of successfully carrying through an agrarian reform that theoretically would not go outside bourgeois-democratic limits. Experiences like those of Russia, China, and Jugoslavia have already demonstrated what explosive potentialities arise from this chronic incapacity. There is no reason to doubt that this same law may be equally valid for India.

NEHRU'S "REFORMISM" AND BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY

We have been speaking of the Indian ruling class as of a class that is indisputably bourgeois capitalist. Indeed, it does not seem to us necessary to prove this, for the demonstration is to be found in the overall history of India for many decades down to our day. We are not overlooking certain airy interpretations of which we spoke at the beginning of this article. But let us say frankly that prattlings about an India that is entering the "socialist world" or that is heading along its own road toward socialism under the direction of its present leadership, seem to us so absurd that it is rather up to those who engage in them to furnish the proofs therefor. We are quite willing to run the risk of being treated as "schematists," but we are convinced that nobody — however skilful he may be in juggling — can succeed in demonstrating that India no longer has a capitalist leadership or that with such a leadership it can be headed toward socialism.

It nevertheless remains to explain why Nehru's India has followed so special a course, which led it to start five-year plans, to sketch out an agrarian reform, to pursue a neutralist policy, and to speak of "socialist models." This task is not in reality very difficult if the slightest thought is given to a few givens in the Indian situation.

India reached political independence by what may be called, if one insists, "peaceful paths," especially because Great Britain was convinced that its economic interests could be safeguarded and that in that country there had been formed a native bourgeoisie sufficiently strong to prevent independence's being immediately followed by a social revolution. The British calculations turned out not to be false, but the Indian bourgeoisie has had to use every whit of its trickery to

maintain an equilibrium which in any cause could not be anything but precarious.

This dominant class, as has been said in passing, was and still is relatively strong for a colonial or semi-colonial country. If we are not mistaken, there exists no other example of a country of this same type. And the Gandhi movement and the Congress Party were able to create a whole leading stratum which, though quite weak compared to the capitalist countries, is nevertheless relatively important in the given situation. It is hardly necessary to say that the relative industrial development created the basic conditions; the contacts with European culture, the unifying function of Great Britain, etc, did the rest. It would be well, no doubt, to recall — even if it is a detail — that there exist in India newspapers of a higher level than in certain countries of Western Europe. The maturity of a dominant class is to be judged also by the organs that it knows how to produce, the forms that it adopts for the education and information of its cadres.

At the moment when the country reached independence, the Congress Party — the political expression of the ruling class — enjoyed very broad support by the masses. For these masses independence meant not only a formal political transformation but also a transformation of an economic and social nature. Neither Nehru nor his collaborators could ignore this element, all the more so in that, at the moment that Great Britain was giving up India, there was developing in China a mighty revolution which was to exert an ever greater influence on all the Asiatic masses.

The path for Nehru's India, therefore, could not be that of Chiang Kai-Shek: it had to be that of a prudent "reformism," even if this was to be found more in projects than in accomplishments. And in view of the still fresh memories of the anti-imperialist struggle, the very geographic position of the country, and its well-considered economic interests,¹² a neutralist foreign policy could only seem far-and-away preferable to an Atlantic policy. It is in fact thanks to all these positions — which the Soviet leaders have not failed to underwrite — that Nehru's party and even more Nehru personally continue to be supported by a broad popular base.

That is, in substance, the Indian "path", to which speeches about the "socialist model" have provided a propaganda accompaniment which, it was rightly supposed, would be palatable to

¹² Its neutralist policy has enabled India to profit by the economic aid of both the capitalist states and the USSR. In this aspect, India has found itself in a favorable situation, much better than that of China.

the masses. Some persons perhaps had illusions about this; others perhaps worried. Needless, for, as a top Indian leader specified in effect to a distinguished meeting of capitalists: "It is a question of an ethical aspiration which up to now has had no specific content."¹³ It will not have any more in the future, either.

It would be difficult to deny the fact that the most immediate economic and social problems have not been solved, and that the gap between India and the more developed capitalist countries has only grown greater. Furthermore, the parallel with China has now become so plain that it is a commonplace. Doubts may be entertained about the way in which the Chinese manipulate statistics. But nobody questions the fact that China has recorded a qualitative difference in its favor.

Nevertheless, if it is desired to count in India's favor its political structure, i.e., its parliamentary democracy, it is true that certain formal democratic rights — which can be appreciated especially, if not exclusively, by the ruling classes — still exist in the Indian Union, where it is possible to organize parties and trade unions, arrange mass meetings and conferences, publish newspapers and magazines, and where the deputies are chosen in *free* elections. But the conditions of the country — such as they have been determined by its historical evolution and rendered specific in the period of independence — are such that the play of parliamentary institutions and of democratic guarantees attached thereto turn inevitably in favor of the dominant, and even the most reactionary, strata. One of the greatest specialists in Indian problems recently wrote:

From the fact that the great majority of deputies is composed of big landowners, usurers, or their representatives, it follows that the parliamentary system is an obstacle to agrarian reform. [Tibor Mende: retranslated from French].

The genuine class nature of Nehrus's democracy could hardly be defined with greater synthesis and efficiency. And we shall not consider those Indian peasants wrong who are convinced that, in spite of all bureaucratic and authoritarian deformations, the Chinese communes represent a more effective form of democracy.

On the other hand, it is all too often agreeable to overestimate one aspect of political conditions in India. Though the aforementioned relative guarantees exist, repression is, on the contrary, almost always rapid and pitiless whenever mass movements, even of a trade-union nature, loom up. It is a matter not only of arrests carried

out on a wide scale, but also of the frequent use of arms with fatal results. During last September's food demonstrations in Calcutta, the dead were counted in the hundreds, the wounded in the thousands, the arrests in multiple thousands. The city had all the appearance of a zone occupied by an enemy army.¹⁴

But in any case the most serious problem remains that of the prospects for development. Will it be possible for India to keep its present structures much longer, to continue to be a parliamentary democracy, and, are we to observe, even by the intermediary of the necessary evolutions, a passing over to socialism by the "democratic" and "peaceful" path?

Some indications in the recent past — and we allude not only to certain very harsh repressions and to the arbitrary action carried out in Kerala, but also to certain manifestations of an internal crisis in the dominant class — might constitute premonitory signs — even though still far off — of a new course. Everything will depend on the evolution of the situation, first of all the economic situation, in these next years, and, naturally, of the dynamic evolution of the mass movement. If the economic stagnation were still to continue, and if certain elementary requirements of the masses were not to be satisfied, the margin still at the disposal of Nehru and the Congress Party might be narrowed down, and in this hypothesis the Indian bourgeoisie could hardly afford the luxury of parliamentary democracy. The Kerala experience, for that matter, has demonstrated what reply it makes when the play of democratic forces tends, even partially, to turn against itself.

Anticipations have already been made about what the Third Five-Year Plan ought to be, and the projects seem ambitious.¹⁵ Unquestionably the future of India depends to a great extent on what it will be possible to accomplish during the last years of the plan now in process and the five following years. The prognosis, on the basis of the experience visualized, ought to be pessimist. But it is not possible to set aside the hypothesis of a more favorable, or less unfavorable, evolution — one that in any case may be able to postpone certain deadlines in the case that, in a prolonged climate of *détente*, the United States contributes aid of a very great scope.¹⁶

¹⁴ The author was an eyewitness of these events.

¹⁵ A criticism in this sense was made by R K Dutt in *New Age*, monthly review of the Indian C P (August 1959).

¹⁶ In the aforementioned article R K Dutt claims that it will be "not only possible but even easy for America to finance the plan as a whole," a plan which should reach 10,000 crores of rupees \$20,000 million, or £714,285,000. If it is considered that the amount of the three debit chapters of the US balance of payments in 1959 reached \$7,500 million, this claim certainly seems exaggerated.

¹³ Cfr *The Japan Times*, 18 October 1959 (in *Far East Economic Problems*).

It is probable that Nehru will try to manoeuvre in this direction, and, in any case, we have in these last months witnessed a slant of his policy in a more "pro-Western" direction.

TOWARD DECISIVE DEADLINES

It is not possible to tackle here the problem, though it is a fundamental one, of the mass movement in India and its most recent developments. It will suffice to indicate that very important obstacles stand in the way of the development of its immense potential power, obstacles which have constituted and still continue to constitute a delaying factor. The geographic extent of the country, the manifold linguistic, religious, and other sorts of differences, the diversity of historical experiences even in recent periods — all these render the effective and efficacious unification of the movement on a national scale extremely difficult. Thus the forces of even the most important parties, including the Communist Party, are very unevenly distributed, while local parties and organizations flourish, strong in one region or state and practically unheard of in the others. In the last analysis, this state of affairs produces one of the most important weaknesses of the movement: the inadequacy of the peasant organizations. And, what is stranger, is just among the rural laborers that this lack is the most pronounced.¹⁷

Aside from the still considerable influence exerted by the Congress Party (the prestige enjoyed by Nehru is a determinant factor), no workers' organization has succeeded, up till now, in exerting a decisive influence on the national scale upon the majority of the mass movement. We have here a characteristic element that differentiates India from, for example, Indonesia.

During a certain period immediately after independence, the hypothesis could be put forward that, because of a whole series of factors, the mass movement might be channeled in the Socialist Party. But this was not verified, and the Socialist Party — which went through different splits and now has to face the competition of other similar parties, sometimes strong on the regional scale — has maintained a relatively limited influence which is far oftener exerted in petty-bourgeois than in worker or peasant circles. This is to a large degree the result of its conservative policy which led it under certain circumstances to attack Nehru from the right. The Communist Party is unquestionably strong-

er, even though more than half of its 27 deputies¹⁸ were elected from only two states, which clearly shows the unevenness of its development. This year feverish discussions, on the occasion of the Kerala and Calcutta events, have opened up about its strength and its future possibilities. In Calcutta, the food movement was attributed to its initiative, though this movement in reality had a much broader leadership and many characteristics of spontaneity stood out in it.¹⁹ In Kerala, which is, however, one of the smallest states in the Union, Communist influence is predominant. Some persons suppose that in the last analysis the repression may strengthen that influence, while others — in leftist circles — claim that the timid policy of Nambudiripad and the non-fulfillment of certain promises have had a negative effect on the popular base and objectively helped the reactionary mobilization.²⁰ It is hard to form a well-defined opinion on the point. But though almost nobody thinks that the C P will have a vigorous development within a short time, very many are nevertheless convinced that it is following a rising curve. What is essential plainly depends on the positions that its leadership will advocate, especially on the fundamental problems.²¹

In any case the situation inside the mass movement is far from being crystalized, and in the process of development there will be new polarizations and new groupings. It is only in this later stage that the Indian revolution will be able to say that it has found its own leadership.

If there are taken into consideration all the factors that are operative and are destined to be accentuated, it is possible in fact to speak of an Indian revolution in the most specific sense. Explosive elements of every sort and in gigantic proportions are present in this subcontinent of 400 million inhabitants. The roads of neo-capitalism, of gradual reform, of an attenuation

¹⁸ The Socialist Party has 20 deputies, the Congress Party 366.

¹⁹ The agitation was led by a committee formed by some ten parties of the left, many of them calling themselves Marxist. It is unquestionable, however, that the C P was the strongest element in this committee; still, it would not alone have been able to determine the situation that was created.

²⁰ It has been particularly emphasized that, despite its formal promises, the Nambudiripad government mobilized the police for anti-worker repressions. In July 1958 at Quilon there were workers killed.

²¹ The line of the Indian C P in this post-war period has undergone different oscillations, but it is now aimed toward a sort of critical support for Nehru. This support has been ensured, thanks to obvious concessions to the wave of nationalism, even on the occasion of the border incidents with China. The Indian C P has also emphasized the theses of the XXth Congress about the democratic and parliamentary path to socialism.

¹⁷ Agrarian reform has also been limited because there are not important mass movements in the rural regions. In the state of Andhra, where a strong peasant organization exists, the reform was much more thorough and effective than elsewhere.

of economic imbalances and social contrasts, are, more than ever, closed. And the immediate prospects for the Indian masses in the existing framework continue to be prospects of destitution and domination.

But the imbalances and contradictions, though they can be maintained for certain periods, are operating in the direction of a break in certain other periods. If account is taken of the dramatic problems raised — within a not very distant period, as we have seen — by the stagnation in agriculture; if it is taken into consideration that the fears and prejudices on which the dominant classes have based their power are, in spite of everything, being inexorably worn away; if it is not forgotten that the Indian masses form part of a colonial world in continual ebullition, and that especially the example of China exerts a

more and more formidable attraction upon them; if the fact is not neglected that the state (in the broadest sense of the word) and “civil society” have in capitalist and bourgeois India roots that are less deep than in the advanced capitalist countries — then it appears legitimate to be convinced that certain historical deadlines are no longer so far away. And the social transformations which may be produced in India during 1960 and which it is absolutely ridiculous to believe can develop in a more or less “democratic” or “constitutional” framework without a break-up of all existing structures, will be destined to leave in the history of our century a mark comparable to those already left by the two revolutions of Russia and China.

1-3 January 1960

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE

By PIERRE FRANK

In our last issue we pointed out that de Gaulle's Bonapartism, after about two years in power, was being stripped of its parliamentary appendages, that the state apparatus appeared to be increasingly isolated, and that de Gaulle's authority was beginning to diminish, especially because of the inability he was showing to end the war in Algeria.

The worsening of the political climate has been rapidly reflected by a series of movements for immediate demands, especially in the Paris public transport system and on the railways. We cannot here undertake a very detailed study of the movements that have occurred; it is to some of their main characteristics and teachings that we should like to call attention.

On the whole, the workers' discontent was so strong that the outbreak of the movements caught napping not only the government but to a quite large extent even the trade-union leaderships. A whole series of struggles were spontaneous in character. The movements were within the limits of *pressure* on the government and management, rather than those of a trial of strength. Most of the demonstrations were of a good-natured sort; it is only in a few special cases that, under provocation, the workers toughened up their movements and a few incidents occurred on a local scale.

In this situation, the trade-union leaderships lined up at the level of the least advanced part of the movements, fostering illusions about the possibility of obtaining substantial results by means solely of pressure, and not preparing the workers for much tougher struggles, for trials of strength. It would certainly have been a great mistake on the part of the union leaders, in the correlation of forces resulting from the May 1958 defeat, to take the weak revival that is now occurring as a starting point for proceeding immediately to launch great struggles that could only turn into that trial of strength. But the role of the leaderships should have been to lead, to foresee, to prepare, and to educate. Alas, it was a long way from that.

All French toilers know that the deterioration of their living levels is caused by the continuation of the war in Algeria. The trade unions — who nevertheless assert that they are all opposed to that war — have not stressed this point strongly enough during these movements. It is the same with the political movements. What is more, neither the French C P nor the C G T

has propagandized for the prospect of a struggle against the regime. Neither the struggles for immediate demands nor the struggle against the war in Algeria have been fitted into this prospect. Under such conditions, it is understandable that it is not easy to summon up the strength, the drive, and the vigor that will be needed in the future by struggles that will inevitably run up against aggravated repression by the government. If there could be any doubt on this point, it would be enough to observe that the government — which, during the whole period when the movements were broad and tended to spread, remained practically inert — stepped right in, as soon as the wave showed signs of ebbing, with a decree militarily requisitioning the Paris transport workers. This was a deliberate provocation, to which the unions involved did not immediately find any appropriate answer.

The strength of the spontaneous movement of the masses showed itself to be sufficiently great so that, despite the break-up of the summit conference, there did not occur what would almost inevitably have happened in other times and under other governments, namely, a break-down of unity in action.

To summarize in a few words the balance-sheet of the Spring 1960 movements for immediate demands, it can be said that the workers' morale came out strengthened, but that there was a big "lost opportunity" for causing the next movements to be involved and led under conditions corresponding to the needs of the situation.

A new phenomenon has appeared in France, as in many other regions of the world: the entry of university youth into political movement, and political demonstrations of youth organizations against the war in Algeria. The U N E F, the officially recognized students' organization, has reestablished relations with the U G E M A, the dissolved organization of the Algerian students. A declaration has been signed by the representatives of 53 youth organizations calling for a halt to the war in Algeria.

Within a relatively short time the reaction has seen its positions in the universities dissolve, while the vanguard has been turning toward various forms of struggle, running from non-violence to aid for the Algerian revolution and refusal to serve in the army.

Thus, among the youth of France, there has been observable — with account taken of the

peculiarities of the situation in the country — a phenomena of a world-wide type, a movement in university youth, not led by the traditional organizations, without previous political training, but spontaneously turning to radical solutions and methods. In France it is the colonial revolution, in the form of the fight of the Algerian people, which has stirred up the university youth, and it is likely that working-class youth also will not long delay in showing a political awakening.

The government has been sharply aware of these manifestations; confronted by the current political revival in France, it attacked the organizationally weakest point, the U N E F — whose members, in the nature of things, are constantly being replaced — by withdrawing the government subsidy that was an important contribution to its functioning. Although declarations of solidarity have not been lacking, one has the feeling that the defense of the U N E F has not been understood as a political problem of very great importance.

The nub of the question is that the official leaderships do not have toward the youth an attitude of real confidence. They are afraid of its non-conformism, its tendency to go much farther than they themselves intend to go. It was enough to observe the reactions of these leaderships and of newspapermen toward those young men who refused military service or who put themselves at the service of the Algerian revolution. That “respectful left,” to pick up the well-chosen expression of *Temps Modernes* (which gave it a masterly thrashing), is shouting “Whoa! whoa!” — imploring everybody to stay inside limits compatible with its reformist desires.

De Gaulle's regime has had to put up with a kicking over of the traces by those who only yesterday were its best friends inside the world of the former French empire. In 1958 de Gaulle invented the “Communauté,” which was to keep together in association whatever remained of the French Union. Guinea left. The Mali (Senegal and the Sudan) were kept by the promise of concessions. Thus the “renovated Communauté” was arrived at, which transformed the whole business into a sort of confederation. Then when everything was just ready, those in favor of a solid federation, i e, the so-called “entente” countries, under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, demanded downright independence.

These various factors — set in an international

context marked by a speeded-up drive forward of the colonial revolution — led de Gaulle to make new declarations that permitted the opening of negotiations with the G P R A, before he should be outstripped by a new worsening of the situation in France itself.

We examine in an editorial note (p 6) the question of these negotiations as they regard the relations between France and Algeria. But there is also the question of what their effects may be on the development of the situation inside France.

It is already visible that the most reformist parts of the workers' movement and of the left bourgeoisie are ready to rely on de Gaulle to follow up events. Because of this fact and also because of the timid policy of the French C P and the Socialist left, it is probable that resistance to the war in Algeria will not have, for a period, the development which, it seems, it would have had undergone if the negotiations had not been begun. But, in our opinion, there is a good likelihood that what is being observed there is only a conjunctural fluctuation. For there seems to be becoming manifest throughout France a reversal of trends, which has its source in deep changes. Since January, the reaction has lost its impetus; it would like to mobilize against the negotiations, whose outcome it fears, but it also fears lest any mobilization would arouse on the left forces that would easily gain the upper hand. On the left, there is observable a symptomatic drive for unity, the wind from which is beginning to be felt by the old reformist weather-vanes of the Socialist Party and the Force Ouvrière labor federation. Of course the leaders are trying not to let themselves be outflanked and to assign this still not very strong movement quite timid goals (laïc schools, etc) which are not of a sort to infuse it with enthusiasm.

Confronted by this, the Gaullist regime is obviously not ready to give way. What is to be expected is a toughening of social relationships, in which the initiative lies in the hands of the state. But however slight the political revival may still be, on the one hand it has its origin in deep movements that are occurring within the masses, and on the other, it has already produced currents among the youth, who are not ready to follow the old leaderships in their cowardly and treacherous policy. The French workers' movement will be able to recover from its May 1958 defeat.

27 June 1960

BOLIVIAN AGRARIAN REFORM

Its Situation and Tasks After Six Years

By HÉCTOR LUCERO

IV¹

THE "FAILURE" OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM

DUAL POWER AND PRODUCTION

Six years after its official promulgation, the agrarian reform has not fulfilled its promises of a considerable increase in production and in peasant well-being. Its enemies are speculating on its "failure."

In the first place, experience demonstrates that any revolution, and any agrarian revolution, at its beginnings brings in its wake a fall in production until a reorganization on new bases has been made. Dual power does not make a climate propitious for raising production, living standards, and productivity. It is a climate of uncertainty, struggle, and lack of effective leadership in the life of the nation. It is in the interest of the revolution to pass as quickly as possible through the stage of dual power and set up the new workers' and peasants' power which reorganizes on new socialist bases the country's entire economic and political apparatus.

Now in Bolivia dual power has been prolonged since 9 April 1952. Although the capitalist power controls the cities, although the workers' and peasants' power appears to be covered over, held in check, braked, there nonetheless continues to exist a climate of uncertainty, of lack of centralized leadership. In this situation it is impossible to obtain a sustained increase in production either in industry or in agriculture. This fact is brought up by all the capitalist theoreticians of the MNR in order to demand a more reactionary policy. In one thing they are quite right: it is necessary to overcome dual power. But the problem is: *who* will liquidate it, and in favor of *whom*? will the capitalist power finish off the workers' power of the trade unions and militia and impose capitalist-imperialist law, or will the workers' power finish off the capitalist government and the reigning disorder and impose its own proletarian order? ²

It has already been observed how the peasant was abandoned by the state, how the agrarian reform was slowed down, both in granting title-deeds and in aid to producers, and how the agrarian economy was left to its own fate and tied down to the same age-old backwardness as always. And lastly other factors have determined the crisis in agrarian reform.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Agrarian production is closely connected with the development of the economy as a whole, and first of all with that of industry. Lenin and Trotsky, basing themselves on the experience of

Nevertheless, it is not unfavorable meteorological conditions alone that can completely explain the great reduction that has occurred in tilled areas. Other factors have had a more decisive influence on the development of agriculture in recent years. Among them there must be pointed out in the first place the faulty way in which the decree of agrarian reform has been applied up until now. The adjudication of lands, in accordance with the norms of this decree, has gone forward at an extraordinarily slow rhythm. The lack of experience and organization in carrying out this kind of work, the almost total lack of surveying personnel, and the relatively complicated procedures for the granting of title-deeds and the distribution of lands, are some of the causes that have motivated this slowness. As a result of this and of the natural post-revolutionary agitation that has existed in the country in these last years, a climate of uncertainty has been created in the countryside, both among the former landowners and among the very peasants favored by the reform. The former have become frightened by the open hostility shown toward them by the peasants, who invade their properties and in fact do not let them come back to their estates. Even those who have done so run into serious difficulties in obtaining laborers. The peasants, for their part, feel insecure because they do not possess legal title, and are afraid of losing at any moment the ownership of the lands which are now being adjudicated. Besides this, they have lacked the necessary technical and financial aid to contribute effectively to their settling themselves down in their new properties. As a result of this prevailing insecurity and the lack of a well-balanced programme of application of the reform, the greater part of the lands directly worked by the former estate-owners has been left practically untilled, and today is used only for grazing — often harmful for the soil — of the peasants' livestock. In this way,

¹ For the first part of this article, see our Spring issue.

² In its already quoted study, the CEPAL sets forth a certain understanding reached by the bourgeoisie on the problem of the fall-off in production. It states:

the Soviet state in its first years, assigned primary importance to the relationship between industrial development and the increase in peasant production: the peasant, though he possesses the land, will not increase his production unless he obtains the industrial products he needs by the exchange of his farm products (i.e., bought with the money he receives for them).

Agrarian reform, by incorporating broad peasant sectors into the money economy, the market, potentially creates a greater demand for industrial articles. But if industry does not satisfy this hope, the agrarian economy closes in on itself, folds up into a subsistence economy, and lowers its acquisitive capacity. This is the beginning of a vicious circle, for, with the shrinking of the market, industry produces less, gives work to fewer workers, satisfies even less the needs of the countryside — which continues to close up still further into a subsistence economy.

Bolivian industry can satisfy the peasants' needs only to a very small extent, nor has there been, of course, the slightest more or less radical planning or orientation of its production in connection with this problem.³ In the first stage (1952-1956), inflation worked against the peasant, for prices of manufactured articles always rose faster than those of agricultural products. But in the second stage (since 1957) stabilization did not arrange the situation either: the abrupt shrinkage of the consumers' market in the cities and the new rise in industrial prices had a direct repercussion on the peasant economy.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MARKET

The relationship of the peasant with the market since the reform has been more uncertain even than before. The landowner fulfilled this function, and, though he got away with the better part of the product of peasant labor, there did exist a traditional system of relations of exchange between town and country. The disappearance of the landowner from the greater part

the only lands that continue to be tilled in a permanent way are the former little plots, *sayañas*, aimed mainly at providing foodstuffs for their owners — which leaves only a very limited part thereof for sale in the markets. This explains the great contradiction that has occurred in the offer of foodstuffs in the urban centres during these last years. In other words, the subsistence character of Bolivian agriculture has become even further accentuated.

³ Industry brings in only 9% of the total national income. But not even its scant development is properly profited by: while factories close, or others cut down production, there exists, for example, an urgent need for tools of a simple sort for agriculture, which is not furnished by national industry, though this is entirely within its present possibilities.

of the Bolivian countryside broke off this link, which was not replaced by another equally centralized one. The dispersal of the small peasant economy weakened this contact with the national market and injured production.

Aside from the peasants who go to offer their products directly in fairs in the towns and cities, there exist middlemen who come to the producing areas to buy harvests. In this form of marketing, the peasant has to yield to the middlemen a very high percentage of the price paid by the consumer for his products (although previously his percentage was even less, since the landowner got away with the greater part). This injures both the producer and the consumer, narrows down the market, and conspires against production.⁴

Coöperatives, which ought to have been a first step toward a more profitable relationship with the market, both for peasant consumption and for the marketing of farm products, were not developed by the government.

A limited number of coöperatives were set up.⁵ But these, for the most part, functioned not as coöperatives but as "cuperativas,"⁶ as they were then described. The government assigned each officially registered coöperative a "cupo" of consumers' products (sugar, flour, rice, *tocuyo* [coarse cotton cloth], etc), priced in dollars at the official rate (190 Bolivianos), while the dollar was quoted at Bs 6,000, 7,000, and finally up to 12,000 on the black market. Of course many of these "coöperatives" existed only on paper, to obtain cupos, and even in the real ones the cupos served to a large extent only to enrich a few favored ones, while only a fraction of these low-priced articles reached the peasant.

But with monetary stabilization, the coöperative movement did not succeed in developing, either: the real point is that this movement

⁴ According to the CEPAL, a calculation made by the Servicio Agrícola Interamericano in May 1956 shows the following break-down in the price of oranges at that date in the city of La Paz:

| | Percentages |
|------------------------------------|-------------|
| Grower | 21 |
| Transportation | 15 |
| Wholesaler | 22 |
| Market semi-wholesaler | 25 |
| Individual city retailer | 17 |
| | 100 |

⁵ According to Deputy López Ávila, there existed in 1957 some 400 coöperatives, "of which only some 30-odd deserve to be so described: the others are simply buying and selling clubs, have no culture, have no organization, and have not even been taught the basic principles of coöperativism."

⁶ The play on words comes from the term "cupo," a kind of quota.

cannot be developed from above, but only by mobilizing the peasantry, setting into operation its own capacity for initiative. But the peasantry cannot be mobilized for one thing and held back for another, and that is the drama of any capitalist government.

What also conspired against the growth of a genuine movement of coöperatives was the political use that the government and the reaction wanted to make of them. Their intention, with the open support of the clergy, was to set the coöperatives in opposition to the trade unions, the coöperative movement as a counterweight to and substitute for the trade-union movement, till the union movement was finally replaced by the coöperative movement. The peasant resisted this campaign, aimed against his main instrument of defense and struggle, and the discredit therefor fell on the coöperatives.

FOREIGN TRADE

Another problem that directly affected agriculture was its relationship with the world market, in the prices of its products (even though they were not destined for export), and in the importation of machines, fertilizers, etc.

As for prices, the importation of a series of agricultural products (rice, wheat, potatoes, etc) with cheap dollars, though it helped consumption in the cities (and also, especially, those who distributed the cupos and foreign exchange), meant a ruinous competition for production inside the country, harmed the establishment of a normal exchange between town and country, contributed to the reduction of cultivated areas, and helped to accentuate subsistence economy in the rural regions and dependence on foreign trade by the entire country.

As for machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, etc, the primitivism of methods of cultivation had already rendered traditional the scantiness or non-existence of any investment by the country in these departments. Up until 1953, imports of farm machinery represented scarcely 5% of capital goods imports, and 1% of total imports (in a mainly agricultural country!). At that time an increase took place, on the one hand through the machinery brought in by the S A I for its work, and on the other through a series of bloc purchases carried out by agreements with foreign trading companies. But these agreements were destined, not so much to mechanize the rural regions, as to enrich a few favored ones, since, apart from the fact that the machinery was bought at high prices and was in many cases unusable, the adjudication of a tractor, for example, at the official price, was not going to be made generally to the producing peasant but

to some "influential politician," who made a highly profitable deal out of it. The mechanization of the rural regions became a farce, and the dollars destined therefor just went into private pockets.⁷

Monetary stabilization brought an end to deals based on the official exchange rate. But the importation of farm machinery and tools was also frozen. As importation is now free, the country's foreign exchange is used by importers for products for which there is a solvent market, i e, those destined for the well-off classes, mainly, apart from foodstuffs. For the peasant, a tractor, which once was a mirage, has now become an impossible dream.

The development of production in a period of agrarian reform has a close connection with foreign trade, and requires a state monopoly of this trade in the hands of the workers and peasants, guaranteeing that their resources shall be used first of all for the real needs of development. Without this, there is no progress in farm production, however much land may be distributed. This is another experience confirmed by the Bolivian revolution.

INVESTMENTS IN THE RURAL REGIONS

The agrarian reform requires increased investment in agriculture, not only in machinery, but also in roads, irrigation works, education, and all the other aspects that have been pointed out. Without this investment, and a parallel and proportionate development of local and national industry, the agrarian reform remains stagnant and shut in on itself.

In a agriculture that scarcely goes beyond the subsistence level, where the landowner has been driven from the rural regions, there exist no normal reserves for investment. These resources can be provided or mobilized only by the state. But if the economy functions on capitalist bases, if capital accumulation is limited to private hands, if the private banks continue to control essential credit, investment is not going to reach rural regions convulsed by the revolution and in the hands of insolvent small peasants who — what is worse — are not even "legally" occupying their lands.⁸

⁷ "The existence of an artificially low official exchange rate meant also a considerable stimulus for the importation of equipment in an indiscriminate manner, not subject to any plan. It has been possible to judge in 1956, when a good part of the existing equipment was paralyzed for lack of repair parts and the lack of personnel specialized in handling it." (C E P A L, in the aforementioned study.)

⁸ The landowners had at their disposal a certain amount of credit which is at present refused to the peasant. For that matter, farm credit was always very low in Bolivia. The C E P A L calculated that between 1950 and 1955 the

With "Bolivian-style" agrarian reform, the rural regions have partially escaped from normal capitalist functioning. Capitalism and its state will invest there only when there are reestablished free disposal of the land and the possibility of obtaining and accumulating profits.

The empiricism of the M N R regime toward the rural regions and the agrarian reform in its first years, imposed on it to a large extent by its being overwhelmed by the mass movement, has been replaced by the conscious determination to reestablish capitalism there. This is a political, rather than an economic, operation. Guevara is the theoretician of this attempt, in the only form that is possible and suitable to capitalism: not merely a just plain return of the former latifundists, which has already become impossible, but rather a recognition of the distribution of land as an irreversible fact yet opening the way to a new concentration of farm property in capitalist hands, depriving the peasants once more of the richest lands by "legal" means (court actions, mortgages, usury, and, in the background, the armed forces) and maintaining the stratum of middle and poor peasants needed to provide cheap manpower for the new agrarian bosses. Guevara is the champion of the struggle against "dual power," "agrarian anarchy," "peasant fortresses," and "agrarian caudillos."

But it is an economic operation as well. The peasantry today has the forces, decisiveness, and weapons to resist too obvious attempts to turn the clock back. But its impoverishment, the abandonment of the countryside, the growing destitution — these are factors of demoralization that the government are consciously cultivating. The excessive subdivision of the subsistence economy not only render impossible even the slightest accumulation by the poor peasant but also create conditions favoring conflicts among the peasants themselves.

The enormous waste of farm manpower, current in all backward countries,⁹ has not been solved,

loans accorded by the Banco Agrícola reached less than 0.5% of the total value of Bolivian farm and stock-raising production. Then the supervised credit of the SAI was set up, which meant a certain increase, but this went by preference to capitalist exploitations in Santa Cruz, and is granted to poor peasants only in minute amounts and with political conditions.

⁹ But in a country with a huge population of underemployed peasants (it would be more correct to say: village inhabitants), it is not necessary to start with huge capital investments in order to achieve a substantial increase in the average productivity of labor.

For what else is underemployment if not the fact that in such backward countries half or two-thirds of the population, living in the villages, are only really working 150 to 200 days a year! (The First

but indeed aggravated, by the situation in the Bolivian rural regions. "The fund of accumulation hidden in underemployment" is completely wasted. The capitalist government needs to *demobilize* the countryside politically: that is its most imperious, most pressing, most urgent need. Thus it cannot try to *mobilize* it economically—far from it. Not only does it not know how to do so, nor does it have the necessary interest, instrumentalities, and authority, but indeed directly it neither can nor finds it suitable to do so.

The landowners, at the time of the revolution, ceased to absorb a considerable part of farm income (although the landowner sector was not suppressed in all regions). Despite the fact that other abuses and exactions against the peasant continued (through judges, functionaries, police, taxes, trade-union bureaucracy, etc), they were less than before.

With these resources—not to mention others that exist—not only was it possible to raise the peasants' living standards much more, but also to develop a fund of accumulation, added to the centralized receipts produced by the nationalization of the mines, for economic development.

THE FAILURE OF THE "PROGRESSIVE" BOURGEOISIE

But the intention of the M N R was to create a "progressive" bourgeoisie by means of the redistribution of national income through inflation and currency control, channeling these benefits into private hands. The resources, in the form of credits and exceptionally cheap foreign exchange which the state turned over to this "bourgeoisie," were in practice to a large extent wrenched by means of inflation from the most numerous productive sector, the peasantry. This "bourgeoisie"

Five-Year Plan of India estimated the number of adult males in Indian agriculture at the staggering figure of 70 million people!) The rest of the year, they do nothing. Now if it were possible to give them something to do during the rest of the year, some productive purpose which does not need huge fixed equipment, their annual production, and thus their annual productivity, would tremendously increase. In fact, while doing nothing, they continue to eat. It would be sufficient to give them a little bit more to eat, while getting them to work, in order to treat the largest part, if not the whole, of their increased production as social surplus product, as a social investment fund. [Ernest Germain, "The Industrialization of Backward Countries," in our issue N° 4, Autumn 1958.]

Although in Bolivia the population problem is far from being raised in the same terms, it is indubitable that there exists semi-employment or underemployment of the peasantry (64% of the population, at least), which has been much aggravated by the economic retreat provoked by the monetary stabilization imposed by the International Monetary Fund.

did not have a safe and profitable field of investment in Bolivia, and even less in its rural regions, and the capital that the government turned over to it fled the country or was used only for speculative ends. The former current of private mining went on, which places Bolivia among those countries "exporting capital."

Those resources, centralized and nationalized, would have been sufficient to give the initial impetus to a harmonious development of industry and farming. Instead, industry and farming have gone in a parallel way, but in the other direction: crisis and falling off of production.

What has failed in Bolivia is not agrarian reform but *capitalist* agrarian reform, administered and directed by the capitalist state. What exists in reality is not a failure but an agrarian crisis. What has reached a crisis is the contradiction between the agrarian revolution, out of capitalist control, carried out by the peasantry, and the continued existence of the capitalist state power and economic structure of the country. The agrarian crisis is the expression in the rural regions of the crisis of dual power.

This crisis capitalism wants to solve in its own favor by a *political* and *economic* operation. These are today the bases, as we shall see below, for a worker-peasant alliance.

V

THE WORKER-PEASANT ALLIANCE: ITS BASES AND TASKS

AGRARIAN REFORM AND PERMANENT REVOLUTION

The Bolivian experience is conclusive: thorough development of the agrarian reform is incompatible with the continuance of the capitalist regime. In spite of its non-socialist nature, the logic of the development of the agrarian reform in this period and in backward countries is anti-capitalist. Either there is set up a workers' and peasants' government that from the seat of power upholds and develops the peasant revolution, or the bourgeois government will soon confront the peasant masses with a sabotage of any advance of agrarian reform, in open or tacit alliance with the landowners.

The illusion of the petty-bourgeois parties and of the theoreticians of bourgeois development in backward countries is that agrarian reform, the destruction of feudalism in the rural regions, and the turning over of the land to the peasants, create an internal market for industry and provide the bases for a development of capitalism and the industrial bourgeoisie.

But the first effect of "Bolivian-style" agrarian reform is not to create a broad market (that comes

later, if there is development), but to liquidate one of the bases of capitalist strength, investment, and accumulation: the alliance with the landowners, their direct appropriation of unpaid peasant labor.

The agrarian reform upsets the balance of power between the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat. On the one hand, as it is the peasant masses who impose agrarian reform by their armed mobilization (and if not, a real agrarian reform and genuine distribution of the land are not achieved), the proletariat gains an ally that is powerful and in full movement. On the other hand, the liquidation of the economic and political power of the landowners deprives the weak national bourgeoisie of what is — apart from imperialism — its best ally against the advance of the masses.

The development of the peasant revolution speeds up the capitulation and sell-out of the national bourgeoisie to imperialism, its last sure ally against the masses.

In its turn, the peasant revolution, the armed mobilization of the peasantry to win and defend its land, the support given by the peasantry to the regime that emerged from the April revolution (which the peasantry understands as being for the defense of its conquests and its lands), the workers' and peasants' alliance in the C O B and in mass actions—these have been the absolute base for the maintenance of the revolution.

Without the peasants' weapons, without the peasants' unions, without their de facto alliance with the miners' and workers' trade unions (despite the sabotage of the leaderships), in a word without dual power, the revolution would long since have been defeated in Bolivia by the capitulation of the petty-bourgeois leadership to the pressure and blows of imperialism and reaction.

Without dual power, under a stable and purely capitalist power (however "progressive" and "democratic" it might have been), the agrarian reform, together with the revolution, would long since have perished.

But, inversely, the maintenance in Bolivia of the capitalist state, of the capitalist regime, is every day objectively working against agrarian reform.

Unless it is accompanied by other measures in an anti-capitalist direction, the agrarian reform will remain isolated and blocked, and will begin to disappoint and disperse the enthusiasm of the masses. Nevertheless, this is not the process of a single day: a peasantry that is armed and occupies its lands in an agrarian country shows a capacity for resistance that can last many long years even though it has not solved the problem of power, especially if the resistance and basic cohe-

sion of the proletariat in its trade unions are maintained, even if it does not go forward.

THE QUESTION OF POWER

The problem of power becomes the key question for the triumph of the peasant revolution and for the agrarian and industrial development of the country. The capitalist power is incapable of pulling the country out of its feudal backwardness and of developing capitalism. As Lenin demonstrated in *State Capitalism and the Tax in Kind*, workers' power is the only one that can develop "capitalism," under the control and direction of the workers' state, in a backward country.

Trotsky says the same in the second thesis of *The Permanent Revolution*:

In respect to countries of retarded bourgeois development, especially colonial and semi-colonial ones, the theory of the permanent revolution means that the integral and effective solution of their democratic aims and of their national emancipation can be conceived only by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this class seizing power as the oppressed nation, and above all of its peasant masses.

But the problem of power raises the problem of the worker-peasant alliance, without which the struggle for workers' power in a backward country is inconceivable.

The worker and peasant alliance is the basis of the Latin American revolution. The precondition for its establishment is that the proletariat calls to the struggle, and itself struggles, with its programme for agrarian reform and the defense of the sharing-out of the land, calling on the peasants to fight for the workers' power, for the workers' and peasants' government, that will support and defend the sharing-out of the land. [Editorial in the *Revista Marxista Latinoamericana*, n° 9.]

This is the fundamental premise for the worker-peasant alliance in the struggle against the national bourgeoisie, the oligarchy, and imperialism. But in Bolivia, since the April revolution, in the situation of the sharing-out of the land and dual power, this premise needs to be complemented by a programme that shows the peasantry that a favorable outlook for the reform already begun lies in the workers' power, in a transitional programme between the present stage and the workers' and peasants' government.

In Bolivia, afterwards in Cuba, and further in other countries of Latin America, the case occurs where the strength of the mass movement carries out a thorough agrarian reform — which the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie would never

have carried out — based on dual power or the beginning of dual power, but the lack or weakness of a revolutionary Marxist leadership prevents it from culminating in workers' power. A bourgeois regime is set up, but paralleled by a beginning of workers' power, and shaken in its foundations and in its possibilities of stability by the peasant revolution. This situation is the typical result of the gap existing between the highly revolutionary objective conditions and the backward subjective conditions, in the formation of a revolutionary workers' leadership of the masses.

THE BASES OF THE WORKER-PEASANT ALLIANCE

It is under these conditions that it is necessary to raise the question: What is the programme for advancing the worker-peasant alliance and, along the way, building this leadership?

It does not take the peasant long to see that the agrarian reform is not a panacea. It is agitated as the basic measure and the masses mobilize behind it, but it needs to be complemented by other measures or it founders. Economic development that raises farm production and peasants' living standards after the reform is added as one of the bases for the continuation of the alliance.

With the agrarian reform half made (the land distributed for the most part, but nothing more), the peasantry has to see in the workers not only the guarantee and the leadership of the struggle for the land as a centre, but also the support and the orientation and leadership for its economic development. It is by its own narrow economic interests that the peasantry measures the results and advantages of the alliance. It knows that in the proletariat it has the guarantee against a return of the latifundists, and therefore it supports it. But it needs something more to go forward against the capitalist government responsible for the crisis in the agrarian reform.

The alliance, if it is to go forward, needs to be based not only on a resistance to an open return to the former regime of the bosses, but above all on a struggle against the capitalist government and their influence on the peasantry. The solutions and means for raising the alliance to the level of this struggle must be based on the current situation and the current stage.

The worker-peasant alliance has not been broken, but it has ebbed. It is maintained as a front of resistance, of defense of gains already won. It needs to be converted into a front for an advance toward new revolutionary positions.

The cause of this ebb is not merely the policy of the leadership, however great its responsibility may be therein. It is also the ebb in farm production, the retreat toward subsistence economy, the

abandonment of peasant needs. The government are aware that these are all factors leading to dispersal. They are profiting by the inactivity and submissiveness of the official labor leadership, its abandonment of the rural regions, in order consciously to accentuate them.

After six years of official agrarian reform, the peasantry has not been able to raise its living levels, its production; it is finding out from experience that land alone is not enough, either with or without title-deeds. That is not what it was expecting from the agrarian reform.

From now on, the workers' movement must appear in factual action as the guide and practical aid, in plans, in methods of struggle, for raising production and the peasantry's living levels. It must show in practice, even on a small scale, that only the workers' and peasants' power can guarantee the peasants' gains and improve their situation. The peasantry, which already possesses its land to a large extent, will be won over to the struggle for the workers' power, against the capitalist government, if from now on the workers' movement demonstrates the methods and possibilities that this power will have for increasing the production and well-being of the peasantry.

WORKERS' POWER AND AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT

The problem is not simply one of plans. There are plans in many books, and even the C E P A L proposes a series of measures needed to improve the situation in the Bolivian countryside. The problem is, rather, who will apply the plans, what forces and with what methods. That is what will make the peasantry decide: practice, and not just plans. And that is, in synthesis, what constitutes the *programme*: the measures, the methods, and the forces that apply them.

The problem, then, is a problem of power: who will govern, and for whose benefit. Measures for raising farm production cannot reach the farming regions from above, from the capitalist power. This power cannot, however good the plans it may work up, mobilize the forces for carrying them out. And — the main point — it does not even want to do so.

This sense of initiative can be awakened, mobilized, and led to develop its full creative capacity only by the workers' power. Workers' power is not in contradiction to peasant mobilization; on the contrary, it needs it for policy and for the economy. Capitalist power is in contradiction to any mobilization in the rural regions. While it is developing an intense campaign for dispersing and politically demobilizing the peasants, it cannot mobilize them for production.

And, in an agrarian country, without the mobilization and participation of the masses, there is no increase in production, and even less in farm production.

State power is necessary to apply the programme for developing agriculture, and for fitting it in, in a balanced way, with the programme of industrial development. Only on a basis of nationalized industry is it possible to combine both aspects without disparities and convulsive crises.¹⁰

State power is necessary to orient and adequately distribute capital resources, always scant in a backward country, to organize and carry through an investment policy in accordance with the needs of development. Without an investment policy, without an order of priorities in the investment of resources, the programme cannot be anything but an abstraction. This policy and these priorities can be solved only from the position of power.

State power is necessary, lastly, to control and use the resources of credit and foreign trade, without which no development of agricultural production is possible.

This power must be based on proletarian democracy, to ensure the contribution of the whole creative spirit of initiative of the masses and to place under its control the properly balanced development of the different branches of the economy.

The democratic participation of the masses is necessary for the solution of the economic, political, and social problem of the plan: the balance between what industry receives from the agrarian eco-

¹⁰ In the case of backward countries, nationalization of the principal means of production and adoption, right from the beginning, of commercial methods and practices, must be completed as quickly as possible by two supplementary measures: the *planning of a speeded-up industrialization, gradual collectivization, of the agrarian economy, especially in accordance with the possibilities of industry*. [Michel Pablo: "Economic Problems of Transitional Regimes," in *Dictature du proletariat, démocratie, socialisme* (Editions de la Quatrième Internationale), p 22.]

The socialist renovation of agriculture will be carried out, naturally, not by coöperatives considered as a new form of organization, but by means of coöperatives based on general industrialization. That is to say that technical and socialist progress in agriculture cannot be separated from an increasing predominance of industry in the country's general economy. [Leon Trotsky, *Toward Capitalism or toward Socialism?*, quoted by Michel Pablo, *op cit*, p 23.]

There is no doubt but that a harmonious and well-balanced solution of these problems is definitively possible only within the framework of the socialist unification of Latin America, and not in each country isolatedly; but, at this stage, the revolution and the struggle for power have their own rhythms and problems in the various countries.

nomy and what it gives it; the correlation between accumulation and consumption, between the funds for the construction of basic capital and the funds for wages; the distribution of the national income. Proletarian democracy is necessary both as an economic stimulus and as a factor in the *well-balanced development of the plan* [Michel Pablo: "Economic Problem of Transitional Regimes," in *Dictature du proletariat, démocratie, socialisme* (Editions de la Quatrième Internationale), p. 26.]

WHERE TO BEGIN

But the central problem at the present level is: From where and with what forces should we, today, set out to reach power? How is the worker-peasant alliance organized for the struggle for power?

A trial balance concerning the worker-peasant alliance may be struck at a less elevated level: that of the peasantry's own interests. To reestablish the alliance, it is necessary to take as a basis the peasantry's interests at this stage, which are: to ensure its right to the land and its gains; to raise its production; to sell its products and be able to acquire what it wants from the cities.

If peasant confidence in the proletariat is to be built up for the struggle against the capitalist government, the peasant must see in the worker an effective aid for an increase in his production and in his living levels. He must see that the worker can really help him in just those matters in which the capitalist power has abandoned him.

It is necessary for the workers' movement to organize the political defense of the peasantry against the offensive of the capitalist government. It must appear, permanently and openly, as its political ally in the cities and the mines, facing up to the government, calling the peasants to its aid, preventing the sending of troops to the rural regions.

But it must also show itself, in factual actions, to be the only firm hope for the peasantry's economic interests, to get out of the present situation of crisis. It must thus prove the unity that exists between the immediate individual economic interests of the peasantry, and its support to and participation in the political perspective of the worker-peasant alliance. There is no other way of winning over the peasantry as an ally, not only to defend the positions already won, but also to go forward against the enemies who are threatening these positions — the capitalist government and imperialism — and to defeat them.

Pacts and agreements must be worked out between the unions of the peasants and the workers (miners, factory-workers, railwaymen, truck-drivers), so as to supply the pulperías¹¹ with farm products, to supply the peasant fairs with industrial products at cost prices, to ensure cheap transport for products in both directions, etc. The bank employees, for example, must carry out studies concerning the peasants' credit needs, and require, through their unions, that the banks extend these credits. The workers', peasants', and university unions must make studies and plans for the necessary investments in fertilizers, seeds, irrigation works, etc, in order to raise production quickly and at low cost, and to draw up an adequate policy of investments for the country's income, as the workers' controls in the Mining Corporation and in some mines (Huanuni, for example) have already begun to do in an elementary way. The peasant unions, with the help of university people, technicians, et al, must broadcast and apply elementary measures for an increase in production. Together with the workers' unions, they must guarantee the marketing of farm products at a better price for the peasants, without middlemen, through the pulperías of the mines and factories. Together with the professors' and primary teachers' unions, they can adopt measures for overcoming illiteracy and developing teaching, in which the capitalist state shows no interest or initiative, and demand the resources for carrying this out. The teachers, in exchange, will be guaranteed the support of the rural regions for their own problems and demands, as will the other sectors. Similar actions and agreements can be considered with the oil-workers, public-health workers, buildig-trades workers, mutual-aid associations, etc.

The trade unions must be brought to function as the elementary organs of power on the economic plane. Even with all their limitations, a few successes will have great importance, and will open up the prospect of coming out the other side of an extremely long period of dual power.

In this way, workers' power will go on raising and building itself inside the situation of dual power, and raising and building the confidence of the great masses in themselves and in the workers' power.

Without state power, it is obvious that these experiments would be inevitably limited and would not provide an overall and lasting solution

¹¹ Once literally "company stores," these almost sole sources of low-priced supplies of foodstuffs, clothing, and other necessities, can still be used, especially in the isolated mining complexes, even after nationalization, to bring pressure on the workers by manipulation of prices, shortages, etc.

for the problems of the revolution. But successes achieved in them, together with unity and support between the workers' and peasants' struggles, will show the way for reestablishing the worker-peasant alliance in the struggle for workers' power. They will show how immense the possibilities of the workers' and peasants' power could be. The peasant will see this in practice much more than in explanations or general propaganda.

The workers' radios, the miners' radios, constitute a valuable medium for broadcasting and propagating these experiences of unity between workers and peasants. The peasantry needs to be informed, to be consciously won over, right down to its last bases, for the alliance with the workers. The miners' radios are the instrument for breaking down its isolation, for giving an impulse to its national unification, for uniting it with the struggles of its class brothers in every corner of the country. A campaign by the miners' unions to provide radio sets to the peasant unions and centres all over the country would have an immense echo, if the peasants know that they can hear broadcasts and news about themselves in their own language, Quechua or Aymara. The possibilities in radio, much broader than those in newspapers, are very vast indeed.

And the same time the central organ of the worker-peasant alliance, the C O B, has to be reorganized under new conditions and for new tasks — not, however, as a dependency of or a negotiator with the capitalist power, but as its enemy, as the national centralizer of the power of the unions and militia, now dispersed throughout the country.

The task of politically pulling the peasantry away from the M N R and its government has to be speeded up. Every strike by the factory-workers and miners must call for peasant support, must strengthen itself with this support, which is today of immense importance. It is necessary to revitalize the departmental centres, the emergency committees, as local organs of the worker-peasant alliance, of leadership for the movements, of regional centralization of the workers' and peasants' power.

A National Congress of Peasants and a National Congress of Worker and Peasant Labor must be the culmination to seal the alliance and impose its programme on the country.

All these tasks are necessary for once more raising up the worker-peasant alliance and its programme, for pulling the revolution out of its stagnation, for making use of the new mobilizations that are shaking the rural regions, and for preventing them from losing themselves in a confusion that is increasing the symptoms of

decomposition of the revolution after so many years without a way out.

The precondition, the prerequisite, for the achievement of these tasks is that of workers' leadership, the adequate and timely participation of the revolutionary Marxist leadership as the centre of regroupment and stimulus for all the revolutionary forces that the government and their bureaucracy are endeavoring to paralyze and disperse.

VI

THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AND THE NEW WORKERS' LEADERSHIP

NEED OF NEW LEADERSHIP

The struggle fully to reestablish the worker-peasant alliance is connected with the struggle for a new workers' and peasants' leadership, both trade-union and political. The present leadership has no interest in this alliance; indeed, it is dangerous for itself and for its party, the M N R. But the struggle for the worker-peasant alliance is developing jointly and along the same paths with the struggle for a new workers' leadership. Decisive therein is the conscious role of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario.¹²

The role of the revolutionary party is indispensable not only in organizing the worker-peasant alliance for the struggle for power, but also in maintaining it after power, to organize and develop production, to build the workers' state and socialism.

The workers' state and the building of socialism cannot be developed without the high and conscious participation of the great worker and peasant masses. Proletarian democracy provides the framework for this participation, but the revolutionary party furnishes the conscious orientation, discusses and sets the goals, wins and guarantees for the workers' vanguard the right to direct the process, and above all ensures a close contact between the broad masses and their leadership.

The agrarian problem is, more than any other, a problem of conscious mobilization, of awakening the spirit of creative initiative and the participation of the great peasant masses. Without this, it is impossible to overcome the gap that separates the age-old backwardness of the rural regions from the highest task of our epoch, the building of socialism. Without the revolutionary party rooted in the masses, this mobiliza-

¹² For fuller development of this section, see the very important Letter from the Secretariat of the Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International to the XVIth Conference of the P O R, in March 1959, on whose fundamental formulations this section is based.

tion is impossible; the lever and the tools are lacking.

The role of revolutionary party does not fall on it from heaven the day after the seizure of power. The party itself builds it in the struggle for power, while it is building itself. Without the leading participation of the cadres formed by the revolutionary party in all sectors of the masses, in the economic and political tasks of the workers' state, there is no building socialism. And without the participation of those cadres among the main sectors of the masses in their struggles against capitalism, there is no struggle for power.

For the struggle for power and for the building of the workers' state and socialism, the revolutionary Marxist party, the P O R, needs to form and develop right in the present stage this staff of cadres.

For the development of the peasant revolution and of the worker-peasant alliance, it needs to form a staff of peasant cadres, rooted in the main sectors of the peasantry, in Ucureña, in North Potosí, in Achacachi, in Chuquisaca, etc. The party needs to build its own peasant organization, its peasant fraction. In the development of this fraction a fundamental part will be played by the support and experience of the miners' fractions, especially for close contact between the mines and the rural regions, which the party is trying to consolidate.

The peasant fraction must function in a centralized way on the national and departmental levels, hold its own meetings and conferences (like the last conference at Ucureña), publish its own newspaper. The goal of the peasant cadres of the party in the immediate next stage must be to win positions of union leadership, so that therefrom, with the support of the party leadership and its other organisms, they can begin to demonstrate in practice the application of the transitional programme for the rural regions, spur on the struggles in other sectors, and help on the worker-peasant alliance. From the positions of leadership in the miners' unions that the party wins, it must help on this same process in the rural regions.

Starting out with a few unions, setting up revolutionary leaderships in various unions, peasants' or miners' (and also in other sectors) the party must from these vantage-points launch a campaign for the resurgence of the worker-peasant alliance, transform this union or these unions into a bulwark for the farm regions' demands and problems, begin to apply measures of pacts, alliances, and practical aid to the peasantry, put into practice — even on a limited scale — some of the transitional measures, some of the im-

mediately applicable points of the programme, of the organization of production, etc, and hold the union up as a practical example of what it is possible for other unions and centres to do.

This policy will give an enormous strength to the new leadership, even though its base may in the beginning be only a single union. It will thus put to use in its favor the whole immense force that is represented today — and more every day — by the peasantry, mobilized and ready to fight.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE P O R

The other workers' leaderships — Stalinism, Lechinism — have totally abandoned and failed the peasant revolution. In face of it, they have demonstrated their complete impotence. This is one more advantage for the revolutionary Marxist leadership, the P O R, which has shown itself to be the only one that has arisen to guide and provide solutions to the struggles and problems of the peasants at this stage. The road is wide open to the P O R to win positions in the peasants' unions, to build and develop its staff of peasant cadres.

The P O R was the only party to give its support to the peasants of North Potosí when the whole reaction was carrying out a national campaign against them. The P O R was the only party to call for cessation of the struggle between Ucureña and Cliza, simultaneously demanding the withdrawal of the army from the rural regions, mediation by the workers' movement, and the calling of a Peasant Conference to solve the problems. The P O R was the only party which, right from the first moment, came to the open defense of the peasants of Achacachi, while the other workers' leaderships were drawing back and echoing the government's campaign of calumny against the peasants. The orientation of the P O R, in its leaflets, in its newspaper, in its delegates at Achacachi, was decisive in keeping up peasant resistance and preventing it from withering away in confusion, lack of orientation, and, especially, isolation. The P O R broke through this isolation and broke up the government's first attempt to hem in Achacachi.

The peasants of Ucureña, of Cliza, of Chuquisaca, of Potosí, and of Achacachi, have shown on each occasion that they are aware of and answer the appeals and guidance of the P O R. Nobody can now erase from peasant consciousness the task accomplished, in Achacachi, in Ucureña, in all the zones of peasant mobilization.

The P O R needs now more than ever to organize and develop its staff of peasant cadres, to harvest and organize all this prestige and authority, to transform itself into the leading force of the

peasant revolution. All possibilities are open for the accomplishment of this task.

The struggle for a new leadership of the revolution is not simply the precondition in order to struggle for the resurgence of the worker-peasant alliance: both struggles must be developed, and develop and influence each other mutually, opening up greater prospects for a new bound forward of the Bolivian revolution, for delivering new and thorough blows against capitalism and imperialism, for strengthening the power of the workers' and peasants' unions and militia, and winning over still broader masses to the conscious struggle for their own state power.

VII

THE PROGRAMME OF THE PEASANT REVOLUTION AT THE PRESENT STAGE

A) ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

- 1) Complete transfer of the land to the peasants. Recognition of the ownership of the land by the peasants who occupied it, without any further judicial procedures. Division of the remaining latifundia.
- 2) Distribution to the peasants of the elementary tools for tillage, to modernize methods of land-cultivation without a big initial capital investment. Manufacture of these tools by industry, thus providing work for sectors that are paralyzed or semi-paralyzed (for example, Pulacayo). Gradual introduction of tractors and other farm-machinery.
- 3) Mass introduction of seeds selected by the state with the collaboration and participation of the peasant unions.
- 4) Mass introduction, in the same way, of the use of natural and chemical fertilizers, to intensify production and the most advantageous use of cultivatable land, eliminating the long periods of fallowness now common.
- 5) Construction of irrigation works, wells, drainage ditches, dams, and defenses against floods, with the contribution of state capital and the organization by the unions of paid peasant labor. Provision of pumps for bringing up water.
- 6) Abundant cheap credit, the nationalization of the Banco Agrícola and an increase in its capitalization, setting up agencies in the main peasant centres, and formation of its board of directors with workers' and peasants' representatives. Nationalization without indemnization of private banking, with workers' control, to put its resources at the service of the country's needs.

- 7) Technical aid to the peasantry, with specialized personnel under union control. Requests for the sending of agrarian technicians by the workers' states, especially those which have recently lived through the experience of their own agrarian reform (China, Jugoslavia, etc), and also planning technicians.
- 8) Construction of roads and bridges to get production to market, with capital contributed by the state and organization of paid peasant labor by the unions.
- 9) Request for credits, in money and machinery, to the workers' states, for the development and mechanization of agriculture (the Peasant Federation of La Paz has already asked that the Soviet offer of credit be accepted and used for this purpose).
- 10) General development of the organization of producers', consumers', and sales coöperatives, based on the successful experience of countries like China. State aid for the formation of coöperatives, in technicians and in money. Reorganization of the Dirección de Cooperativas, suppressing its whole sterile bureaucracy and designating representatives of the workers and peasants. Request to the workers' states for aid in the form of specialists in coöperativism. Organization of production and marketing of manufactured articles by the peasantry in order to utilize integrally the time in which it is not occupied with farm tasks. Setting of prices by the state for each harvest, before sowing, in accordance with a plan of agricultural development worked up by the peasants' and workers' unions of the entire country. Elimination of all middlemen in marketing.
- 12) Plan of agrarian development, including all the foregoing points, worked up by the unions, with technical help, which visualizes solutions for the problem of the scarcity of land in relation with population growth: plans for colonization (voluntarily accepted by the peasants and with complete backing by the state for their installation and first years of stay), for agricultural technification (even on an elementary scale), for the intensification of crops, occupation of manpower in public works for the rural regions (such as those indicated above), and for development of industry. Working up of simple plans on the provincial and local scales, for the peasants and farm unions of each province and district. The general plan of agrarian development must necessarily be coördinated with the state monopoly

of foreign trade and the plan for industrial development.

B) SOCIAL PROBLEMS

- 1) Organization of labor and mutual aid by the peasants themselves, through their own organisms such as unions, committees, etc.
- 2) Construction of schools, in the form already indicated.
- 3) Struggle against illiteracy in children and adults. Teaching to read and write in their own language, Quechua or Aymara. Improvement in the number of primary teachers, in their training, and in their pay.
- 4) Medical and sanitary attention. Construction of dispensaries and hospitals in or near peasant centres. Educational campaigns about sanitary norms and elementary hygiene.
- 5) Raising of the level of living and comfort in the rural regions, the state collaborating with the peasant in the construction and improvement of his house, his domestic utensils, his dietary habits, etc. Extension to the rural regions of workers' social gains such as social security.
- 6) Suppression of all abuses by authorities and functionaries against the peasantry (the peasant unions themselves must organize this task, directly punishing those responsible).
- 7) Emancipation of peasant women. Inclusion of women in the peasant unions, their life and functioning, their leaderships. Formation of Peasant Women's Committees in the unions to attend to specifically feminine problems. Participation of women in the militia, organizing auxiliary corps and women's battalions.
- 8) Struggle against racial and anti-peasant discrimination in the cities and the state apparatus, and drastic punishments of any persons who keep up these practices.
- 9) Cultural and political campaign by the miners' radios, in alliance and agreement with the peasant unions and centres, in Quechua and Aymara. Installation of peasant radios and adequate receiving sets in each peasant union and district.

C) POLITICAL PROBLEMS

- 1) Trade-union democracy. Union independence from the state and the governing party.
- 2) Struggle against the bureaucratization of peasant leaders and against union abuses and dictatorships and terrorist methods.
- 3) Development of the peasant power through the regular functioning of the agrarian unions and centres as the highest and sole authority in each district, solving all problems.
- 4) Reënforcement of the militia, increase in peasants' arms, centralization of the militia by centres, and democratic election of their chiefs and officers by the rankandfile itself.
- 5) Withdrawal of any army forces from the rural regions. Propaganda among the military garrisons that may be sent into the rural regions, calling on the soldiers to fraternize with the peasants and go over to their militia in case of fighting.
- 6) Expulsion from the rural regions and from the country itself of the imperialist agencies S A I and S C I D E.
- 7) Holding of a National Congress of Peasants, to discuss and approve the programme of the agrarian revolution at the present stage, and to unify peasant forces on a national scale to impose it.
- 8) Worker-peasant alliance, through the support of the workers' trade unions for the peasantry's programme and mobilizations, and the solidarity of the peasantry with the workers' mobilizations and demands, setting as the maximum goal the establishment of workers' and peasants' power to ensure and guarantee all gains.
- 9) Holding of a National Congress of Worker and Peasant Labor, to discuss all the problems of the country and the revolution, reorganize the C O B, establish the programme of the worker-peasant alliance, and impose its solutions as the highest organism of the revolution and the masses.
- 10) Workers' and peasants' government, based on the workers' and peasants' unions and their armed militia, as the democratic organs of power and government of the laboring masses in the entire country.

December 1959

Three Declarations of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International

I

FREE COMRADES SANTEN AND RAPTIS!

The International Secretariat of the Fourth International sends its warmest greetings and complete revolutionary solidarity to Comrades Sal Santen and Michel Raptis, imprisoned in Europe for their valiant revolutionary labor in defense of and aid to the Algerian revolution, and accused by the European police of counterfeiting identification papers and banknotes for the Algerian revolutionaries.

The International Secretariat rejects any slanderous accusations by the bourgeois press and authorities against both comrades, and protests the repression of the capitalist authorities against them.

Comrades Santen and Raptis are imprisoned as combatants for the world revolution and as fighters in aid of the Algerian revolution; and, as such, must receive the full support and solidarity of workers', revolutionary, and anti-imperialist organizations, and of all revolutionary militants.

The International Secretariat reveals to workers and anti-imperialist opinion throughout the world that, through newspaper articles, veiled threats have been made against the lives of the families of the imprisoned comrades — by the "Red Hand" — by which this criminal gang, organized and paid by French imperialism would have the pretention of punishing the struggle of Comrades Santen and Raptis in favor of the Algerian revolution.

The International Secretariat reiterates its absolute confidence in both comrades: that from their present combat post, prison, they represent the tradition of revolutionary honor of the Trotskyists and the Fourth International.

The International Secretariat calls on all revolutionary and anti-imperialist organizations and parties, on all revolutionary and anti-imperialist militants, on all forces and individuals who are fighting in one form or another for the triumph of the colonial revolution and for the triumph of the socialist revolution in the world, to denounce the bourgeois repression against Comrades Santen and Raptis, to send them their moral and material solidarity, and to back up the struggle of the Fourth International for the release of both comrades and against repression of revolutionary and anti-imperialist militants.

Free Comrades Santen and Raptis!

Down with repression against the Fourth International and all revolutionary and anti-imperialist workers' organizations!

Long live the Algerian revolution!

Long live the colonial and world revolution!

**THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL**

15 June 1960

II

IN DEFENSE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Yankee imperialism is intensifying its offensive against the Cuban revolution, trying to blockade it economically, and preparing military intervention. Its latest measures have been the refusal by the imperialist oil firms to refine Soviet crude and the stopping of the purchase of Cuban sugar by the United States.

The Cuban government has answered blow for blow,

confiscating the imperialist refineries on the island, and selling the sugar to the Soviet Union.

Yankee imperialism fears the advance of the revolution in Cuba and throughout Latin America. It fears lest the Cuban example spread and powerfully influence the Latin American masses. This fear is shared by all the Latin American bourgeoisies and governments, who are backing

up the imperialist hostility toward revolutionary Cuba. If these governments have not gone further, it is because they are prevented by the Latin American masses' ardent and vigilant solidarity with Cuba.

But their support at the meeting of the Organization of American States, that agency at the service of Yankee imperialism, summoned to consider the "Cuban situation," clearly indicates their decision to back up Yankee measures against Cuba.

While it is strengthening its economic blockade, imperialism is preparing military intervention against Cuba. The O A S meeting, aimed at isolating Cuba, is a new step in this direction. Imperialism wants to demonstrate to the peoples of Latin America that anyone who follows the Cuban road will be crushed.

The situation in Cuba is nearing decisive stages. The whole Cuban people is ready, arms in hand, to defend its revolution and the government which in its eyes personifies it. The whole Cuban people is back of the measures confiscating the imperialist firms, agrarian reform, trade which the U S S R and the other workers' states, the diplomatic recognition of the U S S R and the forthcoming recognition of People's China. The whole Cuban people has received with joy the economic and military aid offered by the Soviet Union against imperialist aggression.

International workers' solidarity, the solidarity of the Latin American workers, and their active participation in the struggle, will be decisive in this action.

The Cuban government's attitude in confiscating the oil refineries must be supported by all revolutionaries against the provocation of imperialism and its servitors.

The refineries must now be placed under workers' administration. If necessary, it would be well to utilize the aid of technicians from the Soviet Union and the other workers' states.

It is necessary to defend the Cuban revolution, it is necessary to break imperialism's economic and commercial

blockade of Cuba. It is necessary to denounce the aggressive manoeuvre against Cuba that is being prepared at O A S meeting.

While imperialism and its bourgeois allies are organizing the attack against the revolutionary island, the Fourth International calls on trade-union organizations, Communist and Socialist Parties, workers' and anti-imperialist parties, in every country, to organize the defense of Cuba in its struggle against imperialism.

The Fourth International calls on the oil-workers' unions in every country, and particularly in Latin America, to force the oil firms to lift their blockade of Cuba, by threatening — as the oil-workers of the Middle East did in 1956 at the time of the aggression against Egypt — to cut off oil to the rest of the world if it is not sent to Cuba. It calls on seamen's unions to back up this action.

The Fourth International calls for the setting up in all countries of committees to aid the Cuban revolution, to organize meetings and mass-meetings and demonstrations, to send delegations of workers, students, and intellectuals to the revolutionary island, to form brigades for the defense of the Cuban revolution.

The Fourth International calls for connecting up the revolutionary struggle in each country with struggle and action in defense of the Cuban revolution, profiting by the increasing weakness of imperialism to inflict new blows upon it and prevent its desperate slash of the paw against Cuba.

For the struggle of revolutionary Cuba against imperialist aggression!

For international workers' solidarity with the Cuban revolution!

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

16 June 1960

III

ON THE RELEASE OF LEON TROTSKY'S MURDERER

Leon Trotsky's murderer has been freed twenty years after he committed his crime, and has left Mexico for Czechoslovakia, with a passport issued by the Czechoslovak authorities in the name of Vandendrescht, one of the alleged names of Mornard.

The murder of Trotsky was the culminating point in Stalin's sanguinary repression of the Bolsheviks. It occurred after the monstrous Moscow Trials, the mass purges of Soviet and foreign communists in the U S S R, the Stalinists' bloody repression of revolutionaries in Spain, and the murders and suspicious deaths of oppositional communists (among them Ignace Reiss, Rudolf Klement, and Leon Sedov, Trotsky's son). It occurred a few weeks after an unsuccessful attempt on Trotsky's life committed in Mexico by notorious Stalinists, among them the painter Alfaro Siqueiros.

Politically, there was no doubt that the crime had been ordered by Stalin.

In the Mexican court, the murderer, who had never been a member of a section of the Fourth International

or of any oppositional communist organization, pleaded that he had been a Trotskyist disillusioned by the counter-revolutionary activity which Trotsky wanted to make him carry out: by raking up again the theme that the GPU had forced upon the accused men, in their "confessions" at the Moscow Trials, the murderer brought a new proof concerning the instigators of the crime. As a result of the testimony given there, the court rejected the explanation given by the murderer.

But at this trial, in 1943, the exact identity of Mornard had not yet been determined. And so his links with the services of the NKVD could not be determined in a juridically unquestionable way. It must not be forgotten that this period in the war was scarcely propitious to the search for the demonstration of truth. It is sufficient to recall that during this period the U S authorities prevented the publication of Trotsky's book, *Stalin*.

Since that time the Mexican authorities have continued their researches, whose results, communicated to writers like Gorkin and Isaac Don Levine, were brought by them

to the attention of the public. Photographs, fingerprints, etc, enabled them to determine, beyond any possible question, that Mornard's real name is Ramón Mercader del Río, that he was a member of the Spanish Communist Party, that his mother, Caridad Mercader, was an agent of the special services of the NKVD, friend of its top chief, General Leonid Eitingon, and that Caridad Mercader and Eitingon precipitately fled Mexico on the very day of Trotsky's murder. We may point out that General Eitingon was liquidated at the same time as Beria, after Stalin's death.

We leave aside the testimony of Enrique Castro Delgado, former member of the Political Bureau of the Spanish CP, who declares that, in conversations at Moscow during the war, Caridad Mercader told him that she had had her son used by the NKVD, that he was the Mornard who had killed Trotsky, and that for this he had been decorated with the Order of the Red Flag. We have no doubt of the veracity of the testimony of Castro Delgado—all the more so in that Caridad Mercader, upon the freeing of the alleged Mornard, dodged the questions of Paris journalists and disappeared from her home.

The data collected by Mexican authorities alone form a convergent cluster of juridically conclusive facts as to the very source of the crime.

But one new fact has just been added—one which is, it might be said, the authentic signature of the instigators of the crime. Mornard remained silent during twenty years of prison; they needed to be certain that he would remain silent once he was free. In order to emerge without any scandal from prison and disappear, he obtained a passport from the Czechoslovak authorities. They had no administrative reason for showing a generosity without precedent — and probably without a future — to a person who had never claimed to be a citizen of their country. There is only one serious and unquestionable explanation. By issuing a genuine passport to the alleged Mornard or Vandendrescht, they avoided any public appearance of the Soviet authorities, desirous of blurring the traces of the crime committed by Ramón Mercader twenty years ago at Stalin's order.

What interests us is not the fate that they are keeping in reserve for their agent, but historical truth.

At the XXth Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev admitted part of the crimes of Stalin. But the greatest names of the October Revolution and of the Communist International — Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rakovsky — have never been rehabilitated, and now the Soviet government has just shown that it is being watchful lest the truth about Trotsky's murder be known.

To excuse himself for his obedience to Stalin's criminal orders for many years, Khrushchev declared that any resistance to Stalin would have been repressed and the people would not have understood. Strange justifications for someone who claims to be a communist leader, to be afraid of repression and not to be immediately understood by the masses! But today, now that he no longer fears repression and can make himself understood by the masses, he wants to prevent the truth from being known about the murder of the man who was the soul of the Soviet revolutionaries' resistance to the strangling of workers' democracy by Stalin.

Thus the Czechoslovak passport issued to Ramón Mercader not only confirms the fact that it was Stalin who ordered the murder of Trotsky, but also reveals that the Moscow bureaucracy, now "liberal," takes over the responsibility for Stalin's crime against the companion of Lenin, the organizer of the Red Army, the champion of Bolshevism in its struggle against rising Stalinism.

The enormous edifice of lies erected by Stalin quickly collapsed a short time after his death. The ruses, the petty devices, the lies by omission and by half-truths, used by the "liberal" bureaucrats, will be equally powerless to stop the forward drive of Soviet society. The return to Lenin will be the total denunciation of Stalinist crimes and the reestablishment of Soviet democracy.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

May 1960

Draft Resolution for the Sixth World Congress of the Fourth International

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Its Balance-Sheet, Its Problems, and Its Prospects

I

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. THE CAUSES WHICH MAINTAIN THE UPSURGE OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The continuing rise of the colonial revolution contrasts in a now striking way with the decline of the revolutionary workers' movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

The upsurge of the colonial revolution in this postwar period is produced by a whole series of causes which were lacking or ceased to exist with the same intensity as previously in the advanced capitalist countries.

The process of relative capitalist stabilization in these countries has occurred simultaneously with the worsening of the economic and financial situation in most of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Capitalism in the advanced countries has profited by the mass injection of American capital and by the enormous worldwide needs in reconstruction and industrial development created by the war, to set in motion a new cycle of expansion on a higher level of productivity. The colonial and semi-colonial countries, on the contrary, having quickly exhausted the capital accumulated during the war and the first years thereafter, saw themselves more and more left behind by the advances, both absolute and relative, achieved by the advanced countries.

The economic evolution of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, marked by a process of industrialization which, though jerky and uneven, has not ceased on the average to be continuous, has favored the industrial expansion of the advanced capitalist countries.

At the same time the capitalist countries have profited both by technological and scientific advances to increase their independence from certain imports of agricultural products and raw materials and by the fall in prices of such imports, to maintain a favorable balance of trade toward the dependent countries and a better protection against inflation. The dependent countries, on the contrary, have seen their balance of trade deteriorate and are struggling against the feverish upthrusts of endemic inflation.

The lag of dependent countries after advanced countries is aggravated in terms of both absolute production and per capita production by the fact that the population of the dependent countries is increasing at a faster rate than their production.

At the basis of these developments lie the facts that the dependent countries have a different social and economic structure, and are historically belated. For a country to be able to catch up with the present development of the advanced capitalist countries it is necessary to have as starting-points a developed economic substructure, technically skilled manpower, and a very high per capita rate of investment.

Now the dependent countries are structurally handicapped in this race. They lack an adequate economic substructure, have a relatively low national income at their disposal, and do not accumulate sufficient capital, both because of

their present limited income and because of the facts that a large part of the surplus-value created goes back to the imperialist countries and that a large part of the capital belonging to the native oligarchies tends to be directed toward usury, trading profits, and rent.

In any case the rate of accumulation of 15 to 20% of the national income considered necessary for large-scale industrialization proves to be, in these countries, beyond their present practical possibilities. Even this rate, in most of these countries, would be insufficient if it were not backed up by other resources.

In the case of countries whose structure is already capitalist, these resources would normally have to come from foreign capital, in the form of public investments (for the substructure) or private reinvestments on the spot. Such resources, even if they were found — despite capital's reservations about investments not producing the average rate of profit — would have to be immensely higher than the total of current annual expenditures going to the "under-developed" countries (including from the U S S R): from \$4,000 million to over \$20,000 million, if not considerably more.¹

It is excluded that capitalism can agree to such an effort. Under these conditions — and without at all minimizing imperialism's new attempts "to aid" on a broader scale the so-called "under-developed" countries (India, Latin America, Africa, the Arab countries) — what must be foreseen is rather that the gap, both *absolute* and *relative* (in the meaning indicated), between these countries and the advanced countries will be aggravated in the years to come.

This means that these countries' economic and industrial development, which nevertheless will not fail to be steady, will be accomplished under conditions that are highly explosive and very different from those of the advanced countries, with real depressions, and not just recessions, unemployment, and inflation.

It is this different economic situation — resulting both from the historical tardiness of the dependent countries compared to the advanced countries launched on a new cycle of expansion, and from the obstacles set up to their development by their economic and social structure, feudocapitalist, and indeed in places tribal with capitalist infiltration — which fundamentally explains the gap between the powerful and constantly renewed revolutionary activity of the masses in the dependent countries, and the decline of the revolutionary workers' movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

¹ United Nations experts have put forward the estimate that the sum annually needed to promote, within 35 years, a doubling of the living levels of populations now having at their disposal \$100 per capita per annum (i.e., some 1,600 million men), would reach \$20,000 million. But other estimates raise this sum to \$50,000-\$60,000 million, and even more.

Another cause that is at present stimulating the upsurge of the colonial revolution is obviously the decline of imperialism in comparison with the rising power of the workers' states, and the new relationships established in this postwar period by the leading strata of the colonial revolution with imperialism on the one hand and the bureaucracy of the workers' states on the other. These leading strata, Bonapartist in function, composed mainly of elements who aspire to a national economic development, profit by the existence, the power, and the increased possibilities of the workers' states, as well as by their antagonism with imperialism, precisely to increase their Bonapartist role and to advance far in their efforts to free themselves from the direct grasp of imperialism.

The colonial revolution is not finished by the attainment of its primordial goal: formal independence from imperialism. It continues with the search for a general liquidation of the whole aftermath of imperialism, and of all structural economic-social fetters on a rapid economic development and industrialization. The essential need, felt in a constantly more imperious and irresistible way by the masses of the dependent countries, is rapidly to reach the level of the advanced industrial countries and to make up their historical lateness.

It is for this reason that in a general way the national anti-imperialist phase of the colonial revolution, during which bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships have been able to play a leading part, is now giving way to a higher phase that brings forward the imperative *economic-social* needs of the dependent countries. This is particularly the case with the formally independent countries of Latin America, the Moslem countries of the Middle East and North Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, etc.

Under these conditions the colonial revolution occupies the vanguard place in the world revolution and operates as its main force, including for the reawakening of the revolutionary struggle in the advanced countries. As a result of the historical lateness of the revolution in the advanced capitalist countries, which is the result of the dialectical interaction of the betrayals of the leaderships and the new economic evolution of capitalism, the colonial revolution is objectively the driving force of the world revolution, combined with the rising force of the workers' states.

The reawakening of the revolution in the advanced capitalist states, particularly of Europe, has every chance of appearing historically as the result, at least in part, of the exterior pressure of these combined forces, in a new economic conjuncture less favorable than at present to capitalism in these countries.

2. THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Under the irresistible drive of the masses, pushing the colonial revolution steadily to a more advanced position, imperialism sees itself forced to resort to more indirect and flexible forms of dependence. All the recent examples given by British, French, and Belgian imperialism clearly show this tendency: the promotion of territories that yesterday were still colonies to the status of self-government, or of dominions within a more and more flexible association with the metropolis; and states that formally are completely independent.

Imperialism — at least its more clear-sighted wing — is at present seeking to safeguard what is essential in its economic positions through a transfer of power to the native élites, which it is trying to develop and bribe, thanks to its political and economic power. This wing is aware of the impossibility of ruling for long either in the form of direct European domination or in the more flexible form of native governments that are not broadly independent.

Wherever native élites exist — intellectuals and various

other categories of actually or potentially bourgeois or petty-bourgeois elements — imperialism is endeavoring to base itself on them by granting them political power, either immediately or in stages, and by bribing them by associating them in a joint economic exploitation of their respective countries. But the big difficulty for imperialism in this enterprise is the lack of native strata sufficiently developed to play such a part, in face of the impetuous movement of the masses.

The specific position of each of the principal imperialism depends on its strength and the concrete situation with which it has to deal.

British imperialism, which extricated itself in time from Asia, while succeeding in safeguarding the essential part of interests in countries like India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and even Malaya, is now trying to carry out the same operation in Africa, while taking into account the special situations in that continent: Central Africa; South Africa, with its large implantation of Europeans, and with very great invested capital at stake. But even in these territories imperialism is now coldly visualizing the day when the explosive policy of the colour-ban and of the dictatorial supremacy of the European minorities will be obliged to make way for the power of the native majority, in spite of the fierce and prolonged resistance by these minorities that must be foreseen.

French imperialism itself is at present obliged to jump over stages, going from the Empire to the paternalistic "Community" and from that to the "renovated" Community, namely, an association of more or less formally independent states like those now attaining "international sovereignty." It is desperately resisting only in Algeria, a land heavily settled by Europeans and endowed with the incalculable wealth of the Sahara.

Belgian imperialism found itself forced to grant independence to the Congo after a slight inclination toward a resistance that was as brief as it was futile.

Portuguese imperialism — which knows that the independence of its colonies will toll the knell of the dictatorial regime, both by showing up the weakness of the regime and by drying up a large part of its economic and financial resources — still resists, defending its slave style of domination. But this all the more reason why, in the present international and African contexts, its inevitable fall will be all the more violent.

As for US imperialism, its colonial policy is more varied. Eschewing direct domination, save in the case of Puerto Rico, it does not hesitate to support brutal native regimes in all parts of the world where it possesses very considerable economic and strategic interests (Central America, South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, etc.). In Africa, on the contrary, where it has to struggle against old imperialist adversaries, compromised by direct domination, it adorns itself with the mask of the "liberator," the "liberal," while trying to get in the good graces of the native bourgeois strata in formation, by means of its material "aid."

For imperialism, the economic and in part strategic importance of the colonial and semi-colonial countries does not cease to be still vital (both for its supplies of raw materials and for the export of its industrial products and even of capital, the importance of this last factor having, however, diminished by comparison with the two others). Furthermore, the strategy of atomic war, which favors surprise attack, and raises the problem of survival, leads to the dispersal of bases around the world.

In the decisive race in which, by the force of events, imperialism finds itself setting out against the workers' states, the maintenance of its influence over dependent countries will take on an importance still greater than in the past. For this competition — supposing that it stays "peaceful" for a period — involves a race even hotter

than in the past for economic power, the most important reserve of which still remains the resources and the industrialization of the dependent countries.

In the decade that is beginning, imperialism enters this race handicapped from several points of view: compromised by its past in the eyes of the masses; incapable, by its structure, of granting effective aid; divided within its own ranks among powers that have reestablished and surpassed their past potential and are throwing themselves into keener competition precisely in the field par excellence for accumulation: the industrialization of dependent countries.

The only chance for imperialism in this field lies in the help that can be brought to it by the colonial bourgeoisie in formation. The next stage of the colonial revolution depends on the race in time between the formation of such strata, to which imperialism conduces by every means, and the revolutionary movement of the masses looking for radical solutions and therefore a radical leadership.

But even the transition via a native neo-bourgeois leadership can turn out historically to be of short duration and finally also economically ruinous for imperialism. For any important development of a native bourgeoisie cannot but diminish in the long run that share of the surplus-value still cornered by imperialism.

3. THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THE WORKERS' STATES

In the present historical phase of the formation, side-by-side with capitalism, of a system of workers' states, the alliance between the colonial revolution and this system of workers' states ought to be establishing itself quite naturally and almost automatically. The convergence of interests in the common struggle against imperialism is obvious, and ought to give rise to an active and unconditional support of this struggle by the workers' states.

Furthermore, in the field of economic exchanges, the workers' states will gradually have the possibility of advantageously replacing the "aid" granted by imperialism, and of diverting the present circuits with imperialism into their own orbit. The workers' states can grant low-cost financial and technical aid for the real economic development of the dependent countries, and without imposing political conditions.

They can furthermore establish — though this case may not be general — trade relations on the basis of the complementary nature of their economies: agricultural products and raw materials coming from the dependent countries against material for industrial equipment coming from the workers' states. The development of such relations with the dependent states in a historic perspective will make clearly apparent the enormous possibilities potentially possessed by the workers' states in this field and the fatal risks run by imperialism in the eventuality of a prolonged "peaceful competition." It is only the nature of the political regime in the present workers' states, degenerated or deformed by the bureaucracy, that limits the possibilities to be exploited, and handicaps and deforms the de facto alliance between the colonial revolution and the workers' states.

Naturally, no objection could be raised to the economic aid which the bureaucracy of the U R S S or of the other workers' states is granting to the bourgeois regimes of the dependent countries so that they may momentarily resist imperialism or develop more freely. But to the degree to which this aid is granted in exchange for the "neutralist" policy of the colonial bourgeoisie and that the Communist Parties in the dependent countries find themselves forced to subordinate their autonomous class policy to the requirements of the diplomacy of the workers'

states, this runs the risk of ending up practically in the consolidation of bourgeois regimes which invariably turn against the workers' movement in their own countries, and, at a more distant stage, against the workers' states themselves. From this point of view, the examples provided recently by Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Kassem, and other beneficiaries of the aid of the workers' states, speak eloquently.

4. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

The native comprador oligarchies, obtaining their income from trading profits, land rent, usury, or acting as functionaries at the service of imperialism, are strata now in decline in the dependent countries, to the advantage of new social formations, which are reflecting the process — steady, in spite of everything — of economic and industrial development in these countries. It is these strata which, directly or through their petty-bourgeois demagogues, are at the present stage cornering for themselves the leadership of the colonial revolution.

The importance of these strata, called national bourgeoisies, is highly variable in the different dependent countries according to the degree of economic development achieved.

In cases such as India, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the matter is one already of a genuine class, sufficiently powerful and conscious to take direct political power, even if it risks losing it momentarily to the benefit of other fractions more tied up with the oligarchy and imperialism.

In the case of other Asiatic and Latin American countries, the importance of the national bourgeoisie compared to the comprador oligarchy is less.

In certain cases its power is often exercised through Bonapartist political regimes (such as Sukarno, Nasser, Kassem, Nkhromah, et al) which are operating historically for the benefit of the national bourgeoisie.

In other cases, which can turn out to be frequent in Africa, the very weak formation of native élites, other than the tribal chiefs and the functionaries at the service of imperialism, can give birth to new comprador bourgeoisies closely associated with imperialism for the economic coëxploitation of their own countries.

Everywhere the principal instrument for the development of the national bourgeoisie proves to be Bonapartist political power. It is this power that renders it possible to face simultaneously the oligarchy, imperialism, and the masses, and to find the important amounts of capital required for building the substructure and the financing of large-scale enterprises. It is furthermore through the exercise of the political power and the economic functions of the state that the cadres of this bourgeoisie are partly formed, by the enrichment of functionaries, their infiltration in the enterprises, their corruption, etc. The Bonapartist state becomes, under these circumstances, a genuine nursery for capitalist development in the dependent countries.

The ideology which best corresponds to the Bonapartist state is the de facto dictatorship of the Single Party, which boils down to its leadership taking power. In the case that this party is truly proletarian and socialist through its programme and ideology, such a dictatorship, based on the masses organized in democratic committees or communes, would unquestionably have a historically progressive meaning. But the pretext of the so-called classless colonial society currently used by certain people to justify in Africa the Bonapartist dictatorship of the Single Party, engaged in a capitalist economic development and without democratic control by the organized masses, is to be rejected.

Though it is true that the multi-party regime of socialist democracy cannot be transplanted, just as is, into a society

scarcely emerged from tribalism, it would be impossible for all that to neglect the need for such a possible Single Party to have a class character with proletarian ideology and programme and to base itself on the masses democratically organized in *peasant communes* and *urban committees* which control the government and hold the power.

As for more developed countries, the right to more than one soviet party must figure as an essential guarantee of a genuine socialist democracy.

No illusion is permissible about the real tendencies of the national bourgeoisie. Although in its formation it is obliged to struggle to a certain extent against imperialism and the oligarchy, to ally itself with the proletariat and its trade-union organizations, and to advocate and even put into practice for a certain period nationalizations and a "mixed" economy, it invariably tends, precisely through its increase in strength, to act like the classic bourgeoisie of the advanced countries: to turn against the workers' movement and to draw closer to imperialism both by "freeing" its "mixed" economy (in order to attract foreign capital and to stimulate native private capitalist initiative) and by lining up diplomatically with imperialism. Nehru's India, one of the first countries that obtained its independence and formed a serious national bourgeoisie, is the mirror in which there is already clearly reflected the national bourgeoisie's inevitable historical evolution, regressive and counter-revolutionary on a relatively short-term basis. (Other examples are: Tunisia, Egypt, Ghana, Argentina, Brazil.) The greatest danger lying in wait for the colonial masses in revolution is to be lulled by the mystique of national unity with their bourgeoisie and to sacrifice to this mystique their autonomous class policy and organization.

5. THE CAPITALIST ROAD OR THE SOCIALIST ROAD?

The colonial masses' aspiration to political independence and rapid economic development is everywhere profound and irresistible.

The national bourgeoisie is trying to fulfil this mission, both to profit by it itself and to pacify the masses. But it stumbles over the impossibility of attaining the goal of rapid economic development by capitalist roads.

The national bourgeoisie shows itself everywhere unable to nationalize definitively (after a few stages that turn out to be necessary) the essential part of the surplus-value extorted by the imperialists in the dependent countries, as well as the land rent of the native feudalists, and to valorize the enormous resource represented by the unused manpower of these countries. Nowhere has it been able or willing to expropriate without indemnity the imperialist enterprises in agriculture, mining, and trade; to expropriate without indemnity the feudalists and give the land to the peasants; to nationalize and plan the economy, and mobilize for its service the masses of the country.

Now the agrarian question is fundamental everywhere. The land for the most part is everywhere hoarded by the native feudalists, colons (big settlers), or foreign imperialist firms, and only a part of it (whose importance varies according to each concrete case) is cultivated on a private basis by native peasants or collectively in tribal reserves (of Negro Africa, for example).

Even these free peasants who are neither serfs nor sharecroppers nor rural laborers are for the most part poor peasants compared to the standards of the peasants of the advanced capitalist countries, and have to struggle desperately to continue to exist as peasants. From this there arises the primordial importance of a radical agrarian reform, accompanied by the effective material and technical aid of a genuine proletarian state.

The agrarian reform is above all the distribution of the land according to the free will of those who till it. According to the concrete case, this can take the form of the

distribution of the lands of the feudalists and the colons to landless or almost landless peasants, accompanied by effective aid by the state to the peasant coöperatives; or else the form of a collective management of the land right from the beginning by communes on a village or broader scale, and collectives of agricultural workers and sharecroppers of the great plantations and estates; or, most frequently, a mixed system.

For economic development, the national bourgeoisie counts only on the main contribution of foreign capital. Now its volume and the conditions for granting it render it an illusion to expect an even slightly rapid industrialization of the dependent countries so as to catch up with the advanced countries. The comparative examples of China and India become decisive in this field (without insisting on that of the U.S.S.R.). The example of Yugoslavia is another. The Chinese experience is extremely valuable as an indication of a specific road for the rapid and balanced economic development of a colonial country that starts out from a very low level of the productive forces.

The organization of peasant masses into communes contains elements that might be able to be profitably applied in other cases, especially where the communal traditions of the peasants are still relatively strong. The political and economic organization of the commune permits productively employing the whole available laboring mass by using the productive means and forces on the spot and thus beginning the rapid and balanced economic development of the country.

The setting up of the communes in general might be criticized only from the viewpoint of their possible bureaucratic administration, which would have the tendency not to take sufficiently into account the masses' living conditions and the need for their voluntarily joining this new type of economic and social organization. But in the case where the bureaucratic excesses might be limited — thanks mainly to the democratic organization of the masses managing the communes — the communes as an institution might turn out historically to be one form for the rapid, balanced, and more productive development of the "under-developed" countries, by using fully and judiciously all the available resources, and a school for a more communal social life.

The Yugoslav example on its side is valuable as an experiment in the rapid development of an "under-developed" country in which private small farm property predominates, thanks to an economy which, while being a workers' economy in its nature, remains open to the advantages of the world market, and thanks also to the close democratic association of the producers in the control and even the management of the economy (workers' councils).

The "under-developed" countries, far from being caught in the dilemma of either stagnation or a capitalist-type development thanks to the contribution of foreign capital, have the real possibility of taking, according to their concrete case, the "Chinese road" or the "Yugoslav road" or any combination of the two, rid of their negative elements.

But the primordial condition for such a possible development is the setting up of new economic and social structures of the socialist type. This means that the struggle for real liberation from imperialism, and for economic development and industrialization, is inseparable from the struggle for the socialist revolution. Only those dependent countries which have known how to combine the anti-imperialist struggle with the struggle for the socialist revolution have been able really to break loose from the imperialist system and to open wide the road to their rapid development and industrialization.

6. THE PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Instinctively, the masses who have thrown themselves into the anti-imperialist struggle against direct or indirect imperialist domination, are pushed toward goals that lie

beyond that of formal independence. In the present international and national contexts of the colonial revolution, it has inexorably a tendency to develop as a permanent revolution, putting more and more in the forefront the economic and social goals of the broad peasant and worker masses who are carrying it forward: agrarian reform, nationalization and planning of the economy, emancipation of women.

In this process the clash with the national bourgeoisie also becomes inevitable at a given stage of the struggle. Though the bourgeoisie in the dependent countries inevitably sets out on a sort of de facto united front of all the social classes (except the feudalists and the comprador bourgeoisie) against direct or indirect imperialist domination, the deepening of the struggle no less inevitably differentiates this front along class lines. The national bourgeoisie soon finds itself at grips with the radicalism of the movement of the peasant and worker masses who aspire to agrarian reform, nationalization and planning of the economy, and the emancipation of women -- all objectives incompatible with the regime of the national bourgeoisie. This obliges the bourgeoisie to turn against the mass movement and to resort to a regime that is, whether overtly or not, dictatorial.

The prestige acquired by the national bourgeoisie during the phase of the united anti-imperialist struggle can -- in the absence of a genuine revolutionary mass party -- win credit for it among the masses and allow it temporarily to stop the revolution halfway (e.g., Nehru, Sukarno, Bourguiba, Nasser, Kassem, Nkrumah, et al). Thence arises the need never to subordinate the autonomous revolutionary movement of the masses to the political leadership of the national bourgeoisie, never to "prettify" it, never to stop criticizing and exposing it, while accepting the anti-imperialist united front with it, i.e., not a lasting political alliance, but conditional practical agreements for limited and specific joint goals.

The prominent role now played in the colonial revolution by the national bourgeoisie, or by petty-bourgeois formations with an ideology that is in the last analysis bourgeois, is partly the result of the policy of Stalinism, which has subordinated the autonomous revolutionary movement of the masses to the interests either of the metropolitan bourgeoisie or of the colonial national bourgeoisie. If this policy is not radically opposed, and if a stop is not put to treating the revolutionary movement of the masses simply as a contributory force to the game of the bourgeoisie and its relations with the Stalinist bureaucracy, there is a risk of enormously slowing down the progress of the colonial revolution to a higher level.

Revolutionary Marxist elements who operate in these dependent countries do not always have the possibility of opposing from the outside and in a completely independent way the existing national movements with bourgeois leadership or ideology, for in this case they would run the risk of cutting themselves off from the broad masses and remaining

in practice ineffective. While taking on everywhere the task of open revolutionary-Marxist publications which clarify the problems and trace out a clear perspective, they may find themselves obliged to carry on the essential part of their activity inside the existing national movements of a mass and revolutionary character, and to advocate within them a wing of a proletarian and socialist orientation. This orientation may in places take the transitional form of a class party, a mass Labor Party based on the trade unions.

The politicization of the trade unions in several dependent countries can operate in favor of the revolutionary workers' movement or of the national bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie will try to domesticate the trade unions as a leading political force both for its combat against the other bourgeois fractions, the comprador feudo-bourgeois, and for its economic development. From this arises the possibility and necessity of directing the organized force of the young and dynamic proletariat of the dependent countries toward the transitional idea of the Labor Party based on the trade unions.

But any orientation exclusively toward the proletariat, which in fact neglects the peasantry, can turn out to be fatal for the victorious outcome of the revolutionary combat. Besides the need of an adequate programme for the agrarian question, taking into account the peculiarities of each case, it is necessary constantly to link up the workers' struggles with the peasants' struggles, and to root the revolutionary organization in the countryside by daily work.

In many dependent countries, conditions are propitious for the organization and maintenance of a guerrilla, fed by the contribution of peasant forces and by the help and protection of the peasant population. The adequate combination of the armed struggle of the peasants with the mobilization of the city workers, can enormously strengthen the vigor and effectiveness of the revolutionary combat, and speed up the fall of the imperialist or comprador regimes in the dependent countries.

The maturity and effectiveness of a revolutionary leadership in several present cases must be shown by its spirit of initiative, its capacity, its audacity in seizing an occasion for starting an armed struggle of the peasants in order to back up and spur on the national revolutionary movement and to leave the adversary no respite for reconsolidating his positions.

The reevaluation of the revolutionary possibilities of peasant warfare, in the light of the experience of China as well as of Algeria, Cuba, and elsewhere, is a duty for every leadership placed in analogous conditions, and one of the most valuable and important lessons, to be thoroughly assimilated, of the experience of the colonial revolution. The modern revolutionary party, in several dependent countries, must be the one to show itself the audacious organizer of the armed struggle of the peasants, raising the revolutionary process in the country right away to a higher level, involved in the seizure of power.

II

THE VARIOUS EPICENTRES OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THEIR PECULIARITIES

7. INDIA AND INDONESIA

In the dependent countries of the Far East the direct political power is at present to be found in the hands of the national bourgeoisie (India), of Bonapartist governments acting on its behalf (Indonesia and Burma), or of comprador cliques closely tied up with imperialism (South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Ceylon, Malaya, and South

Korea). In all these cases, where we now have to deal with formally independent states, the bourgeoisie's inability to complete the revolution, including the bourgeois-democratic one, is now obvious. The most flagrant example is India, far and away the most developed of these countries.

India, far from progressing along the road of a more and more "socialist," nationalized, and planned economy, of a radical agrarian reform and of a real national unification,

thus laying the foundations for a rapid economic development, is in reality going in the opposite direction. Its "mixed" economy is being developed especially in its private sector, wide open again to foreign capital, while neither the Community Project and National Extension Services Programme nor Vinoba Bhavé's unofficial programme of "land gifts" has solved the practical distribution of land to the peasants and their ensuing effective organization in coöperatives.

Because the superannuated structure of India could not yet be fundamentally overturned, the economic goals of the government of the bourgeoisie remain limited and subordinated to outside capitalist aid. This causes the country's rate of economic development, both industrial and agricultural, to remain low, and even to lag behind the rate of development of population.

The country's weak economic development and its only slightly shaken feudo-capitalist structure furthermore prevent the liquidation of regional antagonisms and various obstacles — of customs, languages, religions, etc — which stand in the way of a genuine national unification of the country's rapid economic and cultural development.

As with Indonesia, various regions of Africa, and even Latin America, it is in India the lack of a radical revolution which perpetuates the aftermath of precapitalist ways of living and barbarism, tangled up with those of imperialist domination and aggravated thereby, and which hinders both the process of national unification across the superannuated or artificial frontiers set up by regionalism, communalism, tribalism, or imperialism, and an economic and cultural upsurge.

There follows therefrom the prospect, in the years to come, of explosive developments which will cause the power of the bourgeoisie, after a period of maintaining itself with a parliamentary and democratic façade, to turn toward more open dictatorship. Under the combined pressure of the alarming gap between production increase and population increase and of the revolutionary influence of the successes steadily achieved by China, the Indian bourgeoisie is from now on visualizing the day when the prestige accumulated by the Congress Party and by Nehru personally in the period of the struggle against British imperialism will be completed exhausted.

The break-up of the Congress Party, already begun, and the crystalization on its right of more militant feudo-capitalist and pro-imperialist formations, are signs of an evolution that may well lead to the same open dictatorship as that already experienced by Pakistan. Thus the proof will be given in the case of India as well that the regime of the national bourgeoisie is everywhere doomed to the same economic and political bankruptcy.

In Indonesia, another country where the national bourgeoisie and its leaders were able — thanks to the failures of the Communist Party during the war — to acquire a scarcely deserved national prestige, the parliamentary acrobatics of the bourgeoisie have ended in its setting up its open Bonapartist power, based on the army. It is the treacherous policy of the Indonesian C P which has enabled Sukarno, the "hero" of the weak Indonesian national bourgeoisie, to survive all the grave crises that have succeeded one another in this country since 1945, and now to consolidate its Bonapartist power, prior to turning more decisively against the masses and the C P.

True, even now the power of the Indonesian bourgeoisie remains weak in face of the country's unsolved problems (agrarian reform, real national unification, effective liquidation of the whole economic aftermath of imperialism, industrialization), and of the discontent of the masses, who see their standard of living lowered by the insufficiency of the rate of economic development, inflation, and unemployment.

A radical change in the policy of the C P, in both India

and Indonesia, toward the national bourgeoisie, could naturally open up real revolutionary prospects in a relatively short time. To the degree, however, that this eventuality can be considered improbable, the task of the revolutionary Marxists organized in the Revolutionary Communist Party of India and in the Acoma Partai is to work up a concrete transitional programme which completely exposes the power of the bourgeoisie and turns all the revolutionary forces toward the workers' and peasants' government.

The defense of the Chinese revolution and the popularization of all its valid achievements (including the conception of the communes) is not only a duty but a very powerful weapon in the hands of the revolutionary Marxists operating in these countries. Furthermore, a Leninist united-front policy with the Indian and Indonesian C Ps is necessary both for an effective fight against the bourgeoisie and for the inevitable ideological differentiation in these parties.

The Indian and Indonesian revolutions are the two great events to be faced in the coming years, for which it is necessary to prepare with extreme seriousness, starting right now.

Despite the differences that exist in the respective economic development of India and Indonesia, in the relative strength of their bourgeoisies, and in the structures in the rural regions, the decisive equivalent factors in the two cases are the following. Both in India and Indonesia the masses have obtained considerable experience with the direct rule of the national bourgeoisie, with its inability to solve the agrarian question, the question of real unification, and that of industrialization, in the face of a growing population and also with its dictatorial evolution. The blind alley into which this policy has led, which contrasts more and more with the revolutionary achievements in China and with the international context, can only lead to an explosion.

It is probably the outbreak of the revolutionary crisis in one of these two countries that will be able to touch off a new revolutionary avalanche in a whole series of other countries of the Far East at present under the domination of comprador cliques actively backed by American imperialism.

The Ceylonese revolution, even before then, might form an exception, due to the existence in this country of the Lanka Sama Samaya Party with a solid mass base. But for the L S S P to play its full part, it must strengthen its Bolshevik structure and link itself up better with the peasant masses by means of systematic work among them, backed by the party's labor influence, on the basis of a concrete programme of economic and political transitional demands.

8. THE ARAB REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

At the other end of Asia, in the Islamic countries of the Middle East, there now stands out the epicentre of the Iraqi revolution; this forms a particular part of the Arab revolution.

After having gone forward for a whole period, carrying out important measures in the expropriation of some imperialist positions, agrarian reform, emancipation of women, and the trade-union and military organization of the masses, it has for a certain period now been marking time and even going backward.

As in other analogous cases, the Iraqi revolution has raised to power a staff of "national" officers, of petty-bourgeois origin, with aspirations for a more rapid economic development, rid of the control and fetters of imperialism. Such staffs are caught between adverse social forces characteristic of the Arab countries of the Middle East: the feudalists and the trading and money-lending comprador bourgeoisie, the limited layers of the national bourgeoisie and the urban petty-bourgeoisie (craftsmen, clerks, functionaries, intellectuals), and the revolutionary proletariat

and peasantry, and they take on a pronounced Bonapartist character. As such, however, they are doomed either finally to succumb again to the influence of the feudo-bourgeois, or in the best of cases to become the tool of the policy and interests of the national industrial bourgeoisie and of the urban petty bourgeoisie won over to the same aims.

The evolution of Kassem, following on the analogous evolution of Nasser (more rapid because of the fact that the national bourgeoisie carries greater weight in Egypt than in Iraq), is characteristic in this connection. In order to consolidate his Bonapartist power, Kassem was obliged for a whole period not only to tolerate the revolutionary movement in the cities and the countryside and the organizations claiming to represent it, but to base himself partly thereon in order to stand up to the comprador feudo-bourgeoisie and to the pro-Nasser circles that were aiming to overthrow him.

Kassem has gradually become the tool of the policy of the Iraqi ruling circles who think to exploit the considerable wealth of the country on their own account, and who, in connivance with other Arab leading circles, especially in Syria, are competing for supremacy in the Middle East with the Egyptian bourgeoisie lined up behind Nasser. The Kassem-Nasser rivalry, as well as that which sets Nasser against Bourguiba, destroys the myth of Arab unity set above inter-class antagonisms, and shows that the historically progressive search for the effective unity of the Arab nation will be the work not of the Arab bourgeoisie but of the Arab revolutionary masses engaged in the combat against imperialism, and at a given stage equally against their own ruling classes, including the national bourgeoisie.

The relative consolidation of Kassem's power has been greatly aided by the treacherous policy of the Iraqi C P, which has "idealized" Kassem, has enormously helped in building up his prestige, has subordinated the autonomous policy and organization of the revolutionary movement to Kassem's leadership, and has not been able to use this movement to raise the revolution to a higher level. As in the case of Nasser and the Egyptian C P, which for a whole period glorified Nasser and his regime, and also of the Moroccan C P attitude toward the sultan, the monarchy, and his regime, the Iraqi C P is now reaping the contempt and the repression of the idol it adored.

The Nassers and Kassems represented, at the culminating moment of the revolution, the Kerenskys of the Arab revolution before becoming, by the force of events, the grave-diggers of its socialist completion. Though it is correct and necessary to support them critically against the attacks of imperialism or the native feudo-bourgeois, it is vital to dissipate the illusions of the masses about them and to promote an autonomous class policy aimed toward the workers' and peasants' government.

The replacement of a transitional programme which links up the masses' elementary economic and political demands with the transitional demands, properly so called, and the prospect of the workers' and peasants' government, by a merely bourgeois-democratic programme ensuring the economic development of capitalism, can lead only to certain defeat for the revolutionary movement and to the dictatorial rule of the bourgeoisie or even of the comprador feudo-bourgeois. For only the proletarian leadership of the revolutionary movement of the masses, setting up a workers' and peasants' government, can solve the bourgeois-democratic tasks in the dependent countries (agrarian reform, liquidation of the aftermath of imperialism, real national unification) and start industrialization off on the basis of a nationalized planned economy that productively mobilizes all the country's unused manpower.

After the Mossadegh experience in Iran and the Nasser experience in Egypt, the experience of the Iraqi revolution forms the most advanced point reached up till now in the

Middle East by the colonial revolution.

This experience also shows that without a proletarian and socialist leadership of the revolutionary movement of the masses, the revolution has no chance of solving the bourgeois-democratic tasks and of seriously tackling industrialization. On the contrary, the Bonapartist staffs in power fatally succumb to reactionary native forces and to the influence of imperialism, and turn against the masses in order to keep their movement within the limits of a capitalist development of the country, based on the essential contribution of foreign capital and the superexploitation of the native masses.

Kassem's power, however, is still weak, and the revolutionary potentialities of the Iraqi masses, though stricken, have not been exhausted. The rectification of the situation remains possible provided that the mass movement clarifies its position toward the bourgeois Bonapartist power of Kassem, breaks off the permanent alliance subordinated to his leadership, and opens up in Iraq the prospect of the workers' and peasants' government and of the Iraqi Federal Socialist Republic.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF ISRAEL

The state of Israel, an artificial creation aided by the interests of imperialism in its struggle against the development of the Arab revolution, is at present a special factor which must be taken into account in the Middle East.

The violent disappearance of its population could not be envisaged, nor would it be possible to accept as a permanent state of things its existence in its present form and its expansionist dynamism to the detriment of the Arab masses. The Arab revolutionary Marxists will fight to have the rights of a self-governed national minority granted to the population of Israel within a centralized or federal Arab state of the Middle East. The Israeli revolutionary Marxists will fight for the dissolution of the state of Israel into such a state, and for complete reparation of the abuses and crimes committed against the Arab population uprooted from Palestine.

THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

At almost the other extremity of the Arab world the Algerian revolution is continuing its already six-year-long combat against the essential part of the repressive forces of French imperialism.

The Arab world is thus caught in between two hotbeds of active revolution, Iraq and Algeria: these have to take into account, beside their own internal difficulties of development, the hostility of imperialism, the very relative interest of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the extreme tendency to go bourgeois in Tunisia, Morocco, and especially Egypt. The bourgeois wing of the Arab revolution has been considerably strengthened, and, left to its own dynamics, would keep the revolution at a level similar to that in the semi-colonial countries of Latin America.

The Algerian revolution is at the present time a plebeian force not yet tamed by the Arab bourgeoisie or by any imperialism. Because of Algeria's lack of a native feudo-capitalist class and even of an urban petty-bourgeoisie of any real importance, the peasant and worker base of the Algerian revolution always has a preponderant influence on the few potentially pro-bourgeois elements that stud the apparatus of the F L N.

Much greater, on the contrary, is the danger arising from the structure of this organization, its political apparatus formed in emigration being insufficiently linked up with the fighting forces of the revolution and controlled by them. This factor, combined with the facts that the F L N's social and political doctrine is still insufficiently specified, and that the lack of aid from the French and international proletariat exposes the Algerian revolution to an ever greater pressure of bourgeois and imperialist forces from the outside, stresses the danger of the crystalization in the

FLN apparatus of a bureaucratic tendency susceptible to bourgeois influence.

Such a possible evolution could be fought against only by the contribution of effective proletarian aid, first of all in France itself, and by the creation inside the FLN of a tendency with a more specifically proletarian and socialist orientation, linked up with the fighting base of the revolution, the combatants in the interior and the population, and the proletarian immigration in France.

The need for the transformation of the FLN into a political party with a specific programme, of a control of this party by the combatants and the population, of a control of the government by the party inside Algeria itself, has become at present a primordial condition for the healthy later development of the revolution. The Algerian revolution has reached a critical turning-point.

For more than five years it has sacrificed a great part of its living forces in an unequal combat against a powerful imperialism, and almost without any aid from the world proletariat. At the same time it has been able in combat to arrive at an unquestionable maturity, to create cadres, to expand the network of its international propaganda, to touch public opinion, especially that of the Arab and African countries, and to subject French imperialism to a material and military effort that gravely handicaps its interests and plans in various fields.

At present, in order that it may face the eventuality of a new long period of struggle with French imperialism, it needs — in addition to the aid of the international proletariat and the Arab and African people (in the form of material, diplomatic, and moral help) — to raise to a higher political and organizational level the organization that leads it. Otherwise the immense losses, wear-and-tear, and combat fatigue might possibly lead to a defeat — not of the struggle for the goal of independence in one form or another, but of the revolution for the goal of a real independence that opens the road to the rapid industrial economic development of the country. Anyway, the plebeian base of the Algerian revolution has already acquired enough experience so that the eventuality of a pure and simple Bourguibist development of the revolution can be excluded.

An ideological differentiation within the FLN, with a break into two tendencies — one pro-bourgeois, Bourguibist, which would try to corner the leadership of the country on the basis of a compromise with imperialism, and the other more proletarian — is possible, if not in the long run inevitable. In this case the process which is going on in the Istiqlal in Morocco will take place also in the FLN, with this difference: that the Bourguibist tendency may turn out to be weaker right from the beginning, while the left tendency may turn out to be much more radical than the Moroccan left, and turn toward a mass party based on the trade unions.

The Algerian revolution is a powerful stimulus not only to the entire Arab revolution, but also and especially to the whole African revolution. In the lack of an effective aid from the French and European proletariat, it is still the advances of the African revolution that might be able, more than any other factor, to influence later developments in the Algerian revolution. Furthermore, it is on the outcome of the Algerian revolution that it depends whether the Maghrebian revolution as a whole will rebound or not in the next few years.

As for France, dominated by the Gaullist regime, the Algerian revolution is playing the part of the main force undermining this regime. There can be no stabilization of the Gaullist regime as long as the war in Algeria goes on.

Big capital, which this regime represents, is aware of this fact as well as of the impossibility of putting an end to the Algerian revolution by the way of military "pacification." But on the other hand it is not disposed to lose its vested economic interests in North Africa and

especially the advantages of the exploitation of the Sahara — whence its "solution" of an Algerian state associated with France.

Such a solution presupposes — in lack of a compromise with a decisive wing of the FLN apparatus — the creation of a comprador native élite through the Constantine Plan, access to the administration, etc. But that is a long-term process that French imperialism cannot support without grave economic, political, and international risks — whence the need to conclude that the Gaullist regime is using both "pacification" and the Constantine Plan, etc. as auxiliary means of pressure on the FLN or a decisive wing thereof in order to lead it to a compromise on the solution of association and the specific form thereof.

The special case of the FLN — the leadership of a plebeian revolution in which there are not yet, properly speaking, feudo-capitalist leading classes developed to any serious extent — raises a problem for the proletariat and its revolutionary organizations: they cannot be satisfied to criticize such an organization from the outside without trying above all to bring genuine international aid to the revolution and to work inside this organization's ranks themselves.

9. NEGRO AFRICA

The most spectacular developments in the recent unfolding of the colonial revolution are taking place in Negro Africa.

At an amazing speed the territories under direct colonial control in the region are attaining self-government and even formal independence, skipping over stages. British as well as French and Belgian imperialism have found themselves obliged either to retreat here and there before the movement set going by the masses demanding their liberation from the direct colonial yoke or even to proceed to split such movements by turning the formal power over to native élites. There are still only Central Africa, South Africa, and the territories under Portuguese control that are lagging behind in such an evolution.

The reasons driving imperialism to this greater flexibility are various:

The awakening of the African masses as a result of the events of the war and since then (the strengthening of the workers' states, headed by the USSR, the victory of the Chinese revolution, the Arab and especially the Algerian revolution) has been further aided by the development of the capitalist economy in Africa, urbanization, detribalization, the insecurity introduced into the economic and social life of the autarkic societies of earlier days, the birth of a concentrated and dynamic proletariat and strata of intellectuals, and even in places potentially bourgeois elements who aspire to administer the power themselves. Furthermore, all of Africa (and Negro Africa in particular) containing very considerable and still almost unexploited wealth in minerals, sources of power, and agriculture, has become since the war the principal colonial reserve of imperialism. Its strategic positions have also increased its interest for imperialism.

And lastly, the rivalries among the imperialist powers who are competing for the continent, as well as the East-West antagonism, have helped the self-confidence of the native élites in the possibility of their exploiting the situation to reach direct power. The trend of British imperialism, as well as of French, Belgian, and American imperialisms, in Africa, now sufficiently clear, is to speed up the formation of limited native élites, turn the political power over to them, and associate them, by bribing them, in the economic coexploitation of Africa. In the lack of a classic-type class structure of any degree of development among the natives in Negro Africa, and especially the lack of a bourgeoisie, including a developed petty bourgeoisie, the limited élites that exist — a few intellectuals, a few

functionaries, a few trade-union cadres, a few tradesmen and businessmen — constitute potentially, if not already actually, new comprador strata, on which imperialism bases its hope to see them develop and stabilize as such.

But on the other hand the still extreme social, economic, and political weakness of these limited élites, faced with a powerful mass movement that is eager for radical reforms and solutions, as well as the awareness of these élites that they have the possibility of staking on the rivalries among the imperialists and the East-West antagonism, pushes them to a *sui generis* role not only *politically* but also *socially*, in the following more specific sense:

Not having yet taken form and root in rapidly changing African society, these élites constitute, at the present stage, less the embryo of a neo-bourgeois class than the embryo of a *state bureaucracy* manoeuvring between the plebeian mass of present African society and imperialism. It is only in cases like Ghana or the Ivory Coast, where capitalist penetration in agriculture has already created a peasantry and an urban petty-bourgeoisie (studded with a few genuinely bourgeois elements), both mercantile, that the embryo of a native bourgeois power is to be found.

This specific social role peculiar to present-day African society can just as well evolve toward a clearly bourgeois character as toward a quasi-proletarian character, according to the strength of the mass movement, and its relations with imperialism and the workers' states. At the present moment the Guinea of Sekou Touré is the most advanced example of this phenomenon. The Kenya of Jomo Kenyatta, and even the Tanganyika of Julius Nyerere may turn out tomorrow to be analogous examples, as well as the Cameroons, the territories under Portuguese control, and others. In all these examples the fundamental element of future evolution is the state and the stratum which administers it.

In the case where the economy is aimed toward nationalization of the few key mining, agricultural, and trading enterprises, the collectivization of agriculture on the basis of the tribal village or of broader communes, and the structure of the state on the basis of peasant and urban communes, there is beginning the development of a workers' state based essentially on a nationalized and planned economy.

The nationalization of the foreign enterprises can, furthermore, be carried out by stages, provided that they expatriate only a limited part of the profit, while reinvesting the rest on the spot, and submit to control by the state and by their workers organized in councils.

The collectivization of agriculture can turn out to be enormously facilitated by the survival in Negro Africa of communal tribal customs, particularly strong in this field. The essential aid (scientific, technical, and material) of the state to agriculture, in order to fight effectively against unfavorable climatic conditions and to increase yields can also enormously facilitate such a collectivist trend in agriculture right from the beginning. In these countries the most important resource for their rapid economic development lies in the productive use of all available manpower, hitherto largely unused.

But such a mobilization is impossible without the climate of a genuine revolution, of a genuine workers' and peasants' government, in the framework of a nationalized and planned economy. Naturally it is not a matter of aiming at the construction of an autarkic "socialist" economy, which could only keep the living levels of the masses very low, and make the political regime degenerate toward a bureaucratic dictatorship. It is a matter of profiting broadly by all the possibilities of the world market in both its capitalist and socialist sectors, as well as by the development of the inter-African market and trade.

The socialist revolution in Negro Africa inevitably presents peculiarities owing to the fact that we are dealing here with an economic-social level lower than that of the

dependent countries of feudo-capitalist structure in other parts of the world, in Latin America or Asia. In Negro Africa we are generally dealing with more specific structures of a still largely tribal society, breaking up under the penetration of imperialism and capitalism that is destroying the autarkic subsistence economy, commercializing native small-scale agricultural production side-by-side with capitalist large-scale agricultural production, and causing the concentration in the cities, the mining centres, and the imperialist plantations of the manpower released by the break-up of the traditional national economy.

Because this degree of economic development did not throw up native ruling classes — for the limited European minorities, up until very recently, administered and directed the economy themselves, while they entrusted local civil administration to the traditional chiefs and their own functionaries — present-day society in Negro Africa is a specific form of combined development of the structures of natural economy, simple market economy, and imperialist economy, while the links of a feudal economy or of a native capitalist economy are still totally or largely lacking.²

It is from this that there arises the specific role of the limited native stratum which is acceding to power and controls the state, in an equally specific international and national context unknown in the past. This stratum possesses in the state a force per se, without undergoing the precise influence or control of a ruling class whose agent it is. It is by its administration of the state that this stratum is developing and acquiring social importance, and not by the intrinsic needs of production and its role in production. Under the historical conditions prevailing in the past and up till the last war, such a stratum could have evolved only toward a comprador bourgeoisie in the service of imperialism.

But under the specific present conditions, where it inevitably is subjected to the influence of the powerful movement of the masses and of the rising power of the workers' states, and knows that it can profit by the East-West antagonism, this stratum is taking on a Bonapartist role which it imparts to the whole state, whose economic and social structures are not yet definitively oriented toward an inevitably classic capitalist development.

The boundaries of the present African states are artificial and absurd, and correspond to the lines of the carve-up into zones of influence, a division carried out by imperialism toward the end of the last century (Congress of Berlin, 1885). It is necessary to proceed to a regroupment of the existing states into broader formations, in the direction of the African Federal State, grouping all the Negro-Hamite peoples' south of the Arab countries of North Africa.

These peoples are not strictly homogeneous from the viewpoint of ethnic origins, language, and religion. But common customs, a common civilization, and a common destiny have been forged on the basis of an identical tribal economic and social organization through the centuries of slave exploitation by the whites and the native mercenaries under their orders, and now the beginning of an African common national consciousness through the struggle that it is carrying on for its liberation from the imperialist yoke. The Pan-Africanism that stirs the African élites and more and more carries away the vanguard sectors entering into the decisive struggle against imperialism, corresponds to a confused search for African national unity, forged by those common origins, destiny, and struggle.

Granted, Pan-Africanism can also become the ideology of the African bourgeoisie now in formation to overshadow differences and the class struggle and to exploit for a

² With the exception, however, of certain regions such as the northern part of Nigeria, where feudal agricultural property predominates.

whole period for its own class profit the revolutionary potentialities and labor power of the masses. (Pan-Arabism is undergoing such a fate at the hands of a Nasser and of other spokesmen of the rising Arab bourgeoisie.) It is necessary to distinguish between Pan-Africanism in the mouth of a Nkhrumah and Pan-Africanism as an idea of national unity of the whole African Negro people, a powerful revolutionary force urging on the African masses in their struggle against imperialism.

The concrete stages of regroupment of the African nation, by fusion or federation, cannot be foreseen and advocated as early as the present moment. But it can be said that the tendency to unification must be everywhere favored, encouraged, written into the programme of the African revolutionary party. If the radiation of the Guinea of Sékou Touré is destined to grow in all Negro Africa as an attempt at a non-capitalist development, the revolutionary hotbeds to be noted in Negro Africa in the coming years are South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, Central Africa, Kenya, the Congo, and Nigeria.

The revolution that has begun in South Africa has every chance of developing in the coming years as a second Algerian war at the other end of the continent. This struggle, a combination of a guerrilla and a revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat in the cities and the mines, will have the active support of all Negro Africa, which constitutes the hinterland. The human reserves of the peasantry, as well as the geographical advantages of the country, are extraordinarily favorable to a guerrilla. Furthermore, the industrial, agricultural, and mining proletariat of South Africa is vital to the country's economy. A revolutionary uprising of the South African masses, based on a genuine revolutionary organization of a national character, is capable of putting a relatively rapid end to the fierce resistance of the European minority. But in any case, it is necessary to take this inevitable resistance into account: not to minimize it and to make preparations on the basis thereof.

The South African revolution will inevitably have to take on the aspect of a proletarian and socialist revolution, overthrowing the regime — slavery-minded, racist, sui generis — of the economically most advanced capitalism in all Africa. Both during the phase of struggle and by the significance and results of its victorious outcome, the South African revolution will pull all Negro Africa up to a higher level of its revolutionary development. What is at present necessary in South Africa is to build on a national scale a revolutionary organization of the non-European masses which, while setting out from these masses' economic and political national demands, will be aimed toward the armed uprising and the proletarian revolution.

Without decisive action in this direction, without participation in all the mobilizations of the masses, without flexible tactics so as not to get cut off from the masses even when they take false steps, there is a great risk that the revolutionary potentiality of the masses may be for a whole period spent in explosions without a future, and that the effective leadership of them may pass over to activist elements who are incapable of keeping up a long-term struggle nationally organized and steadily raising itself to higher levels.

As in the case of the Arab countries — and in places even more in the case also of the countries of Negro Africa — the organization of the revolutionary Marxist tendency, necessary everywhere, will have to do the bulk of its work for a whole period inside the existing national mass movements and in the trade unions where these exist. Its general goal will be the creation of class parties of a mass character, based on trade unions, to be organized everywhere.

These parties will have to work up a transitional programme, corresponding to the specific conditions in each country, while taking into account their regroupment

and orientation toward the African Federal State (or the Socialist United States of Negro Africa). The organization of trade unions and their autonomous federation on the Pan-African scale is a task to be ardently pursued everywhere, for the trade unions are called on to represent everywhere the main organized force that the governments will try to domesticate to their service (as well as, in addition, the nationalist parties of the bourgeoisie now in formation).

10. THE NEW PHASE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

The revolution in Latin America is reaching the highest level attained by the colonial revolution at the present stage, having gone beyond the phase of formal independence and acquired a considerable experience of the comprador oligarchy and even of the national bourgeoisie.

The capitalist development in Latin America is the most advanced of all the dependent regions, and in certain cases, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, has even reached a level which brings these countries close to being capitalist states, admittedly behindhand compared to the advanced capitalist states of today, but materially close to the average pre-war capitalist level. Yet even in these cases the imperialist grip is still strong, as well as that of the comprador landed and trading oligarchy, which implies a combined structure in these countries, full of contradictions, and of discontinuities and disequilibriums characteristic of their economic development.

The process of industrialization of Latin America has been considerably speeded up during the war and since, and, despite its jerky character, does not fail to be continuous. Of all the dependent regions, Latin America has received the greatest part of the investments of European and North America origins.

But it is also from there that imperialism has extorted the greatest part of surplus value, far surpassing the total of its "aid" without productive reinvestment on the spot. It is the conditions of imperialist exploitation of Latin America's enormous resources in agriculture, power, and mining, combined with that of the parasitical landed and commercial oligarchy, which holds back the economic development of this region and causes the discontinuities, crises, and disequilibriums characteristic of this development.

The formation of capital productively reinvested on the spot is hindered by the repatriation of the greatest part of the surplus value extorted by the mining, petroleum, agricultural, and other imperialist enterprises; by the speculative turn given to its investments by the oligarchy; by the very weak rate of internal savings, due to the present low income of the population. The importance of this last factor in capital formation is nevertheless limited compared to the other two factors.

As long as Latin America's agricultural and mining exports profited by scarcities in the world market during the war and immediately thereafter, the formation of local monetary capital was on the rise and considerable in amount. That, together with other factors, aided speeded-up industrialization. But since these exports have been suffering from the drop in prices and even relatively in volume, this source for the formation of local capital has been diminishing.

Latin America's superannuated feudo-capitalist and imperialist structures, moreover, prevent the balanced expansion of the internal market. The peasant majority of the population has little or no land, and is without adequate aid from the state, the workers' wages are generally low, while a developed substructure (communications, power, various constructions of public utility, etc.) are

lacking. As a consequence the internal market is both limited and disjointed.

As a result of the fact, moreover, that the economy often depends on the export of a very limited range of products, if not of one single agricultural or mining product, these countries feel recessions in the world market as genuine economic crises, and struggle in the throes of chronic inflation. This does not tend to broaden the internal market or to aid the formation and investment of local capital.

The artificial frontiers — an inheritance from imperialist colonization and domination and from the regional interests of the comprador oligarchy — also prevent the market from being expanded to the full extent of its natural confines: all of Latin America; or, to begin with, South America on the one hand, and Central America, Mexico, and the islands of the Caribbean on the other.

It is North American imperialism that is opposed, with the firmest determination, to the free development of the Latin American revolution. Latin America's resources in agriculture, power, and mining, from Mexico to Patagonia, passing through the wealth of Venezuela and Brazil, constitute for the highly developed economy of the U.S.A., which is exhausting its own national resources, absolutely necessary reserves. Latin America is, moreover, the most important outlet for the industrial products and capital of Yankee imperialism, while its strategic interest is also vital for the latter.

It is North American imperialism which, having gradually supplanted the European imperialisms in Latin America to a great extent, has become the main reactionary force, allied with the comprador oligarchy, in hindering this region's free and balanced economic development and industrialization, and in maintaining both the anachronistic social structures and the extreme Balkanization of the region.

Its grip on it since the war, however, has not ceased to encounter the violent and sometimes victorious opposition of the new rising forces of the Latin America revolution. Its hold is equally undermined by revived imperialist competition, as well as by that begun by the workers' states.

To the degree in which, despite everything, the economic development and industrialization of this region have continued and even speeded up since the war, the social configuration of these countries has been seriously modified, and is very different from, far more developed than, that in the other dependent regions of the world.

Besides the peasantry — share-croppers, rural laborers, and poor individual peasants — who still form the great majority of the population, and also besides the considerable urban petty bourgeoisie — intellectuals, office-workers, functionaries, small businessmen, and craftsmen — there has been formed a concentrated and dynamic industrial proletariat, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, as well as in the mining or oil centres of Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela.

Furthermore, besides the classic comprador landed and commercial strata, there have been formed new strata of the industrial national bourgeoisie, who hope for a freer economic development, less hindered by imperialism and the oligarchy. It is these strata which, in various Latin American countries, either directly or through the intermediary of Bonapartist political regimes, are endeavoring to corner and hold on to political power, and to channel for their own profit the powerful anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement of the masses of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the radicalized urban petty bourgeoisie.

But the resistance of imperialism and the oligarchy to

such experiments is still very strong. What is more, the national bourgeoisie itself is afraid to trust too much the support of the revolutionary masses and is incapable of radically opposing imperialism and the oligarchy. This political factor, in interaction with the economic difficulties, the acuteness of social contradictions, and the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses, is at the basis of the chronic instability, the almost permanent revolutionary crisis, which characterizes Latin American countries at the present stage.

Since the dictatorship of the regimes of the comprador oligarchy, relying on the army and the police, proves in most cases to be henceforth impossible or inoperative, and since the power of the national bourgeoisie, caught in between the opposition of imperialism, of the oligarchy, and the radicalism of the mass movement, proves to be profoundly unstable, political crisis in Latin America becomes endemic. It thus reflects on the political plane the revolutionary transformation now going on in Latin American society, full of contradictions, discontinuities, and disequilibria, in the present international context of the general crisis of imperialism, the rise of the economic and military power of the workers' states, and the international rise of the colonial revolution.

The prolongation of instability and revolutionary crisis in the Latin American countries is moreover the expression of the lateness — or rather, inadequate parallel growth in maturity — of a revolutionary proletarian leadership capable of bringing this crisis to a victorious outcome in the immediate future. But the objective conditions are eminently favorable for such a rapid growth in maturity and for the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass leadership.

The objectively revolutionary situation which at present more or less generally characterizes Latin America is clearly reflected both in the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses and in the extreme division and acuteness of antagonisms among the leading classes.

The uninterrupted struggle of the Argentine proletariat since the fall of Perón, the maintenance of the fundamental gains of the Bolivian revolution since 1952, the rise in influence of the worker's parties in Chile, the fall of the dictatorships in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, the Cuban revolution, and the struggle now begun against the dictatorship in Paraguay, are so many eloquent signs of the rising extreme power of the revolutionary movement of the masses.

On the other hand, the divisions within the ruling classes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and elsewhere, as well as the inability of the army — traditional tool of reactionary dictatorship in these countries — to intervene effectively and thwart the chronic crisis, are also significant signs of the depth of the instability and of the objectively revolutionary situation that marks Latin America.

THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME AND THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The level that the Latin American revolution will reach at the next stage will depend on the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass leadership capable of replacing the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois staffs that are leading the revolutionary movement of the masses. This task is at present possible provided that the revolutionary Marxist tendency operates with audacity and ingenuity in the mass movement, taking into account the special conditions that prevail in each country.

Everywhere combining independent activity with entrust work in the proletarian or even plebeian mass formations of a revolutionary nature, it will have as its task to work up and to advocate a transitional programme toward a workers' and peasants' government and toward socialism,

which includes in particular: a radical agrarian reform, distributing the land to the peasants who till it, and an effective aid by the state to the latter's coöperative organizations; a plan for economic development and industrialization on the basis of a fundamentally nationalized economy that takes into account the resources of the world market, especially of the unified Latin American market, and of aid from and exchanges with the workers' states.

On the general Latin American level the slogan of the *Socialist United States of Latin America* must be tirelessly propagandized.

What is everywhere necessary is not abstract propaganda for the proletarian power and the socialist revolution, but a concrete answer to the vital problems of each country, to be solved by the workers' and peasants government based on the political and trade-union workers organizations and on the organization of masses into militia and committees.

The agrarian reform must lead to distributing the land of the oligarchy to the peasants who till it and to envisage their immediately collectivist exploitation only in the specific cases where still deep-rooted communal customs facilitate this solution, as also in the case of plantations which the state transforms into model collectivist exploitations run by collectives formed by their workers. The agrarian reform must also be accompanied by a programme of specific aid on the technical and financial level by the workers' state, favoring coöperative exploitation by peasants.

As for nationalizations, although those of the banks, transport, some key enterprises, and foreign trade are indispensable right from the start, as for the rest, measures will be taken according to the criterion of continuity and the increase in production, within the possible limits of state control over enterprises (including foreign ones).

As in the dependent countries less developed than those of Latin America, in this region also one of the main reasons for speeding up economic development and industrialization according to a plan is the productive mobilization of the immense manpower of a population, growing at one of the highest rates in the world, that is at present largely unused. But only the radical revolution led by the proletariat, under the power of a workers' and peasants' government, can create the moral and practical framework needed for such a mobilization.

The working up of the concrete political transitional programme should go hand in hand with the search for the transitional organizational road toward the mass revolutionary party. The goal in this field, everywhere in Latin America at present, must be to form class political organizations having a mass influence, that are distinct from the most advanced formations of the national bourgeoisie and the radical petty-bourgeoisie which are cornering the leadership of the revolution.

A characteristic of the Latin American revolution, more marked than elsewhere, is the important role (including a political role) played in several Latin American countries by the trade-union movement (Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile especially). In all these countries the national bourgeoisie has sought to domesticate the trade unions as a force to fight against its adversaries and to develop itself. To offset this tendency and to exploit fully the social and political importance acquired by the unions, it is necessary to propagandize systematically the idea of the *mass Labor Party based on the trade unions*. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the union movement's own power, it is necessary to call for and fight for trade-union unification in each country (one union per industry and one single trade-union federation) as well as for the creation of an autonomous Latin American trade-union confederation.

The immense revolutionary potentialities of Latin America's landless peasantry have been shown in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Central America, and above all in Cuba. Unless

very special attention is paid to this question by the revolutionary Marxist tendency, the revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat runs the risk of remaining ineffective.

The revolutionary mobilization of the peasants is possible on the basis of systematic propaganda for the programme of radical agrarian reform, and of no less systematic work among them which will root the revolutionary organization in the rural regions and create peasant cadres. But above all it is necessary to seize a politically propitious moment during the period of acute revolutionary ferment to organize and audaciously launch an armed struggle by the peasants for the land, and to connect it up with the workers' mobilizations. Thereafter the peasant guerrilla may prove to be a powerful stimulus to the workers' struggles and deprive the class enemy of the advantage in case of a possible partial defeat or ebb of the workers' movement.

In Latin America the revolutionary Marxist tendency has a field that is more propitious than elsewhere for its rapid development. Apart from the objectively favorable conditions, neither the existing Socialist nor Communist Parties have become deeply rooted in the masses. Their opportunist and timorous policy, in tow to the bourgeoisie, does not correspond to the revolutionary aspirations of the Latin American masses and to the urgency of a radical solution.

Under the pressure of the powerful revolutionary movement of the masses, the divisions and crisis within the ruling classes, the weakening of imperialism internationally, and the rising power and prestige of the workers' states, important left-centrist wings are at present developing in certain Socialist Parties (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina).

The Communist Parties, on the contrary, are centred round the sole goal of bringing pressure on US imperialism for the benefit of the momentary interests of Soviet diplomacy, by staking exclusively on the quite relative antagonism between the national bourgeoisie and that imperialism — whence their abandonment of any autonomous class policy and unfolding of an ultra-opportunist policy that relegates them to the role of powerless super-numeraries, without prestige and invariably "betrayed" by different politicians of the bourgeoisie looking for a highly appreciated "left" cover.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS

In the present context, which is in general objectively revolutionary in Latin America, there stand out the more special situations in *Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba*.

In *Argentina*, the spontaneous combativity of the working class is equalled only by that of the masses in Japan. Under these conditions the stabilization of the regime is constantly put off, but neither do the masses succeed in giving a revolutionary outcome to the country's chronic crisis. Only the creation of a class political party based on the trade unions, which will know how to seize the propitious moment for organizing the masses in committees and militia, mobilizing the peasants and the agricultural proletariat, and aim the whole struggle toward the workers' and peasants' government, can bring the country out of its blind alley.

In the situation created by the revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat, there have appeared at various moments, at least potentially, elements of *dual power*; these will also probably appear again. It is necessary to work in such a way that these elements take on specific organizational form (committees, militia, guerrilla). In such a situation, propaganda, increased tenfold, for the *Labor Party based on the trade unions* can then produce more substantial results, swinging the radical wing of the Peronist trade unions in this direction — which would speed up by interaction the whole revolutionary process in the country. Because, stuck as it now is in the blind alley of an

activity that is, from the political viewpoint, largely of the revolutionary-syndicalist type, there is a risk that in the long run it will, at least temporarily, exhaust the activist interest of the masses and cause a stabilization — temporary and quite relative — of the open or camouflaged dictatorship based essentially on the army.

In *Bolivia* we are witnessing a new relative upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the masses which is expressed in the sanguinary defeats among the peasants and miners suffered by both the *rosca* and the right wing of the M N R. But for lack of a sufficient strengthening of the revolutionary party, there is a risk that this upsurge be monopolized once more by the left-centre wing of the M N R (Paz Estenssoro), seconded by the centrist leadership of the C O B (Lechín) and the M N R left.

It is the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses that permitted the maintenance of the fundamental conquests of the revolution and heretofore victoriously repulsed all assaults by the reaction and by the pro-imperialist right wing of the M N R. It is the weakness of the revolutionary party that has prevented the revolution from ending up in the workers' and peasants' government.

With the prospect of a return to power of the Paz Estenssoro - Lechín centrist alliance and of the present favorable Latin American context, a new rise of the masses is inevitable. It is necessary to profit by this situation to put the whole mining region under the effective administration of the workers (committees and militia), to generalize the agrarian reform under the pressure of the peasants militia and unions, and to impose an economic plan taking into account the country's real resources, including its labor power, and the aid of the workers' states and exchanges with them.

The slogan of the Special Congress of the C O B, to settle — with the help of the committees and militia — the question of power, of agrarian reform, and of the economic plan, can under these conditions become timely again. The key to this possible and necessary development remains, however, the strengthening of the party on the national scale, and especially among the miners and peasants, where the essential part of its daily activity and its leadership should be.

In *Venezuela* the party borne to power by the revolutionary masses must confront in pressure from imperialism and from the masses eager for a radical transformation, for a real outcome to the revolution they began. Past experience in this country has shown that all governments, in however "revolutionary" a way they may have begun their career, invariably succumb to the pressure of Yankee imperialism and of its enormous interests in Venezuela's fabulous oil and mining riches.

The *Acción Democrática* is a heteroclit formation reminiscent of the A P R A or the M N R, with a radical petty-bourgeois leadership, which has already become differentiated into a reactionary and pro-imperialist wing and a wing more pervious to the influence of its radical base. Without the organization of workers' and peasants' militia and committees, it will prove to be impossible to force the party and the government to broaden the conquests of the revolution, to proceed to a genuine agrarian reform, to nationalize the country's oil and mining riches, to promulgate a plan for the diversified and rapid development of the economy, profiting by the country's considerable financial resources, and thus effectively to defend the revolution against the inevitable new assaults by imperialism and reaction.

Entrist work of the revolutionary Marxist tendency in side the leftwing of the A D must lead to advocating the formation of a Labor Party based on the trade unions.

In *Cuba*, the achievements and teachings of the Cuban revolution, advanced post of the whole Latin American revolution, are already numerous and important.

The Cuban revolution has demonstrated the effectiveness of a guerrilla based on the active support of a poor peasantry eager for a radical agrarian reform, combined with the mobilization of the proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses of the urban centres, including, at a given stage, in the form of armed action by limited squads surrounded by the sympathy and protection of the population.

The Cuban revolution, under the impetus of the revolutionary masses — peasants, proletarians, and radicalized urban petty-bourgeois — and in face of the fact that the comprador forces were so extremely compromised with the sanguinary dictatorship now overthrown, is developing rapidly and powerfully as a permanent revolution, in spite of its disparate official leadership and the lack of a mass revolutionary party.

The leadership of the Cuban revolution, purged of a whole series of flatly bourgeois-liberal elements, is at present a Jacobin staff subjected in varying degrees to the revolutionary influence of the masses — that is to say, a staff which, despite its non-proletarian social origins and ideology, has found itself forced to go beyond the limits of capitalism and seriously to undermine its equilibrium. But it has not yet overthrown this regime, and it will not be able, in its present form, to do so, without the creation of a mass revolutionary party, linked up with the masses' militia, committees, and trade unions.

By the scope already attained by the agrarian reform, by the few measures of nationalization of foreign imperialist enterprises, by the thorough purge of the state apparatus, and by the creation of militia and people's tribunals, the Cuban revolution has already gone considerably outside the frame of capitalism without having completely broken it and replaced it by a state of a new type based on a nationalized and planned economy. What is important at the present stage is not so much the completion of the economic and social measures that will confirm the overthrow of the feudo-capitalist regime, but rather the organization of a proletarian political power by the extension and institutionalization of militia and people's tribunals, and the organization of communes and committees as organs of local power.

The economic and social measures in the direction of an effective nationalized and planned economy can in this case be spaced out in accordance with the strengthening of the revolution internally and internationally, without provoking premature reactions by Yankee imperialism and without causing production to suffer disproportionately. The key to the victorious development of the Cuban revolution lies, inside the country, in the rapid formation of the mass revolutionary party with a clear proletarian and socialist programme, integrating all the country's valid revolutionary elements, and, outside the country, in an international organization for the defense of the Cuban revolution, especially in the countries of Latin America.

The echo and repercussions of the Cuban revolution in all this region are already immense and will continue to increase. Hence these are to be expected fierce efforts by Yankee imperialism and the Latin American comprador oligarchies to beat down the Cuban revolutionary regime by any means, or to bring it to capitulate and go bourgeois.

For this reason the safety of the Cuban revolution lies finally in keeping up its effective defense in the Latin American countries, in a clear indication addressed to Yankee imperialism that any military intervention it might make in Cuba would stir up a regular hurricane in all Latin America, in the spread of the Cuban revolution to other countries of Latin America. The movement of organization of *Committees for the Defense of the Cuban Revolution*, as well as *volunteer corps*, must be rapidly extended through all Latin America.

III

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION
AND THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

11. CONCLUSIONS

One of the most positive aspects of the colonial revolution is the fact that immense masses of humanity — who were still up till yesterday crushed by the exploitation of imperialism and the comprador ruling classes, poverty-stricken, uncultured, passive — have got into movement, irreversible and irresistible, to win for themselves a material, cultural, and social level in conformance with the present possibilities of humanity.

From this point of view a qualitative transformation has been produced in humanity by this revolutionary awakening to the highest civilizing aspirations, and by the results of this awakening on, for example, the status of women and the family, now being radically changed. All humanity is already benefiting from this qualitative transformation by the revolution of masses who have long lived on the edges of civilization, a revolution which by this fact speeds up its general movement toward the new socialist civilization.

Granted, it is not a question of exaggeratedly embellishing the fact that the colonial revolution at the present historical stage occupies the vanguard of the world revolution. The revolutionary Marxists are also fully aware of the drawbacks inherent in the lateness of the socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries for raising the ideological level of the masses, for creating genuine mass revolutionary Marxist parties, for overcoming the phenomena of bureaucratization in the movement and in the workers' states, and for rapidly building a socialism that is immediately, and not just in some distant future, of benefit to the masses.

But it is a question in any case of taking as a point of departure the present historical realities, and of making the most of them. It is now clear that the process of the world revolution is developing from the periphery, from the colonial and dependent countries as well as from the existing workers' states, toward the capitalist countries of Europe, and the United States (very probably the last of all).

The Fourth International, heir to the revolutionary traditions and principles of the Third International of Lenin and Trotsky, under these conditions cannot do otherwise than, quite naturally, carry on the essential part of its activity in the living field of the revolution, where the masses, and the world's most oppressed and exploited peoples, are struggling.

For valid historical reasons the development of the Fourth International was during a whole period centred on the advanced capitalist countries, considered, until the eve of the last war, as the N° 1 epicentre of the world revolution.

Now it is necessary for the Fourth International to reorganize its activities as an International in terms of the principal sector of the world revolution, which is the colonial revolution, and carry on in this field, for a whole period, the essential part of its efforts.

The immediate future of the International lies in countries and regions like India, Indonesia, Japan, the Arab lands, Negro Africa, and Latin America, where immediate and rapid gains are possible.

The Fourth International must show itself capable of organizing in all these fields valid forces which without any sectarianism link themselves up with the revolutionary movement of the masses and provide effective answers to their aspirations.

The extreme degeneration of the Social-Democracy, in tow to moribund imperialism, and of Stalinism, in tow to the conservative Soviet bureaucracy, leave the field of the colonial revolution wide open to the strategical and practical audacity, the tactical ingenuity, of the revolutionary organizations of the Fourth International.

It is by its close and total fusion with the emancipating struggle of the masses and the most disinherited peoples in the world that the Fourth International will prove its full historical justification and impose its role as the leading revolutionary vanguard.

May 1960

Argentina

THE FIGHT AGAINST THE EMERGENCY BILL

The Argentine proletariat is currently in a dangerous situation, for, despite the acute struggles among the various sectors of the army and of the bourgeoisie, which might in a short time lead to a coup d'état, all these forces fully agree about the goal they want to attain: the crushing, repressing, and subduing of the fighting spirit and consciousness of the proletariat.

Though they have not so far reached their goal, they are gaining ground, however, by taking a number of reactionary measures: the cost of living is steadily increasing, unemployment is reaching alarming levels, the number of the workers who are imprisoned and banished is increasing, some nationalized firms are being given back to private enterprise. The bourgeoisie has concentrated its present activity on an effort to pass the Security and Emergency Bill which is meant, not to fight terrorism, but to defy the organization and the struggles of the worker and peasant masses.

The fact that the strike of the shoe workers ended by acceptance of the employers' proposal after 55 days of struggle is clear evidence that it is necessary to unify the working class's struggle into a general mobilization.

In the sector of the vineyard laborers, the strike is winding up owing to the criminally conciliatory policy of its leadership, who, instead of unifying the strike, is paralyzing and splitting it, first by organizing strikes in scattered places isolated one from the other — first in one province and then in another province — and then by concluding separate agreements with the employers.

It is this divisive policy, which is at the present time a suicidal one, carried on by the majority of the trade unions, that creates the present situation of the working-class movement in which symptoms of confusion and division are beginning to be seen. Meanwhile the small cliques of the army and of the bourgeoisie struggle for power. The Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the U C R I (Frondizi's party), approve the Emergency Bill and intervention in the state of Córdoba. To judge from their statements, they are docile malleable instruments in the hands of the army.

While discussions are going on regarding whose hands the power is going to fall into, while a coup d'état is being prepared, while a monstrosly repressive legislation is being prepared against the workers, the working-class

movement does not take action. This is not due to a lack of fighting spirit. For instance, during a vibrant meeting before the end of their strike, 10,000 shoe workers who had already been on strike for a month, with their savings mostly exhausted, *unanimously* decided to go on with the strike.

The working class wants to fight and feels the necessity of defeating the policy of the government. But it does not know how to do it. It cannot find the channels or the way to express the fighting spirit and even heroism that it showed in previous struggles. It is the conciliatory and pro-bourgeois trade-union leadership that is not capable of understanding the needs and fighting spirit of the working class. On the whole, the working class and the exploited masses are maintaining their fighting power.

The working class must take action to face this situation. In the name and on behalf of all the exploited masses in the country, the working class must check the offensive of the government, the employers, and imperialism.

The resolution of the delegates of the employees in the Carma machine plant, by approving that the M O U (the provisional trade-union congress) should function as a General Confederation of Labor, and by calling for a general mobilization on the basis of a minimum programme, pointed the way. A general mobilization of the working class and of all the exploited people must be organized to prevent the government, the bourgeoisie, and imperialism from going forward with their reactionary plans of hunger, poverty, and superexploitation. It is necessary to unify these struggles on the basis of a Proletarian United Front and a minimum programme including the following points:

- a) against the passing of the Emergency Bill;
- b) for freeing the imprisoned and banished workers;
- c) for functioning of the M O U as a General Confederation of Labor;
- d) against hunger: a minimum living wage and introduction of the sliding scale of wages and salaries under workers' control;
- e) against unemployment: nationalization, under workers' control, of all factories that have been closed, and adoption of a shorter working day with no change in wages;
- f) against the return of nationalized factories to private enterprise: workers' control of all government industries.



Australia

REFUSION CONFERENCE

On 15 April the Australian Section of the Fourth International held a conference at which a group of comrades previously associated with the now defunct International Committee rejoined our ranks. A certain number of heretofore unorganized workers and students also joined up at the Conference.

The section, thus seriously reenforced, set up a plan for

work, mainly in the direction of the Australian Labour Party, but also with additional dispositions aimed at the Australian Communist Party, which has kept serious positions in the trade-union movement. Measures were taken for bringing out a regular publication.

The Conference sent its greetings to the World Party and to all its sections.

Brazil

THE CRISIS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

By CLAUDIO RAMOS

The crisis that is opening up in the Communist Party of Brazil, reflected in the extent and depth of the discussions for its Vth Congress, has no precedent in the history of the Communist movement in Brazil.

Announcing the Vth Congress, the official theses for discussion — which are trying to maintain the present ultra-rightist line — were approved by only 60% of the Central Committee, when “normally” they should have been unanimously accepted and presented as a work that was ready and completed. The rest of the Central Committee required the opening of a broad debate in the press and throughout the entire party, for a period of approximately four months, so as to be able to reach the Vth Congress with better elements for approving a political line.

And so there began a debate that took on the proportions of a regular avalanche.

THE CAUSES OF THE NEW CRISIS

There is no doubt that outside conditions encouraged the discussions and rendered them possible. Today a majority group of the party bureaucracy would no longer be able to drown out the divergent voices by appealing to the “infallible word” of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The outside monolithism that facilitated the liquidation of internal struggles has been broken. The line of the international Communist movement can now be seen by the militants as the line of Khrushchev, but also as that of Tito, and especially as that of the Chinese leadership.

At the same time, the rigid structure of the other CPs of capitalist countries has been broken. An example of this is the attitude of Marinello, leader of the Cuban Popular Socialist Party (Communist), who, in connection with the visit to Cuba of the Brazilian Presidential candidate Janio Quadros, expressed his surprise at the fact that the Brazilian Communists were not backing this candidate, who was “progressive and had such good democratic intentions.”

But, unlike what occurred at the time of the 1956 rightist crisis, which ended with the split-off of Agildo Barata and his group, it is not so much external factors — at that time especially the XXth Congress — but above all the internal factors that have given the impulse to this new wave of crisis.

In the debates, there are references to Mikoyan, to Chou En-Lai, to Mao, et al, and there is no lack of concern with the fate of the international communist movement. But the centre of the discussion is the national problem and the party's inability to face it.

In synthesis, the crisis originates in the fact that it is absolutely impossible for the militant to put into practice the party's present ultra-rightist line. This is reflected mainly in the general political field, in the trade-union field, and in the peasant movement.

On the political terrain, the problem of the Presidential elections this coming October happens to coincide with the mood of the rank and file, disappointed by the line of support to the national candidates of the national bourgeoisie. As an independent working-class political line does not enter even remotely into the calculations of the party leadership, the party was faced by the choice between two bourgeois candidates: Janio Quadros or Marshal Lott. And Lott ended up by being chosen.

It is completely false to suppose that Marshal Lott fills in Brazil the role of a Nehru or a Nasser, for example. Minister of War in the reactionary government of Café Filho — who followed on the fall of Vargas — Lott has since then leaned toward conciliation with the old groups connected with the Vargas government itself and with sectors of the nationalist bourgeoisie tied up with the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB).

But — the opposite of what happened in previous elections — Lott is not even a typical candidate of the national bourgeoisie, and his demagogic total lack of concern, in the electoral campaign, serves to deepen the gulf that lies between CP support for his candidacy and an independent communist line.

Launched as a candidate immediately after a trip to the United States, the marshal took a stand against legality for the Brazilian CP, refused to go to Cuba, where, he said, “a bloody revolution” was being made, declared his opposition to renewal of diplomatic relations with the USSR and to the support being given to him by the CP. In his speeches, agrarian reform and the need for a general raise in wages are just never mentioned.

All the foregoing causes the CP rank and file to refuse openly to support Lott, or at most to accept party discipline without lifting a finger to further the election campaign.

In the trade-union field, the rightist line advocated a policy of “unity of the movement at any cost” and a line of collaboration with the “nationalist sectors” of the government. The Communist militants were trying to appear as the hyphen between the bureaucrats tied up with the Ministry of Labor and those who had promised support to Janio Quadros and a sector of the bourgeoisie of São Paulo state (see “A ação dos comunistas nos sindicatos,” in *Novos Rumos*, December 1959). On this account, the needs and hopes of the masses were set aside, and the Communist militants received orders not to raise troublesome problems for the government (such as the new minimum wage and the single trade-union federation) and to defend “governmental measures for fighting the high cost of living.”

The result was isolation of the CP militants in the factories, loss of control in some unions and federations, penetration of the demagogy of the bureaucrats tied up with Janio Quadros (the other bourgeois candidate) in the trade-union movement. Suffice it to say that at the Workers' Trade-Union Congress, held in April at São Paulo, it was the Janists who raised the slogans that were most felt by the masses, such as a general raise in wages and the single trade-union federation, taking advantage of the timidity and inertia of the Communists.

On the other hand, as a result of the rightist line that grew stronger through the March 1958 declaration which called for a united front with “latifundist sectors with interests different from those of imperialism,” the peasant movement was relegated by the party leadership to a completely secondary plane.

The appearance of the Peasant Leagues of Pernambuco — a province in the northeast of the country — independently of the action and influence of the CP, and the weight of the peasant problem as a whole, are bringing pressure on the Communist militants, especially in the northeastern provinces.

DISCUSSIONS AND PRESSURE OF THE RANKS

The appearance of the Peasant Leagues of Pernambuco line is reflected in the higher organism and from these goes up to the commanding heights.

But there the rank and file cannot find their own channel for expression. They are the motive force behind the crisis, but only the opening of the debate made it possible for them to appear directly — at least in part — in the discussion that is going on.

The articles published in the Communist weekly *Novos Rumos* by the top leaders generally do not take as their starting point daily concrete experience and the analysis of the party's defeats so as to establish a political line. The verbally violent discussions of the apparatus men employ complicated language. Two sectors may be distinguished.

One (Mario Alves, Jacob Gorender), responsible for the theses presented for discussion, is attempting to maintain, by means of concessions, the political line of the unprincipled united front with the national bourgeoisie, with a prospect of bourgeois development, claiming that there will be "gradual reforms and the replacement of the reactionary elements in the government."

The other sector criticizes the theses and the present line, setting as its goal united front with the national bourgeoisie, but based on pressure on that bourgeoisie by the mass movement. It is interesting to note that this sector, not homogeneous, is represented by old names in the party, such as Pedro Pomar, Mauricio Graboís, and João Amazonas.

Basically, though reflecting different tendencies, both sectors in the top leadership show the same inability to understand the problems of the Brazilian revolution and the need to take them as a starting point for formulating a communist policy. Thus both the theses of the right and the programme presented in an article by Mauricio Graboís advocate as the first point of a political action programme diplomatic relations with the USSR, China, and the socialist countries, and support in the United Nations for "proposals for preserving peace."

In any case, the current in the leadership that is turning left cannot be just brushed aside.

Though its conclusions are not very different from those of the other sector, it nevertheless makes serious criticisms of the ultra-rightist opportunism of the present line and thereby encourages the spirit of rebellion among the party rank and file. The harsh attacks against the "embellishment of national capitalism," the theses on the "peaceful path for the Brazilian revolution," and on the "gradual transformation of the government," are of special importance. Analyzing the nature of the Brazilian revolution, in an article titled, "Duas Concepções, Duas Orientações Políticas" (*Novos Rumos*, May 1960), Graboís, for example, holds a position identical with that of the Chinese, i.e., that

on the political terrain, the new regime must create a democratic state and a democratic and anti-imperialist government, different, in its class composition and its aims, from all previous governments in Brazil. Although the revolution, at this stage, corresponds to bourgeois-democratic tasks, the new state will not be able to be a modern bourgeois state, directed by the bourgeoisie. Brazil's bourgeoisie, by its dual character — revolutionary and conciliationist — is incapable of solving with finality the fundamental problems of the development of the national economy, of the full democratization of the country, and of effective improvement in the living conditions of the people. The new power must be a power of the united front of the democratic and anti-imperialist forces, led by the working class, and therefore very different from a bourgeois state of that type. This fact originates in the circumstance that the proletariat

will have to lead the revolutionary forces and also that the revolution, though not socialist, is an integral part of the world socialist revolution.

But even more important than the analysis of the currents that are appearing in the leadership is an evaluation of the new critical wave that is sweeping through the whole party. The discussion cannot be kept within the traditional schematic limits, and the situation allows the appearance in the party press of the most advanced positions and those that remain halfway but with a visibly leftist position.

Novos Rumos publishes a letter from a militant in Sergipe (a northeastern province), with assertions like the following:

Things seen from Rio de Janeiro, through the congress, are one thing, but here in the interior the panorama is different. [...] For my part, I confess that I don't know whether Fidel Castro is this or that, but the truth is that he is making a revolution in Cuba, fighting against North American colonizing capitalism, fighting against colonialism. Can anyone at this moment in a small Latin American country go beyond Fidel Castro? When it's all added up, which thing is more important for the people: an agrarian reform made under any party banner whatever, or a Communist Party with its arms open to such a progressive bourgeoisie, serving as an instrument so that the latter may climb up, satisfied with the alms of electing a town councillor here or there?

At the same time there was published an article by a militant from Rio Grande do Sul, in which he observes:

I read the theses, and, like many other comrades, I had trouble in understanding them integrally. They form a voluminous document that does not take the level of the party into account. I observed that the theses and the March 1958 declaration present a study on the development of capitalism in our country. Unquestionably this is a merit, for it is very important to know the objective processes which are developing in Brazil. But it is not enough to know this development. It is necessary to know from what viewpoint the phenomenon is being evaluated: from the viewpoint of the proletariat or from that of the bourgeoisie. [...] The party and the working class have the duty of opening up a clear prospect for the proletariat. And that prospect must be the conquest, in the process of the struggle, of the leadership of the movement, for which the fundamental condition is the worker-peasant alliance and not the worker-bourgeois alliance.

Examples like this are being repeated and will be repeated to a higher degree.

All this reveals how the ranks are this time the great centre of the crisis in the Brazilian CP, even when they cannot express themselves completely and have not yet created an organized tendency.

Unlike what happened in 1956, when the dissidents of Agildo Barata broke away to the right and presented a national-reformist prospect without ties with the Soviet bureaucracy, today the wind is inevitably blowing leftward. The party as a whole is not limiting itself to the theses under discussion, or to the new statutes presented jointly with the theses. It is a matter of examining everything, without formalism, from top to bottom. There appeared in *Novos Rumos* a proposal to prolong the discussion for a year; this was followed by various voices wholly supporting the proposal, or asking an extension to six months.

Whatever may be the trends of the new crisis, one thing is sure: it is encouraged by the conviction that the party's rightist opportunism has reached a point that has brought it into a blind alley and a danger of a catastrophic liquidation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRAZILIAN C P AND THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY MARXISM

But, finally, it may be asked, what is the present strength of the Brazilian C P, and how serious is its crisis for the country's mass movement as a whole?

The Brazilian C P today is far from having the strength and prestige of the years 1945-50. The betrayals of the Stalinist leadership weakened the party badly, led to disorganization and the loss of control of various trade unions.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the party crisis therefore does not immediately have repercussions in the mass movement, it does not lose its fundamental importance, because of the concrete conditions in the country.

In the absence of any other left party that has reasonable forces and is nationally known (the Brazilian Socialist Party is far from having the characteristics of the Chilean or Uruguayan S Ps), the C P became a sort of sounding-board for what was happening in the country's political life. The pressure of the working class and of the petty bourgeoisie, the pressure of the national bourgeoisie, the problems of the trade-union movement, and the lack of an independent workers' party — all these are reflected in the party discussions. And these discussions, even when they are clamped into abstract analyses about what is "the fundamental contradiction of the country," are for the moment the highest debate on the road of the Brazilian revolution, amid the sterility of bourgeois politics.

The Brazilian C P lost most of its cadres, but the best vanguard elements, with rare exceptions, had their experience therein, and the diffuse influence of the party is still alive in the country.

The road to building an independent mass workers' party inevitably passes through the Brazilian C P, and depends to a large extent on how its crisis evolves.

The Brazilian Partido Operario Revolucionario (Trotskyista) does not yet have the necessary forces and integration to render the process of the crisis much more fecund. But even so its presence in the debate is remarked, and there opens up to it an immense field of work, through a combined action on the C P, from outside and inside.

The ranks of the C P have known how to deduce conclusions about the leadership's line, and refuse to apply a policy inapplicable in practice. But, as is logical, they do not succeed in generalizing the problem and offering an independent way out. Thus, in the electoral field, the militants often refuse both Janio and Lott, but, for lack of any other way out, tend to accept passively the candidate indicated by the party leadership.

In this sense, the campaign of Trotskyism for launching a workers' candidacy for the Presidency of the Republic, based on the trade unions, peasant leagues, popular groupings, and student associations, is today obtaining a very

serious echo among the most advanced elements of the C P, who, faced with the false dilemma of Janio or Lott, are seeking an independent way.

The work of the P O R concentrates on a patient but bold action, in face of the new conditions, for building a new left tendency inside the C P. Revolutionary Marxism has a fundamental role in the formation of this left, which, though not Trotskyist, will be able under Trotskyist influence to become a genuine pole of attraction, advocate an independent political line, setting out from the masses' immediate needs toward more general conclusions.

Today a few cells are spontaneously raising the question of the need to present their own theses in opposition to the theses for discussion, emphasizing that the articles of Grabois, Pomar, et al are inadequate to serve as a platform for an opposition in the party. Therein lies one of the sources of a left that is seeking to organize itself with its own programme; and the better the work of the revolutionary Marxists is oriented toward bringing this crisis to maturity, the faster this evolution will be.

PROSPECTS FOR THE BRAZILIAN C P

At present there is no longer any possibility of the Brazilian C P's again becoming the bureaucratic and monolithic party of the past.

Not only do external circumstances prevent this relapse, but also the extensiveness of the discussions, in a party of bureaucratic structure, has set going a ferment that is in the long run uncontrollable.

These events in the party, after three years of apparent calm, have an importance and scope that not even the revolutionary Marxists foresaw to their full extent. It is hard to determine, at the present point, the exact road that will be taken by the C P. But the strong pressure from the left permits asserting that it is possible it may become a centrist party, of a type distinct from those existing up till now.

On the other hand, a strengthening of the Brazilian C P depends fundamentally on an organized tendency that takes the mass movement as it is, boldly raises its most immediate demands, and opens up an independent prospect. For either left or right "sectarianism," so much talked about, consists precisely in the inability to fuse into the mass movement with one's revolutionary solution, instead of wanting to transform it into a field for manoeuvring or simply winning over cadres.

Be this as it may, at the present stage the action of the Trotskyists, in the direction of building an organized left inside the Brazilian C P, is the surest and most effective road for building a real mass workers' party to fill the enormous void between the objective possibilities of the Brazilian revolution and the lack of a consistent leadership.

June 1960



France

REFUSAL OF MILITARY SERVICE

The greater and greater resistance to the Algerian war among university youth has not only found expression in the U N E F (French National Students' Union), but among that youth, currents have formed that refuse military service, not as conscientious objectors, but because they consider this war an unjust one. The figure of these "réfractaires" is set at between 2,000 and 3,000, and it is understandable that that is worrying the government.

The "left," including the leadership of the French

Communist Party, has almost unanimously condemned these young men who put themselves "outside the national community." This stand by people who consider themselves responsible figures has been sharply criticized by quite wide circles of youth and university people, and the "left," after having condemned, has had to discuss.

These draft-resisters, like the intellectuals who understood that the victory of socialism against the Gaullist regime was connected with the struggle and the victory of

the Algerian revolution, are testimony to the fact that the colonial revolution is beginning to show itself to be more powerful than the traditional leaderships installed in capitalist society.

We may point out that there is a greater and greater multiplicity of the most varied publications (books, pamphlets, newspapers, bulletins, leaflets) which disregard bourgeois legality.

STRONG MINORITY AGAINST MOLLET POLICY AT SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS

The French Socialist Party recently held its LIInd Congress, the first since that split that gave birth to the PSU. With the left departed, it might have seemed that Guy Mollet would dominate the congress without a rival. Nothing of the sort. The main question, of course, was that of Algeria. The ultra tendency of Lacoste and Lejeune, which in the past, without carrying all before it, had at least left its mark on the party, was reduced this time to a trifling number of votes (less than 5%). The Mollet leadership obtained for its pro - de Gaulle Algerian resolu-

tion only 55% of the votes, while 40% were for a Gazier-Deferre resolution which, while not very audacious, at least came out for political negotiation with the FLN.

On the level of general policy, the "left" of Gazier, which called for a break with the Gaullist regime, obtained no more than 27% of the votes. It consequently appears that even inside the SP the currents in favor of negotiation with the FLN extend even to more or less clearly self-declared Gaullists; this reflects the increase throughout the country of a desire for negotiations with the G P R A.



Great Britain

ORGANIZED LABOR MOVES LEFT IN BRITAIN: DEFEAT FOR GAITSKELL AND RIGHT WING

After the General Election defeat, in concert with the right-wing revisionist trend in Europe, Gaitskell and the right wing of the Labour Party began an assault on the fundamental principles and policies of the Labour movement. They wished to take a stand similar to that of the revisionists who have changed the official programme of the Social-Democracy in Germany and in other European countries. This was an expression of the pressure of capitalism due to the sustained boom.

The policy advocated by Gaitskell, Douglas Jay, Crossland, and other members of the Froggnal Road clique declared that the nature of capitalism had changed and with capitalism's new prosperity it was necessary to abandon the programme of nationalization on which Labour has based itself in the past. Gaitskell and the other leaders of the right wing expected to win an easy majority.

The Labour movement in Britain, however, has been developed over decades in a struggle against Liberal-Labourism. Founded for the purpose of *independent* Labour representation, it adopted a socialist objective in its Constitution only in 1918, following the wave of radicalism which swept Europe in the wake of the Russian Revolution. Nearly all the important unions, however, have adopted, in one form of words or another, the objective of socialism in their constitutions. The Labour Party, which is based on the unions, its local branches, and also its constituency organizations, is far to the left of the leadership.

In spite of the increase in the standard of living, full employment and the benefits of the "welfare state," the mass of the more class-conscious and organized section of the working class feel a deep distrust and profound disbelief in the lasting character of the "never had it so good" "prosperity." In any event, the more conscious part of the working class, the more active section that forms the backbone of the Labour Party and the trade unions, understand that this prosperity is to a great extent based on women working, overtime, bonus schemes and a greater rate of exploitation than in the past due to the increased productivity of labor.

Gaitskell and his cronies in the Hampstead coterie com-

pletely mistook the temper of the movement. At this stage they are completely out of touch with the feelings of the rank and file. In contrast to such previous leaders of the Labour Party, as MacDonald, for example, who participated in the movement's development, or Attlee, who started at the bottom and had some feeling for the movement, Gaitskell in effect started as a university graduate and stepped straight on to the parliamentary arena. It was probably a moot point whether he joined the Tory Party or the Labour Party. He represents a petty-bourgeois tendency which has no feel whatsoever for the mass movement.

Marx and Lenin had observed that, while in many respects the British working class was far more backward than their brothers on the Continent, at the same time once they had made a step forward, it was not easy to push them back to previous positions. The British working class learn slowly, empirically, and as Trotsky observed, clumsily and ponderously, but once they have assimilated a lesson, it is not easy to dislodge them from any position in the field of ideas or social conquests. It was with this that Gaitskell and the other revisionists had not reckoned.

Raising the question has had the opposite result to what Gaitskell had expected. During the election campaign, the Labour leaders had been compelled to adopt a spurious position of criticism of the ruling class in order to revive some enthusiasm among the workers. Gaitskell had attacked the monopolies and the millionaire backers of the Tory Party. This, plus a careful build-up in the capitalist press, had for the first time given a certain amount of personal popularity to the leader of the Labour Party. It was this among other things which probably misled Gaitskell into thinking that he could without too much difficulty change the policy of the party to what he considered an "election-winning" programme.

The reaction in the constituencies and in the trade-union branches, however, was one of instant alarm. Gaitskell stamped his foot but it was the legions of his opponents that he stirred up. Gaitskell's assault had been on the now famous Clause 4 of the Constitution adopted in

1918. This declares for the nationalization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the democratic control thereof, as the objective of the Labour Party.

The attempt at "streamlining" and "modernizing" the Labour movement "in line with modern realities," far from meeting the expected acclaim inside the movement, had the opposite result. It received the enthusiastic plaudits of the entire capitalist press, from the shrill screams of the *Daily Express* to the hysteria of the *Mirror*, from the extreme right *Daily Mail* to the sedate *Times*, from the *Liberal News-Chronicle* to the official Labour journal, the *Herald*; serious bourgeois weeklies like *The Economist* and the serious monthlies and quarterlies all greeted this "coming of age" of Labour. *There was only one thing wrong: the reception it received among the active organised workers!*

Even the Parliamentary Party, especially the trade-union MPs, received it with dismay. Only a few middle-class MPs greeted it with any enthusiasm, and they quickly took refuge in silence. Had Gaitskell persisted in his intention, nothing could have been more certain than his overwhelming defeat at the Party Conference. It is doubtful if he would have received half a million votes for the proposal! In this predicament the "Leader" had to be rescued from his troops. Whatever popularity had been gained in the election had rapidly evaporated in the atmosphere created by his stubborn attempt to change party policy. George Brown, in reality one of the extreme right-wingers but with a little more "savvy" and tact than his leader, found the apparent answer. As one of the trade union MPs with more experience of the movement as a former trade-union organizer, he thought he had the solution. A frontal attack on the hard-won objectives of the party was not possible. Why not a flank attack? Leave Clause 4 and at the same time put in another clause which in effect nullifies it! All the trade-union leaders had been furious with Gaitskell for "stirring it up." Why start a discussion when after all the clause can be left peacefully embedded in the Constitution without any practical relation to Labour's real policies? In reality Gaitskell wished to bury nationalization, even of a partial character, once and for all. Now he seized on Brown's suggestion as a way out. Clause 4 would remain but so would a new declaration of aims which would enshrine as Labour's aim a "mixed economy" of private enterprise as well as public ownership.

In Brown's quaint phrase it would be the New Testament of Labour, side-by-side with the Old Testament. And, as with the Christians, obviously the New Testament would be the more important part, which would decide policy and programme for Labour. It was this new compromise that was moved at the National Executive. In the alleged interest of unity, with some amendments, the draft was accepted by the former Bevanites, the supposed leaders of the left wing on the National Executive. They stilled their consciences by referring to the phrase which speaks of the necessity for the nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy — commanding heights which were left vague and unspecified. So that Douglas Jay could later declare in a speech that, apart from steel, the commanding heights were already nationalized! According to reports, the only vote against this "compromise" was that of the Transport & General Workers Union nominee on the Executive, Harry Nicholas.

This complete misunderstanding of the temper of the movement by even the so-called left is very significant. At one Union conference after another this compromise has been rejected by the rank-and-file delegates, and once they sensed the ranks' feeling, by many of the union leadership as well. At the Amalgamated Engineering Union Conference a resolution against amending

Clause 4 in any way was carried unanimously, even such right-wingers as Carron supporting it. At the Building Workers Conference the same occurred. In spite of the opposition of the executives, the railwaymen and the miners both rejected the compromise. Undoubtedly the bulk of the constituency parties will react in the same way. The T & G W U executive of course rejected the compromise unanimously! Even the National & G M W U, which remains the citadel of the right wing, carried a resolution in favor by only a narrow majority. If the question is put to the Party Conference, Gaitskell will be overwhelmingly defeated. The party leadership are trying to avoid defeat by shelving the issue until amendments are debated in 1962.... The whole issue will be dropped and Gaitskell & Co will not revive it to face certain defeat. It remains to be seen whether this manoeuvre will be successful.

Meanwhile the Gaitskell leadership's defense policy too, which has consisted of tailing behind the Conservatives, is receiving one setback after another. On this issue too the active workers are repudiating the party leadership. While at the miners' union conference the Gaitskell-amended policy received a majority of about two to one, at the conference of the National Union of Railwaymen, a resolution demanding unilateral nuclear disarmament was narrowly carried by 39 to 38. The A E U executive, in face of the pressure of the members, has now decided to present a resolution on unilateral nuclear disarmament in line with their conference decisions. The line-up of the unions is now 2,834,000 for unilateral disarmament and 1,769,000 against. Most of the constituencies will also support unilateral disarmament, so the defeat of the Gaitskell leadership on this issue is now certain. Only if one or more union leaderships betray their mandate can Gaitskell gain a majority. As things stand, this seems unlikely. So the leadership is virtually certain of defeat on this question.

Facing defeat on this question, Gaitskell had been threatening to ignore conference decisions as "not binding" on the Parliamentary Party. This further "clanger" dropped by Gaitskell only incensed the workers and even many of the union bureaucracies. If the leadership tries to maintain this position it can only lead to the resignation of Gaitskell. The bulk of the members of the Parliamentary Party know that there is no future for a head-on defiance of the party itself.

Coming in a period of boom, with a relative lull in the class struggle, these events have great significance for the future of the Labour movement in Britain. There is a big difference in the attitude towards the leadership in 1945 and at the present time. The organized active minority, which bears the brunt of the work in the wards and union branches in proselytizing the ideas of socialism, has become far more critical, and has moved somewhat *to the left*, or at least is endeavoring to maintain the best traditions of the past. It is not prepared to give up the hardwon programme of the past.

From this point of view undoubtedly and even from that of the right wing, Gaitskell is the worst leader yet. He has an unerring instinct for rousing the antagonism and opposition of the party masses. Undoubtedly even the right wing, of whose prejudices, backwardness, and ignorance Gaitskell is the perfect embodiment, would be glad to get rid of this inept and crude petty bourgeois, if they had an alternative leader. Had it not been for the illness and subsequent death of Bevan the entire party would have turned to him in relief in the present circumstances. Gaitskell only survives as leader because the right wing cannot think of anyone better to fill his shoes. The lack of seriousness and principle of the "Leader" was shown in his endeavor to regain some popularity by an unexpected attack on the land speculators and a demand for

the nationalization of the land. It should be clearly understood, however, that this is only a dress-rehearsal for future events in Britain. Undoubtedly it is only the more advanced elements who attend their ward parties, union branches, etc, who have been affected by these events. It does not involve the class as a whole — as yet! In face of the pressures of capitalist “prosperity,” of the press, and of the leadership, this is a splendid demonstration of the soundness of the core of the organized working class in Britain. It represents the elemental surge of the workers in the constituencies and unions in defense of what they believe should be a class and socialist programme. It is a splendid testimonial to the soundness of the more active and thinking elements. Behind them they will bring the battalions of their class.

In an editorial following these events the *Daily Herald* cynically asked what the fuss was all about. The Constitution should be reaffirmed and then the party should pass to “practical business.” How little they have understood the lesson of these events. *These events are a dress rehearsal for the storms of the future.* In 1945 the Labour Party came to power in Britain under favorable circumstances. The next essay in government may not be so fortu-

nate. These events have underlined Trotsky's idea that it is impossible to break the will of the working class to transform society on socialist lines. The next Labour Government will, under conditions of crisis — for without crisis it seems unlikely under present circumstances that Labour will come to power — be faced with demands for drastic attacks on capitalist society, for the nationalization of this or that industry.

Under these circumstances the Labour movement can begin rapidly to transform itself. An organized left wing involving tens and hundreds of thousands of workers will appear. The ideas of Marxism and the Marxists within the Labour Party will gain a mass audience. Gaitskell blunderingly attacked the socialist premise on which the Labour Party presents itself to its members. He unwittingly revealed the social basis of the Labour Party. It will be impossible to maintain the present relationship of forces within the Labour Party with its socialist working-class base and its petty-bourgeois leadership, reflecting capitalist influence and ideology within the Labour movement. A veritable gulf will appear between them. In the coming epoch, great numbers of workers within the Labour movement will find the road to revolutionary Marxism.



U.S.A.

DEATH OF ALBERT GOLDMAN

We have learned of the death of Albert Goldman at the age of 63. A member of the I W W in 1919, he joined the American Communist Party in 1920. A journeyman taylor and a union militant, he took evening courses and in 1924 passed his bar exams as a lawyer. From then on he was at the service of the workers' movement against the legal traps of the U S government and the bosses.

In 1933 he was expelled from the C P for left opposition and joined the Trotskyist organization. Breaking discipline in 1935, he put into practice his policy of entrisism in the Socialist Party, which the Trotskyists followed in 1936, when his indiscipline was forgiven because his “seniority” made him the only Trotskyist who had certain much-needed formal rights.

In 1937 he acted as Trotsky's attorney before the International Commission of Enquiry on the Moscow Trials, presided over by Professor John Dewey. He won his client a resounding “Not Guilty!”

During the war, he was one of the 18 Trotskyist leaders prosecuted and sentenced at Minneapolis to a year in prison under the despicable Smith Act.

In 1946, largely on organizational grounds, he broke with the Socialist Workers Party, and finally ended up in the Social-Democracy. But the best years of his life were those he lived as a pioneer of Trotskyism and the Fourth International, and, with the recollection of his personal qualities of deep conscientiousness, quiet courage, and enduring patience, he will be remembered with warm regrets even by many who were his adversaries.



Venezuela

REVOLUTIONARY PROSPECTS

With the recent attempt to assassinate President Rómulo Betancourt, hatched by Venezuelan reactionaries, with the backing of the increasingly senile and psychopathic dictator of the Dominican Republic — who, with the overdue eclipse of Syngman Rhee, is becoming the leading symbol of blind and frantic resistance to the most elementary progress in the colonial and semicolonial countries — world attention has again been drawn to the tense transitional situation in the continuing Venezuelan revolution. Under these circumstances, we think that our readers will be interested in a survey of the current Venezuelan scene recently sent us by a Venezuelan correspondent:

The ravages caused by the wave of earthquakes, which, starting in Chile, have had repercussions over the whole

Pacific area, are relatively slight compared to the repeated blows that the revolutionary tidal wave is causing to imperialism in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The upsurge of the Venezuelan masses, though it has not yet gone beyond the measures imposed by conventional legality, has only increased since the last months of 1957, when the people of Caracas began their struggle against the ten-year dictatorship that collapsed in January 1958.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Venezuelan proletariat, like that of much of Latin America, shows a high political level, and, for the last two and a half years, has been looking for a leadership suitable to its strength. To the contrary of Cuba, where

the army was dissolved by the triumphant revolution, in Venezuela it was the army itself that gave the coup de grâce to the dictatorship which, up until 23 January 1958, it had joined with the top bourgeoisie and imperialism to support. There then occurred a divorce between the interests of the military caste and those of the bourgeoisie, which had never had a specific political party. Soon stage was opened in which political parties, reorganized by leaders who emerged from exile or prison, tried to adapt their programmes both to bourgeois aspirations and to the growing clamor of the masses; and, faced with the risk of military reaction, they decided to defend the provisional government and to tone down their programmes into a joint line of action that was known by the name of unity.

It was under this sign that the December 1958 elections were held. Three candidates were launched, "provisionally," each saying that he was quite ready to withdraw, all three with the same programme previously and jointly approved, and all three flattering imperialism and the rich bourgeoisie of Caracas. What kept them so united was the fear of a military coup. The aggressive masses of the capital had confidence in Larrazábal, in whom they saw the man who had finished off the tyranny, but whose personality consisted precisely in the fact that he had none. He was backed by the Communist Party and the URD, a party of professional politicians who profited by the popularity of their candidate. Larrazábal and Caldera together obtained half the vote. The latter was the candidate of the Church, whose influence on the Venezuelan people is very much less than that of the people on the government. The other half was obtained by Rómulo Betancourt, the current President, leader of the Acción Democrática, a Petty-bourgeois nationalist party, which takes its inspiration from the programme of the Peruvian APRA, and has become the most numerous during the time it was in power from 1945 to 1948. It is a well-organized party, and the only party that had a honor-list of dead to exhibit during the fight against the dictatorship. Its main support lies among the peasantry, and the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie of the provincial towns and villages.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CRISIS

The current government can be characterized by its attitude toward the danger of a coup d'état and toward the economic crisis. What saved it from being overthrown by the armed forces was the unanimous defense provided for it by the peasants, workers, students, and middle classes, as can be judged from the 24-hour strike that paralyzed the country in April this year. The formula adopted by Betancourt, however, is the coalition in power of his party with the URD and the Christian-Social Party, on the one hand; and, on the other a policy of flatteries toward the top military chiefs, not excluding the chiefs of past revolts, as in the case of General Castro León, who as punishment was sent to the pleasure-island where the former dictator used to take his ease. It is thus not surprising that the democratic regime lives under a daily threat.

If one knows the composition of the government, it is easy to guess that the economic crisis is at present loaded on the shoulders of the toilers, to the profit of the bankers and other individuals whose interests are mixed up with those of the foreign monopolies. The latter have really not much to complain about, for, just as the Acción Democrática is now becoming the party of

the bourgeoisie, the government of Betancourt is transforming Venezuela into Uncle Sam's spoiled nephew.

The Four-Year Plan presented by President to Congress is a confession in advance of the failure into which his economic and administrative management will lead. The unemployed are at least 200,000 in a country whose total population is seven million. The agrarian reform, that the peasantry (40% of the population) has been awaiting for a century and half, will not be able to go beyond the distribution of a few lands to the most starving peasants — who already constitute the greatest danger for the tranquility of bourgeois institutions. The problem is too grave to be solved by a criterion set by millionaires who, when the time comes to pay, find that their pockets are empty.

YOUTH IS ORGANIZING

With food dear, wages stagnant or dropping, and faced with the impassivity of the regime, a feeling of discontent is spreading from the workers to the petty bourgeoisie. The Venezuelan Communist Party, which is perhaps the strongest in Latin America, has tried to exploit this to its own advantage; but something has gone sour in side that party and it must be recognized that its success has been infinitesimal.

On the other hand, the traditional mass party in Venezuela, the Acción Democrática, had a youth which, together with the youth of the Communist Party, had engaged in the decisive battle during the last years of the tyranny. Within its organization there was a strong left opposition that threatened to carry all the militants along with it. The old leaders, already tired and separated from the masses, understood the grave risk of this, and decided to act in time: in the first half of April 1960 the youth of the Acción Democrática was expelled from the party.

Only two months have passed, and already the new movement, whose name and programme have not yet been specified (it is announced that they will be in June, when its first national assembly will be held), has been set up in all Venezuelan towns and villages, and has carried out public demonstrations in Maracaibo and Caracas, which drew more people than the demonstrations of the party from which they had been expelled. It is even said that many voters for the Communist Party have joined the new organization. And the workers organized in the trade unions, though in their specific economic needs, they remain faithful to the union bureaucracy, in their general political orientation have not concealed their sympathy for the party now being born.

The new party looks socialist: its best-known leaders have publicly stated their belief in Marxism; the party's enmity to capitalism in general, and not just to imperialism, seems to be the prevailing thought. The impact of the Cuban revolution on the Latin-American masses, and especially on Venezuela, has been formidable, and the people regard the new movement as a sort of Venezuelan "26 July Movement," which, if it reaches power, must make a more radical revolution than that in Cuba because in Venezuela national capitalism is very strong, and, because of its 90% money-lending and importing nature, cannot be counted on; imperialist interests therein are incomparably more important than in any other country on the continent.

León David

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