a determining force of the revolution. Hereafter, there must be effective slogans and extensive propaganda toward them.

e. The toiling youth masses constitute over 30 percent of the population, and they are also the bravest and firmest in struggle. Therefore, propaganda to win the youth masses is an important task in the entire propaganda program.

f. In regard to China's broad lumpen masses, if they take the side of the revolutionary class, they will become an instrument of the revolution; if they take the side of the reactionary class, they will become an instrument of the counterrevolution. Therefore, winning them over from under the influence of the reactionary class is one of the party's propaganda tasks. When performing propaganda work, attention must be given to the life and nature of the different groups of vagrants and appropriate propaganda measures adopted.

g. The destruction of the armed organizations of the landlord class and the winning over of their masses constitute one of the conditions for the victory of the rural land revolution. Hereafter, special attention must be given to the propaganda work on the membership masses of the civil defense and pacification units.

h. The propaganda and agitation slogans must be adapted to the particular areas, and different slogans must also be created according to the different times (such as fall harvest, year-end, the Chiang [5592]-Kuei [2710] war period and the Wang [3076]-Chiang [5592] war period).

2. Propaganda technique:

a. The propaganda team:

(1) Significance: The Red Army propaganda team is an important tool of its propaganda work. If the propaganda team is not well organized, a large part of the Red Army's propaganda task is wasted. Therefore, the reform and training of the propaganda team is one of the tasks at present requiring the party's re-enforced endeavor. The first step is to correct, from the theoretical aspect, the contempt felt by the officers and soldiers for propaganda work and propaganda teams. Such odd nicknames as "loafers" and "fake medicine peddlers" must be deleted hereafter.

(2) Organization:

(a) Take each detachment as a unit; the detachments directly subordinate to the army and column command will each form a unit. Each unit will organize a propaganda team composed of a commander and a deputy commander, 16 propagandists, 1 porter (carrying propaganda materials), and 2 orderlies. The propagandists of each company are divided into a number of subunits (the number of subunits to be decided according to the number of battalions or other troop units and organs), and each subunit has a leader and three propagandists.
(b) The detachment propaganda team is under the command of the detachment political commissar. When the battalions proceed separately to perform guerrilla work, each battalion must have attached to it a propaganda subunit under the command of the battalion political commissar. The propaganda teams of the columns are under the command of the propaganda section of the column political department. The army propaganda team is under the direction of the propaganda section of the army political department.

(c) The funds of the propaganda teams are disbursed by the political department; they must be adequate.

(d) In regard to improving the quality of the propagandists, besides requesting the local governments to select progressive elements to join the Red Army propaganda team, the superior elements among the soldiers in the various units must be selected (excluding the squad leaders wherever possible) to serve as propagandists. The political department must regularly formulate training plans for the propaganda team, specify the training material, method, time and instructors, and actively improve the quality of the propagandists.

b. In regard to the propaganda documents, such as handbills, announcements and declarations, the existing ones should be reviewed, and new ones drafted promptly.

The suitable and effective distribution of propaganda material is an important item in the technique of the propaganda team. The political work organs must give attention to such means as sending propaganda by mail, enclosing propaganda material among other matters through the mail, or printing propaganda and agitation slogans on postal matters, and they must do so successfully.

c. Wall bulletins are one of the important means of mass propaganda. The army and the columns must each run a wall bulletin, to be handled by the propaganda section of the political department and named "Current Affairs Brief Report." The contents are: (1) International and domestic political news; (2) the mass struggle situation of guerrilla areas; (3) the work condition of the Red Army. There must be at least one issue a week, written on large pieces of paper, not mimeographed, in as many copies as possible. Attention must be given to the following: (1) The production must be prompt; (2) the contents must be rich; and (3) the calligraphy should be fairly large and clear.

d. The various political departments must collect and compile revolutionary songs expressing the sentiments of the masses, and the editing and compiling committee of the army political department has the responsibility of supervision and inspection.

e. The art unit of the propaganda section of the army political department must be reenforced. It must publish lithographed or mimeographed pictorials. To reenforce the military art unit, all those with talent in painting and drawing in the army must be gathered together.
f. Costumed propaganda is one of the most concrete and effective means of propaganda. All the propaganda teams of the detachments and directly subordinate units must organize costumed propaganda subunits, responsible for creating and directing costumed propaganda to the masses.

g. Take each battalion as a unit, clubs must be organized in the soldiers' associations.

h. Verbal and written propaganda subunits must be organized in the propaganda teams, for the purpose of studying and directing verbal and written propaganda techniques.

i. The three disciplinary rules must be strictly enforced.

j. The political departments and the propaganda teams must, with organization and planning, call all types of mass meetings. They must decide in advance the order of meeting, the speakers, the topics and the time.

k. Propaganda aimed at the soldiers and lower level officers of the White army is extremely important. Attention must be given to the following methods hereafter:

   (1) The text of the propaganda must be short and concise, so that it can be read at a glance. It must be skillful and clever, so that it will leave an impression.

   (2) Besides systematically displaying many slogans appropriate to the particular units along the road traveled by the enemy, handbills must be stored with the party units and mass organizations along the road, so that they can be ingeniously distributed when the enemy soldiers pass through.

   (3) The names of the enemy officers and soldiers and the identity of their unit must be ascertained from the captives and through mail inspection, so that propaganda material or letters can be sent to them.

   (4) Preferential treatment of captives is an effective method of propagandizing to the enemy force. Preferential treatment includes the following methods: The first is to refrain from searching them for money and things. In the past, the conduct of the Red Army soldiers of searching captives for money and things must be firmly stopped. The second is to welcome captives with great warmth, so that they will feel a spiritual happiness. Insulting them by word or deed must be opposed. The third is equal material treatment of the captives, same as the old soldiers. Fourth, after propaganda, those who do not wish to remain will be issued travel expenses and released for them to return home, so that they will spread the influence of the Red Army in the White army. Forcing the unwilling ones to remain just to satisfy the desire for more soldiers must be opposed. Except under special conditions, the above are suitable for all captured officers and soldiers alike.
(5) Giving medical attention to the enemy wounded is also an effective method of propaganda. The medical treatment and monetary allowances to wounded enemy soldiers must be exactly the same as wounded Red Army soldiers. All possible opportunities must be utilized to return wounded enemy soldiers who have received medical attention and monetary allowances, to the enemy army. This principle applies to wounded enemy officers.

V. Political Training of Soldiers

A. Material

The following items must be artistically incorporated into textbooks to serve as training material for soldiers:

2. All aspects of the land revolution.
3. The armed organization and its tactics.
4. The reasons for the three articles of discipline.
5. Slogans for morning and evening roll calls.
7. How to do mass work.
8. Individual explanation of Red Army slogans.
9. Rectification of the many biases.
11. The current stage of the revolution and its future.
13. Comparison of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
15. Stories of social progress.
17. The geography and the political and economic knowledge of the guerrilla areas.
18. Revolutionary songs.
19. Pictorial news.

B. Method

1. Political classes;

   a. Political classes are divided into regular, special and cadre classes. Regular classes are further divided into two types: When a detachment is together, classes are held with each detachment as a unit. For instructors, the detachment political commissar serves as the instructor in charge, and battalion political commissars are responsible for the various subjects separately. Besides combat soldiers who are required to attend, messengers, orderlies, porters, grooms and cooks must all attend. The goal of the regular class is basic political knowledge for soldiers in general.

   b. With each detachment as a unit, the special class, through selection and examination, consists of 50 soldiers from the battalions who can
read some and have some political knowledge. The detachment political commissar serves as the instructor in charge, and the battalion political commissars are responsible for the various subjects separately. The goal of the special class is to create personnel with political knowledge one level higher than the regular class, in preparation for promotion to lower level cadres in the future.

c. The column is the unit for the cadre class, and the directly subordinate unit of the army forms another unit, organized with battalion commanders and deputy commanders, company commanders and deputy commanders, military aides of the various levels, and other designated personnel. The goal is to raise the political level of the current lower level cadres, so that they can lead the masses, in preparation for promotion to middle level cadres in the future. The political commissar, political department chairman, and commander of the column and others with suitable qualifications serve as the instructors.

d. The political training committee must be organized with each detachment as a unit, to include the political committee members of the detachment and qualified military officers. The detachment political commissar serves as chairman. The function of the committee is to discuss the various problems on the political training of the soldiers in the detachment.

e. The political training of the directly subordinate units of the army and columns is handled by the political training committee organized by the political propaganda sections of the army and columns.

f. Method of instruction:

(1) Heuristic method (abolishing the cramming method).
(2) From the near to the far.
(3) From the elementary to the advanced.
(4) Lecturing in colloquial style (explaining new terms in colloquial).
(5) Clarity in lecturing.
(6) Lectures must be interesting.
(7) Lecturing supplemented with gestures.
(8) Review the idea of the previous session at the current session.
(9) Outline must be brought out.
(10) Discussion method should be used in the cadre class.

2. Lectures at morning and evening roll calls:

a. Limited to a maximum of 30 minutes each time.

b. Material:

(1) Reporting of political news.
(2) Criticisms of daily life.
(3) Explanation of the weekly political slogan.
3. Assembly lectures:
   a. Once a week for the detachment; once every half month for the column; no set schedule for the army.
   b. For each lecture, the political work organ (political commissar of the detachment), together with the military work organ, systematically specifies the contents of the lecture, designates the lecturer and schedules the time.
   c. Except for the orderlies, everyone must attend the lectures.
   d. The lower level political organ must report to the higher level the contents of each lecture and the influence on the masses.

4. Individual conversation:
   a. Individual conversations must be held with the following categories of people:
      (1) Those with biases.
      (2) Those receiving punishment.
      (3) The wounded.
      (4) The sick.
      (5) New recruits.
      (6) Captive soldiers.
      (7) Those dissatisfied with their work.
      (8) Those wavering in ideology.
   b. Before the conversation, the psychology and circumstances of the objective must be investigated.
   c. During the conversation, one must take the attitude of a comrade and talk with sincerity.
   d. After the conversation, the important points of the conversation and its effect must be recorded.

5. Recreation:
   a. With the battalion as the unit, the soldiers' association club must be reenforced and the following types of recreation included:
      (1) Hide-and-seek game.
      (2) Soccer.
      (3) Music.
      (4) Martial arts.
      (5) Flower drum tunes.
      (6) Old drama.
b. A costumed propaganda group will be organized under each propaganda team.

c. The funds for recreational equipment are paid out of the public funds (funds for the battalion to be approved by the column political department).

6. Improvement of treatment:

a. Corporal punishment must be abolished firmly.

b. Verbal abuses must be abolished.

c. Wounded and sick soldiers must receive preferential treatment.

d. The system of issuing 0.40 yuan per person per month for straw sandals must be resumed.

7. Special education of new recruits and captives:

a. Explain to them the life and habits of the Red Army, such as (1) equality of officers and soldiers (There is only the distinction of functions between officers and soldiers, but no distinction of classes. The officers are not the exploiting class, nor the soldiers the exploited.); (2) the three disciplinary rules and the reasons; (3) the significance and effect of the soldiers' association; (4) the economic system in the Red Army (the source of revenue, the management organization, the principle of keeping accounts open to the public, and the system of inspection by the soldiers); (5) management of the battalion mess by the economic committee; (6) abolition of corporal punishment and verbal abuses; and (7) preferential treatment of prisoners of war.

b. Lectures on the brief struggle history of the Red Army.

c. The principles of the Red Army: (1) The difference between the Red Army and the White army--detailed explanation of this point to the prisoners of war; (2) the difference between the Red Army and bandits; and (3) the three great missions of the Red Army.

d. Lectures on the organizational system of the Red Army.

e. Common political knowledge, such as (1) the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; (2) the invasion of China by British, Japanese and American imperialists; (3) how the warlords of the different factions fight everywhere under the direction of imperialism; (4) land division; (5) the soviet; (6) the Red Guard, etc.
VI. Special Education of Youth Soldiers

A. The political departments of the columns are responsible for compiling youth literacy texts (using the Commercial Press elementary school texts, People's 1,000-word Vocabulary text and Lung-yen Cultural Press texts as references).

B. Each column must organize a youth soldiers' school, divided into three or four classes, one class for each detachment and one for each directly subordinate unit, with a maximum of 25 students per class. The chairman of the political department serves as the principal and the propaganda section chief as the dean. Each class has an instructor in charge. One semester consists of 90 hours.

C. Stationeries are paid by public funds and distributed to the students.

VII. Abolition of Corporal Punishment

A. The Effect of Corporal Punishment in the Red Army

In the units where corporal punishment is more severe, there are more dissatisfied soldiers and deserters. There were the following most apparent instances: A certain officer of the 8th detachment of the 3d column liked to punish by flogging. As a result, not only almost all the messengers and cooks, but even the supply sergeant and aides, fled. During one period, a battalion commander who liked to flog people was assigned to the 25th battalion of the 9th detachment. The masses nicknamed him "Ironsmith." In consequence, the soldiers felt hopeless and utterly dissatisfied. They only became liberated when the commander was transferred. The result of flogging in the 3d battalion of the special service detachment was the desertion of 4 cooks, 1 special service chief and 2 squad leaders who had struggled for a long time. One of them, Hsiao Wen-ch'eng [5618 2429 2052], left a letter, explaining that he was not counterrevolutionary, but deserted because he could not stand the oppression. When the 4th column was first organized, the officers transferred from the 1st, 2d and 3d columns beat the soldiers savagely. As a result, the soldiers deserted one after another. Finally, this group of officers themselves could not stand their ground, and they had to leave the 4th column. The 2d column has more deserters than any other column. Though there are many reasons, the habit of flogging intensively practiced by its lower level officers is one of the most important ones. There were three suicide incidents in the 2d column (1 platoon leader and 2 soldiers). This is the biggest stigma of the Red Army, and the significance is extremely serious. It cannot but be considered an outcome of flogging practiced intensively in the 2d column. Currently, the outcry of the common soldiers in the Red Army is: "Officers do not beat the soldiers; they merely flog them to near death!" Such expression of the indignation and wrath of the masses truly deserves our serious attention.
B. The Origin of Corporal Punishment and the Reason for Its Abolition

To maintain its exploitation, the feudal class had to resort to the most cruel punishment as a tool, in order to suppress the resistance and revolt of the exploited. This was the reason that corporal punishment was created in the feudal era. When economic development progressed to the capitalist system, it became necessary to introduce liberalism in order to encourage the individuality of the worker-peasant masses, enhance their labor and fighting capacities, and create the conditions for the development of capitalism. Therefore, the bourgeois nations generally have abolished corporal punishment, and the monstrosity of flogging has disappeared in the troops. When the economic development reached the stage of socialism, with the aggravation of the class struggle, the worker-peasant class, for the purpose of overthrowing the power of the ruling class and eliminating the exploitation based on such power, must activate the strength of the broad masses of its own class before it can win the victory of the struggle. The soviet political power is the political power of the most progressive class, and no remnant of the feudal system may exist under it. Therefore, in Soviet Russia, corporal punishment is not only no longer in existence in its Red Army, but the use of corporal punishment is strictly prohibited in its laws in general. The Red 4th Army was created in a China where the feudal system had not been completely eliminated, and its main components mostly came from the troops of the feudal warlords. The thinking and habits of the feudal system remain strong in the officers and soldiers in general, and therefore, the habit of flogging and the saying of "no fear without flogging" are the same as in the troops of the feudal warlords. Though the slogan that the officers must not beat the soldiers and the provision that the soldiers have the right to express their grievances have long been proposed, they are not effective at all, resulting in the alienation between the officers and soldiers, the low morale of the officers as well as the soldiers, the growing number of deserters, the atmosphere of dissatisfaction in the troops, and even incidents of suicide. This situation is completely contrary to the fighting tasks of the Red Army. If it is not promptly rectified, the danger is beyond description.

C. Methods of Rectification

1. Firmly abolish corporal punishment.

2. Launch a movement to abolish corporal punishment. This campaign must aim at both the officers and the soldiers, and spread the meaning that "only the abolition of corporal punishment will benefit the struggle" generally in the officer and soldier masses. Only then will the officers realize that the abolition of corporal punishment not only will not make it impossible for them to command the troops, but will benefit management and training. On the part of the soldiers, not only will they not become more intractable, but, because of the abolition of corporal punishment, they will enhance their fighting morale. With the disappearance of the alienation between the officers and soldiers, they will consciously accept control, training and general discipline.
3. After corporal punishment is abolished, certain temporary undesirable phenomena may appear due to historical reasons. But the situation will only serve to intensify our responsibilities. We must vigorously promote the spirit of persuasion and the conscious observance of discipline to overcome the most evil feudal system contrary to the struggle tasks. We must never use the undesirable phenomena as an excuse to defend the practice of flogging. All those opposing the abolition of corporal punishment under the excuse of the temporary undesirable phenomena, or slacking off on the movement to abolish corporal punishment, are objectively blocking the development of the revolutionary struggle and thereby helping the ruling class.

4. The legal procedure to abolish corporal punishment in the Red Army is:
   a. The penal regulations of the Red Army must be revised.
   b. The supreme military and political organs' conference must jointly issue a general order abolishing corporal punishment and promulgate the new penal regulations of the Red Army.
   c. After the general order is issued, the military and political organs must call a meeting of officers to explain in detail the reasons for abolishing corporal punishment, so that they will support the momentous reform embodied in the general order and implement it diligently in the troops.
   d. Meanwhile, the soldiers' council must call a meeting of soldier delegates, explaining that, besides supporting the reform, they must hereafter consciously observe discipline and make stringent mass disciplinary sanctions, in order to obtain the desired result of abolishing corporal punishment.

VIII. Preferential Treatment of Wounded Soldiers

A. The Misery of the Wounded and the Sick and Its Influence

1. The health organs of the various units are unsound. Medical officers, drugs and stretcher facilities are inadequate, and the personnel are insufficient and not well organized. Therefore, many wounded and sick soldiers sometimes cannot even obtain basic care let alone full treatment.

2. The military and political organs of the army do not give sufficient attention to the wounded and the sick. For instance: a. In regard to the soundness of the health organs, the authorities have not only failed to make maximum effort, but actually paid no attention to it. The issue of health is rarely discussed at the various meetings. b. The officers are not doing all they can to comfort the wounded and the sick. Such practice as bringing tea to the patients, covering them at night, and visiting them are almost nonexistent in the Red Army. The officers take the attitude of indifference, or they even find the patients annoying. c. When marching, the officers, and even the soldiers, show no sympathy toward the wounded dropping out of rank, refusing to help them, cursing them or driving them on ruthlessly.

3. The seriously wounded and sick do not have adequate supplies and allowances. Wounded soldiers do not have a change of clothes 7 or 8 days after being wounded. Sick officers receive recuperation allowances, but not the sick soldiers.
4. The defects of Chiao-yang Hospital are: a. Being disorganized. b. Shortage of medical officers and drugs. c. Medical officers selling private medicine. d. Lack of cleanliness. e. Inadequate cold weather clothing and bedding. f. Shortage of medical attendants. g. Inferior food. h. Cramped quarters. i. Bad relationship with the local people. As a result, the wounded and the sick regard the hospital as a jail and are unwilling to remain in the rear.

The ill treatment of wounded and sick soldiers has produced the following effect: a. The soldiers become dissatisfied with the Red Army. "While the Red Army is good, one must not become wounded or sick." Such opinion is widespread among all soldiers and the lower level officers. b. The dissatisfaction of the soldiers and the officers further aggravates the alienation between the officers and soldiers. c. The soldiers and lower level officers are afraid of being wounded. Therefore, the combat power of the Red Army is reduced. d. There are many deserters. e. The worker-peasant masses are less eager to join the Red Army.

B. Methods of Rectification

1. The military and political organs must not remain indifferent to the issue of health. It must be fully discussed at the various meetings.

2. The organization of the health units must be improved. Qualified personnel must be assigned to work in such units, instead of packing all those not needed elsewhere into the medical teams. Moreover, the personnel must be increased, so that the patients will have adequate attention. The shortages of physicians and drugs must be remedied wherever possible. In regard to physicians, they must be urged to be more careful in diagnosing, instead of being so indifferent.

3. Officers, especially company officers in contact with the soldiers, must visit the patients from time to time, bring them tea, and cover them up at night. If the patients are cold, the officers must find the means to help them, such as borrowing from others, or putting more clothes on them. Such means of caring for the patients must be made into a system, followed by everyone, because it is the best way to win the masses.

4. In regard to the wounded dropping out of rank when marching: a. No one is permitted to revile or ridicule them. b. When the wounded or sick are required to yield the way, they must be asked politely, instead of being pushed aside roughly. c. Regardless of which unit or organ, whenever a soldier drops out of rank due to injury or illness, be he a combatant or noncombatant, someone must be immediately assigned to look after him. If the injury or illness is serious, all means must be exhausted to have him carried. d. When marching, the rear guard must patiently help the wounded and the sick who are out of rank, and carry their weapons for them when necessary.
5. Allowances for incidental expenses must be issued to the patients. Those seriously wounded or ill must receive more than those not seriously wounded or ill. In regard to those extremely sick or wounded, appropriate recuperation allowances must be issued without distinction of officer or soldier.

6. In regard to the clothing and bedding of the patients, while the army must do its best to provide them, donations must be solicited among the officers and soldiers of all the units. It will not only increase the incidental allowances of the patients, but also serve as a good means to stimulate the spirit of mutual help in times of need.

7. The many defects of the Chiao-yang Rear Hospital must be rectified systematically. In addition, a campaign for donations (clothing, bedding, cash, grain) must be launched among the worker-peasant masses in western Fukien, in order to bring closer the relationship between the worker-peasant masses and the Red Army.

IX. The Relationship Between the Military and the Political Commands of the Red Army

A. Before the high level local political organ is organized, the political and military organs of the Red Army, under the leadership of the Front Committee, perform their work in a parallel manner.

B. The Relationship Between the Red Army and the Masses

1. In all matters affecting the entire army, such as the promulgation of political programs, the military and political commands will promulgate them jointly.

2. Before the local political organ is organized, the direction and supervision of mass work, such as propagandizing to the masses, organizing the masses, building political power, down to confiscation, trial, punishment, soliciting donations, raising funds, and relief, are the functions of the political department.

3. In all areas where an administrative organ has not yet been set up, the Red Army political department serves in its place, until the time when it is. In all areas where it has been set up, the principle that the local administrative organ handles all matters independently in order to gain the confidence of the masses must be followed. Only when the local administrative organ is not yet soundly established, in matters concerning the Red Army and the local area, the method of joint handling by the local administrative organ and the Red Army political department may be resorted to.

4. Helping the local militia stabilize and develop is the responsibility of the political department; helping it in peacetime military training and wartime combat direction is the responsibility of Headquarters. Nevertheless, whenever possible, it should be done through the local administrative organ, and direct handling should be avoided as much as possible.
C. In regard to the personnel and administration of the Red Army, the military and political commands each has its independent line. In matters concerning both, such as mutual transfers of personnel, mutual transmission of information, etc., they are handled through official communications.

D. In regard to etiquette and discipline, the military and political commands follow the principle of class subordination. There must be no disrespect or insubordination on ground of different commands.

E. In regard to supplies, health, marching, combat and encampment, the political command must accept the direction of the military command. In regard to political training and mass work, the reverse is true. But such direction can only be issued to the subordinate organs (general affairs section or the adjutant section) of the other command.

F. The direction of matters relating to Red Army fund raising and the decision and disbursement of political work allocations are to be made by the political department, and the military affairs organs may not interfere. (Funds are drawn directly from the quartermaster's office by the political department.) Allocations to the party units are made by the political department.

G. All orders of the military affairs organ, except those which have to be consigned by the political commissar, require no endorsement by the political department director. All orders of the political organs are singly handled by the political department without having to be endorsed by the political commissar.

Editor's note: This document is one of the earliest and most important records written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the army and party building of the Chinese Communist Party. Its standpoint and basic content are completely applicable today. The many kinds of non-proletarian biases, i.e., manifestations of warlordist and petty bourgeois biases, pointed in the first part of the resolution are the fundamental problems of the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army today as well as the Red Army at that time. Our troops exist for the people; therefore, the three great missions of the Red Army at that time were "fighting," "raising funds," and "doing mass work." This document is extremely forceful on the mass work viewpoint of the Red Army. Today's 8th Route Army and New 4th Army still have three great missions, except that "fund raising" has been developed to "production." The decisions on abolishing corporal punishment (not beating people) and the propaganda and education work of the troops in this document deserve our serious attention today. In general, as our troops are founded on peasants and other petty bourgeois elements and situated in an environment of prolonged dispersed rural guerrilla warfare and in the midst of mercenaries and counterrevolutionary enemies, such counterrevolutionary enemies, traitors and secret service agents, old army officers, war prisoners, lumpen proletarians, old peasants, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and the various dogmatist and
sectarianist factors corrode us from the inside as well as the outside. Therefore, to make our troops truly into the troops completely belonging to the people under the leadership of the proletarian ideology, we must wage a constant anti-bias struggle. Currently, ours are the best troops in the nation supported by the people. There has been a great improvement since 1929. However, in recent years, certain defects still remain in the relations between the army and the party and government, between the troops and the people, between the officers and the soldiers, between the lower and higher levels, between military affairs and political work cadres, and among military units. The main ones among the defects are the warlordist biases of severance from the masses and require the intensive examination and rectification by our military affairs and political work cadres in the rectification movement and the support-government-and-love-people movement. Meanwhile, this document starts from the masses and gives considerations to the civilian and soldier masses everywhere. Therefore, it furnishes us with an effective weapon on this point. In the political education of our troops, this document was not publicized for many years, and, when it was publicized, it was not used to launch self-criticism, thereby re-committing an error long solved by this document. This is one loss. Now, the Central has decided to make this resolution a document for the rectification of the military cadres and a text for the education of the entire army.


"Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the 4th Army of the Red Army,"
New Democracy Publishing House (Hong Kong), January 1949

6080
CSO: 4005
LETTER TO COMRADE LIN PIaO

5 January 1930

[Text] Comrade Lin Piao:

The new year has been here several days, but I have not yet replied to your letter. First, because I have some business which keeps me busy. Second, because after all, what could I write to you about? What was there that was good which I could offer you? I cudgelled my brains, but could not think of anything suitable. Hence the delay. Now I have thought of something. I do not know whether it is appropriate after all to your situation, but this matter of mine is in fact an important question in the present struggle. Even if it is not appropriate to your individual situation, it is nevertheless an important question. Hence I bring it up.

What is the question that I am going to bring up? It is a question of appraisal of the current situation and our actions ensuing from it. I used to feel in the past and still feel that your appraisal of the current situation has been relatively pessimistic. This view of yours was most apparent at the conference in Jui-chin on the evening of 18 May last year. I knew that you believed that a revolutionary upsurge would come inevitably, but you did not believe it possible that it would come soon, so you disapproved of action on the plan to seize Kiangsi within a year and favored only guerrilla activities in the three border areas between Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; and as you had no profound notion about establishing a Red political power in these three areas, you had no profound notion of promoting a nationwide revolutionary upsurge through intensification and expansion of this Red political power. Since you believe in the XXX-style policy of mobile guerrilla warfare, you seem to think that, since the revolutionary upsurge is still far away, it will be labor lost to attempt to build up our political power by hard work. Instead, you want to extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means and, when the masses throughout the country have been won over, or won over to a certain degree, to launch a nationwide uprising which, with the forces of the Red Army thrown in, would become a great, nationwide revolution. Your theory of first winning over the masses and then establishing political power on a nationwide scale, including all regions, is in my view not suitable to
the Chinese revolution. According to my observation, this theory of yours stems mainly from your failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colony contended for by many imperialist powers. If you clearly understand this, then first, you will understand why in China alone in the world there is such an unusual thing as a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, why the fight intensifies and expands day by day, and why no unified political power has ever come into being. Second, you will understand how important the peasant problem is, and consequently why rural uprisings have developed on such a nationwide scale as at present. Third, you will understand the absolute correctness of the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourth, you will understand another unusual thing which corresponds to and arises out of the first that only in China is there a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, and that is the existence and development of the Red Army and guerrilla troops, and, together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas (soviets) that have grown amid the encirclement of the White political power (no such unusual thing is found anywhere except in China). Fifth, you will also understand that the formation and development of the Red Army, the guerrilla units and the soviet areas is the highest form of peasant struggle in a semi-colony, a form which peasant struggle in a semi-colony will inevitably take. Sixth, you will understand that they (the Red Army and peasants' soviets) undoubtedly are the most important allied forces (which the proletariat must come forward to lead) of the struggle of the proletariat in a semi-colony, and that undoubtedly they are an important factor in accelerating the revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. Seventh, you will understand that the policy of purely mobile guerrilla activities cannot accomplish the task of accelerating the nationwide revolutionary upsurge, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu [Teh]-Mao [Tse-tung], Ho Lung, Li Wen-lin and Fang Chih-min is undoubtedly correct—policy such as establishing base areas, building up political power according to plan, close cooperation between Red Army guerrillas and the broad peasant masses, their organization and training in struggle, deepening of the agrarian revolution, expanding armed forces by developing first township uprising forces, then district Red Guards, then county Red Guards, then local Red Army units, all the way up to the regular Red Army, and expanding political power by advancing in a series of waves. Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be one of our important instruments in the coming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge.

I wish to speak once more now about the reason why you make a relatively pessimistic—to my way of thinking—appraisal of the current situation. Your appraisal, I think, is exactly the opposite of that made by a group in the party who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity. Comrades who suffer from this malady unduly overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution and underestimate the objective forces. Such an appraisal stems largely from subjectivism. In the end, it will undoubtedly lead to the path of adventurism.
You have not made such a mistake. But you seem to have a fault in another respect, and that is, you underestimate somewhat the subjective forces and overestimate somewhat the objective forces. This is also an inappropriate appraisal and will inevitably produce another kind of bad result. You admit the weakness of the subjective forces and the strength of the objective forces, but you do not seem to understand the following important features:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, so are all organs (government, armed forces, parties, organizations, etc.) of the ruling classes with their foothold on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This explains why revolution cannot break out at present in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are much stronger than those in China, the forces of the ruling classes there are also many times stronger than those in our country. The subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, but because the objective forces are also weak, the revolution will certainly move toward an upsurge more quickly in China than in Western Europe.

2. Since the defeat of the Great Revolution, the subjective forces of revolution have indeed been greatly weakened. The force that remains is to all appearances very small and this naturally makes some comrades (who judge by appearances) feel pessimistic. But it is a quite different thing if we look into the essence of the matter. Here the old Chinese proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," is applicable. In other words, although the force is only a small one at present, it will rapidly develop. In China, as things stand, its development is not merely a possibility but a necessity. This was fully proved in the 30 May Movement and the Great Revolutionary Movement which followed. In studying an event, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as a guide to the threshold of the essence. Once we have crossed the threshold, we must grasp the essence and put aside the appearance that serves as the guide. This alone is the reliable and scientific method of analysis which has revolutionary significance.

3. Similarly, in estimating the objective forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but must study their essence. In the early period of our independent regime on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, a small number of comrades seriously believed in the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Party Committee of that time and regarded our class enemy as not worth a rap. The two phrases, "extremely shaky" and "exceedingly panicky," which have been passed on as standing jokes even to this day, were precisely the description used at that time (from May to June 1928) by the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in sizing up Lu-Ti-p'ing, the ruler of Hunan. Political adventurism necessarily ensued from such an appraisal. But during the approximately 4 months from November 1928 to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwantsi warlords broke out), when the largest third joint expedition pressed forward to Ching-kang Mountains, a section of comrades raised the question, "How long can the Red flag be kept flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and the situation was taking shape for a fight between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang and the Kwantsi warlords.
In reality it was just the time when the counterrevolutionary tide began to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. But during this very period not only was a pessimistic view found in the Red Army and local party organizations, but the party center was more or less perplexed by surface conditions and became pessimistic in its tone. The February letter from the Central Committee furnished proof of the pessimism shown by the party in its analysis at that time.

4. The present objective situation may still easily perplex those comrades who observe only the appearance of the existing conditions but not their essence. Those of us working in the Red Army, especially when defeated in battle, encircled on all sides or pursued by strong enemy forces, often un- wittingly universalize and magnify what after all are only momentary, particular and local conditions, as if the whole situation in China and throughout the world was dark and gloomy, and the prospect of victory of the revolution dim and remote. They neglect the essence in making such an observation because they have not made a scientific analysis of the general situation. If it is asked whether the revolutionary upsurge will arise soon in China, we can give a definite answer only after studying carefully whether the contradictions leading to the revolutionary upsurge are really developing.

Since contradictions are developing internationally between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between imperialism and the proletariat in these countries, the imperialists feel all the more urgently the need to contend for China. As the imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily expanding and intensifying strife thus ensues between the various cliques of rulers in China and the contradictions between them develop daily. From these contradictions between the various cliques of rulers—the strife between the warlords—ensues an increase of taxation; thus the development of the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the rulers is accelerated with every passing day. From the contradiction between imperialism and Chinese capitalism, that is, the failure of the Chinese bourgeoisie to obtain concessions from imperialism, ensues an immediate intensification of the contradiction between China's bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class: the Chinese bourgeoisie must now intensify their exploitation of the working class. From the imperialist commodity aggression, the inroads made by Chinese merchant capital, and increase of taxation by the government—all of which are contradictory to the interests of the landlord class, ensues the sharpening of the contradiction between the landlords and the peasants, that is, exploitation by landlords in the form of rent and usury becomes heavier. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the broad masses of workers and peasants, and increase of taxation by the government, dealers in domestic products and independent small producers are forced daily further on the road to bankruptcy. Because of the unrestricted expansion of [government] troops without sufficient provisions and funds to support them and the steady spread of war, the masses of soldiers constantly find themselves suffering from cold, hunger, exhaustion and
casualties. Because of the increase of taxation by the government, the mounting burden of rent and interest demanded by landlords, and the daily extension of the horrors of war, which leads to widespread famine and banditry throughout the country, the broad masses of peasants and the urban poor are brought to such a pass that they can hardly survive. Because funds are lacking for keeping schools open, many students are worried that they may not be able to continue their education. Because of the backwardness of production, graduates have little hope of obtaining employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see how desperately precarious the situation is, and how chaotic the state in which China finds herself. We shall also see how inevitably and soon the revolutionary upsurge against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords will arise. China is littered all over with dry firewood which will soon be kindled and become a conflagration. The proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," appropriately describes how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the nationwide development of workers' strikes, peasant uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, and strikes by merchants and students to see that it is no longer merely "sparks" but will undoubtedly not take long for these "sparks" to become "a prairie fire."

The gist of what is said above was given in a letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee, dated 5 April 1929. It reads in part:

"The letter of the Central Committee (dated 9 February last year) gives too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The [Kuomintang's] three campaigns of 'encirclement' against the Ching-kang Mountains marked the height of the counterrevolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counterrevolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has been gradually rising. Although our party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened even to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will recover rapidly with the gradual ebbe of the counterrevolutionary tide and passivity among cadres in the party will also soon disappear. The masses will certainly come over to us. For not only has the [government] policy of massacre been 'driving the fish into deep water' but even reformism no longer appeals to the masses. It is certain that the illusions of the masses about the Kuomintang will quickly evaporate. In the situation that will arise, no party can compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's 6th National Congress are quite correct: the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist; the immediate task of the party is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate uprisings. But the revolution will rapidly develop, and in making propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings, a positive attitude should be adopted. In the great chaos of the current situation, only by putting forward positive slogans and by taking a positive attitude can we lead the masses. It is also certain that only by adopting such a positive attitude can the party recover its fighting capacity. We think that the party made a putschist mistake before, but that in some respects it now has a tendency toward abolitionism.... Proletarian leadership is the sole key to the victory of the revolution. The laying of the party's proletarian basis and establishment of the party branches in industrial enterprises in
key districts are the important organizational tasks of the party at present. But at the same time the development of struggles in the countryside, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and creation and expansion of the Red Army are also main conditions for helping the struggle in the cities and accelerating the revolutionary upsurge. Therefore, it is the biggest mistake to abandon the struggle in cities and be immersed in guerrilla activities in rural areas. But in our opinion it is also a mistake for any of our party members to fear the development of the power of the peasants lest it become stronger than that of the workers and hence detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution in semi-colonial China will fail only if the peasant struggle is deprived of the leadership of the workers, and it will never suffer just because the peasants, through their struggle, become more powerful than the workers."

The letter also contains the following reply to the question of the Red Army's line of action:

"To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee wants us to divide up our forces into very small units and disperse them widely over the countryside, and that Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung leave the ranks so that the major targets will be hidden from the enemy. This is an idealistic way of thinking. To divide up our forces into company or battalion-size units, each operating on its own; to disperse them widely over the countryside; to arouse the masses through guerrilla activities; and to avoid becoming the enemy's target—all these we planned and tried on numerous occasions ever since the winter of 1927, but they all proved failures. The reasons are: (1) Most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army came from the outside and are different from the local Red guardsmen in their origin. (2) With small dispersed units, the leadership will become so weak as to be unable to cope with adverse circumstances, hence we shall be liable to suffer defeat. (3) Small units are easy for the enemy to crush separately. (4) The more adverse the circumstances, the greater becomes the need for the forces to be concentrated and for the leadership to conduct resolute struggle, for only thus can we achieve internal unity against the enemy. Only in favorable circumstances can the forces be divided for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must do in adverse circumstances..."

The defect of this passage is that the reasons given against the division of forces are of a negative character, and that is far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is this: only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy cities. Only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying cities can we arouse the masses on a large scale and build up a unified political power over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we arouse the attention of the people far and near (i.e., "expanding our political influence"), and make a material contribution toward accelerating the revolutionary upsurge. For instance, both the regime we created on the Hunan-Kiangsi border in the year before last and that created in western Fukien last year were the result
of our policy of concentrating the troops. This is the general principle.
Are there, however, not times when the forces should be divided up? Yes,
there are. The letter to the Central Committee from the Front Committee
speaks of the Red Army's guerrilla tactics, including the division of forces
within a short radius:

"The tactics we have worked out during the last 3 years in the course of the
struggle are indeed different from any employed in ancient or modern times,
in China or elsewhere. With our tactics, the struggles of the masses are
daily expanding and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are
guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points: "Disperse
the forces to arouse the masses and concentrate the forces to deal with the
enemy." "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy
tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." "In an independent regime
with stabilized territory, we adopt the policy of advancing in a series of
waves. When pursued by a powerful enemy, we adopt the policy of circling
around in a whirling motion." "Arouse the largest number of the masses in the
shortest possible time and by the best possible method." These tactics are
just like casting a net. We should be able to cast the net wide or draw it in at any moment. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to
deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have applied in the past 3 years."

Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide up our forces for a short term.
For example, when we first captured the county town of Yung-hsin on the
Hunan-Kiangsi border, we divided up the 29th and 31st Regiments within the
boundaries of Yung-hsin. Again, when we captured for the third time the
county town of Yung-hsin, we divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regi-
ment to the border of An-fu, the 29th to Lien-hua and the 31st to the border
of Chi-an County. And again, in April and May last year our troops were
divided up in the counties of southern Kiangsi, and in July they were divided
up in the counties of western Fukien. All these were appropriate examples.
As to the dispersion of forces over a wide area, this is possible only under
two conditions: when circumstances are comparatively favorable and when the
leading body is comparatively sound. For the aim of dividing up our forces
is to render ourselves more capable of winning over the masses, of deepening
the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and of expanding
the Red Army and the local armed forces. It is better not to divide up the
forces if it is impossible to attain these aims, or if division of forces
could only lead to defeat and a weakening of the Red Army, as in August of
the year before last when our forces were divided up on the Hunan-Kiangsi
border for an attack on Ch'en-chou. If the two above-mentioned conditions
are present, we should undoubtedly divide up the forces, because then
division will be more advantageous than concentration. As for the division
of forces under emergency circumstances to preserve our strength and avoid
concentration of target for the enemy, I am opposed to that in principle.
This is made clear in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central
Committee quoted above. In addition, will there be a time when work should
be done by dividing the forces because economic conditions do not permit
concentration? That is possible, but I cannot make a positive conclusion,
because we have not yet had concrete experience in this respect.

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The February letter from the Central Committee was not written in the right spirit, and has exerted a bad influence on a number of comrades in the party in the 4th Army. Even you seemed to have been affected too. The Central Committee also issued at that time a circular stating that war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords might not break out. Since then, however, its appraisals and directives have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular to correct the one containing the inadequate appraisal (as in fact it was only part of a larger circular). Although it did not make any formal correction as to the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives were entirely not tainted with such pessimism and its views on the Red Army's movements now completely agree with ours. Yet that letter remains a bad influence on a number of comrades. The Front Committee's reply to the letter of the Central Committee was made public within the party together with the Central Committee's letter, but it does not seem to have had a considerable influence on this section of comrades, because the letter from the Central Committee exactly suited their convictions. Meanwhile, many subsequent correct directives from the Central Committee on its appraisal of the current situation might not have been heeded by this section of comrades, or even if they have heeded them, they are still unable to erase completely the former impression given them. Thus I feel that even now it is still necessary to give some explanation on the question.

The plan to seize Kwangsi within a year was also proposed by the Front Committee to the Central Committee in April last year, and a resolution was subsequently passed at Yu-tu. I record as follows the reason given then in the letter to the Central Committee:

"The troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are drawing near each other in the environs of Chiu-chiang, and big battles will take place presently. The Kuomintang rule will consequently disintegrate and the revolutionary upsurge will arrive soon. In preparing our work in these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the military forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan are too strong, while in Hunan, because of the party's putschist mistake, we have moreover lost almost all our mass following outside as well as inside the party. In the three provinces of Fukien, Kwangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, the enemy's military strength there is at its feeblest. In Chekiang, there are only a small number of provincial guards under Chiang Po-ch'eng. In Fukien, though there are altogether 14 regiments under 5 commands, Kuo Feng-ming's brigade has already been smashed; the troops under the respective command of Ch'en Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang are bandit forces of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and certainly cannot have great fighting capacity; Chang Chen alone is comparatively able to fight; but even he, according to an analysis made by the Provincial Committee of Fukien, has under his command only two regiments of some fighting capacity. In addition, Fukien is now entirely in a state of confusion and disunity. In Kwangsi there are altogether 16 regiments under two commands—that of Chu P'ei-te and that of Hsiung Shih-hui; the military strength there is
superior to that of either Fukien or Chekiang, but still far inferior to that of Hunan. Secondly, we have committed fewer putschist mistakes in these three provinces. With the exception of Chekiang, where the situation is not quite clear to us, the party's organizations and mass following in both Kiangsi and Fukien are better than those in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for instance. There we still retain a fairly adequate basis in Te-an, Hsiu-shui and T'ung-ku in northern Kiangsi. In Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan in western Kiangsi the party and the Red Guards are still powerful. In southern Kiangsi the situation is even more hopeful, as the 2d and 4th Regiments of the Red Army tend to grow every day in counties like Chi-an, Yung-hsin and Hsing-kuo, and the Red Army under Pang Chih-min is by no means wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nan-chang. We propose to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged warfare between the Kuomintang warlords, we contend with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi and at the same time for the western parts of both Fukien and Chekiang. In these three provinces the Red Army should be expanded and an independent regime of the masses created. We set the time-limit at 1 year for accomplishing this plan. Within this year proletarian bases for struggle should be established in such places as Shanghai, Wusih, Ningpo, Hangchow, Foochow and Amoy, in order to provide leadership to the peasant struggles in the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien. The Provincial Committee of Kiangsi must be made healthy and strong. An effort must be made to build workers' bases of Nan-chang, Chiu-chiang, Chi-an and the Nan-chang-Chiu-chiang Railway."

The above proposal to seize Kiangsi in 1 year erred in setting the time-limit mechanically at 1 year. The proposal to seize Kiangsi was based, in my opinion, on the consideration that the nationwide revolutionary upsurge would arise soon, apart from the conditions in the province itself. For if we had not been convinced of this, we could not possibly have arrived at the conclusion about the seizure of Kiangsi in a year. The only defect in the proposal was setting the time-limit mechanically at 1 year, thereby affecting the meaning of the word "soon" in the statement that "a revolutionary upsurge will arise soon" and making it smack more or less of mechanicism and impetuousity. But you do not believe in the seizure of Kiangsi in a year, because you overestimate the objective forces and underestimate the subjective forces. Consequently, you do not believe in the arrival of the revolutionary upsurge soon, and hence your conclusion. As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they will deserve our attention. Apart from the subjective conditions as stated above to which I have no new opinion to add, three things concerning the objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out: First, the economy in Kiangsi is chiefly an economy of feudal vestiges, i.e., one of exploitation through land rent; the power of the merchant bourgeoisie is relatively weak; and the armed forces of the landlords are stronger than those in any other southern province. Second, Kiangsi has no troops of its own. It has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the "annihilation of Communists" or "annihilation of bandits," these troops are not very enthusiastic because they are unfamiliar with local conditions and do not feel such personal concern as native troops do.
And third, Kiangsi, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hong Kong where almost all things are under British control, is comparatively free from the influence of imperialism. Once we have grasped these three points, we can explain why rural uprisings have been more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.

I have now said roughly all I want to say to you. I have perhaps said too much, like a chatterbox. But I think our discussion of the question is good. If this question which we are discussing is really correctly settled, the influence on the action of the Red Army will be great. So I have written this with great pleasure.

Lastly there are still two points which need making clear. First, how to interpret the two words "arise soon" in the phrase "a revolutionary upsurge will arise soon" is a common question among many comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. Of future developments and changes he should and can only point the general direction; he should not and cannot mechanically fix the day and the hour. My statement that the revolutionary upsurge in China will arise soon emphatically does not refer to something utterly devoid of significance for action, to a tantalizing phantom, which, in the words of some people, "may arise." It is like a ship on the sea whose masthead is already seen in the horizon by people standing on the shore. It is like the morning sun which, rising with radiant beams in the east, is already seen from afar by people standing on the top of a mountain. It is like an almost fully formed child stirring in its mother's womb. Second, when I say you want to extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means, I do not mean that you have a purely military viewpoint and the mentality of a roving bandit. Obviously, you have neither, because neither has any idea of winning over the masses, while you advocate "winning over the masses without reservation." You not only advocate it, but are actually doing it. What I do not approve is your lack of a profound notion about establishing a [Red] political power, as a result of which the task of winning over the masses to accelerate the coming of the revolutionary upsurge will certainly not be satisfactorily accomplished as you wish. The principal purpose of my letter is to make clear this point.

Please correct me where I am wrong.


CSO: 4005

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QUESTION OF RICH PEASANTS AFTER LAND DISTRIBUTION (Situation at Yung-hsin and in the Northern Party)

October 1930

[Text] Exploitation by the rich peasants of the Red area of Yung-hsin is done by (1) hoarding of grain to raise its price and (2) selling of industrial products. Hoarding of grain is in turn done by two methods: one, hoarding of their own surplus grain and two, buying of grain from poor peasants at very low prices, causing this year's serious spring famine. Because they wanted to hoard grain and raise its price, and as the maximum price of grain was set by the government, the rich peasants concealed all their grain, so that poor people and workers in the town had to subsist on thin gruel for a whole week. Even farm hands and poor peasants in rural villages, unable to buy grain, had to fight with starvation. Later, the county soviet led a spring famine struggle, waging a resolute fight against the rich peasants without making any concession, in a determined bid to hold down grain prices. The party acted in all districts and villages, leading Young Pioneers in throwing open storerooms and uncovering large amounts of grain concealed by the rich peasants in wine barrels, double walls, barns and under brick-covered yards and beds. As a result, there was enough grain for all and to spare. And when new grain was harvested, the rich peasants all brought their old grain to the town to sell. In selling industrial goods and doing small business the rich peasants make extraordinarily large profit. They deal mainly in salt, imported stockings, handkerchiefs, sugar and soap. They have money and various old social connections. They can buy in quantity what the poor peasants and farm hands cannot buy. (The above is reported by Wang Huai [3769/2037]; the following is by Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115/2973/0086])

The situation prevails not only in Yung-hsin, but also in the northern parts, where a spring famine struggle was also waged this year. There the rich peasants do business and make money like their counterparts in Yung-hsin. There is Chiu Ju-t'ang in Fu-t'ien which is smalltime capitalist. When there is a shortage of salt in the north, it goes to buy salt in Nan-chang. When supplies of printing ink and paper run short, it also buys them from Nan-chang. Consequently, it has friendly contacts with the leader of the Kuomintang lookout squads as well as old social connections. Chiu Ju-t'ang
sells salt and other goods at a very high price. In June-July it sold salt at 1 string and 600 coppers a catty. It owns two sewing machines and is opposed by all tailors and dressmakers of Fu-t'ien, as it takes away work from them. Because it sold goods at too high prices, the Fu-t'ien town soviet, acting on demands by the masses, had the proprietor of Chiu Ju-t'ang arrested and fined him 1,000 yuan. After the fine, he continued to do business in Fu-t'ien. After the capture of Chi-an, his business has grown even more. During the spring famine in the north, the rich peasants sold their grain in White areas. The spring famine struggle was to stop grain from flowing to White areas, permitting such flow only between Red areas.

CSO: 4005
INVESTIGATION IN TUNG-T'ANG AND OTHER AREAS

8 November 1930

[Text] On 30 October 1930, the Red Army Front Committee decided at Lo-fang on a policy of luring the enemy deep into our territory. On 6 November the Red Army moved from Hsia-chiang, crossed Kan-chiang and marched toward Yung-feng and Nan-ch'eng, while I went from Hsia-chiang to Chi-an to make arrangements for a withdrawal. On 7 November I passed the night at Tung-t'ang, arriving at Chi-an the following day. On the way I made some summary investigations. My investigations at Li-chia-fang have enabled me to know clearly the organization and activities of village and township level soviets in the agrarian struggle in these places. Prior to these investigations, my ideas of the situation were vague. These investigations have enabled me to find out the serious character of land distribution based on each village as a unit. Land is already distributed in several dozen counties in southwestern Kiangsi. The land law promulgated by the superior level government makes the distribution based on each township as a unit, and all personnel of superior-level organs presume that distribution is made with each township as a unit. The actual situation is quite different. Distribution is generally made with each village as a unit. Only in a few instances has it been made with each township as a unit. Such distribution based on each village—advantageous to the rich peasants but disadvantageous to poor peasants—should be changed.

I. Investigations in Tung-t'ang

Tung-t'ang village of the 15th township, T'ung-shui Ch'u, Chi-shui County.

The township consists of 1,000 families of 3,000 persons.

Land is distributed with each village as a unit.

The population of this village is 290.

The village government has a chairman and a secretary, both of whom provide their own food.

Land distribution is made at 1 tou 3 sheng per capita, yielding about 2.5 tan of grain. (1 tou of land yields 2 tan of grain.)
In some other villages the distribution is 1.5 tou per capita or 2 tou, which is the maximum. Distribution never exceeds 2 tou in this township.

Hu Te-shun, 48, is secretary of the village government and concurrently a teacher at the Common People's School. Eight persons eat in his house: he himself, his five children, his wife, and the wife of his eldest son. The eldest son, 25, is a tailor but also tills the land. The second son, 19, is learning to be a carpenter. He has gone to Yung-feng County to serve as an apprentice and has no money to send home. The third son, 14, is learning to do wickerwork. He too, being still an apprentice, has no money to send home. The fourth son, 7, goes to school. The fifth son is only 3 years old. The family had 1 shih 3 tou and 8 sheng of land in the past, yielding 27 tan of grain a year. When there was not enough grain to eat, the family lived on sweet potatoes and kept pigs for sale. The eldest son already earned some money and tilled the land besides. They owed a debt of 300 strings of copper cash. The eight-member family receives a total of 1 shih and 4 sheng of land as a result of the recent land distribution, but the land is divided and 3 tou and 4 sheng is taken out of it.

For 70 or 80 li round from Chi-antown to Chin-t'an, T'ung-shui and Fu-t'ien, almost all female members of families weave cloth. The output is considerable. Yarn (foreign yarn) is provided the peasant families by merchants, rich peasants and landlords. The process of capitalists undermining household side-occupation has not yet ended.

II. Investigations in Ta-ch'iao

This belongs to the 9th township of Chint'an Ch'u, Chi-shui County. It is 50 li from Chi-an.

The Ch'u is divided into 13 townships.

This township is divided into 5 villages.

This village is Tach'iao Village.

Chairman of the township government is Sun Hsiu-en.

The population of Liu-chia of Kao-k'eng is 570. Distribution of land is 9 lo or 4.5 shih per capita. The population of T'ang-chia of Kao-k'eng is 110, with each person also receiving 9 lo. Each of the 50 persons of Wu-chia of Kao-k'eng also receives 9 lo. The three villages of Liu, T'ang and Wu have one government in common. The distribution is 9 lo per capita in all three villages.

The Kuo clan of Ta-ch'iao village, with 1,027 persons, receives 8 lo per capita, or 2 tou of land, yielding 4 tan of grain. The Lo clan of Shen-chiang Market, with a population of 210 in two villages under one government, receives 8 lo per capita.
The two villages of Kuo and Lo receive 8 1/2 lo per capita, because the land here is better. The distribution in the three villages of Liu, T'ang and Wu is 9 1/2 lo per capita, because the land here is poorer. The average per capita consumption of grain is 10 1/2 lo (5 tan) a year.

Late crop rice can be grown on one-third of the land of each village. This cannot be done in the remaining two-thirds of the land because of lack of water. The two kinds of land, that which can grow late crop rice and that which cannot, are mixed in distribution, so that each person receives some of each kind. The 8 or 9 lo refers to the combined yield of early and late crops. As the per capita consumption is 10 1/2 lo a year, he who receives 8 lo is 2 1/2 lo short and he who receives 9 lo is 1 1/2 lo short. The shortage is made good in two ways: One is working at the crafts, such as cloth dyeing, rice processing, carpentry, blacksmithing, tailoring, etc. Over 300 persons have gone to other places to work. Of these, 170 or 180 have gone to Kanchow, mainly as millers, tailors and small merchants. About 100 persons have gone to Chi-an, mainly to work at rice milling and cloth dyeing. All these persons receive their share of land at home. The township does not produce coarse grain.

Two are weaving cloth. The female members of every family weave cloth. Each "piece" of cloth is over 12 chang or 130 ch'ih long and is worth 400 copper cash in wages. A worker who is fast takes 10 days to weave one piece and will get 1,200 copper cash a month in wages. A worker who is not fast, or who has to look after small children besides, will not be able to finish one piece in 10 days. The rich peasants and small-time merchants bring foreign yarn from Chi-an and allot it to the villagers and families. Those whose work is not satisfactory are paid 300 coppers a piece or even as little as 200. Some even have to pay for the yarn spoiled. In addition to the cash payment, a worker receives also 2 tael of yarn for every piece of cloth woven. The yarn is enough for 2 ch'ih of cloth, and each ch'ih is worth 100 to 110 coppers. It is this extra payment in yarn that provides the peasants with clothing. The 120-copper a month is enough for cooking oil and salt. Working at crafts and weaving cloth together constitute the main source of income that makes up for the grain shortage. At present there is not much work to do either in weaving or the crafts. The workers who have gone to Kanchow have not yet returned. Of the 100 men who went to Chi-an, 50 or 60 have come back.

This township has not yet set up a school.

A recent order from this Ch' u will have 20 volunteers for the Red Army from each township. Eighteen have responded, all voluntarily. A rally was held today at Wu-kang Ch' u Government to send them off.

III. Investigations in Li-chia-fang

Li-chia-fang is the 19th township, Ju-fang Ch' u, Chi-an. (About 40 li from Chi-an)

This township has nine villages under six village-level governments.

Of the nine villages, six are large and three small.
The six large villages are Li-chia-fang, Shang-chao-t'ang, Ts'ang-hsia, Hsu-yuan, Chin-pi and Chou-yuan. The three small ones are Yen-chia-fang, Hsiao-li-chia-fang and Yang-p'ing-chou. The three small villages and Li-chia-fang are under one government, while each of the remaining five large villages has its own government.

The village government of Li-chia-fang is run by four persons: one chairman, one secretary, one officer in charge of land and grain, and one in charge of communications and concurrently cooking. The chairman, secretary and communications officer who is concurrently the cook live and work in the government building and eat at public expense. The officer in charge of land and grain administration lives in his own home and eats his own meals. He is provided with meals only when he works at the government office.

The village government's expenses are: (1) Regular meals for three plus meals for an average of two persons a day. At 10 cents per person each day, it comes to 15 yuan a month. (2) Office expenses for lamps, oil, paper and pens, 3 yuan. (3) Every time Red Guards and Young Pioneers are sent out on a mission they are paid expenses for straw sandals, haircut, cigarettes. Sometimes they are paid 500 and other times 1 string of coppers (Actual expenses are defrayed; overpayment is returned, underpayment is made up for.) In the nine attacks on Chi-an, they sometimes went on a mission for a month before returning. These pocket expenses amounted to 3 yuan a month on the average in the past. In the past, the village government had also to pay for their food. Later, the township government paid for their food and the village government gave them pocket expenses. These three items amounted to a total of 21 yuan.

In the past nine persons worked for the village government. There were the chairman, secretary, finance officer, procurement officer, land officer, grain officer, judge, communications officer and the cook. All nine worked in the government office and were provided with board.

The revolutionary force was in control from early in the 1st month this year to the 19th of the third month, and again from the fourth day of the sixth month to the fourth day of the ninth month. In the period from the 20th of the third month to the third of the sixth month when the reactionary force was in control, the village government was abolished and the responsible persons fled to Fu-t'ien. From the fifth day of the ninth month up to the present, only four persons work regularly in the government. More money was required when nine persons worked in the office.

In the period from the tenth of the first month to the 19th of the third month, and again from the fourth of the sixth month to the fifth of the ninth month, the township government comprised the chairman, a secretary, buyer, treasurer, cultural officer, land officer, grain officer, judge, communications officer, a cook, three women officers, three Young Pioneers (the leader, the deputy leader and an instructor and concurrently secretary), and one leader of the Children's Corps, a total of 18 [sic] persons. They were all provided with board by the government. From the sixth of the ninth month up to the present
the number of officers has been reduced to seven: the chairman, a secretary, an officer in charge of land and grain, a cultural officer, the chairman of the Woman's Committee, the leader of the Red Guards who doubles for the cook, and another secretary who is the "Confiscations Commissar" and concurrently the officer who "goes to the villages to do propaganda on the expansion of the Red Army." These seven persons regularly live and have their meals in the government offices. The four members of the Woman's Committee eat their meals at the government office when they have official work to do, otherwise they stay at home. The work of these four women members consists of going to the villages to organize working women to serve as Red Guards, comforting squads and washing squads, and doing propaganda to get the men to serve in the Red Army.

In the second month this year eight men from this township went to join the Red Army. During the second attack on Chi-an on the 18th of the sixth month, two men from each village or a total of 18, went to join the Red Army. During the seventh attack on Chi-an in the seventh month, another seven men went. After the ninth attack on Chi-an on the 13th of the eighth month, another 46 men went. These have been placed in the Independent Regiments and are receiving training at the command post of the 2d Independent Regiment at Ta-t'ang. Altogether 80 persons from this township have gone to join the Red Army. They all did so after being agitated. But of the last batch of 46, 4 or 5 were unwilling to join up and wept. They went reluctantly.

This township comprises nine villages: Li-chia-fang (of the surname of Hu, over 220 persons), Hsiao-li-chia-fang (surname of Li, 30 persons), Yeh-chia-fang (surname of Yeh, 45 persons) and Yang-p'ing-chou (surname of Tung, 24 persons); these four villages have a population of 327 (155 male and 172 female). Shang-chao-t'ang, (surname of Liu, 200 persons); Ts'ang-h sia, surname of Yen, 315 persons (150 male and 165 female); Hsu-yuan, surname of Chou, 300 persons; Chin-pi, 190 persons; and Chou-yuan, 372 persons (176 male and 196 female). The nine villages have a total population of 1,404.

The four villages headed by Li-chia-fang have altogether 921.1 mou of fields. In Li-chia-fang each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding 7 tan of grain. In Yeh-chia-fang each person receives 3 mou, yielding 6 tan of grain. In Hsiao-li-chia-fang each person receives 2 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain. In Yang-p'ing-chou each person receives 2.5 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain. Of the remaining 17.9 mou of Li-chia-fang, 6 mou has been transferred to Hsiao-li-chia-fang and another 6 to Yeh-chia-fang. Only 5.9 mou remains "communal property." After distribution in Yang-p'ing-chou, 2.3 mou remains "communal property." This remainder after distribution is difficult to divide up again. So it is public land of the village government, which rents it out at a rate of 60 percent of the yield. This rent in kind helps to defray public expenses.

Shang-chao-t'ang Village has 820 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.4 mou, yielding 2.5 tan of grain. After the distribution, 29.2 mou remains "communal property."
Ts'ang-hsia Village has 690.3 mou of fields. Each person receives a share that yields 7.8 tan of grain.

Hsu-yuan has over 820 mou of fields. Method of distribution: Each person who stays in the village receives 3.5 mou. The land is good, each mou yielding 5 lo (2 lo make 1 tan), so that 3.5 mou yields 17 lo. Each worker receives 1.75 mou, or half of what a peasant gets. Each person who has left to work elsewhere receives 1.4 mou.

Chin-pi Village has 489 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding 6 lo of grain. Those who have left to work elsewhere get nothing.

Chou-yuan Village has 510.5 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.2 mou and gets 6 lo of grain from it. Those who have left the village get nothing.

After the Red Army captured Chi-an, four members of the reactionary lookout squad—the leader, his deputy, the secretary and a platoon leader—were taken prisoner in Chi-an. They were sent under escort to T'ung-shu-p'ing Ch'u Government and executed. All ordinary members of the squad joined in the revolution in this township and no one went to Chi-an. Three platoon leaders and 10 group leaders who stayed at home were not executed. They were permitted to join in the revolution.

Yen Ch'un-wen, chairman of the township government, owned 8 mou of fields, yielding 24 lo of grain at only 3 lo a mou, and supporting a family of four. At the first distribution of land in the seventh month, when both those at home and those who had left to work elsewhere received a share, Yen's family had 1.2 mou taken away from him, so that he now owned only 6.8 mou, capable of yielding 20 lo of grain or 5 lo for each member of the family. After the capture of Chi-an in the eighth month another distribution was made. This time those who had left and found work elsewhere received nothing. Only those who stayed behind and those who had left but could not find work elsewhere were given a share of 2.2 mou. Since the family already had 8 mou, it received 0.8 mou. The family owed a debt of 500 strings of coppers in the past. A daughter (7 years old) was sold in Chi-an (the buyer was from Kanchow, but operated a money-lending shop in Chi-an called Ho Mao) for 100 yuan. This the family paid the creditor, but another 200 strings of coppers was still outstanding. Another daughter (newly born) was given away to the Catholic Church in Chi-an, for which the family received nothing.

IV. Investigations in Hsi-i-t'ing

This is one of the villages of the 23d township of Ju'fang Ch'u of Chi-an. It is 15 li from Chi-an.

Ju-fang Ch'u comprises over 30 townships.

There are nine village governments in this township.

Hsi-i-t'ing Village has a population of about 600.
The village government is run by five persons: the chairman, a secretary, grain officer, land officer and a woman officer. They all provide their own meals, as the village government does not provide board. But when they gather together for some business (such as a conference), the village government will provide them with meals.

Public funds of the ancestral temple and other religious pools are combined for the use of the village government.

The village government's expenses consist of payments to Red Guards and Young Pioneers who are sent out on missions (as in the attacks on Chi-an and in attending conferences) and to soldiers of the Independent Regiments for their meals (10 cents a day for each man). This is the only payment. No money is given for straw sandals, haircuts or cigarettes.

Nineteen persons work for the township government: one chairman, two secretaries (one works for the township government and the other for the Red Guards), a cultural officer, buyer, grain officer, land officer, Red Guards officer, social insurance officer, two women (one chairman of the Women's Committee, one in charge of organization), a cook, a communications officer, one leader of Red Guards brigade, three leaders of Red Guards teams, one Red Guards instructor, and one Young Pioneer leader. This township government began working on the ninth day of the sixth month. It was unstable, because the reactionaries of Chi-an often came to this township to arrest people, and when the enemy came the government moved out. It was only after the capture of Chi-an that township work began to develop. The reactionaries took away 10 people, two of then were executed. After the capture of Chi-an, the eight prisoners were released, and over 20 reactionaries from this township were seized in Chi-an. Of these, six of the more brutal were executed, a number was released after paying a fine, and the remaining were sent under escort to T'ung-shup'ing Ch'u Government. The government is very busy now distributing land and grain, opposing debts, and setting up a school.

Land distribution is being made right now in this township. Distribution is already made in five villages, taking each village as a unit. But an order has come from the superior level, stating that distribution should be made on the basis of taking each township as a unit, so that distribution has got to be made again. The opinion of the various villages is that distribution should be made on the basis of taking each village as a unit where the land owned by the village is extensive and each township as a unit where the land owned by the various villages is small. Of the nine villages of this township, eight want the distribution based on village as a unit, only one wants it based on township as a unit.

The five villages where distribution is already made are Ting-t'ang, Pan-chi-k'ang, T'a'shui, Hsin-t'ang and Hsia-shang. In Ting-t'ang the distribution is 2 mou (yielding between 4 and 5 lo) per capita. In Pan-chi-k'ang it is 2.5 mou per capita. In T'a'shui and Hsia-shang it is also 2 mou per capita, but in Hsin-t'ang it is only 0.8 mou per capita. Hsin-t'ang has little land and wants distribution based on the township as a unit. Though the land of
Hsin-t'ang, with a population of about 200 all surnamed Huang, is small, it is all good land (with no flooding disasters), some high, some low.

Chi-an has been captured for more than a month, but distribution of land is not yet accomplished in this township. It will take another 5 or 6 days to complete.

The anti-debts struggle means creditors are required to surrender the promisory notes they hold, so they may be destroyed. Of the nine villages, only Kuan-t'ien has so far surrendered all promisory notes to the township government, but they are not yet destroyed.

The chairman of the township government has been dismissed by the Ch'u Government. Wang Yu-t'ang, the new chairman, has been here only 5 days.

Liu Ch'uan-sheng, the previous chairman, is a carpenter. His family of three owns 1.8 mou of land. He was made chairman in the sixth month.

Ju-heng and Fang-k'uo were formerly two districts, but are now combined into one under the name of Ju-heng Ch'u. The new chairman if this township government comes from Ju-heng, but this township formerly belonged to Fang-k'uo Ch'u. Wang Yu-t'ang, a carpenter, owns 5 mou of land which yields 18 lo of grain for his family of four. Besides being a carpenter, Wang also tills the land. Over 70 men from this district have joined the Red Army. Of these, over 40 are Young Pioneers, teenagers who are very brave.

The District Government is situated in T'ung-shup'ing. Its chairman, Ch'en Chun-pin, is a rice miller.

° "Rural Surveys," Liberation Press, July 1947
LAND DISTRIBUTION IN WESTERN KIANGSI

12-15 November 1930

[Text] These are delegates' reports made during the expanded conference of the western Kiangsi Mobile Commission held on 12 November 1930 and the expanded conference of the Provincial Mobile Commission held on 15 November. I made brief notes during the conferences, and, although they are very sketchy, from them one can see a small part of the land struggle in southwestern Kiangsi.

1. Distribution of Fields

Ch'un-hua: Townships are separated by as much as 10 li. In one township the good and the bad [fields] were grouped for even distribution. The first distribution took place in December of last year (1929). The second distribution took place in March of this year, taking the original tiller as the basic unit and taking from those with more to compensate those with less. Now the third distribution is taking place, using the fertile [land] to compensate for the infertile. Distribution is beginning, and will take over 10 days to complete.

Ju-yen: In December of last year (1929), the fields of the bad gentry and landlords were distributed, but public fields and the fields of wealthy farmers had not yet been distributed. In March of this year, all [fields] were confiscated and distributed in accordance with productive capacity. In May, all [fields] were confiscated for the third time and distributed according to physical labor. Yet it was not thoroughly equal in that some fertile land was taken from those with more fertile land while some infertile land was taken from those having more infertile land. Equalization has not yet been accomplished by division into three classes, A, B and C. The majority used the village as the basic unit.

Shui-tung: The township was used as the basic unit for all three distributions. During the first, in January of last year, land was taken from those with more to compensate those with less. During the second, in June, fertile land was taken to compensate for the infertile, but it was still incomplete.
and many persons were dissatisfied with it. The third distribution is now in process. Land committee members of the various townships were concentrated at district level and land commissions were organized for mutual assistance in distribution, and to carry out the taking of fertile land to compensate for the infertile. When Chi-an was opened, over 1,000 people returned from the city and received land in the same manner as others. On completion of this distribution, distribution will have been completed in 13 out of 17 townships.

Western District: Two distributions have been made. During the second one in August of this year, although distribution was made in three classes, upper, middle and lower, with the good and the bad [fields] distributed equally, it was actually not complete. The township was the basic unit. The township is too big, with the district fields being as much as 6 or 7 li away and unwanted by the farmers.

Recently the District Commission announced that the third distribution would be complete, taking fertile land to compensate for infertile land, and burning tax records and land titles, with five inspectors dispatched by the district to assist in the distribution.

Ju-fang: The first [distribution] was in January of this year, with the good and the bad [fields] distributed equally. It was incomplete—public fields remained. In some cases the township was the basic unit and in some cases the village was the basic unit. The second was in May, when the masses took the defector leaders' fields and distributed them to the poor people (those receiving distributed land for the first time). In the third (the current one), equal distribution was made to the upper, middle and lower classes. Territory newly seized in the three or four townships in the Nan-yu-miao area has not been completely distributed. Distribution is complete in Hsi-yi-t'ing, where the township was the basic unit.

An-fu: Distribution has not yet been made in places where there have been no defectors—distribution was made first in places where there had been defections, with 10 days to complete distribution which was to be totally equal. Distribution is half complete in seven districts, two-thirds complete in five districts, and has not yet been done in the remaining turncoat places. Among the nine districts in the county, the First District is not turncoat at all, one-third of the Second District is not turncoat, half of the Third District is not turncoat, one-third of the Fourth District is not turncoat, three-fifths of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Districts is not turncoat, half the Eighth District is not turncoat, the Ninth District—the city—is completely turncoat, as is the 30-li area around the city. The reason some areas are not turncoat is that they border on the red areas of Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Yuan-chou. All non-turncoat places are "weak and small minority peoples" who have been oppressed by the large villages. Distribution of fields has been completed in all such places, taking from those with much to compensate those with little, but not yet taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile land.
Tung-ku: The township was the basic unit. Land was distributed in July of last year (1929), taking fertile land to compensate for the infertile, and equalizing by division into three classes: A, B and C. The second distribution has not yet taken place. Later, because those serving in the Red Army had returned their land to the government, such land in the various villages was given to the villagers to till. The masses of the people clamored, so the fields were evenly divided in July of last year under the slogan "Group for evenness."

Hsia-chiang: In the first distribution which took place in January and February of this year, the fields of the local tyrants and evil gentry were divided. Public fields were divided during the second distribution held in March. Fields of wealthy farmers were divided in the third distribution held in April and May, completing the distribution by taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile [fields]. Taking the village as the basic unit, there were unwanted fields because there was much land and few people. Two distributions have taken place in the newly developed areas. The first distribution was carried out in haphazard fashion 2 weeks ago. The second and current distribution must be completed in 5 days. The good and the bad [fields] are being combined for even distribution.

Shui-han: The first was made in March of this year, taking from those with much to compensate those with little. For the second distribution carried out during August along the border of the White areas, land was taken from those with much to compensate those with little, but the fertile were not taken to compensate for the infertile. In the remainder, fertile [land] was taken to compensate for the infertile. Special distribution of good fields, however, was made to responsible members of the party headquarters and the farmers were directed to help work such fields.

Ju-lin: The first distribution took place in March of this year, taking from those with much to compensate those with little. In May the entire district defected. In June the guard units were overthrown, and the second distribution of fields took place, with the fertile taken to compensate for the infertile in several townships, but in the great majority of townships distribution was performed in name only. This was because the AB group was in control there. The township was the basic unit with the village being the basic unit only under special circumstances.

Yung-hsin: In the Northwestern Special District, the old, young, and crippled who had no tilling capability received an additional half-share. It was also so resolved at the first County Delegates' Plenary Conference, in addition, it was resolved to add to those receiving the additional half-share those "working personnel" whose dependents did not have a tilling capability. This was carried out in part of the Northwestern Special District, but was rejected by the Special Western Route Working Committee, because it stemmed from a charitable view, and was derided by some as the "Orphan and Widow Line." In Yung-hsin land distribution was performed twice throughout the county, the first after Lung-yuan-k'ou was opened, the second was carried out in September after being decided upon by the Western Route Working Committee in June. Distribution has still not been completed.
in one-fifth of the county: the entire First District (city), half of the
Fourth District (Nan-hsiang), and the entire Fifth District (Tung-hsiang).
The farmers of Yung-hsin wished to use production capacity as the standard
for the distribution of fields, and this was accepted at the County Delegates
Plenary Conference.

Chi-shui: County seat and Feng-shui fields have been distributed; [fields in]
Chin-t'an have not.

"Distribute to people who can be seen." "Group good with bad." "Distribution
was poor at the outset."

The "Honan Fellows" are a difficult problem. In the township of Ku-ts'un,
each person received only 2 tan worth of land [production capacity].

Wan-an: The village was the basic unit. By the second distribution, the
fertile were taken to compensate for the infertile.

Fen-yi: Fields distributed with the village as the basic unit. Division
was by [amounts of] grain, not by field. Over 2,000 houses were burned by
the counterrevolutionaries, and for more than 20 li there were no old houses.

2. The Barren [Fallow] Field Situation

Tung-ku: Each person received a minimum of 16 tan of grain (a tan is about
80 catties); many fields were uncultivated. A large portion of the hills
were fallow because it cost too much to harvest peaches; nor were the hills
dug up.

Ch'un-hua: Fields capable of producing 400 or 500 baskets lay fallow
because (1) the March distribution occurred when farming was busy, the
farmers had no family property, furniture or equipment, the land distributed
was poor and distant, and (2) manpower was inadequate because of the elder
sons serving in the Red Army and working outside (that is to say 2,700 or
2,800 persons).

Shui-tung: Several li were fallow. This was because Lin-shui at the Red-
White border was frequently harassed by the reactionaries of Chi-an city.
Several hundred guards were required daily. Three lines of guards were
posted, and were frequently killed by the enemy at night.

Shui-nan: Fields [capable] of [producing] several hundred tan of grain lie
fallow because, when public fields are reserved, the farmers are unwilling
to rent them for tilling. "Having received distribution of fields [capable]
of [producing] several tan of grain, I have enough to eat, and am unwilling
to till public fields."

Ju-lin: Fields of several thousand tan of grain lie fallow, with no one
to harvest the ripe grain. This is because the fields belonged to the
guards of the reactionary landlords and wealthy farmers, and when these people fled, the government did not distribute the fields to the farmers, so the farmers had no responsibility to till or harvest them (Ju-lin is a district near the city of Chi-an).

An-fu: Fields of 6,000 tan of grain lie fallow in the Tao-p'u and Ch'ung-wen Districts, because reactionary farmers are afraid to return to their homes in view of revenge-ism for slaughter. It was also because the distribution of fields was not thorough, having been on the basis of numbers only. Both reasons stemmed from the mischief-making led by the wealthy farmers. An-fu has much land and few people. Most of the people from Hunan, Yung-hsin and Honan work fields in An-fu. If you will only pay their taxes to the government, they will give you their fields to work. Why are there so few people? It is because many die because of poor sanitation.

Hsin-yu: Fields of several hundred tan of grain lie fallow in three Red districts because part of the people left to serve in the Red Army. Some [fields] are also fallow near the Red-White border.

Fen-yi: Fields of several tans of grain lie fallow.

Yung-hsin: Generally speaking, no fields are fallow, with total fields of less than 100 tan of grain lying fallow.

Kung-nan: Much land lies fallow in all Red-White border areas.

3. The Problem of Distributing Land to Workers

The farmers of Yung-hsin opposed the sharing of land equally with the workers, but the Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference did not accept this view.

In one district in Tai-ho the wages of workers were reduced after the distribution of land to them, but the wages were later restored.

In Chi-an, workers who worked for less than a half-year received their distribution of land accordingly, whereas those who worked for more than half the year received a half-share of land.

4. The Problem of Distributing Hills

The Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference resolved that the township would be the basic unit in tea-producing hills, with equal distribution made according to population.

The Chi-an Delegates Plenary Conference (October 1930) resolved that bamboo-covered and tree-covered hills would not be divided but would be controlled by the township soviet and used by the farmers. Those needing bamboo or wood must get the government's permission to cut [bamboo or trees]. Reeds and grass may be freely cut and taken from hills.
Tea-oil hills in Yung-hsin, Hsia-chiang, Yen-fu, Ju-hsing, Tung-ku, T'ai-ho and the Western District have all been equally divided. Ju-fang and Ch'un-hua have no hills producing tea and oil. The hills of Wan-an have not been divided.

Fen-yi: On 5 November of this year (1930), the Provincial Mobile Commission dispatched Liu Lin-tung to participate in the County Mobile Commission, which passed by the County Workers Farmers and Soldiers Plenary Conference. The method was: "Hills worth over 300 yuan will be turned over to the soviets. Hills worth less than 300 yuan will be controlled by the original owners." In May and June of this year (before the 2d Plenary Conference), however, because of the receipt of orders from higher authority (the Fourth Expanded Conference of the Northern Route Mobile Commission), the township had already been taken as the basic unit in equal distribution of hills, although no meeting had been held in this county. This decision was reversed in November, and the farmers were very dissatisfied.

There are seven types of hills: (1) lumber [producing], (2) miscellaneous food, (3) raw material, (4) bamboo and wood (large and small), (5) firewood (reed and grass hills and firewood hills), (6) mines and (7) barren hills.


CSO: 4005
MISTAKES IN LAND STRUGGLE IN KIANGSI

14 November 1930

[Text]  On 14 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Committee met in Chi-an. After the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen, and Ma Ming, I spoke as the representative of past committee members, pointing out that the line continually followed within the Western and Southern Kiangsi Party after the "Second Plenary Conference" of cancelling land reform had been discussed in conference, and all acknowledged that a determined struggle must be carried out against this incorrect line. The following are a few important points which I recorded during the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen and Ma King, and only I can understand many of them.

Ju-lin District: Wash away loyal comrades, leaving the homogeneous AB group.

Red areas: Wealthy farmers control the economy.

Yung-hsin: Wealthy farms control the food. The government's policy of suppressing wealthy farmers is correct.

District Committee secretaries do not visit townships to inspect.

The views of the Central Committee and higher authority are not transmitted to lower levels.

"Kill all wealthy farmers and landlords."

"Must divide firmly."

Use the White Terror in discussing the policy of wealthy farmers cheating poor farmers, "White Symbol."

When the line is not clearly specified, the wealthy farmers will encircle and deceive, as was the case in the Fourth District Committee of Yung-hsin (Ma Ming is the secretary).
Distribution of the fields of the Eastern Route has not been completed at all. In the Southern Route, distribution has only been completed in the Hsing-kuo and Kung counties.

Tseng is a superior man.

Eighty percent of the Ju-i-chin Party is landlords and wealthy farmers; over 80 excellent party members, over 30 landlords and wealthy farmers including the head of the counterrevolutionary guard unit. No fields have been distributed in 2 months. The grain of the local tyrants remnants has been taken away.

The youth of the masses of the East Route are brave, the Youth Corps is cowardly.

Women have not struggled.

"Everything must be divided, this is the farmers' consciousness."

There are many wealthy farmers but few poor farmers in the tea hills. Failure to divide tea hills is to the benefit of the wealthy farmers.

Village peoples' schools are also benefits of the wealthy farmers, inasmuch as the children of poor farmers have to work, so few of them attend school.

Wealthy farmers order the masses to fight to protect the interests of the wealthy farmers. The officers of the Hsin-feng Red Guards are all wealthy farmers. "Seize names," "adjust fields," "fight butchers," "fines."

With the slogan of protecting Red areas, the wealthy farmers of the northwestern townships of Hsin-feng incite Red troops to desert and return home. The wealthy farmers are an obstacle to the expansion of the Red Army.

The problem of preferential treatment for Red Army dependents. In Yung-hsin, preferential treatment was not afforded to Red Army volunteers, and no assistance was provided in tilling their fields. The dependents of those dispatched by the government were treated preferentially.

Hsin-feng: Those members of local Red defense units killed or wounded in action were treated preferentially. Those killed or wounded in action in the 22d Army were ignored. The wealthy farmers played tricks.

Only wealthy farmers opposed freedom of marriage. Saying "The farmers oppose it" is a lack of differentiation.

At the Second Plenary Conference, eliminate farmers, cancel land reform.

Li Wen-lin went to the Southern Route on 24 August. He did not make a specialized report on land reform. There was no specialized discussion.
At the Southern Route Expanded Conference of 15 July, Ch'en Yi put forth eight principles such as immediate distribution of fields and harvesting of grain, taking from those with much to compensate those with little, taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile, unconditional distribution of housing, division of hills and woods, division of ponds, and so on, which were promulgated by the Southern Kiangsi Revolutionary Committee.

The wealthy farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757], citing Article 14 of the "Western and Southern Kiangsi Land Law"—the original tiller should be the owner—spoke loudly of not violating the land law, but their violation was counterrevolution, even to the extent of "fighting." The Revolutionary Committee had to issue this official announcement.

There was some interaction between the two cooks at the Expanded Conference. "It's hereditary, so now he wants to be chairman too?"

Afraid that the communists "won't talk, just chop off heads."

"Even if you paid your rent in years past, this field can't be worked!"

Red Army wives and freedom of marriage.

"Will you serve in the Red Army? If you serve in the Red Army, I cannot marry you." "If people report that you have been killed in the Red Army, must I still observe the festivals for you?" "Eight yuan for 80 catties of meat." "Yesterday I went to him, today I go to the Chairman. That's freedom." "Reporting to the West River Combined Conference, Ch'en Chi-chung washed away the atmosphere of Ch'en Yi (After 9 days of meetings, Ch'en Yi had resolved a detailed land law. Arriving on the tenth day, Ch'en Chih-chung cancelled it.)

"Confiscation of the land of the landlords and dividing it equally is only a temporary measure rather than an objective, nor will it develop a land law of proletarian consciousness."

Hsieh Han-ch'ang transmitted the message in the Northern Route: "Using labor is the standard in the poor farmers' consciousness."

The body strength of poor farmers does not equal that of wealthy farmers (poor farmers have nothing to eat); nor are the sons of poor farmers strong.

Li Tui-ts'ung said, "At the Second Plenary Conference no one had a grasp [of the subject], so the land question could not be discussed."

In the Western Route the message was transmitted (by Chou Kao-ch'ao): "To divide everything is the poor farmers' consciousness."

On 28 October an expanded conference was held at Hsin-feng by the Southern Route Mobil Commission, at which Kuo transmitted the message: "Take the fertile to compensate for the infertile, make thoroughly equal distribution." Yet after a day and a half of meetings, it had not been discussed, and there was no resolution.
The two lines of Southern Kiangsi (as stated by Ch'en Yi):

"Yung-hsin is not the wealthy farmers' line. I oppose," said Ma.

"I don't agree with entering deeply into land reform," Tuan Liang-pi said to Ch'en Cheng-jen.

"To expand and deepen simultaneously is the total farmer consciousness.

"To fail to attack Chi-an, and to attack Kiu-kiang later, will irrevocably lose the high tide of the Chinese revolution," so reported the Special Committee to the Central Committee.


CS0: 4005
HARVEST DISTRIBUTION AND RENT PROBLEMS

15 November 1930

[Text] On 15 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Mobile Committee held an expanded conference at Chi-an. Besides members of the Provincial Committee and the Standing Committee, those attending the conference included the chairman of the Yung-hsin, Chi-an, T'ai-ho, Wan-an, Chi-shui, An-fu, Fen-yi and Hsia-chiang soviets as well as Comrade Ch'en Yi of the 22d Army. I participated in this conference as the representative of past committee members. The special feature of this conference was the discussion of two problems: harvest distribution and rent. With regard to harvest distribution, I brought up the mass basis of support for harvest distribution. With regard to the renting of land, the previously prevalent leftist but actually wealthy farmer theory of "Rent should not be collected in soviet areas" was overthrown. In addition, the Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134] method of distribution according to labor was opposed by pointing out that its error lay in helping wealthy farmers while it was contrary to the interests of poor farmers. This conference broke up prematurely because reactionary troops had already reached Hsia-chiang, and those responsible for the various counties had to return to prepare to deal with the enemy. Therefore such questions scheduled for discussion as "Mountain forests," "Ponds," "Housing," "Fallow Fields," "Unemployment," and "Debt" were not discussed. A serious enemy offensive and the Fu-t'ien Incident occurred after the conference. So for this reason the resolutions of the conference have not been promulgated. What follows is a brief record made by me during the day's conference. I retained it because it contained some important material.

1. Distribution of Fields in Ch'un-hua With the District as the Basic Unit

The third distribution of fields in Ch'un-hua District (October 1930) had progressed to using the district as the basic unit, taking a census of population and production capacity to determine how much land each person should receive. Then distribution was made within the scope of the township, "shifting fields where possible and shifting people where fields could not be shifted." Now the more than 30,000 persons in Ch'un-hua District have each received an equal amount of land (each person received land capable of producing 11 shih of grain, with each shih equal to 44 catties).
2. Deficiencies of Distribution of Fields With the Village as the Basic Unit

The deficiencies in using the village as the basic unit are: (1) large villages are unwilling to give up fields to small villages; (2) with too many basic units, it is not easy for district and township governments to press [the program], so many concealed deficiencies developed; and (3) within a single village, it was easy for the masses to be hoodwinked through the use of surname-ism by landlords and wealthy farmers and not thoroughly divide land evenly, nor thoroughly combat local tyrants. This view is worth noting.

3. The Land Struggle Cannot Be Deepened at a Stroke

In the distribution of land, no matter how many times the land is divided, the wealthy farmers always conceal the good land the first time, making it impossible to investigate and to classify the land into the three grades: upper, middle and lower. Wealthy farmers and middle farmers always lead the first time, while the poor farmers have no authority. "After some period of unrest, the proletariat will arise." This view is correct.

4. Yang Ch'eng-fu's [2799 2052 5346] Plan for "The Socialization of Agriculture"

Yang Ch'eng-fu, chairman of the Chi-an County Government (originally chairman and secretary of Ch'un-hua District Committee), was determined to achieve common tilling and expenditure of [the proceeds of] the land in three steps: the first was to distribute land with the district as the basic unit, the second was to organize cooperatives and the third was to share in the tilling and expenditure. This is completely erroneous.

5. The Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134] Style of Distribution According to Labor

The deficiency of using labor as the basis for distribution of land is that orphans, widows, the elderly, infants, women with small [bound] feet, and all people unable to till the land, would not have enough to eat. Even poor farmers of great laboring capacity are no match for wealthy farmers because poor farmers do not have the oxen, farming implements and capital of the wealthy farmers. In addition, wealthy farmers can lease the land of the orphaned, widowed, elderly, infants, women with small feet, and others. Therefore, using labor as the basis for distribution is of benefit only to wealthy farmers.

The "Chiang Han-po Method" using labor as the basic unit was carried out in the "border areas" along An-fu's boundary with Chi-an and Fen-yi as well as in Yen-fu Township in Chi-an. It was also carried out absolutely, regardless of age, distribution was made to those with the capacity for labor and not to those without it. Distribution was made to vagrants. Those with no capacity for labor would receive food from the farming of those with the capacity for labor. A member of the Political Committee of the Third Army Group who came to Chi-an said to Wang Huai [3769 2037] that the land
distribution method on the border of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi took labor as the basic unit, with those with no capacity for labor receiving a half-share, and with nothing furnished by the government.

When labor is used as the basic unit for distribution, the wealthy farmers, with much land, need to use their oxen, plows and harrows themselves, so the poor farmers cannot even borrow them. It is only by equal distribution that poor farmers will be able to borrow the excess farming implements of the wealthy farmers, therefore the poor farmers demand equal distribution.

6. Harvest Distribution Problems

Part of the farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757] upheld the slogan of the Ting-chou [3060 1558] Conference: "Unconditional distribution of the harvest"; while others upheld the slogan of the Pi-t'ou [7095 7333] Conference: "Do not distribute green young sprouts"; and the pretext was: "Do not break the Land Law."

Land was distributed in the county of the Northern Route in May of this year. Compensation was provided for capital and for original tillers at the rate of 600 cash per shih of grain [capacity]. In Fu't'ien the wealthy farmers were not compensated for their land while poor farmers received a string of cash per tan of grain for their land.

Land was distributed in Ch'un-hua in March, at which time no planting had been done, plowing had been done only once and fertilizer had been spread in a few cases. After distribution no compensation was paid for capital.

On the Northern Route, compensation of 600 cash or a string of cash was paid for capital on each shih of grain. Before May, the county had resolved that the price of grain would be 4 strings [of cash] per shih, with compensation paid at the rate of one-sixth or one quarter. Land had not yet been distributed at the time, and it was a period of famine, so prescribing the price of grain at 4 strings was intended to help the poor farmers by equalizing the price of grain. After the harvest, however, the price was still fixed at 4 strings per shih. "This is incorrect."

In Yung-hsin during the fifth month of the old calendar last year, the government of the Fifth District of the Northwestern Special Area prescribed that land distribution would take place when the early grain crop was about to ripen. Persons entering land would compensate those leaving the land 1 yuan "big money" for every 2 tan of grain (200 catties, which is a shih of land). Rice is harvested once a year. In May, when the seedlings have just been transplanted, the rice is still not fully grown, so persons leaving the land were compensated a string of cash for each shih of land (2 tan of grain). The County Committee had decided that land would be received without compensation, but because of restricted communications, the Fifth District did not receive the direction of the County Committee, and therefore proceeded according to its own decision.
The wealthy farmers in the eastern townships of Yu-tu and the northwestern part of Kung County requested compensation of 2 yuan "small money" (worth 4 strings) for each piece of land producing a shih of grain (actually only 8 tou). The party prohibited this and land was received without compensation.

A legitimate policy should be: "To receive land without compensation, and to divide both land and harvest." Equal distribution would be made for uniform application to family members of landlords. Assessments should be made separately against landlords who have much money. Vagrants should receive equal distribution because they work hard. The wealthy farmers' opposition to vagrants' sharing the harvest is wrong. Middle farmers, not having much land to be distributed, would not be affected. Although the "top layer of poor farmers" which tills much land would be affected, there will be other benefits to compensate them. The broad masses of the low level poor farmers, manual laborers and tenant farmers support this method 100 percent. After the distribution of the harvest, those not having the strength to cultivate their land would be permitted to follow the rental method.

7. Consolidating Original Tillers for Equal Distribution

In the past, using the "village" and "family" as the basic unit and the original tiller as the criterion for equal distribution, resulted in benefit for the wealthy farmers but not for the poor farmers. The legitimate way should be: taking the township as the basic unit according to the total population of the township divided by the total of the original tillers of land in the entire township (total township population is the total of those who originally tilled land in the village as well as those who originally tilled land in other villages), taking from those with much to compensate those with little, taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile, shifting land when it can be shifted (villages with more land would give part of their land to villages with less land). When land cannot be shifted, move people (when distances are great, there is no way to shift land, so people must be moved). This method is called "Distribution by Consolidating Original Tillers."

8. The Non-laboring Population and the New Land Rental System

When people without the capacity for labor rent their land to those with laboring capacity to farm, the tenant hands over grain as rent to the owner. In Ch'un-hua, Wan-an and Hsin-yu four-tenths was handed over; in Fen-yi and Ning-tu five-tenths was handed over; and in Yung-hsin one-third was handed over. The land in Fu-t'ien (a district of Chi-an) was divided into three classes—upper, middle and lower. For the upper class four-tenths was handed over, for the middle class three-tenths, and for the lower class two-tenths was handed over. This appears to be comparatively reasonable.
In Ch'un-hua, An-fu, T'ai-he, Hsin-yu, Pen-yi and Hsia-chiang, those without the capacity for labor who wish to rent their land comprise about 20 percent of the population. In Ning-tu they comprise over 20 percent because of the number of women with small [bound] feet. In Yung-hsin they comprise only 5 percent because the women all have big [unbound] feet, and the renters are mostly widowed, orphaned, crippled, aged, very young or engaged in revolutionary work. The above refers only to that portion of the population in which the entire family lacks the capacity for labor and must rent its land. There are even more of the population who do not have the capacity for labor but who have family members who can farm the land, and thus do not have to rent their land. Generally speaking, 75 percent of the entire population does not have the capacity for labor, that is, only one out of every four persons is a young man strong enough to till the land--this is China's big problem. This so-called lack of laboring capacity, however, refers to actual tilling of the land. About half of them have a partial capacity for such labor as tending cattle, chopping wood, cooking rice, washing clothes and preparing food. Statistically:

25 percent--have full capacity for labor  
37.5 percent--have half-capacity or some capacity for labor  
37.5 percent--have no capacity at all for labor.

The "Renting Land for Grain" in all the above-mentioned areas is the so-called "Grain Distribution System" except for Ch'un-hua's, which is the "Rental System." The deficiency in the grain distribution system is that those renting land [from others] emphasize their own land, and invest effort and fertilizer haphazardly in the landowner's land. When the grain is ripe, it is shared according to the amount harvested, equally, or on a four-to-six or other ratio. This system is not beneficial to the owner of the rented land. With the rental system, the rent is fixed without regard to the amount harvested. Therefore the tenant is attentive to the expenditure of effort and fertilizer, which is of benefit to both production and the owner of the land.

The deficiencies of the rental system are:

(1) Fixed rent is detrimental to the tenant in disaster years.

(2) It is also detrimental to the tenant when Red Guard units are called out for many farming days and farming is reduced.

In summary, the grain distribution system is of benefit to the wealthy farmers, while the rental system is of benefit to the poor farmers.

A legitimate policy would be as follows:

(1) Should poor farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed lack oxen, farming implements or capital after receiving land, the government should distribute surplus oxen, farming implements and other items confiscated
from wealthy farmers and landlords to the tenant farmers, poor farmers, the unemployed and others for their own farming. At the same time, the collective use of such implements should be rewarded, and some items confiscated from wealthy farmers and landlords given to cooperatives. Yet another method is for individuals to borrow oxen and farming implements temporarily from wealthy farmers for support, with the government controlling those wealthy farmers who wilfully fail to lend their things, so as to help the poor farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed.

(2) Those totally unable to till the land should be permitted to rent their land to wealthy and middle farmers to till under the following conditions:

(a) Abolish the grain distribution system, prescribing a fixed rental, with no reduction for disasters.

(b) Prescribe the minimum rental (50 percent) to preclude excessive exploitation of poor and tenant farmers by wealthy farmers.

(c) Do not permit wealthy farmers to use the pretext of farming only their own land and not that of others. Should a wealthy farmer be willing to rent land, the township government should take all land which must be rented and distribute it among the wealthy and middle farmers of the township, forcing them to farm it.

9. The Problem of Unemployed Workers From Cities Requesting Land

Over 200 unemployed masons and carpenters in the city of T'ai-he [3141 0735] requested that land be distributed to them, but received none. They were from outside counties and the farmers of the city area would not permit land to be distributed to them. The sugar cane workers from outside Nan-men City also requested the distribution of land. This problem also occurred in Hsing-kuo [5281 0948].

This problem deserves careful and deliberate consideration.

INVESTIGATION AT MU-K'OU VILLAGE

21 November 1930

[Text] On 18 November 1930, the Red Army abandoned Chi-an. On the 19th I went with Comrades Ku Pai [0657 2672] and Hsieh Wei-chun [6200 0787 0193] from Chi-an to Heng-t'ien [5899 3944], which belongs to Yung-feng [3057 6265], to meet with the Main Force of the Red Army. Passed through Shui-nan [3055 0589] to Pai-sha [4101 3097], ate lunch at Mu-k'ou [2606 0656] Village, and investigated the composition of the members of the village government and the reactionary elements killed in this village. This investigation proved that, in the equal distribution of land, the middle farmers not only do not lose but even gain; and that wealthy farmers and small landlords, in the intense struggle of the farmers, will go over to the counterrevolutionary camp.

Mu-k'ou Village of the 8th Township, Shui-nan District, Chi-shui [0679 3055] County

There are 200 people in the entire village.

There are 46 able-bodied adults, all of whom have been enrolled in Red Guards units.

The village government is established in the ancestral hall.

There are nine functionaries in the village government: Chairman, Secretary, Committee Member for Land, Committee Member for Social Insurance, Committee Member for Red Guards, Committee Member for Food, Committee Member for Adjudication, Committee Member for Women, and Committee Member for Youth.

Chairman Liu Hsing-nan [0491 5281 0589] (small landlord), two persons to feed, has 56 shih of land (each shih of land produces 3 baskets of grain and each basket of land 10 catties). Farms over 10 shih and rents 40 shih. Because of his liking for gambling, he has no money to lend. During this distribution of land, most of his land was given up. Secretary P'eng Chia-fa [1756 1367 4099] (middle farmer) eight persons to feed, has land for 48 shih of grain and rented [from others] over 20 shih more [of land], has enough to eat, and has no debts. By this distribution each person received
7 shih and 8 tou, totaling 64 shih; thus he received 16 shih in the distribution, proof that middle farmers receive land in the distribution. Committee Member for Land Liu Hsing-wen [0491 5281 2429] (poor farmer), three persons to feed, land for 10 shih of grain, and not enough to eat. He received 14 shih in this distribution, and in the past had debts of 60 yuan. "Committee Member for Social Insurance" Wu K'ai-lien [0124 7030 6647] (poor farmer), has four persons to feed, 16 shih of grain land, not enough to eat, and rented over 20 shih from others. He received 15 shih and 2 tou in this distribution, and had debts in the past. Committee Member for Red Guards P'eng Chia-hsiung [1756 1367 0338] (middle farmer), one person to feed in the past, 12 shih of grain land, sold 6 shih to repay high-interest debts, leaving 6 shih which gave him enough to eat. He also worked as a day laborer, had no wife, and could not feed pigs. Liking to gamble, he had debts of 30 yuan. After the revolution, he "acquired" a wife. The wife brought with her a 13-year-old son and a 13-year-old daughter-in-law. Now, with four people to receive distribution of land, each person receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, they receive a total of 31 shih and 2 tou. Speaking in terms of the individual, originally having only 6 shih and now receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, an increase of 1 shih and 8 tou, is another proof of middle farmers receiving land from the distribution. Committee Member for Food Hsu Chuan-chang [1776 0278 4545] (poor farmer), one person to feed, had only 2 shih of grain land, which was not enough and he had to work as a day laborer. Now he has received through the distribution 5 shih and 8 tou, and still does not have a wife. Chairman P'eng [sic] Hsing-nan also serves as Committee Member for Adjudication. Committee Member for Women Yang Chiu-ying [2799 0046 5391] (middle farmer), five persons to feed, has 50 shih of grain land. With her husband and her father farming, there is enough to eat but no excess, and she has no debts. From this distribution, she received 6 shih of grain land—another proof of middle farmers receiving land through distribution. Of the above seven functionaries of the village government, one a small landlord, three middle farmers and three poor farmers, all middle farmers received land through the distribution.

Revolution began in this village the year before last, and land was distributed in January of this year (distribution was from Tung-ku [2639 0942] District—this village previously belonged to Tung-ku). All members of the village government feed themselves, and the revolution came along without arousing violent opposition.

A total of seven reactionaries have been killed in this village: P'eng Chia-kuang [1756 1367 0342], P'eng Chia-shan [1756 1367 0810], P'eng Chia-chun [1756 1367 0193], P'eng Pei-chun [1756 0971], P'eng Ch'ang-lung [1756 2490 7127], P'eng Ch'ang-hsi [1756 2490 4406], and Wen Chih-kuei [3306 1807 6311]. P'eng Chia-kuang (small landlord), three persons to feed, had over 30 shih of grain land, was proprietor of a cloth shop in Shui-nan, rented his land to others to farm and collected the rent. Business was bad in the shop, which lost money every year. Handled the collection of taxes of the 38th Tu and sought profit in so doing. Smoked opium, a scholar and a very villainous member of the gentry. P'eng Chia-shan (wealthy
farmer), younger brother of Chia-kuang, five persons to feed, had over 40 shih of grain land, and had money to lend. Saddened because of the cancellation of debts, he joined with Honan bandits, and was captured and killed along with his elder brother in July of last year. P'eng Chia-chun [1756-1367 0193] (vagrant), three persons to feed, had no land and owed debts to others. Joining the revolution, he served as adjutant in the Tung-ku guerrillas. He also served as executive officer and quartermaster. Later he deserted, acquired three guns and became a bandit, preying on local tyrants. He was captured last year and killed. He liked to play cards. P'eng P'ei-chun (wealthy farmer), four persons to feed, had 120 shih of land, which he employed two old persons to farm, and also rented one-half to others to farm. He had money to lend. When the masses divided the land and burned [land] titles, he was unwilling and was killed. P'eng Ch'ang-lung (small landlord), four persons to feed, had 60 shih of land, all of which was rented to others to farm. Lent peppermint oil money, lent jute money. A scholar, taught school in Chi-shui County. Went with the Honan bandits, was captured on the front line and killed. P'eng Chang-hsi (small landlord), three persons to feed, P'eng Chang-lung's younger brother, 60 shih of land, lent peppermint oil and jute money, receiving three baskets of grain in return for each yuan lent, killed in March the year before last. Wen Chih-kuei (wealthy farmer), seven persons to feed, 30 shih of grain land, rented over 100 shih, besides his own labor, he hired an old person and many day laborers, did not lend money, but engaged in small business carrying ducks and oil seeds to sell. He plotted with the Honan bandits to leak information of the revolution and was killed. (The so-called Honan bandits were part of the Honanese who had moved to Chi-shui County in Kiangsi, some of whom became bandits.)

The above seven reactionary elements who were killed—three small landlords, three wealthy farmers and one vagrant—proved that, when land reform deepens, many small landlords and wealthy farmers will move in the direction of counterrevolution. Whether every one of these seven persons should have been killed, however, is a question.


CSO: 4005
LAND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAM--1930

[Text] 1. Overthrow the bureaucratic regime of the evil gentry and landlords, disarm the counterrevolutionary forces, arm the workers and farmers and establish a regime of farmers delegates conferences in villages.

2. Confiscate without compensation the property and land of the evil gentry and landlord class, turn it over to the farmers delegates conferences (soviet) for disposition, to distribute it to landless farmers, and farmers with little land, for their use.

3. Real property of ancestral halls, temples and churches, as well as other public property and government-owned fallow land, or ownerless fallow land and sandy fields, should all be turned over to farmers delegates conferences (soviet) for distribution to farmers for their use.

4. A portion of the state-owned land in provincial areas will be provided to the soviet governments for population movement for reclamation and for distribution to soldiers of the workers' and farmers' army to be put to economic use.

5. Announce that all high-interest loan agreements are null and void.

6. Burn all land titles of the government of the evil gentry, as well as other contracts which exploit the farmers (includes written and oral ones).

7. Cancel all taxes proclaimed by warlords and local yamen [governments], cancel the monopoly tax system and cancel the likin [tax], establishing a single agricultural economic progressive tax.

8. The state will assist the agricultural economy:

   (1) To manage land construction projects,
   (2) To improve and expand water conservation,
   (3) To prevent natural disasters,
   (4) By statement management of population movement,
(5) By providing low-interest loans through agricultural banks, trusts, etc.

(6) By [establishing] a single currency system and a single system of weights and measures.

(7) By placing all forests and waterways under the control of Soviet governments.


CSO: 4005
LAND LAW PROMULGATED BY CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION (1930)

[Text] Chapter I. Confiscation and Distribution of Land

Article 1. After rising up and overthrowing the regime of the evil gentry and landlord class, all private and group-owned—ancestral halls of the evil gentry and landlords, temple [religious] institutions and wealthy farmers—land and fields, mountains and forests, ponds and houses, must immediately be confiscated and turned over to public ownership by the Soviet governments for distribution to farmers with little or no land and other poor people who need it for their use. In areas where there are only farmers' associations, where Soviets have not been established, the farmers' associations may also carry out the confiscation and distribution.

Article 2. After investigation by the Soviets, family members of evil gentry and landlords and reactionaries will be permitted to live in the villages, and those with no other means of making a living may receive distribution of an appropriate amount of land.

Article 3. Distribution of land will be made according to regulations to officers and soldiers serving in the Red Army as well as to those engaged in revolutionary work. The Soviets will also assign people to assist their family members in farming.

Article 4. Those in industry and commerce in villages who can make their living will not receive land. Those who cannot make a living will receive an appropriate amount of land limited to that necessary to compensate for the deficiency and permit them to make a living.

Article 5. Land must be distributed to tenant farmers and unemployed wanderers who wish to have land distributed to them. Those wanderers who receive land, however, must break themselves of opium, gambling and other evil addictions, otherwise the Soviets will recover their land.

Article 6. Those living away from their home villages will not receive land.

Article 7. The township shall be the basic unit for the distribution of land. The farmers of a township will put together for common distribution all land tilled by them in their own township as well as in neighboring townships.
Should there be three or four adjoining townships in which some townships have more land and some less, they will be considered a single township for distribution. Those townships with so little land as to be incapable of maintaining their livelihood, and which have no other means of production to maintain their livelihood, may combine three or four townships into one unit for distribution, but the township soviet must request and receive authorization from the district soviet.

Article 8. To meet the demands of the majority, and to expedite the receipt of land by farmers, men, women, old and young should receive equal distribution according to village population. The distribution method based on labor as the criterion should not be adopted.

Article 9. In principle, city merchants and workers will not receive land. When possible, however, appropriate amounts of land will be distributed to unemployed workers and poor people from cities who request it.

Article 10. To seek speedy destruction of feudal influences and to attack wealthy farmers, the distribution of land should be in accordance with the principle of taking from those with much to compensate those with little and taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile. Landlords and wealthy farmers should not be permitted to conceal land, not reporting it, nor to monopolize fertile land. After the distribution of land, wooden signs prescribed by the soviets will be erected in the fields, with the amount of production from the field and the present tiller inscribed thereon.

Article 11. All deeds covering land of evil gentry and landlords, wealthy farmers, and ancestral halls and temples shall be handed over within a limited period to township soviets or to township or district farmers' associations, and burned publicly.

Article 12. After the distribution of land, county soviets or district soviets shall issue farming certificates.

Article 13. Whenever anyone in a township dies, changes his occupation, or departs, the land distributed to him shall revert to the soviet for redistribution. When anyone arrives from outside the township or is born in the township, the soviet should find a way to distribute land to that person, but subsequent to the harvest.

Article 14. When land is distributed after an uprising and it is after planting by farmers, the production from the field shall be harvested by the farmer receiving the field, and the original tiller may not keep it [the production or harvest].

Article 15. Vegetable gardens, dams and fallow land (where miscellaneous grains can be planted) must be distributed. Large ponds not suitable for distribution shall be operated by the soviet or rented for a fixed price.
Article 16. Bamboo [producing] and lumber [producing] hills should be divided for calculation purposes into fields according to their production and combined with fields for distribution. Those with the characteristics of industrial capital [plant or equipment], employing labor, establishing factories and manufacturing, however, may be rented as entities and need not be distributed.

Article 17. Pine, fir and other mountain forests will be managed or rented by the soviets. When authorized by the soviet, however, and when the people of the township need to use wood for repairing embankments, constructing public facilities and houses, and for repairing buildings burned by the reactionaries, they may take wood from the forests.

Article 18. Hills producing firewood will be managed by the soviet governments for public use.

Article 19. To meet the requirements of poor farmers, all confiscated land should be distributed to them, and it need not be retained by the soviets. Under certain conditions, however, that portion of the land which cannot be completely distributed may be used to establish model farms or be rented temporarily. At the same time a portion of such buildings should be retained for public enterprises.

Chapter II. Cancellation of Debts

Article 20. All debts owed by workers, farmers and poor people to the evil gentry and landlords and rich peasants shall not be repaid, and all bonds and loan agreements shall be handed over to the soviets or farmers' associations for burning.

Article 21. All debts new and old owed by the evil gentry and landlords and merchants to the government or to workers, farmers or poor people must be repaid in full.

Article 22. Old trading accounts owed by workers, farmers and poor people to merchants prior to the uprising, irrespective of whether they were commercial or high-interest, or whether they were personal accounts, shall not be repaid.

Article 23. In principle, with respect to accounts incurred by workers, farmers and poor people among themselves, what was borrowed prior to the uprising shall not be repaid. This excludes only no-interest loans made with the objective of friendly assistance, and which the borrower is willing to repay.

Article 24. Wherever workers, farmers and poor people have pawned or mortgaged articles or houses to evil gentry and landlords, wealthy farmers or pawnbrokers, the items given as security shall be recovered unconditionally.
Article 25. Financial associations and grain associations shall all be disbanded.

Article 26. Under the soviet regime, high-interest loans are prohibited. County soviets will prescribe appropriate interest rates according to the monetary situation in the local area. The rates should not, however, exceed that received from ordinary capital under the general economic conditions in the area.

Chapter III. Land Tax

Article 27. To meet requirements for overthrowing the counterrevolutionaries (such as to expand the Red Army and Red Guard units, to support governmental organizations, etc.), and requirements to further the interests of the masses (such as establishing schools and dispensaries; aiding the crippled, the aged and infants; repairing roads and embankments, etc.), the soviets may levy land taxes on farmers.

Article 28. In keeping with the principle of protecting poor farmers and joining with middle farmers to attack wealthy farmers, land taxes may be levied only after soviets have been established, the masses have realized practical benefits, and the higher-level soviet has approved.

Article 29. Land taxes will be levied by classes according to the annual harvest of grain from the land distributed to the farmers.

1. Each person who received distributed land who harvests less than 5 tan of grain shall be exempt from land taxes.

2. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 6 tan of grain will be taxed 1 percent.

3. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 7 tan of grain will be taxed 1.5 percent.

4. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 8 tan of land will be taxed 2.5 percent.

5. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 9 tan of grain will be taxed 4 percent.

6. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 10 tan of grain will be taxed 5.5 percent.

7. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 11 tan of grain will be taxed No percentage listed.

8. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 12 tan of grain will be taxed 8 percent.
For each additional ton of grain harvested, an additional 1.5 percent in land taxes shall be collected.

Article 30. Income and expenditures from land taxes must be centralized at the high-level soviet government. Lower-level governments may not collect and disburse freely. Expenditure standards shall be determined by the high-level government according to the amount of revenue and the urgency and significance of the requirements of the governments at various levels.

Chapter IV. Wages

Article 31. Wages of handicraft industry workers and tenant farmers in farming villages which have been too low in the past should be raised. Henceforth, wages shall be determined by the soviets according to two standards— the rise or fall of prices of commodities and the abundance or paucity of farmers' income. County or provincial soviets must approve wages prescribed by township soviets.

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INVESTIGATIONS IN HSING-KUO COUNTY

26 January 1931

[Text] In September 1930 the Red 1st Army returned to Kiangsi following its attack on Changsha. In early October after breaking through Chi-an it entered the Yuan River Valley where many peasants came from Hsing-kuo to join the ranks of the Red Army. I took this opportunity to conduct an investigation of the 10th (Yung-feng) District in Hsing-kuo County. I got together and held fact-finding meetings with eight persons, namely, Fu Chi-t'ing, Li Ch'ang-ying, Wen Feng-chang, Ch'en Chen-shan, Chung Te-wu, Huang Ta-ch'uan, Ch'en Pei-p'ing and Lei Han-hsiang. The investigation was undertaken at the end of October 1930 with Lo-fang, Hsin-yu County as the meeting place where a series of fact-finding meetings were held for a full week. Yung-feng District is situated at the intersection of three adjoining counties of Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an. It is divided into four townships, of which the old Ling-yuan District is the 1st, Tung-chiang the 2d, Shan-k'eng the 3d and Chiang-t'uan the 4th, with Yung-feng-yu of the 2d township as the political and economic center of this district. The distribution of population is as follows: the 1st township has 3,000 people, the 2d 800, the 3d 3,000 and the 4th 4,000, so the total population of this district is 8,800. Because this district is bounded by the three counties of Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an, so if the situation in this district is well understood, there is not much difference in that of the other two counties. In fact, conditions of struggle for land are not much different in the whole region of southern Kiangsi. Practical policy must be determined on the basis of actual conditions. Things which you sit around imagining about or which you read from sketchy written reports are definitely not those based on actual conditions. It is dangerous to base decision of policy on reports which were either unrealistic or "believed to be true." In the past many mistakes were made in the Red areas because the leadership of the party had not been in keeping with actual conditions. It is, therefore, most essential to make detailed scientific investigations based on actual conditions. Generally speaking, this investigation is still not penetrating enough even though it is more so compared with those made on previous occasions. First, I have made an investigation of eight families, something which I have never attempted before. The truth is that without