Chapter 4. Handling of Property Matters After Divorce

Article 13

After divorce, the original land, assets and debts of the husband and wife will be managed separately and individually. After a full year of marriage, assets increased through the endeavors of both parties will be shared equally. If there are issues then it will be divided in accordance with the size of the family. Public debts incurred during the period of cohabitation shall be the responsibility of the husband.

Article 14

Should the wife move to another village after the divorce she is entitled to have land distributed to her at the new village of residence in accordance with that village's distribution ratio. If the new village of residence does not have any more land for distribution, the woman still holds on to her original land. Whether the land is to be rented out, sold or exchanged is for the woman to decide. Children given into the custody of the woman will live with their mother. The distribution or handling the matter of their land is to be wholly in accordance with the method mentioned above.

Article 15

A woman who does not remarry after divorce but is unable to maintain a livelihood due to lack of labor or steady employment will be helped by the ex-husband in cultivating her land or providing for her livelihood. But should the former husband be in the same situation this requirement is excepted.

Chapter 5. The Problem of Children After Divorce

Article 16

Children born before the divorce and those conceived before divorce are to be placed in the custody of the woman for rearing. If the woman is unwilling to do so, the man shall assume the responsibility, with the provision that the wishes of the older children should be respected.

Article 17

The man shall be responsible for two-thirds of the needs of the livelihood of children in the custody of the woman until they reach the age of 16. Payment of such alimony shall take the form of either cash payments or the cultivation of the land distributed to the children.

Article 18

Only when the woman remarryes and her new husband is willing to bring up the children can the natural father of the children be released from the aforesaid responsibilities. The new husband accepting the rearing of the children.
must register with the village or urban soviet. After registration, he should be responsible for them until they come of age and they are not to be ill-treated or stopped maintaining their livelihood half way through.

Chapter 6. The Problem of Illegitimate Children

Article 19

Children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all the rights of legally born children under this marriage law. Abandonment or ill-treatment of illegitimate children is prohibited.

Chapter 7. By-Laws

Article 20

Offenses against this law shall be punishable under the criminal code.

Article 21

This law becomes effective as of the date of proclamation.

* Soviet Legal Code, Vol 2, People's Committee on Judicial Matters (Moscow), July 1934.

* Compilation of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Book 5, 1935.

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HOW DO TOWNSHIP SOVIET GOVERNMENTS WORK?

10 April 1934

[Text] The basic organizations of the Soviet Government are the township and municipal soviets and they are the levels closest to the people. They are the agencies which directly lead the people in carrying out the various tasks of the Soviet.

In a Civil War, the work of mobilizing for war is very urgent and the livelihood of the masses needs to be improved. It is of primary importance to go all out to improve the work at township and municipal soviets, strengthen the organization and leadership of these soviets so that they will be completely suitable for developing the revolution and improving the livelihood of the people.

The orientation of the work to improve the functions of township and municipal soviets should be directed at being most capable of contacting the masses, rousing the enthusiasm and creativity of the masses, mobilizing them to carry out the tasks of the soviets and expediting the accomplishment of these tasks so that there will be complete coordination between the work of the Soviet, the revolution and the well-being of the masses. This is the principle on which the work of the Soviet is based. There are already many township soviets in our areas which are capable of meeting these basic requirements and they have created many good organizational structures and work methods. There are, however, many other townships which contravene these requirements in their work or have not completely complied with these requirements. It is urgently necessary to clearly and concretely set forth regulations in the work of the township soviets based upon these requirements so that each township soviet functionary will have a uniform standard to work by.

How shall the township soviets carry out their work? They should be in accordance with the following regulations.

A. The Work of the Township Soviet Presidium

1. The Presidium of a township should constitute seven members if large and five if small. These are people elected by the Congress, only those who are most activist and capable should be elected.
2. The presidium is the supreme political organ of the entire township after
the ending of the Congress. It should resolutely implement the resolutions
and instructions of Congress and higher level soviets, and directly lead the
work of the entire township.

3. The presidium should know how to grasp the central task at each period
and bring these tasks up for discussion at the Congress. It should not busy
itself with various minor matters and neglect the central task.

4. Meetings of the presidium must be well conducted, and the work of the
standing members must be carried out with urgency and thoroughness. There
should be no phenomenon of laxness and laziness and commandism must be
completely done away with.

5. The presidium must understand the situation of each village, the charac-
teristics of each village and they must give their attention to the difficul-
ties of the masses in each village and, in accordance with the actual situation
prevailing in each village and its special characteristics, impel the work in
order to resolve the difficult problems of the masses.

6. For rapid improvement in the work of each village, attention must be given
to motivating the work of the chairman and vice chairman, the representative
meetings of each village, the mass meetings, and the small group meetings
under the leadership of each member so that they all will be held promptly
as scheduled and conducted properly.

7. The presidium must give attention to keeping the entire body of repre-
sentatives, the various committees and the various mass organizations united
and rally them around itself, motivating them to mobilizing the people of
the entire township to carry out various tasks. They should not become
separated with the mass organizations, the representatives and the committees
and leave only a few to do the job.

8. The leadership of the representatives meeting must be given careful
attention, and the presidium must have proper preparations made before they
are held.

9. The presidium should meet every 5 days. That is, the presidium must meet
twice before and after the representatives meeting in the in-between periods,
and the chairman of the township may be asked to attend.

On the question of problems to be discussed at the meeting, at first it will
mainly be discussions on how to inspire the chairman and vice chairmen of the
various villages as well as comrades of the Congress how to implement the
work given to them earlier and carrying out the resolutions of the earlier
Congress, and this meeting is best held 2 or 3 days after the next Congress.

The meeting of the presidium has also had to contend with minor matters.
Do not bring these trivial matters up for discussion at the next Congress.
The meeting of the presidium should best be held after supper and should not last longer than 2 hours.

10. The presidium should have a system of division of labor and work should be assigned to those members who are not on the standing committee to spur the people of certain villages in carrying out certain types of work.

The chairman of the presidium should naturally direct the work of the entire township, be the chairman of the presidium when it is in meeting, attend meetings convened by higher levels and manage daily routines. He should grasp the central tasks assigned by higher echelon at certain periods of time (such as the expansion of the Red Army, the land inspection movement, elections, road construction, collecting land taxes, selling bonds, development of cooperatives and spring cultivation movement, etc.). He should pay attention to routine work (such as the training of Red Youth Units, Red Martial Law, food grains, education, public health and preferential treatment of members of Red Army families). He should also be careful of special situations arising in his own village (such as famine, plague epidemics, floods and counterrevolutionary activities, etc.). He should constantly think about these problems and tasks, how such work should be done in the villages, which village is falling behind in its work and should be prodded and aid given. He should divide the paper work with his vice chairman and also have a division of labor in attending the meetings of the various villages and gathering good experiences gained in each piece of work done in a village and the poor performance observed. These are to be presented at the meeting of the presidium or reported at the meeting of Congress contributing material for the Congress to discuss (when that problem is on discussion). Attending the meetings of the various mass meetings held by the villages, by various mass organizations and committees should also be delegated by the chairman of the presidium.

The vice chairman should share the paper work with the chairman, attending the meetings of the various villages, and assign to himself the work of one or two villages. He must be thoroughly capable of motivating and collecting materials and return to make a report. He is also required to understand the work of the entire township so that when the chairman is absent he can work on behalf of the chairman. A permanent vice chairman must help the chairman with the daily routine and also frequently attend the meetings of the various committees and mass organizations.

The paper work consists of processing census and land ledgers, registration of marriages, births and deaths, various investigation reports, writing up reports to the area soviet, allocating transportation labor, sending notices to various villages, writing up travel permits, helping members of Red Army families write letters, reading documents from higher levels to those chairmen and vice chairmen who are illiterate, underscore the important parts when reading documents at presidium and congress meetings, keep minutes of the meetings, and remind the chairman and vice chairmen on those areas where they have neglected to give their attention. The secretary should also attend the meetings of the presidiums and mass organizations and if he is a representative he should participate in the presidium.
11. The examination and education of representatives should be matter the presidium should give its attention to. Among the representatives, there will be some who are activists in their work and some who are apathetic and go slow. The model work of the activists should be set forth as models for those workers with pessimistic outlooks. These pessimists must be criticized. Some should be named in the representative meetings so as to rouse the others to struggle against them. Educate the entire body of representatives in this manner, so as to transform the pessimists into activists.

There are some to whom being elected representatives is their first experience and do not know how to go about their work. They must be taught carefully how the work is to be done. Those who have often undergone education through criticism and struggle and still do not show any change or progress (such as after 1 or 2 months being unable to accomplish the tasks given them, or even deliberately staying away from meetings 5 or 6 consecutive times) should be brought to the attention of the Congress and resolution passed to expel them and substituting alternate members. It would be incorrect not to expel such worthless members and have them replaced. After reassignment of a representative engaged in certain work, he should also be immediately replaced.

Investigations should also be made to see whether landlord, rich peasant and counterrevolutionary elements fraudulently pose as representatives to sabotage our Soviet. They should be immediately expelled. It is even more necessary to apprehend and punish counterrevolutionaries.

12. Inspectors at sentry points and transportation of the township soviet may be selected from the three methods defined as follows: Appoint someone permanently to the post. He will have to rely on his own rations, but will be exempt from various duties. Also, dispatch people to help with the family's farming. Or dispatch personnel from the Young Pioneer units on a rotational basis. They will be notified the evening of the previous day to take up their work the next morning. They shall return home to eat their meals, but no help will be dispatched to assist with the farming. Or, send one person to stay permanently on site with the residents providing the meals through monetary contributions. Each area will decide on their own which method to select. The first method will be the best. Young comrades should be selected in all cases for the post of transportation and sentry point personnel. These people must be highly intelligent and should be literate. They should be given training in their work.

B. The Functions of the Congress

1. The township congress is the highest organ of political power in the township. Leadership of Congress is of extreme importance because from the discussions held in Congress emerge the implementation of all laws and policies of the Soviet and the accomplishment of various tasks of the Soviet.
2. Generally, congresses are held every 10 days. It should be held in the evening when farm work is busy. The duration of the meeting should be 2 hours at the most, and not to exceed 3 hours.

Each meeting should be divided into the period for reporting and the period for discussions. The chairman and participants from the area Soviet will each make a 10-minute report. If there are too many, it should be brought up during the period of discussion. In discussions about work done in their own villages, after the village chairman makes his report for several minutes, if there are many points to be reported they may be taken up during the period for discussions. In special work investigative meetings more time should be given to the various village chairmen to make their reports. The reports must contain factual materials and proposals. Reports made up of empty talk will be abolished.

3. Each Congress will have but one principal matter for discussion. There may be one or two problems of secondary importance. A greater part of the meeting should be devoted to the discussion of the major problem, and less time given to the secondary problems. If several problems of great importance are brought up for discussion every time then the meeting will wind up without any results.

4. Discussions of problems must be on a practical basis. For instance, a discussion of spring cultivation should include such subjects as "the development of labor mutual help cooperatives," "development of plow oxen cooperatives," "how the land cultivation troop should give preferential treatment to the families of Red Army members," "increasing fertilizers," "more plowing and more raking," "reclaim wasteland and mountains," "repair embankments, ponds and water-wheels," "planting of cotton," "planting more or less glutinous rice," "planting more vegetables" and others. These discussions must be based on the actual situation prevailing in the villages. Precise methods must be set forth for each item discussed.

For example, on "developing the labor cooperatives," estimates must be made on how many more people can be expanded in the entire township now, set a total figure and, in accordance with the actual situation of the villages, set forth how many more people should each village include. Then, this task should be handed over to the chairmen and vice chairmen of the villages to take back with them. In accordance with the number of residents under the jurisdiction, each representative makes actual allocations. And a period for the task to be accomplished must also be set. In discussions, each item must be taken separately. Proceed to the second item after the first item has been discussed and concluded, with the conclusions of these discussions deemed to be resolutions and recorded in the registry, to facilitate inspection during the next meeting and so that the presidium will be able to spur the people. Incompleted discussions will be continued at the next meeting.

At the second spring farming meeting, the resolutions made at the earlier meeting should be examined. When examining a certain item, the various chairmen of the villages should report the actual situation, the reasons for
completing or not completing certain tasks with the main idea of searching out experiences and lessons for the various representatives to study. After such an examination, continue with the discussions of new problems of the spring plowing. Criticism should be made in the light of the circumstances of those representatives and village chairmen who were discovered not to have completed their tasks so as to alert them. In the discussion of other matters this example should be followed.

Many of the township representatives' meetings are not thorough in their discussions of problems and neglect to shift out the minor items from the bigger problems, or make a general discussion of all the problems without going through them one by one. This causes people to return from these meetings without any clear-cut understanding of the resolutions made. At these meetings, discussions are made without any regard to the actual situation and characteristics of the various villages. Nor are quotas set for each village (this is with regard to those cases where quantity has to be set). Regulations were not set forth when the task was to be completed. Village chairmen were not charged with assigning definite tasks to the various representatives when they returned to their villages, to see to it that they were completed and encouraging them to do so.

In setting tasks for certain villages with particular characteristics (for example, requiring certain village to dig ponds), they will not make it a special point to ask the representatives of a certain village "Do you think it is right to regulate it so?" But they pass this as a general resolution. Resolutions were discussed by only certain township soviets. In many meetings, these resolutions were not brought forth for examination. Even when examined, the reasons for success or failure of each household or village were not settled. Nor were those representatives and village chairmen who were dragging their feet criticized. What is the use of such examinations and discussions, then? They are empty of substance, bureaucratic and a waste of time that cannot accomplish the mission of the Soviet. Taking an attitude of peace toward those pessimists and feet-draggers will cause the Congress to lose its vitality. It will be unable to encourage those representatives of backward families and villages to lead the masses and work hard to reach the level of advanced families and villages. This is wrong.

5. For a Congress to be successful, preparations made by the presidium must be good. What was said before about the presidium requiring to hold a meeting before the representative meeting and make careful preparations on the reports and problems to be presented at the next meeting is indispensable. The preparation work is the special responsibility of the chairman and the vice chairman and secretary must assist him.

6. In many instances, chairmen presiding over the meetings were elected on the spur of the moment. In some areas it is incorrectly regulated that members of the presidium should not be elected. The presiding chairman should be the permanently assigned functionary. The chairman of the township soviet would be best, because only he is knowledgeable about the entire township.
7. A roll call shall be made at every representative meeting. Those who are absent shall be so marked on the name list. The presidium should have a list of the representatives, names, sex, age and class element, in accordance with each household and village.

C. The Structure and Function of the Village

1. The village is the core of the work of the township. The presidium of the township soviet should give its entire attention to the organization and leadership of the village.

2. It is imperative that all townships which have not delimited villages should do so. Some townships may be delimited to two and some to three villages, while other big townships may divide into four or five villages. This delimiting shall be based upon actual situation. Generally, in dividing the area into villages, the smaller they are the better they will be, because big areas cannot be easily directed.

3. The village shall have one chairman and one vice chairman, who will be elected at the representatives meeting of the township. Electees should be the most capable and most activist of the representatives. In a village with only a few families (a small village), the chairman and vice chairman should not be from the same family.

The village chairman has the responsibility to oversee the work of the entire village and the vice chairman is to help him.

(Note:) In cases of chairmen and vice chairmen who have an inadequate labor force in their families, the township soviet may designate aid be given them by the masses during the busy farming season in the form of pro-rated labor in order to make up for their time spent (more than the other representatives) in their endeavors to accomplish the tasks of the Soviet.

Should the people agree, full preferential treatment may be given the village chairman so that he can devote his entire time to the tasks and seek benefits for the masses of the entire village.

4. Generally, the village chairman will hold a meeting of all of the representatives every 10 days (for instance, if there are 15 representatives in the village, these 15 will be called to the meeting). When work is busy these meetings may be called every 5 days. In examining the work of the representatives, discuss how to accomplish the tasks given to the village by the township congress in accordance with the characteristics of each family or household. Resolve minor disputes and problems of mutual help among the village residents, prepare reports for the mass meetings to be held by the village and give impetus to the work of the village committee.

5. Village representatives meeting of this kind should be scheduled by the township soviet's presidium. It is best to schedule meetings to be held between the two representatives meetings, but closer to the latter. For
example, there are three villages in a certain township and the township representatives meetings are to be held on the 5th and the 15th. The schedule can be set for the first village to hold its meeting on the eleventh, the second on the twelfth and the third on the thirteenth. Then, standing committee members, especially the chairman, of the township soviet will be able to attend these village meetings. If the meeting is to be held once every 5 days, then they can be scheduled to be held once several days after the first township soviet meeting and once several days before the next representative meeting of the township soviet. These meetings are mainly for examining and directing work, and for the village chairman to make this report on the results of the examinations at the next township congress.

6. Set up a system of a division of labor among the representatives in giving leadership to the masses. For instance, a certain village has 15 representatives and 500 residents. Divide these 500 people into 15 divisions in accordance with the distances of the representatives' residences to them and assign one representative over the people of one division. This should not be done by averaging, but should be in accordance with the locations of the households, the strength and weaknesses of the representative and by assigning to them a suitable number of people. There can be as many as 50 to 60 to a representative, and as few as 30 or 40.

This method of dividing work among the representatives will place responsibilities on all of the representatives. Each representative shall, in clearly distinguished spheres, lead the masses in the work of the Soviet (such as supervising the score or so people working under him in spring farming, propagandizing a dozen or so of the activists among his group to join the Red Army, participating in cooperatives, supervising children in the day schools, encouraging adults to attend night schools, encouraging each family to sweep their houses and clean their sewers to maintain hygiene, taking a dozen or so people to hold mass meetings, keep surveillance on the activities of landlords and rich peasants, etc.). He should solicit the ideas of the masses and speedily bring them to the attention of the village and township representatives' meetings, speedily resolve difficulties and problems of the masses. To date, however, there are some areas where such a system of division of labor among the representatives has not been implemented. This system should be put into effect immediately.

(Note:) The village chairman should have a ledger in which the population of the village, the area of land available in the village, the number of Red youth troops, the quantity of food grains (the total quantity available, how many families have surpluses and how many are deficient) and other necessary items. Each representative should also have a list of names of the people under their jurisdictions.

7. Each of the representatives must call meetings of those dozen or so people under their jurisdiction, examine the situation of the Soviet work done by each family, discuss the work currently to be done, report articles of competition, the township soviet's resolutions, collect proposals from the people and report them at the village or township congresses. Such meetings
will take the form of informal talks with the representative as the chairman of the meeting. One hour will be enough time for the meeting and it should be held when everybody has leisure to do so.

Such meetings should be scheduled once every 10 days, and the units under the jurisdiction of the representatives of the entire village may also hold their meetings on the same day. Should a representative group by unable to hold the meeting with due cause they should be made responsible to hold it on another day. The chairman of the township soviet convened the chairman of the various villages and make up a schedule so that there will be no conflicts between village, township and other meetings. When this type of meeting is held, the masses should be directed to launch criticisms of each other. For instance, is a family receiving a deserter and refusing to return him to his unit, or is a certain family failing to put its best efforts in the spring plowing, or is a household apathetic toward helping families of Red Army members cultivate their lands? If a family is neglecting its aged members, neglecting to encourage its children in their studies and not maintaining a hygienic standard they should be criticized. Soviet resolutions can be very rapidly spread to the masses through such meetings, accelerating the work of the Soviet, rapidly improving the well-being of the people and heightening the fervor of the spirit of mass struggles.

Besides attending such meetings, each representative must make time to visit individual households under his jurisdiction to check on whether they have any problems that require resolving, whether they have carried out the resolutions of the Soviet. The first of these visits should be made on families of Red Army members and on the poorest people in the village. Visits should also be paid to households of landlords and rich peasants in order to observe whether they are committing anything improper.

The small unit meetings and household visits of representatives should be directed by the village chairman who will have that responsibility. From these observations the quality of the work of the representative can be evaluated.

8. The mass meeting of the village has the highest potential to educate the masses, mobilize them to carry out the tasks of the Soviet and enhance the spirit of struggle among them. It should be regarded as an important method to mobilize and educate the masses. In many places not much attention is given to convening such mass meetings and this is incorrect.

In such village mass meetings, reports are made on resolutions passed by the township soviet, the revolutionary competition that is being carried out between villages and households and explaining the revolutionary tasks set forth by higher level soviets so that after the masses have completely understood them these tasks could be carried out with all-out effort.

A bi-monthly schedule should be set for such mass meetings by the township soviet for the various villages and notifying the village chairman. Do not
let these meetings conflict with others. So that the township soviet will be able to dispatch personnel to participate, do not hold these village mass meetings on the same day.

In villages where the populace is concentrated in one household, the entire village will be considered as one unit in holding such meetings, and the village chairman will preside. The majority of the villages in the soviet areas, however, have two or more households, and the meetings should be divided into two divisions so that everybody, men, women, old and young can attend. The village chairman and the vice chairman will each preside over one of the meetings. There should be proper preparations made before holding such meetings. How to aid the various representatives to get the majority of the masses to attend the mass meetings, what to report at these meetings and how to lead the masses to voice their opinions—these must be discussed and agreed upon at the village congress. These mass meetings should not exceed 2 hours, and they must be held when the majority of the masses have nothing else to do.

Mass meetings at the township level should not be held for good cause, such as memorial days or festival days. The work of mobilizing the masses and educating them must be done mainly through utilizing the mass meetings of the small unit type under the jurisdiction of the representative or the village mass meetings.

D. The Committees of the Villages and the Township

1. Below the township, soviet committees administrating various special tasks to aid the township soviet should be organized. Activists among the masses should join the committees as members and each representative of the township soviet should participate in one or two committees and play a leadership role in them. The committee system must be regarded as one of the principal means to maintain liaison with the masses and propel forward the work of the Soviet. Make haste to organize such committees in those areas where there are none.

2. Some committees are constantly being organized, such as those for the expansion of the Red Army, for giving preferential treatment and comfort to the Red Army, for maintaining alerts, for defense against air attacks and poisons, for agricultural production (such as spring and summer cultivation, fall harvesting and winter plowing), for education in production, for forestry and water conservancy, for investigation and registration, for education, for health, for roads and bridges, for food grains, for State properties (in townships where there are State properties) and for worker-peasant surveillance. All these committees always have work to do.

Some of the committees are organized for temporary purposes, such as land inspection, confiscation and levies, land tax collections, selling bonds, land reclamation and elections. These committees are temporary in nature, and they are no longer required after the work has been done. The next time such work has to be done, these committees are again organized. The
committees for land inspection, confiscation and levies are also no longer required after the land problem has been thoroughly resolved.

3. Some committees should only be at township level. Others (such as committees for the expansion of the Red Army, for the preferential treatment of the Red Army, for education in production, for spring cultivation, for forestry and water conservancy, for education and health) need to expand into the villages. Only when the villages have such committees can the tasks be easily popularized and intensified.

4. In accordance with the nature of the committee, the personnel could range from as few as five to as many as seven or nine persons. Do not overstaff. As for committees which exist at both village and township levels (such as the spring cultivation committee) five members will be enough for each of the village and township committees, while the chairman of the village committee is permitted to be a member of the township committee.

5. At the township level, the chairman and members of the committees should be elected at the township congress after the presidium has prepared a list and presented it. At the village level, the village chairman will prepare a list and have it passed at the village congress.

6. The most activist comrade must be found to head the committee, and the presidium must educate the various chairmen how to carry out the work and supervise them to convene their own meetings on schedule and inspect their work. Chairmen who dragged their feet must be impeached and replaced with a new chairman.

7. Preparations must be made beforehand by the chairman when holding his own meeting, ensuring that every meeting will achieve results. After the meeting, each committee member must be assigned a task and told how to accomplish it. At the next meeting they must be made to report on the task performed. Committee members who drag their feet will be dismissed and others will replace them.

8. A new election of the committees should be held usually every 6 months. In these elections retain the activists and eliminate the feet draggers.

9. There should be a division of labor within the presidium of the township soviet so that the members will be able to participate in the meetings of the various committees at the township level. The best means of doing this is for each member of the presidium to have several committees under his jurisdiction. For example, the chairman will have jurisdiction over the committees for military affairs and finances (such as the committees for expanding the Red Army, for giving comfort to the Red Army, for the Red military alert, for defense against air attacks and poisons, for collecting land taxes, for selling bonds, for the confiscation of land and levying and the protection of State properties, etc.). The vice chairman will have jurisdiction over economic matters (such as committees for the preferential
treatment of Red Army, spring cultivation, forestry, water conservancy, food grains, roads and bridges and education in production, etc.). The secretary may take over other areas of responsibilities (education, health, worker-peasant inspection, investigation and registration, etc.). At the presidium meeting it will be resolved what duties each would be assigned and materials for the meetings collected so that the reports may be made at the meeting.

When committee meetings are held, the township committee chairmen must attend the meetings of the committees under their jurisdictions (such as the chairman of the township educational committee attending the village committee meeting on education). The chairman and vice chairman of the village committee should also make a division of labor and take part.

10. The schedules of the meetings of the various committees of the townships and the villages should be set up by the township presidium in accordance with the priorities of the work to be done at different periods, such as more meetings of the spring farming committee should be held in the spring time, but when winter comes, the winter plowing committee could slacken their schedule of meetings. Each meeting should not last more than 2 1/2 hours.

E. The Liaison Between the Township Soviet and the Mass Organizations

1. More attention and aid should be given to the various mass organizations of the township (such as the trade unions, poor peasants groups, women workers and peasants congress, the anti-imperialist alliance to support the Soviet, mutual help associations, youth groups, labor mutual help cooperatives, plow cooperatives and various types of cooperatives such as the consumers co-ops, production co-ops, food co-ops and credit unions, baby-care centers, the association to eliminate illiteracy, the committee for the movement to gain literacy and clubs, etc.) rely on their efforts to mobilize the broad masses to complete the various revolutionary tasks.

The township soviet has full responsibilities for these organizations which have no higher levels, such as the poor peasant groups, the women worker-peasant congress, labor mutual help associations, plow-oxen cooperatives and child-care centers. It must inspect their work periodically and provide them with full leadership. Should it find errors in the work of these organizations, discussion should be held speedily and the errors corrected. The township soviet has the responsibility to help them resolve difficulties regardless of the nature of the organizations.

2. The responsible person for the organization whose work is being discussed by the township soviet and the representatives meeting should be invited to attend the meeting and when meetings are being held by these organizations, the township soviet should also dispatch personnel to participate. This holds true with regard to the village congress and village mass organizations. Consultations should be held by the township soviet's presidium with the responsible persons of the various mass organizations when schedules of meetings are being worked out so that there will be no conflicts of meetings at the village and township levels.
3. The township soviet must give its attention to giving leadership to the Red Guards and the Young Pioneer units so that all young men and women and adults will be participating in these town units. The majority of them must be made to participate in village and township trainings so that there will be progress daily. Dispatch personnel to participate in their cadres' meeting.

F. Revolutionary Competition and Commando Units

1. In order to attain quality and speed in the work of the Soviet so that it will be done well and with speed, the method or revolutionary competition and the organization of commando units should be put into effect in every township and village.

2. Regardless of whether it originated from higher levels or launched by the village themselves, revolutionary competition must first be discussed at the township congress and reported at the meetings of the people at village levels and at small units level. When it concerns a certain mass organization it must also be reported at the meeting of that organization, so that there will be clear understanding and acceptance by each and every one of the representatives and the people. Only by having every one understand and accept it can they be made to shoulder their responsibilities and ignite their revolutionary zeal and put their efforts into the work, thereby carrying out the work in a fast and better manner and completing the work as required by the competition or even ahead of schedule. All methods of commandism and coercion must be abolished in this regard.

3. The competition of each item of work is not ended by merely discussing and reporting about it. A very close inspection must also be carried out. Each representative examines each household, the chairman and vice chairman of the villages examine the representatives. The presidium of the township soviet and the Congress will examine the chairmen and vice chairmen of the villages. If such examinations are not carried out some person, representative, village household, will do the work haphazardly and will not be able to complete the work assigned as scheduled, or even though they meet the quota the quality will be poor. The system of examination is a very important method to achieve speed and quality in the work of the soviet. Decisions without examinations is but a bureaucratic way of leadership, and it is as harmful as coercion.

4. In each of these competition events discussions shall be made at the village and township congress when the period set is over, distinctions will be made between the superior and the inferior performers, the superior performance will be rewarded while the inferior one will be criticized.

5. A commando unit consisting of from five to seven persons may be organized in each village in order to attain speed and quality in the work of the Soviet. Select on a voluntary basis comrades from among the representatives and the masses those who are activists and have the capability to work to participate in these commando units, with each village having a leader of a commando unit. Members should not be selected from the same household.
Work of the commando unit will be done in two ways. The first kind will be for
the member of one household to do commando work in the other (such as member
of household A going to household B and vice versa). But the emphasis will
be to have members of advanced household going to the more backward ones.
The other kind is within the sphere of the township, with commando units of
one village going to another village to do commando work (village A going
to village B) and it should primarily be on the basis of units from progres-
sive villages going to more backward ones to do commando work. Doing commando
work is not to cuss at other people but to help with the work that is being
done there, teaching them better ways so that the work there will improve
rapidly and educating them in the work methods of the more advanced villages
and households.

A unit leader in overall command of the commando units will be appointed under
the township soviet presidium who will administer all the units and who will
have the authority to deploy the commando units of the various villages.
The presidium should call periodical meetings of commanders of village
and township commando units to examine their work and tell them how to go
about their work. These units' leaders will then convene meetings of
commando units members and give them training. The presidium should also
convene all of the members of the commando units on a monthly or bi-monthly
basis to train them.

C. On the Leadership Exercised by the District Soviet Over the Township
Soviet

The district soviet must direct the township soviet to implement all of the
aforementioned items accordingly, explaining these items to the comrades of
the township soviet so that they will have full understanding. Spot checks
will be made on whether the township soviets are carrying out the afore-
mentioned items as described. More frequent explanations and assistants
must be given, especially toward those township soviets whose work is
falling behind. Examinations of the district soviet's work by higher
echelon will be based upon whether the district soviet has given thorough
leadership to the various townships under its jurisdiction in implementing
the aforementioned items to realize the best in quality and speed in the
various tasks set by the Soviet.

(Note: This document is also applicable to municipality and ward soviets.)

10 April 1934

* On the work methods of area and township soviets, by the People's Committee
of the Chinese Soviet Republic, April 1934,


8439
CSO: 4005
DECLARATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ON 1 MAY LABOR DAY

April 1934

[Text] Workers and Peasants of the Entire Soviet Areas!

This year's "May Day" falls on a day when we are carrying out a merciless and decisive campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang!

Two-thirds of the regular Kuomintang troops throughout the country, the main force of Chiang Kai-shek, the bandit chieftain of all fascist imperialists, comprised of 66 divisions, 8 independent brigades, constituting more than 700,000 White troops, are attacking our central Soviet areas!

On all the battle lines of the front, Kuomintang planes and artillery are bombarding us, their machine guns and rifles are enfilading us with fire, their blockhouses are blockading us and they are carrying out inhuman burning and killings. They want to drown our worker-peasant soviet regime in a sea of blood!

However, this type of frenzied and hopeless attacks launched by the imperialist Kuomintang cannot frighten the courageous Red Army on the front lines and make the worker-peasant masses in the entire Soviet areas lose hope. On the contrary, it further increases the anger and heightened the determination of every Red fighter and every worker and peasant to struggle on. Tens of thousands of worker-peasant masses have been engulfed in the flood of participation in the war, pledging to fight to the very end in defense of the Soviet regime.

The fifth campaign is an even more merciless and prolonged campaign than any others. It is a war determining the survival or death of the Kuomintang landlord bourgeoisie or the political power of the workers and peasants. It is possible to achieve final victory only by mobilizing all of the worker-peasant masses in the entire Soviet areas and vigorously participate in this campaign!
On May Day of this year the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls upon every one of the workers and peasants in the entire Soviet areas to arm themselves and join the Red Army! Join the Red Guards, the Young Pioneers, Model Red Youth Units and guerrilla units! Wage a decisive war with the enemy attacking us,

Comrades of the members of the model Red youth units who took part in the armed review made during Red May have enlisted in the Red Army by entire battalions and regiments to struggle to the end and smash the enemy's fight encirclement and suppression campaign!

Defend every inch of our Soviet areas by launching guerrilla warfare on a massive scale so as to confuse him, encircle him, tire him out, strike at him and destroy him thereby helping our Red Army and in coordination with them win a decisive victory! Only victory through armed struggle—primarily by destroying the main force of the bandit chieftain Chiang Kai-shek—can we be assured of the freedom of land possession, the 8-hour work system, and all revolutionary rights given to us by the Soviet revolution. Only through victory attained by armed struggle can we ultimately overthrow the rule of imperialist Kuomintang and establish a nationwide Chinese soviet regime and finally be emancipated from under the iron heels of the landlord bourgeoisie!

Worker-peasant masses in the rear areas! Let's pool all our resources in order to assure the ration supply of our Red Army. Let every worker and peasant save 3 sheng of rice to help the Red Army, plant more vegetables and raise more pigs for the Red fighters fighting on the fronts! Let us complete as speedily as possible the selling of construction bonds, collect and transport our rations where they are needed, economize on all expenditures in the rear areas, save every penny and struggle for victory on the front lines!

The masses of workers and peasants in all the areas of the soviets! We are facing a battle to the death. Let us smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the imperialist Kuomintang with our iron fists and the unified and powerful will of the worker-peasant masses to win victory throughout soviet China! The soviet road is the only pathway leading to liberation for all exploited people and oppressed nations.

Long Live "May 1" Labor Day!

Long Live the Soviet New China!

(Signed) Mao Tse-tung, chairman, Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic of China

° "Red China," Vol 179, 24 April 1934.
COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG ON SCHEMES OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

April 1934

[Text] On 17 April, the Foreign Ministry of Imperialist Japan published its note to the big powers regarding their China policy. Since then, the imperialist countries, from the viewpoint of their interests in their spheres of influence in China, have made known opinions expressing dissatisfaction. Immediately, the Kuomintang Nanking government also published treasonous comments of the most shameless nature.

In order to secure the views of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on this matter, the reporter of this paper made a special visit to interview Comrade Mao Tse-tung. The following is the conversation that ensued.

The recent note of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is the clearest indication of Japanese imperialism's plan to gain sole control of China. In this note, Japanese imperialism has openly defined China as a Japanese protectorate. It has directly set forth its policy of protecting, with the force of arms, Japan's monopoly of all military, political and economic matters in China. This plan of Japanese imperialism is to directly suppress the Chinese Revolution with its own powers in the course of gaining sole control, and completely colonize China, as well as to create an even more consolidated rear defense area so as to launch a war against the Soviet Union.

Although this plan of Japanese imperialism met with the opposition of other imperialist countries, the true intent of this opposition is limited to their unwillingness to see Japan gain sole control of China and their desire to have China divided up by international imperialism and become the "open door" common colony of all. With regard to the direct suppression of China's revolution and the strengthening of the rear area defense for the war against the Soviet Union, the various imperialist countries are naturally in complete accord with Japan.
The traitorous Kuomintang Government of China behaves in the most shameless and pitiful manner. On the 19th, the spokesman of the Kuomintang Nanking government published a vile and base statement in which it held that it is the "natural obligation" of the Kuomintang Government to "propose international cooperation in order to achieve international peace and security." That is to say, to propose the joint partition of China by international imperialism and to guarantee the security of international imperialism's interests in China.

Of course, the Kuomintang truly "never had the desire to harm any nation," and it is even more true that it entertains no idea of disturbing the peace of Asia." The Kuomintang explains carefully to Japan: "The procurement of military supplies (such as military aircraft) and the employment of foreign military training officers and experts are only for national defense needs, and they are mostly for maintaining domestic peace and order."

Nevertheless, the fact is such that not a single penny of the loans obtained from the various countries of Britain, France, America and Italy, nor a single bullet from the equipment bought from these countries, has been used by the Kuomintang to oppose Japanese imperialism's aggression in Manchuria and North China and British and French violent and forceful occupation of Tibet. The Kuomintang has always adopted an attitude of compromise and capitulation toward imperialist aggression that does not even come near to anything like national defense.

What is actually meant by the Kuomintang's so-called "maintaining domestic order and peace" is the suppression of the worker-peasant revolutionary movement in China and, especially, the offensive against the Soviet areas and the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

Chiang Kai-shek, the arch criminal of national betrayal, deployed 70 percent of his regular troops in Kiangsi Province to carry out its fifth "encirclement and suppression." This is exactly an expression of the Kuomintang's loyalty to imperialism, playing the role of street sweeper for imperialism in dividing up China.

The Kuomintang has specifically underscored this point in its explanation to Japan. The Kuomintang went a step further to announce that "If existing unequal matters can be rectified, improvements may be made in Sino-Japanese relations, thereby preserving the common interests of the two countries." This is ample expression of the slavish nature of the Kuomintang running dog. The Kuomintang made such a shameless, tail-wagging announcement to the Japanese to gain their sympathy because it was fearful of not being able to efficiently discharge its duties as a dog and being unable to please every one of its owners.

The Soviet Central Government, representing the hard-working worker-peasant masses of China and the Worker-Peasant Red Army, resolutely opposes Japanese imperialism's plan to gain sole control of China and points out the Kuomintang's plot to guide imperialism toward a common partitioning of China,
In order to achieve freedom and liberation for the nation and society, the masses of Chinese workers and peasants must rise as one and, under the leadership of the Soviet regime, smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Soviet Red Army by the imperialist Kuomintang. This is the only way to obstruct the path to complete colonization of China, and wrest victory for the Soviet new China.

"Red China, Vol 181, 28 April 1934.

8439
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DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE WORKER-PEASANT RED ARMY ON ITS INTENTION TO MARCH NORTH TO COMBAT JAPANESE AGGRESSION

15 July 1934

[Text] Workers, peasants, soldiers and all revolutionary people in the country!

The devilish Japanese imperialists have swallowed up our three eastern provinces (Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning), invaded and occupied Jehol and Inner Mongolia. Now they have again seized our entire North China. In South China, Japanese imperialism is planning the direct occupation of Fukien Province with the use of big naval guns and their army, navy and air forces. It intends to transform all China into a colony and turn the people of China into colonial slaves, to forever suffer the butchery of Japanese bandits and to be raped, exploited and ravaged by them!

The warlords of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang and others, have always adopted an attitude of surrender and betrayal in dealing with Japanese imperialist aggression. They sold out the three eastern provinces, Jehol and Inner Mongolia. Now they are directly trafficking with "Manchukuo," recognizing that entity and selling out all of North China and Fukien Province. They are helping Japanese imperialism to suppress the Chinese anti-Japanese movement, the boycott of Japanese goods and the guerrilla warfare waged by the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army. Under the pretext of "no strength to oppose Japan," they amassed over a million soldiers from all over China, expended 100 million silver yuan and used all the planes and artillery they have to launch endless "encirclements" against the only anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist Soviet government of the workers and peasants and the Worker-Peasant Red Army. All these testify that the Kuomintang warlords are the loyalist of the running dogs of Japanese imperialism. The Kuomintang warlords are the biggest traitors and national betrayers in the history of China.

In dealing with the non-stop aggression of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have repeatedly called on
the people of China to arm and oppose Japanese imperialist aggression with national revolutionary warfare. They openly declared war and issued emergency mobilization orders for war against Japan to mobilize the people in the entire Soviet area and prepare them to directly fight against Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have repeatedly proclaimed to the people of China that under the three conditions of:

1) Cease all attacks against Soviet areas and the Red Army;

2) Cede to the people the initial powers toward democratic rights—the freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association and the freedom to strike and demonstrate; and

3) Immediately arm the people and create a people's anti-Japanese volunteer army to defend China," they are willing to conclude a fighting agreement with any armed unit. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have repeatedly opposed the Tangku agreement, direct negotiations between China and Japan, recognition of the Japanese puppet government of "Manchukuo" and the Kuomintang betrayal of North China.

They have repeatedly called for open aid to the anti-Japanese volunteer army in North China and all revolutionary movements in China opposing Japan and imperialism and opposition against all suppressions and slaughter perpetrated by imperialism and the Kuomintang against the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialism movement.

The broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary people throughout China are against the Kuomintang's betrayal of Jehol, the three eastern provinces (Heilungkiang, Liaoning and Kirin), Inner Mongolia, North China, Fukien Province and all of China, and support the proposal of the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army to oppose Japan and their anti-Japan activities. This has compelled the Kuomintang to blockade us even more frantically and attack us, thereby preventing our Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army from uniting directly with the people of China, from carrying out unified action with the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in North China to launch a national revolution against the Japanese imperialists and drive the bandits of Japanese imperialism from China. Not only have the Kuomintang warlords completely ignored the proposal to unite with the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army and together oppose Japan, but they have even more shamelessly betrayed China and stepped up the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army to help Japanese imperialism swallow up China.

In order to mobilize all their forces to fight directly against Japanese imperialism, the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army have been forced to first engage in bloody combat with the over 2-million-man bandit army of the Kuomintang which have been attacking us so as to preserve
the free, Soviet territories, which have already shaken off the fetters of imperialism and prevent them from ever again being trampled upon and betrayed by the Kuomintang, the running dogs of imperialism.

We absolutely will not abandon the anti-imperialist revolutionary base of China formed through countless bloody battles with the bandit army of the Kuomintang. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army absolutely cannot idly watch the enslavement of the Chinese nation by Japanese imperialism, absolutely will not permit the traitors and national betrayers in the Kuomintang to completely auction off all of China.

They absolutely will not allow Japanese imperialism to ravage and perpetrate mass butchery of the broad masses of the hard-working people of China, nor can it allow the solitary struggle of the Northwest Volunteer Army to go on (without support). The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army, at the crucial moment of the merciless, decisive battle against the superior force of the Kuomintang bandit army, have, with the greatest of determination and disregarding all difficulties, dispatched an anti-Japanese vanguard force to march north to fight the Japanese.

If only the armed units that are attacking us can accept the three conditions we have set forth, the main strength of our Worker-Peasant Red Army can then march north in full force, following the vanguard unit to unite with all armed forces in China and fight the Japanese together.

People of all China! The vanguard unit of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army marching north to fight the Japanese is willing to unite with the people of China and all armed forces to fight together against the Japanese, launch a people's national revolutionary war and overthrow Japanese imperialism. All the people opposing Japan should help the vanguard unit of our Worker-Peasant Red Army now marching north to fight against Japan, unite and rally around this vanguard force, join its column, arm and fight directly against the bandits of Japanese imperialism attacking China. All people opposing Japan are our compatriots and all armed units fighting against Japan are fellow travellers. We should all unite. All individuals, groups or armed units who prohibit or oppress our opposition against Japan are traitors and betrayers of the nation. We should all arise and wipe them out!

We hold that only a national revolution waged by the armed units of the people of all China can overthrow Japan and all imperialism and secure the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and preserve the territorial integrity of China.

For attaining victory in the national revolution the Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army make these concrete proposals.

1. Resolutely oppose the selling out of the three eastern provinces, Jehol, Inner Mongolia, North China, Fukien Province and all China by the
Kuomintang Government, oppose direct negotiations between China and Japan to sell out and take over the nation, oppose the recognition of the puppet "Manchukuo," and discard the dream of getting help from the League of Nations, the bandit clique of imperialism and from U.S. imperialism.

2. Immediately proclaim the severing of relations with Japan and the abrogation of the Tangku agreement and all secret Sino-Japanese treaties. Mobilize the entire Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force to fight against Japan. Immediately cease the attacks on the Soviet areas and stop blockading them so that the Worker-Peasant Red Army can be fully utilized in direct battle with Japanese imperialism.

3. Call on the people throughout the country to arm themselves with all of the weapons in the Kuomintang arsenals and in the Central Ordnance Factory, and the armaments being imported, organize anti-Japanese people's voluntary armies and guerrilla warfare and war against Japan and give active support to the Northeast Volunteer Army and the vanguard force of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army marching north to fight the Japanese.

4. Confiscate all business enterprises and assets of Japanese imperialists traitors and national betrayers, stop all payments of principal and interest on all debts owed by China to Japan, establish a progressive tax system and seize the entire military budget of the Kuomintang to use as combat funds against the Japanese (to finance the war against Japan).

5. Organize anti-Japanese people's groups on a general scale (such as anti-Japanese associations, committees for boycotting Japanese goods, committees for the solicitation of funds in support of the volunteer army and the Red Army, as well as all kinds of anti-Japanese control units, sabotage units, communication units, propaganda units and transportation units. Absorb the broad masses into the anti-Japanese groups without regard to age, sex, creed or political faction and use strikes, boycott of classes, absenteeism and closing of shops to oppose the aggression of Japanese imperialism and the national betrayal and capitulation of the Kuomintang Government.

The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army will struggle for this program without regard to any and all sacrifices. The Soviet Government and the Worker-Peasant Red Army ask the people of all China to support this program and, together with us, struggle to the end for the implementation of this program.

Let the Kuomintang, the running dog of imperialism and the traitors and national betrayers in the Kuomintang clamor that "China has no strength to oppose Japan!"

The anti-Japanese general mobilization of the people of China, the anti-Japanese armed forces countrywide, the anti-Japanese people's group throughout the nation have all the power to overthrow Japan and all imperialism and to overthrow the Kuomintang, this clique of traitors and national betrayers!
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman
Chou En-lai, vice chairman
Wang Chia-ch'iang [3769 4471 5638]

Chu Teh, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee of the
Worker-Peasant Red Army.

15 July 1934

* "Red China," Vol 221, 1 August 1934.

* Soldiers Daily Curriculum, Vol 1, July 1934.

* Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution, Vol 3,
  People's University of China, 1956.

8439
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COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG TALKS ON CURRENT SITUATION AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE VANGUARD UNIT OF THE RED ARMY

July 1934

[Text] The correspondent of this paper called on Chairman Mao of the Central Government yesterday to inquire on the question of the current situation and the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Unit of the Red Army. The talk follows.

After seizing Manchuria and Jehol by force and gaining control of P'ing-chin [1627 3160] to achieve open traffic and communication and following its publication of the announcement of its intention to solely take over China and its presentation to the Kuomintang of a list of over 1,000 "unresolved issues"—and a demand for their resolution—Japanese imperialism has begun stepping up its new offensive to swallow up China. The Japanese Government recently presented to the United States of America its suggestion to divide the Pacific Ocean equally between the two countries. It is frenziedly preparing for an anti-Soviet Union war in northern Manchuria and held the Dailen Conference with Kuomintang representatives, clearly indicating that Japanese imperialism is striving to mitigate the struggles between the imperialists in an attempt to achieve a temporary understanding among them and, together, divide up China, attack the Chinese revolution and oppose the Soviet Union. The Kuomintang Nanking Government, the running dog of Japanese imperialism, is presently spreading a smoke screen of "abrogate the Tangku Agreement" and "recover the war areas" to cover up the Dailen Conference, which is very rapidly selling out all of China and, on another side, the veteran pro-Japanese Pei Yang [0554 3152] warlord, An Fu-hsi [1344 4395 4762] is fully cooperating with the Kuomintang. Such important people as Wang Ke-min [3769 0344 2404] are streaming south and holding secret talks in Shanghai and at Mo-ch'i-en-shan [5359 0578 1472] with Huang Fu [7806 6744], T'ang You-jen [0781 2589 1103] and others. Tuan Ch'i-ju [3003 4388 3843], a chieftain of An Fu-hsi, went to Lu Shan [1687 1472] and conferred in secret with Chiang Kai-shek. This kind of massive cooperation between new and old traitors wholly shows that there is a high urgency in the new offensive of Japanese imperialism. The Chinese nation has come to an extremely dangerous juncture. The fate of slavery and doom is threatening the hard-working masses of the entire country.
The new offensive of Japanese imperialism and the massive attacks of the Kuomintang on our Soviet areas are completely coordinated as one. Several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops are advancing from the doorway areas of the Soviet region—Kuang-ch'ang [1684 2490], Lien-ch'eng [6647 1004], Lung-kang [7873 1481] and T'ai-ho [3141 0735]—into the central areas to carry out the last stage of the fifth encirclement, planning to bathe the Soviet area in blood, wipe out the Soviet Red Army and be the most dutiful running dog of imperialism in carving up China. These are the special characteristics of the current situation. To protect their own territory and take punitive action against the traitors—the Kuomintang—the Soviet Government and the Red Army are leading the broad masses and the heroic and courageous Red Army to unleash the most intensive and blood battles on various fronts against the enemy. They are putting all their forces and applying all means to the task of smashing this brutal "encirclement and suppression." The Soviet and the Red Army have long ago made up their minds to smash this ferocious encirclement, no matter what happens. Now it is even more necessary for us to utilize all resoluteness, tenacity and perseverance to smash this encirclement. By so doing we will also be sure of smashing it in the end.

In the most recent period we have created 70,000 new Red Army soldiers in the Soviet area and mobilized several hundred thousand tons of grain to solve the problem of supply between seasons, and, presently, we are carrying out the great mobilization for the autumn harvest. Our guerrilla forces have been greatly expanded and they are still being expanded. Guerrilla warfare is spreading on a wide scale. A mass movement of boiling salt and weaving cloth is underway to provide material support. Military industry, such as the manufacturing of ammunition, has increased by several tens of times. The Kuomintang does not even dream that we have such strength. The Kuomintang has early claimed that we were in a "very poor position" and they had won big victories. But the facts proved, and will prove in the end, that it is the rotten-to-the-core Kuomintang that is in a "very poor position."

Chiang Kai-shek, very pleased with himself, began to build blockhouses for several thousand li and several tens of layers deep in the Soviet areas and boasted how their "easy-pickings—fishing in packed waters" policy was soon to "succeed." True, Chiang Kai-shek has built many blockhouses and he has occupied some of our areas—Ningtu and Hsing Kuo. Many of the Kuomintang units, however, were routed and annihilated under the iron fists of the Red Army. These are things Chiang Kai-shek does not mention and prohibits from being mentioned. Such a stupid pig as Chiang Kai-shek does not understand that in the end it is Chiang Kai-shek and the entire landlord capitalist Kuomintang and not the Soviet Red Army, who will be in a "very poor position." They also do not understand that it is the imperialists who are directing the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang who will, in the end, be in a very "difficult position."

Let me again point out two things. First, what kind of influence is imparted to the over 1 million soldiers of theirs sent to attack our Soviet areas (Kiangsi, Szechwan, Hunan, Fukien and Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) when confronted
with the Soviet Red Army? We would like to say that such a broad mass of soldiers were, on the one hand, forced to attack us, and, on the other hand, they were receiving our revolutionary education. It can be said that the various Soviet areas are universities where the soldiers of the White armies are educated in revolution. It is not only the Red Army, but also his own soldiers, who are helping to dig the grave of Chiang Kai-shek. May I ask, does this stupid pig, Chiang Kai-shek, understand this? Second, the Kuomintang is frantically selling out the country, daily groveling on its hands and knees before imperialism, the arch enemy of the people throughout China, and presenting China to Japanese imperialism. Not a shot was fired against the several hundred-thousand Japanese bandit troops. But all the troops it has from the three eastern provinces, Jehol, Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hangchow, Hankow and Honan, Hopeh, Kiangsu and Chekiang were deployed to attack the Red Army while these areas were presented to imperialism to be ravaged and oppressed. Similarly, Ch'en Chi-t'ang [7115 3444 2768] did not guard against Hong Kong (British imperialism's base for aggression against China) but handed the Canton-Kowloon railway to the British and deployed 80 percent of his troops to Kiangsi and Fukien to attack the Red Army.

Will the broad masses of these areas allow Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Chi-t'ang to go on selling out the country like this to the very end? No. They absolutely will not. As for Chiang Kai-shek and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, (as well as Chang Hsueh-liang [1728 1331 5328], Ho Chien [0149 6943] and others), tens of thousands of bombs are buried right underneath their legs. These bombs have exploded or are exploding in some areas (the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army of the three eastern provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang and Liaoning, the People's Revolutionary Army, the Shanghai campaign, guerrilla attacks in various areas, and people's uprisings). In some areas, bombs will explode on a massive scale. Please tell me, who among the hard-working masses of the country and the soldiers of the White armies does not support the Chinese Communist Party's five big programs of opposition to the Japanese? Who does not support the order of the Soviet Central Government declaring war on Japan? Who does not accept the call made by the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee to "desist from attacking the Red Army, unite with the Red Army to fight together against Japanese imperialism?" There is no doubt that if they only read or hear about our programs, order, and call, they will jump up and be willing to carry them out. There is no doubt that the storm of nationwide opposition against Japan and imperialism will break and gather force under the call of the bright, Red banner.

At a time when the Kuomintang has sold out half of China and the people throughout the country, as though anticipating rain in a time of severe drought, look forward to the Red Army's march north to fight the Japanese, the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee, on 1 August of this year when the working people of the world were staging massive demonstrations against the imperialist war of aggression, dispatched an anti-Japanese vanguard unit. It has been approaching Fuchow for the
last 2 days and will pass through the various provinces in the east as it
marches north to fight the Japanese. The purpose of this is to make the people
throughout China realize that in all of China the Red Army is the only army
that is truly in opposition to the Japanese. Although the main force of the
Red Army has been prevented from marching north by the Kuomintang's fifth
encirclement, it is now proceeding to smash it and only after thoroughly
smashing the Kuomintang's encirclement can the Red Army march north in
strength. Meanwhile, it has dispatched a vanguard unit of its own forces.
Although this force has only one vanguard unit it is fully combat effective
and has ample fire power. The fighters and commanders are all of high
calibre and they have already shown the greatest courage in battles against
the Kuomintang troops. Although this unit is not heavily equipped, we
believe that it will receive the support of the people along the way. All
those elements in the Kuomintang forces who are determined to fight Japan
will join the ranks of this unit in an endless stream and it will very
rapidly grow into a huge force for fighting the Japanese.

Chiang Kai-shek and his Nanking Government, this faithful running dog of
Japanese imperialism, in order to discharge its duty, will surely send troops
to block the path as the unit marches north. If this should be so, then the
vanguard unit will have to fight the blocking troops of Chiang Kai-shek as
it advances. This will necessitate directing massive propaganda toward the
soldiers of this blocking force to win their sympathy and collapse their
ranks so that the march up north will be fast. The sooner we fight the
Japanese the better it will be because the new offensive of Japanese
imperialism is imminent. Fangs are bared and claws unsheathed as all the
imperialists prepare to divide up China and the disaster looming over the
heads of the people all over the country is growing greater and greater.

We are, therefore, calling for the country to rise as one and help the Soviet
Red Army so that we will be able to quickly smash the fifth encirclement
and concentrate our forces to fight against Japan and oppose imperialism.
Give assistance to our anti-Japanese vanguard unit so as to enable the anti-
Japanese Red Army to march forward rapidly. The anti-Japanese vanguard unit
of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army is now on the move! Our courageous
and heroic Worker-Peasant Red Army has taken concrete action to oppose the
aggression of Japanese imperialism and to save China from disaster.
Simultaneously, the Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Affairs
Committee have issued orders for the Red Army throughout the country to be
ready to move out at any time after the vanguard unit. But, the Kuomintang
is blocking the Red Army with a huge force of several hundred thousand,
deploying its entire northern army southward into Kiangsi Province. People
of China, is it still unclear to you? The Kuomintang is the street sweeper
for Japanese imperialism. People of the country and brothers of the White
Army, oppose the Kuomintang policy of national betrayal and surrender!
We demand the general mobilization of the army, navy and air force to fight
Oppose the attacks against the Red Army! The guns of all the troops in China should be pointed and fired at Japanese imperialism and at the traitors who are betraying the nation! Only thus can we, and will we, be victorious over Japanese imperialism!

"Red China," Vol 221, 1 August 1934.
ORDER OF CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC

15 August 1934

[Text] K'ung Ho-ch'ung [1313 5440 1404] was a member of the Central Executive Committee and former commander of the Red 16th Army. While working in the Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet area he disobeyed orders of the Central Revolutionary Military Committee several times. He was panicky and vacillating in attacks against the enemy and he led the Red Army in retreat and flight. In consideration of the fact that elements of the counterrevolutionary liquidation faction infiltrated the unit and caused heavy losses to the Red 16th Army and the people of the Hunan-Kwangtung-Kiangsi Soviet area, he was several times educated through criticism, but to no avail. Last October, he was relieved of his command of the Red 16th Army, but hoping that he would still be amenable to education, he was ordered to report to the Central Government for admission to the Red Army University to be educated. Not only did he show no improvement whatsoever, but also took to opposing the revolution. When he was assigned to the Replacement Division in July of this year he seized this opportunity to escape and surrender to the enemy. A member of the Central Executive Committee, K'ung Ho-ch'ung, who has a relatively long history of struggle, could not see the victorious future of the revolution and resorted to the most despicable action of rebellion at a time when our courageous and heroic Red Army and the broad masses were engaged in the final and decisive battle against the enemy's fifth encirclement. Besides expelling him from the Central Committee, a special order has been issued to all the Red armies in China, various local units and the various levels of the Soviet Government and the revolutionary groups in various areas and the worker-peasant masses of the Soviet and White areas are called upon, that if K'ung Ho-ch'ung is encountered, he should be executed on the spot as a warning to the vacillating and the rebellious.

By order,

Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Republic of China

Hsiang Ying, vice chairman
Chang Kuo-t'ao, vice chairman

15 August 1934

"Red China," Vol 228, 30 August 1934.

8439
CSO: 4005
SIX-POINT PROGRAM PROPOSED BY CHU TEH AND MAO TSE-TUNG

To Soldiers of White Army to Combat Japanese Aggression

1934

[Text] 1. [We] demand the immediate cessation of attacks against the Soviet areas and the march north to oppose Japan, the implementation of the policy of Chinese not fighting against Chinese, not fighting against the Red Army and turning the guns on Japanese imperialism and Chinese traitors.

2. [We] demand the freedom of assembly, association, speech and action for soldiers fighting against Japan, the organization of an anti-Japanese Soldiers' Union and the resolution of the major task of opposing Japan and matters of intimate concern to the soldiers.

3. [We] demand the improvement of living conditions and treatment of soldiers, payment in full in arrears, opposition to the use of abusive language and physical punishment and opposition against the fascist emperor's suppression and slaughter.

4. Arrive at an understanding with the Red Army and dispatch representatives from both sides so as to set up an alliance for the cessation of warfare and opposition to Japan.

5. Kill the officers who forbid soldiers to fight against Japan and rise in mutiny and join the Red Army, which is truly opposing Japan.

6. Refrain from burning and killing the workers and peasants in the Soviet areas, oppose the Kuomintang's oppression of the anti-Japanese mass movement and unite with compatriots all over China in unified opposition against Japan!

Brother soldiers of the White army!

285
Unite immediately and carry out this six-point program of opposition to Japan if you want to save China and do not wish to become colonial slaves. The Red Army is constantly prepared to welcome you to send representatives and jointly set up an alliance to cease fighting [among ourselves] and oppose Japan. Let us all unite and march north to fight the Japanese!

Soldiers of the White army and the Red Army unite!

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Down with the national traitor, the Kuomintang!

* Soldiers Daily Curriculum, Vol 1, July 1934.

8439
CSO: 4005
FINAL DECISION OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ENEMY'S FIFTH ENCIRCLEMENT

Adopted at Tsun-i Conference of Political Bureau on 8 January 1935

8 January 1935

[Text] After listening to the summation report made by Comrade x x on the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and the supplementary report by Comrade x x the enlarged session of the Political Bureau held that the report made by Comrade x x is basically incorrect.

1. In its decision on the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" the CCP Central Committee has clearly pointed out that the fifth "encirclement and suppression" is an ever more vicious offensive launched against the soviet revolutionary movement by imperialism and Kuomintang reaction.

It also pointed out at the same time that in this ferocious and decisive battle of the classes, the inner weaknesses of imperialism and the Kuomintang, and the new intensification of the revolutionary situation, has caused a new change in the relative strength of the classes in the country which is favorable to us, and it has arrived at the correct conclusion that "In the midst of the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' we possess all the conditions for winning a decisive victory, which are even more adequate than before" (CCP Central Committee decision 20 July 1933). But, in his report, Comrade x x over-estimated objective difficulties. He placed the reason for the inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the central Soviet area on the strong and powerful forces of imperialism and the Kuomintang. But, at the same time, he did not adequately appraise the current revolutionary situation. This will certainly lead to an opportunistic conclusion that, on the objective level, it will definitely be impossible to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression."

2. The CCP Central Committee, in accordance with its own correct decision, has set forth concrete tasks for opposing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression." One-and-a-half year's difficult struggle against "encirclement and suppression" has proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the CCP Central Committee's political line is correct. Especially, the party committee in the central Soviet area, under the direct leadership of the CCP Central Committee, has achieved unprecedented results in mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants to participate in the revolutionary war. The movement to expand the Red Army has become an upsurge
of the masses. The mobilization of worker and peasant activists, arming and sending them to the front, has reached over 100,000, thereby greatly expanding the Red Army. The model Red Youth Units are beginning to turn into rear support troops for the Red Army, and the people's armed organizations of the Red Youth Units have achieved great growth. Under the slogan of "all for victory on the front" the party committee has resolved financial, food and all other material needs of the Red Army. The intensification of the class struggle inside the Soviet area, the economic construction of the Soviet and the thorough improvement of relations between the Soviet government and the masses have even more vigorously developed the masses' enthusiasm and activism for participation in the revolutionary campaigns. All these have created favorable conditions for the thorough smashing of the fifth "encirclement and suppression." However, in his report, Comrade xx was clearly inadequate in his appraisal of these favorable conditions. Coming from this kind of inadequate appraisal it will be inevitable to reach the conclusion that on the subjective level we will have no ability to smash the "encirclement and suppression."

3. It should be pointed out that there are still many serious shortcomings in our work. With regard to the party's leadership of the broad masses of workers and peasants in opposing imperialism and the Kuomintang in the White area, and the leadership of the daily struggles, it still has not shown any marked progress. The development of guerrilla warfare and the work of collapsing the soldiers of the White army are still weak. The mutual help and coordination between the Red armies in the various Soviet areas given under a unified strategic purpose are still insufficient. All these weaknesses will undoubtedly affect the action taken to oppose the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and it will become an important cause for our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression." The existence of these weaknesses absolutely must not be construed as the chief reason for the inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression." But, in his report and conclusion Comrade x x exaggerated on these weaknesses in the work. And yet he did not understand, nor did he acknowledge, the basically erroneous estimates made on the strategic and tactical levels of the military leadership. This has prevented us from understanding where the main reason for the inability of the main force of our Red Army to leave the central Soviet area and our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in this area was. It covered up the evil fruits of the erroneous line in the strategic and tactical area of our military leadership. With the courage and skill of the Red Army in combat, model rear area work and the support of the broad masses notwithstanding, it will be impossible to achieve a decisive victory in the war if we cannot apply correct strategy and tactics in our military leadership. Herein lies the principal reason for our inability to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" in the central Soviet area.

4. After suffering defeats in four "encirclement and suppressions," the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-shek and his imperialist military advisers have learned that it was extremely unfavorable to use the strategy and tactic of "penetrating deeply" to give us battle inside the Soviet areas. Therefore, in the fifth "encirclement and suppression," they adopted the strategy
and tactic of protracted warfare and blockhouse warfare in an attempt to gradually whittle away our effective strength and our material and financial resources, constrict our Soviet area, and, finally, to search out our main force and engage it in decisive battle so as to achieve the objective of wiping us out.

Under these circumstances our strategic line should be defense through decisive engagements (offensive defense). Concentrate superior forces, select the enemy's weak spots, and, by using mobile warfare, confidently go about wiping out a part, or a major part, of the enemy, destroying them one at a time and thoroughly smashing the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" thoroughly. In the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression," defense through decisive engagements was substituted with the line of pure defense (defensive defense), mobile warfare was substituted with positional warfare and blockhouse warfare and the tactical principle of "short, swift thrusts" was applied to support this kind of strategic battle lines of pure defense. This enabled the enemy's strategy and tactic of protracted war and blockhouse warfare to achieve their objective and caused the main force of our Red Army to suffer partial losses and to withdraw from the central Soviet base area. It should be pointed out that this line is diametrically opposite to the basic principle of the strategy and tactics that would achieve victory for our Red Army.

5. At this present stage of the Civil War in China when we do not yet have the coordination of worker uprisings in big cities and towns and the mutiny of White soldiers, when our Red Army is still very inadequate in numbers, when our Soviet areas still constitute only a small part of China, when we still lack special weaponry such as planes and artillery, and when we are still in a situation of having to fight from interior lines, our strategic line, naturally, will be defense through decisive engagements when the enemy launches his "encirclement and suppression" and attacks us. That is, our defense will not be pure defense, but a defense seeking for a decisive engagement and then switching over to the counteroffensive. Pure defense can drain the enemy to a considerable degree and it can preserve territory for a certain period of time. But it will be impossible to protect the Soviet area by smashing the "encirclement and suppression" in the end, and there is no hope of achieving final victory. It is only by going from the defense to the counteroffensive (on a campaign and strategic level) and then to the offensive, winning victory in decisive engagements and wiping out enemy effective strength on a massive scale can we smash the enemy, protect the Soviet area and develop the Soviet revolutionary movement.

With this strategic line we should not immediately engage the attacking enemy in decisive battle we are not confident of winning before we have discovered and exploited the weaknesses of the enemy. What we should do is to continue to confuse and lure the enemy on various fronts by using our secondary forces (such as guerrilla units, people's armed force, independent battalions and regiments, and part of the Red Army's main force). In this regard, the main thing is to contain the enemy with mobile warfare while the main forces withdraw to a suitable distance or move out on the enemy's
flanks or his rear areas, conceal and concentrate and seek favorable opportunity and launch surprise attacks on the enemy. Under the situation of fighting along interior lines, the withdrawal and concealment of the Red Army in the face of enemy's attacks with superior forces will be fully adequate to tire out the enemy and cause him to become arrogant and careless and to commit errors and expose their weaknesses. This creates the condition for switching over to the counteroffensive and winning victory in decisive battles.

We must most carefully analyze and appraise the enemy situation so that the engagement will be properly planned and launched at a favorable time. Do not permit enemy's feints and provocations to make us unnecessarily deploy our forces and engage the enemy and become fatigued, thereby causing us to lose the opportunity for victory in decisive engagements toward a certain direction. In order to achieve victory, we do not have to block the path the attack is taking when the enemy begins his advance in accordance to (his) plan. We should wait until he has penetrated to a suitable distance and then encircle and wipe him out (that is, luring the enemy to penetrate deeply). For the purpose of achieving victory we will do whatever is necessary, temporarily abandoning part of the territory of the Soviet area, even to the extent of having the main force withdraw temporarily from the Soviet base area, because we know that we will not only be able to recover abandoned territory, but also expand the territory of the Soviet area if we only can annihilate the enemy and smash his "encirclement and suppression." All these are for the purpose of enabling the Red Army to always assume the active role and fight successfully against the enemy's attacks and "encirclement and suppression," and to always avoid a passive role and its ensuing unfavorable results.

All these principles, however, were flouted in the fifth battle. In February of last year a cable from the Communist International correctly expounded this: "We feel as if nearly all the plans and measures adopted by the military command during this period were frequently produced by the pressures brought to bear by the enemy. The enemy's provocations have caused us to engage in unnecessary reorganization of our forces. Therefore, our forces were unable to participate vigorously in engagements with the enemy because of continuous changes. We feel that we should defeat the enemy in those areas where we have already won certain victories, and refrain from attempting to defeat the enemy on all fronts at the same time."

The leaders of the pure defense line were unable to understand this kind of instruction from the Comintern, therefore, the pure defense line, which was wholeheartedly willing to place itself in a passive role, did not, and was also unable to, plan to defeat the enemy on all fronts at the same time, but attempted to stop the enemy on all fronts at the same time. This was so not only prior to February of last year but also after the main force of the Red Army had to withdraw from the Soviet area. The slogan
"attack on all fronts" set forth in the past by Comrade x x x became resistance on all fronts during the fifth "encirclement and suppression." Strategically speaking, both of them are wrong. Politically, the slogan "do not abandon an inch of soviet territory" is correct, but it becomes wholly erroneous when mechanically applied to strategy. It can easily become a camouflage for the line of pure defense.

6. In order to win victory in a decisive engagement it is absolutely necessary to concentrate superior forces. Currently, in a contrast between enemy forces and ours, the enemy has absolute superiority in troops. They often attack us with troops several times, or even several tens of times, stronger than ours. But this is not something we have to fear because the enemy is situated on the exterior line and has adopted a strategic policy of encirclement, advancing along different routes and converging to attack. This creates the opportunity for us to defeat the enemy one at a time, and enables us to benefit from fighting along exterior lines in the campaign (localized exterior lines) while engaged in strategic interior line combat. That is, contain the enemy's one line or several lines of advance with part of our forces and concentrate the greatest force to encircle and wipe out one line of the enemy's advance, using this kind of method to defeat the enemy individually and smash his "encirclement and suppression." Under the situation of fighting along strategic interior lines, it is only by concentrating superior forces to seek victory in exterior line engagements in the campaign can it enable the Red Army to constantly grasp the initiative and force the enemy into a passive position, and finally to smash his entire plan.

In the past, however, the leaders of the pure defense line almost always scatter their forces (primarily the dispersement of the 1st and 3d Army Corps) in their resistance along all fronts against the enemy's advance. The result of this dispersement has frequently put us in a passive position, weakening our forces everywhere and proving advantageous to the enemy for defeating us one at a time. In the war of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" we were unable to achieve victories in many of the campaigns (such as the campaigns at Hsun-k'ou [3169 0656], T'uan-tsun [0957 2625], Chien-ning [1696 1337], and Wen-fang [3306 0972] because our forces were not concentrated. The central task given the Red Army by the leaders of the pure defense line was to block the advance of the enemy in an attempt to wipe out part of the enemy with "short, swift thrusts," and it was not to seize the initiative, not to win victory in decisive engagements. The result was that the number of enemy (troops) wiped out by the Red Army was very small, and, in the end, the Soviet area was also ravaged by the enemy.

7. Wiping out the enemy in mobile warfare is the specialty of our Worker-Peasant Red Army. When the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" began, the Comintern pointed out for us (in a cable sent in October of the year before): "In our actions we should not adopt the method of positional warfare, but adopt the method of mobile warfare on both flanks of the enemy." In last February's cable it was repeated: "Based on past experience, it is plain that our troops have won many great victories in mobile warfare,
but they were unable to win victory in battles fought by storming the blockhouse areas." These instructions from the Comintern were completely correct. Although we did not have the opportunity under the blockhouse warefare of the enemy's fifth encirclement to adopt mobile warfare on a massive scale as was the case with the enemy's "deep penetration" in the first, second, third and fourth "encirclement and suppressions," the feasibility of mobile warfare still exists. This, in practice, has been proved many times (in the various campaigns of Hsun-k'ou, T'uan-tsun, Chiang-chun-tien [1412 6511 3013], Chien-ning, Wen-fang, Hu-fang [3275 0972], and, especially at the time of the 19th Route Army uprising. Nevertheless, the pure defense line which grew out of the fear of blockhouse warefare and Comrade Hua Fu's [5478 1133] theory of "short, quick, thrusts" caused us to switch from mobile warfare to positional warfare during the fifth campaign. But this mode of positional warfare, at that time, was only beneficial to the enemy, and it was extremely disadvantageous to the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

Under current technical conditions, storming the enemy's blockhouses should be rejected. It is only in a situation where the blockhouses are weak, or isolated, or it is either for the purpose of striking at enemy reinforcements or to force the enemy to deploy his troops that attacks on enemy blockhouses are permitted. Frequently, assaults on enemy blockhouses have been undertaken lightly with hardly any affect. This is not surprising, because war has been taken as a child's game.

Due to underestimating the feasibility of mobile warfare in the fifth war, there was absolute separation of the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" from his first, second, third and fourth encirclements. This, in turn, led to the absolute negation of past experiences in mobile warfare and to the absolute denial of the combat methods of luring the enemy in to wipe him out. This, in practice, led to the reluctant rejection of the correct instructions of the Comintern and these were natural rationale for the leaders of pure defense and short, quick thrusts.

8. Because of the overestimation of the enemy's blockhouse warefare and the underestimation of the feasibility of mobile warfare, the theory that victory can only be realized through tactics was born. It held that only tactical victory can be turned into a campaign victory, and, then, victory in the campaign will bring about changes favorable to us strategically (Comrade Hua Fu's article and comrades x x and x x letters to Lin Piao and P'eng Te-huai). It held that "under blockhouse warefare there can only be many small victories but no clear-cut victory" (see Comrade x x's speech in the Political Bureau and Comrade x x's "Red Star" article, and it also held that blockhouse warefare can be handled only by dividing the troops to resist and by short, quick thrusts. The theory and practice of all these strategies and tactics of opportunism in the revolutionary war became bankrupt during the fifth campaign.

We cannot deny that blockhouse warefare has created new difficulties for smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" (whereas they first reviled blockhouse warefare with the empty talk of the left--see Comrade x x's article in "Red Star"). We do not deny, but should prepare for, the
technical conditions of the Red Army (planes and artillery), especially the uprisings of worker-peasant soldiers inside the blockhouse areas so as to overcome even more powerful enemy blockhouses in the future. However, blockhouse warfare can also be smashed, even at present. Blockhouse warfare has fatigued the enemy's troops and dispersed his forces. It has fostered the enemy's dependency on the blockhouses, causing them to lose confidence of victory when they leave them.

At the same time the enemy cannot advance on us without leaving his blockhouses. Nor can he build enough blockhouses all over the country to restrict the movement of the Red Army. All these taken together create favorable conditions for us to overcome blockhouse warfare. The method to be applied by the Red Army toward smashing blockhouse warfare is still dependent upon mobile warfare, dependent upon unfolding guerrilla warfare all around the blockhouse lines in a coordinated move with the Red Army and dependent upon the intensification of the movement among the White soldiers. We wait inside the lines of the blockhouses for the enemy to advance and then destroy his troops on a massive scale outside the lines of the blockhouses, when the Red Army has moved to an area free of blockhouses to carry out its activities, to force the enemy to leave his blockhouses and engage us in mobile warfare. If we only apply the strategic and tactical principles of mobile warfare flexibly, skillfully and with strategem, we will then certainly be able to smash the enemy's blockhouse warfare. Only a correct strategic guideline can correctly lead a campaign and correctly apply tactics to smash blockhouse warfare and to smash the "encirclement and suppression." In pure defense and in "short, quick thrusts" victory is not mainly dependent upon correct leadership of the strategic campaign, but merely on tactics. This, in practice, is to surrender to blockhouse warfare, not to smash it.

9. The understanding of the leaders of the pure defense line is also incorrect with regard to the question of protracted war and waging war with quick, decisive engagements. The Chinese civil war is not a short-term war. It is a prolonged, protracted war. The Soviet Revolution was developed and consolidated in the midst of the continuous smashing of the enemy's encirclements. When favorable conditions occur, we should switch over completely from the defensive to the counteroffensive, and then to the offensive, wipe out the enemy and smash the "encirclement and suppression" (for example, the first, second, third and fourth wars, and prior to the Kuang-ch'ang [1684 2490] campaign). When unfavorable conditions arise we can temporarily withdraw to conserve our effective strength and then go over to the counteroffensive and offensive when other favorable conditions came into being (for example, after the Kuang-ch'ang campaign of the fifth war). This is the first basic principle. Simultaneously, however, another principle must also be understood. In order to wage a protracted and prolonged war, all efforts must be made to achieve a quick and decisive battle situation in each of the "encirclement and suppressions" and in every one of the campaigns, because under the present balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, it will be extremely disadvantageous for us to adopt the policy of protracted warfare toward each and every one of the "encirclement and suppressions" and toward each and every one of the campaigns.
We must apply a correct strategic policy and smash the enemy's plans when he uses protracted warfare against us (as in the fifth "encirclement and suppression") and win a decisive victory in a period of time we can sustain to smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." Using figures of our manpower, material resources and munition supply to compare to what the Kuomintang has (the so-called competition with the enemy at attrition, see Comrade X X's article in "Red Star")—such understanding of protracted warfare is basically wrong. In such things we are at present situated in an absolutely "inferior position" and such comparison of figures can only give proof of contrary conclusions.

Precisely because we must wage protracted warfare in the long-range Civil War, and, at the same time, wage a campaign of quick decisions in every campaign, we must be especially careful in deciding upon our strategic campaign plans. The strategy of pure defense pursued during the fifth war was basically wrong, and the many battles of desperate recklessness fought under this erroneous strategy (such as the campaigns of Kuang-ch'ang, Mao-ting-san [3029 0002 0005], San-chi-fang [0005 3305 0972], P'ing-liao [1627 4070] and others) were similarly erroneous. The Red Army must avoid those battles which have no prospects of victory. Even though the battle decision was correct at that point of time we should immediately refuse to engage in such battles when the situation changes unfavorably against us. It is a heinous crime to play with uprisings, and it is also criminal to play with battles.

Exactly because we must wage protracted warfare and wage quick and decisive engagements in the campaign, we must provide the Red Army with the necessary time for resting its forces and for educating and training them. These are prerequisite conditions for victory in the war. It is wrong to say that it was not possible to rest and train during the fifth war. That is the inevitable conclusion of proponents of pure defense and short, quick thrusts. It is also incorrect to hold that in order to inject vigor into the Red Army activities we must have it fighting battles frequently, and without stop, and there is no need to give attention to rest and training. Without the necessary rest and training we cannot then fight battles well and victoriously. The organization of the Red Army must be suitable to the environment of the current Civil War. It is wrong to establish many new regimental and divisional units before the main force has been brought up to strength. Only after the main force is up to strength should new units be established. It is not right to throw into battle all by itself a division of new troops who have no education or training and who have no combat experience. There should be a core of veteran soldiers in the division of new troops, and, in the initial stage, place them by all possible means under the command of a veteran army corps in order to have some combat experience drilled into them. The kind of unnecessary, unwieldy, top-heavy organizations and those improperly equipped, should all be converted to light equipment, and the company and the leadership of units below divisional level must be strengthened.
Precisely because we must wage protracted warfare and fight short, decisive engagements in the campaign, we must oppose that kind of theory which places the need to conserve effective strength in opposition to the need to protect the Soviet area. The heroic sacrifice of the Red Army is entirely necessary for the purpose of fighting a victorious battle. This is the essence of the class armed forces, the foundation of victory for the revolutionary war. This kind of sacrifice is made in exchange for victory, and this kind of victory is worthwhile. This cannot be suitably applied to conduct a battle of desperation because we must understand that only by conserving our effective strength can we truly defend the Soviet area. Without a powerful Red Army the Soviet area cannot be protected, while with one we can, after all, recover, even if the Soviet area sustained partial loss temporarily. Furthermore, only by relying upon the Red Army can new Soviet areas be formed.

Under the principle of waging protracted warfare we must oppose the two kinds of erroneous tendencies which may arise after we have smashed the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" with counteroffensive engagements. One type is conservatism rising from fatigue and overestimation of the enemy's strength. This type of conservatism causes us to become disappointed and discouraged, causes us to stop and become immobile. It causes us to become unable to go over from the counteroffensive to the offensive to wipe out even more enemies, develop even bigger Soviet areas and expand the forces of the Red Army. It prevents us from being able to obtain adequate conditions to smash the new "encirclement and suppression" before its onset. The other is adventurism rising from overestimation of one's own victory and inadequate appraisal of enemy strength. This kind of adventurism prevents us from achieving victory from our offensives (such as offensives undertaken without prospects of victory, and unnecessary offensives against key cities), and even causes the victory already won to be wasted or go up in smoke. It causes excessive losses to the Red Army effective strength, causes neglect in the mission to expand the Red Army, expand the Soviet territory and achieve the development and consolidation of strategic areas. This similarly prevents us from obtaining favorable conditions to continue smashing the enemy before the coming of his "encirclement and suppression." Opposing these two erroneous tendencies is a serious problem for the party with regard to the question of strategic offensive. That is, in the period between the enemy's two encirclements.

Under the principle of waging quick, decisive engagements in the campaign we must oppose the opportunist tendency of hastily accepting battle, which has its roots in fear and panic, or of being imprudent in the initial battle. We must oppose opportunist trend toward feeling that nothing could be done about it after failing to win victory in a battle against the enemy which was launched in the hope of knocking him out first, or not making adequate preparations on the pretext of launching a quick, decisive engagement, or not making all necessary preparations in a period of time that can possibly be sustained, against the enemy's encirclement. For a quick, decisive engagement there are many necessary conditions (such as strategic
superiority, correctness of campaign leadership, mobile warfare, grasping
the opportune moment and concentration of forces) to wipe out the enemy
troops. Only by wiping out enemy troops can a battle situation be quickly
resolved and cause the enemy's offensive and "encirclement and suppression"
to be smashed.

10. One of our important strategies for smashing the enemy's "encirclement
and suppression" is to take advantage of every friction within the
counterrevolution and vigorously widen the rift within their ranks so as to
benefit our switching over to the counteroffensive and offensive. The
incident of the 19th Route Army in Fukien Province was the crux to smashing
the enemy's fifth encirclement. At that time, the CCP Central Committee
adopted the correct political line of utilizing this contradiction within
the Kuomintang. It concluded a cease-fire agreement with the 19th Route
Army so as to impel it to oppose Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek.
At that time, Comrade x x and others, under the empty talk of the left,
adopted an opposing policy on the strategic plane. They did not understand
at all that utilizing the 19th Route Army incident politically and militarily
was an important key to smashing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppres-
sion." On the contrary, they felt that the Red Army's continuation of its
activities on the eastern front and striking at the rear and flanks of
Chiang Kai-shek's troops attacking the 19th Route Army was equivalent to
helping the 19th Route Army. They deployed the main force of the Red Army
to the west to engage in the useless effort of attacking the blockhouses
in the Yung-feng [3657 0023] area and lost this precious opportunity. They
basically did not comprehend that the existence of the 19th Route Army's
People's Government at that time was advantageous to us. Striking at
Chiang Kai-shek's flanks and rear in direct coordination with the 19th
Route Army was precisely for our own benefit. This was not because the
19th Route Army was a revolutionary army. On the contrary, it was merely
a faction within the counterrevolution. This faction planned to use even
more swindles and arbitrary propaganda, and even such terms as socialism,
to preserve in entirety the rule of the landlord bourgeoisie. Only by
demonstrating to the worker-peasant soldiers of the 19th Route Army with
concrete action that we give aid to the anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kai-shek
struggles of any faction can we even more easily expose the swindles of the
warlords of the 19th Route Army and win the soldiers over to our side in the
common war against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.

Only by adopting on a military plane a policy of direct coordination with
the 19th Route Army can we retain the opportunity, at that crucial point
in time, to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's main force. This kind of condition
has no precedent in the many past battles. We did not utilize this
militarily. For the leaders of pure defense this would not be out of the
ordinary, because their objective, originally, was merely to resist the
enemy's advance. As for using the frictions and contradictions within the
enemy ranks to bring about our going over to the counteroffensive and the
offensive was a rash move in their eyes.
11. Similarly, error in principle was also committed on the question of changing strategy and carrying out the breakthrough of the encirclement. The first thing we should discuss is that when we saw that the possibility of achieving decisive victory by continuing to fight along interior lines in the central Soviet area had become remote, and, finally, had become impossible (period between May and July 1934, that is, after the Kuang-ch'ang campaign). We should have altered our strategic policy without any hesitation and carried out a strategic withdrawal in order to conserve the effective strength of the Red Army's main force, and sought favorable opportunities in the vast blockhouse-like area for an opportune moment to go over to the counteroffensive, smash the encirclement and create new Soviet areas to protect the old. In its 25 June cable, the Comintern pointed out in this manner: "(the resources for) the mobilization of new armed forces in the central area have not dried up yet. The Red Army's strength to resist and the situation in its rear area are not enough to make us panic.

Even speaking on the matter of the Red Army's main force in the Soviet area withdrawing, its only reason is to conserve its effective strength and avoid the possibility of being attacked by the enemy. On discussing the resolutions of the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Committee and the 13th Plenary Session of the Communist International the future prospects of the struggle and the current international situation as well as the flexible policy of the Red Army, it was, first of all, inclined toward the conservation of effective strength, to consolidate and expand under new conditions and to wait for the opportunity to launch a massive offensive against imperialism and the Kuomintang." On this crucial point it was clear that our strategic policy was also incorrect. This question was not mentioned at all in the "strategic plan for the 3 months of May, June and July." Although this problem was brought up in the "Strategic plan for the 3 months of August, September and October" and preparations were also begun for withdrawing from the Soviet area, nevertheless, the basic principle of the new plan was still contrary to the strategic policy which should have been adopted at that time. "Use all available strength to continue with the defense of the Soviet area and win a massive victory in the campaign by doing so" and "launch guerrilla warfare and strengthen activities in the secondary direction to achieve a strategic change in the situation"—all these still remain as the second article of the first part of the basic principle of the new plan, and the question of conserving effective strength was completely ignored. Whereas this question was the foundation of the strategic policy on which the decision to withdraw from the Soviet area rests. The error in timing, plus the emergence of positional warfare in this campaign, caused heavy losses to the Red Army. This kind of contradictory attitude of preparing for a breakthrough on the one hand, and, on the other, "Use all available strength to continue with the defense of the central area" is precisely the manifestation of the inevitable panic of leaders of the pure defense line when they arrived at the crucial moment of change.

Of even greater importance are our activities for breaking through. In the mind's eye of Comrade Hua Fu they were basically irresolute and not combat orientated. It was a kind of panicky running away, home moving type of
activity. Precisely for this reason, not only was this massive changeover not conducted in accordance with the Comintern's instruction to carry out work directed at explaining the situation to the cadres and Red commanders, it was not even brought up for discussion at the Political Bureau conference. The political objective of the mass movement of several million people was not considered to be a significant problem. The necessary time for rest, reorganization and training was not given to the main force of the Red Army for moving from the Soviet area to the White area and for changing from positional warfare to mobile warfare, and a hasty departure was made. They were silent from beginning to end with regard to the basic questions of what the present mission was, where they were going and why they were withdrawing from the Soviet areas. Therefore, they were unable to heighten the enthusiasm and activism of the Red Army fighters on the military level, and, especially, on the political level. This cannot be but a grave error. The huge column of the military committee and other rear echelon departmental organizations of the Army Corps caused great difficulties to the Red Army fighting on the move, turning all combat troops into a covering force, slowing down movement and losing the opportunity for reaching the pre-designated area.

It was completely forgotten that the strategic switch-over carried out by the Red Army would encounter serious opposition from the enemy, that in the course of the long move it would have to fight many difficult and decisive battles with all of the pursuing and blocking enemy forces before being able to arrive at its objective. All these military, political and organizational errors, especially the fact that the strategic policy was not based upon the principle of obtaining the necessary and opportune moment to engage the enemy in decisive battle brought about a situation in which we find ourselves almost always being placed in a passive position and frequently subjected to enemy attacks and being unable to strike at the enemy with strength. It therefore turned the 3-month breakthrough campaign into a covering engagement everywhere, and there were no free rein offensives taken on our own initiative. Although "preparing for combat" was frequently on the lips, in practice, we were frequently "avoiding combat" besides conducting covering engagements. The morale of the Red Army could not be uplifted, there was over-fatigue from being unable to get a moment's rest. And it resulted in a decrease in personnel to an unprecedented degree. It also caused the correct slogan of "counteroffensive" to become, in practice, a camouflage for the policy of avoiding combat advocated by Comrade x x and others. There was no preparation for actually seizing victory in the counteroffensive when it became necessary. We failed to compel the enemy to change his entire plan to attack the central Soviet area with the Red Army's change of strategy so as to protect the central area, smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression," establish the Hunan base and even to conserve the effective strength of the Red Army at a high level. All these were the unavoidable result of basically adopting avoidance of combat in the strategic policy. This strategic avoidance of combat stems from our erroneous viewpoints. That is to say the Red Army must first arrive at its designated area (western Hunan Province), unload its baggage and then launch a counteroffensive to wipe out the enemy. Otherwise, it would not be possible.
In the pursuit of the enemy (for instance, the columns of Chou [0719] and Hsueth [5641], they were afraid to give battle even when the enemy became separated and they were fatigued. The source of this kind of erroneous viewpoint lies in not understanding the fact that the current situation does not allow us to go about our task in such a simple, nonchalant and straightforward manner, as well as in overestimating the strength of the pursuing enemy. This way of doing things might be possible in a brief situation involving inconsequential movements of small units. But, in a situation covering several thousand li of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and involving the massive strategic relocation of the Red Army's main force it was impossible. Avoid battles with the enemy which are unnecessary and where no weaknesses can be exploited. Engagements with the enemy should not be avoided when the contrary arises. Herein lies the main reason for the failure to accomplish their own mission in the breakthrough activities. This error in principle kept on developing right up to the final stage of the breakthrough campaign. When the Red Army reached the borders of Hunan and Kweichow it still acted in a mechanical manner and wanted to advance into the area of the 26th Army Corps. They did not know how to change action guidelines with the situation that had already changed. When the Red Army arrived in the area of Wu-chiang [3527 3068], they again did not know how to delineate the task of switching over in the counter-offensive in accordance with the changes in the new situation to wipe out the pursuing troops of Chiang Kai-shek, but only recognize the task of wiping out a handful of the enemy in Kweichow and some so-called bandits. Although the last two errors were corrected due to the resolute opposition of the majority of the comrades in the Political Bureau, they were enough to display the habitual opportunist tendencies of Comrade Hua Fu and others with regard to strategy.

The prospects in the development of the pure defense line are: Either it would be desperate recklessness or flightism. There could be nothing else.

12. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that all the facts have substantiated that our line of pure defense in military matters is the principal reason for our inability to smash the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression." All attempts to defend the erroneous line with regard to military leadership with the party's correct line will be futile. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that this kind of pure defense line in military affairs is a kind of concrete manifestation of right opportunism. It rises from inadequate appraisal of enemy strength, overestimating objective difficulties, especially the difficulties of protracted campaigns and blockhouse warfare, underestimating one's own subjective strength, especially the strength of the Soviet area and of the Red Army and from not understanding the characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary war.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that the struggle against the pure defense line in military matters is the concrete struggle in the party against right opportunism. This kind of struggle should be launched and intensified in the entire party. All attempts to turn this struggle into an unprincipled individual squabble will be severely dealt with.
13. Furthermore, the enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that Comrade x x, especially Comrade Hua Fu's, method of leadership was very poor. All the functions of the military committee were single-handedly monopolized by Comrade Hua Fu, the collective leadership of the military committee was abolished, there was a great increase of punitivism, and self-criticism was nonexistent. Not only all differing opinions on the military plane were completely ignored but repressive measures were adopted against them, and the ingenuity, expertise and creativity of lower level commanders were stifled. Many valuable experiences and lessons of past revolutionary battles were thrown away under the pretext of switching strategy and tactics and labeled "guerrillaism." Although the majority of the comrades in the military committee have made correct suggestions many times, and many intense debates have broken out over it, it did not affect Comrade Hua Fu and Comrade x x. All these contributed to the abnormal phenomenon within the military committee.

At the same time, the Political Bureau believes even more so that, in the past, the Secretariat and the Political Bureau's leadership of the military committee was extremely inadequate. The greatest part of the Secretariat's and Political Bureau's attention was focused on the huge Red Army and on matters concerning the assurance of material supply to the Red Army. Unprecedented great results were achieved in this respect (in these fields). Very little attention was given to strategy and tactics, placing this responsibility on the shoulders of a very few comrades, mainly Comrade x x and Comrade Hua Fu. We did not clearly understand that the question of conducting a war affects the overall situation of victory or defeat, and mistakes could turn achievements gained from the best rear area work into smoke. The mistake the Political Bureau made on this question should be admitted. All the comrades of the Secretariat should bear an even greater part of the responsibility because some of the important decisions or strategic plans were approved by them.

But the enlarged session of the Political Bureau especially set forth the grave errors of Comrade x x in this respect. Representing the CCP Central Committee, he directed the work of the military committee. With regard to the error in line committed by Comrade Hua Fu in directing battles and the abnormal phenomenon within the military committee, he not only did not correct it in a timely manner but vigorously supported and nurtured the development of this kind of error. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau considers that Comrade x x should bear the main responsibility in this respect, but Comrade x x, in his conclusion, did not admit his own errors, nor did he accept the criticism of the greatest majority of the comrades. It must be pointed out that with regard to Comrade x x, this kind of error was not an error of the entire political line, but a partial and serious political error.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that the error committed in the past on military leadership must be thoroughly rectified in order to smash the enemy's encirclement campaign, create new Soviet areas and improve the method of leadership of the military committee.
14. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau holds that although our past erroneous leadership in military matters has caused us to be unable to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" within the central Soviet area and brought about the forced withdrawal, with partial losses, of our main force Red Army from the Soviet area. Nevertheless, the Red Army's main force still exists. We have the superior conditions based on the masses, the correct leadership of the party, a relatively good area with regard to materials and terrain and the support of the broad masses throughout the country. In coordination with the victories of the Fourth Front Army and of the 26th Army Corps, plus the correct conduct of warfare, we believe all these difficulties can be overcome through the industrious efforts of the entire body of our comrades and the red commanders. At the same time the difficulties of the enemy have increased greatly and the area of our activities has become very distant from the counterrevolutionary base of the Nanking government. The blockhouse area, which was run by Chiang Kai-shek for many years and on which he placed his reliance, is now no more. The contradictions and disunity within the ranks of the warlords have further multiplied and the main force of our chief enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, has been weakened in the fifth "encirclement and suppression." The division of China by imperialism, the Kuomintang's policy of national betrayal and the unprecedented collapse of the national economy throughout the country have made it even more clear to the people of the nation that only the Soviet can save China. They, thereby, become even more sympathetic to the Soviet Revolution and give it support, and even directly participating in struggles on behalf of the Soviet political power. All these are favorable conditions for smashing the enemy's new encirclement campaign, creating new Soviet bases and developing a nation-wide soviet movement. It must be pointed out, however, that the current situation has set critical tasks before the party and the Red Army. This is because at no time will imperialism and the counterrevolutionary warlords of the Kuomintang relax their drive against us. In the face of the new encirclement campaign we must recreate Soviet areas as there are no existing ones, and the central Red Army is not in the Yunnan-Kweichow area. Our victory must be won through arduous struggles of our own. The creation of new Soviet areas cannot be successful without going through bloody struggle. The current central problem is how to be victorious over the troops of Szechwan, Yunn, Kweichow and Chiang Kai-shek. The movements of the Red Army must have a high degree of flexibility in order to fight successfully against these enemies.

The basic principles of revolutionary warfare have been decided and to accomplish battle tasks it will be necessary to apply these principles in a flexible way. The special capacity of the Red Army for mobile warfare has been considerably weakened by protracted positional warfare in the battles of the fifth encirclement, and, right now, the various levels of Red Army commanders are required to have a high level of tactical skill in mobile warfare. The resolute and rapid change over from the tactics of positional warfare (short, quick thrusts) to the tactics of mobile warfare is a very serious task. Necessary training in skills must be given to the fighters, especially the new ones. In political work everything must meet with the
current need of the movement in order to guarantee the accomplishment of every combat task. The Red Army needs even more to rest up and reorganize during battles and also to expand itself in a big way. The Red Army should tighten up its own discipline. It must maintain even closer relations with the broad masses of hard working worker-peasant masses and become as one with them and strengthen in a big way the work of the local people. The current situation demands that the leadership of the party and the Red Army should exert all efforts to resolve these basic questions concretely and positively.

The work of the party in the White area must be established and strengthened. There must be a thorough change in the leadership method of the mass struggle in the White area. The work of collapsing the White army must be launched in a positive manner. The propagation of large-scale guerrilla warfare is one of the party's most central tasks. The party must hold fast to the leadership of guerrilla warfare in the central Soviet area and the Soviet areas of Hunan-Kiangsi and Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi provinces, change past methods of work to conform with the new situation. Finally, even more closer relationship must be established with the 26th Army Corps and the Fourth Front Army and also strengthen the leadership over them in order to achieve unified action of all the Red armies in the country and their coordination with each other.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that we can accomplish these serious tasks that have been placed before us, and their accomplishment ensures subsequent new victories in the revolution. New victories in the revolution will make our central Red Army create a new Soviet base area in the vast expanse of the three provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan, bring about the recovery of our old Soviet area, and the creation of a unified liaison between the Red armies in various areas with the Soviet areas. It will also bring about a change of the struggle of the worker-peasant masses throughout the country into a victorious revolution.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau believes that the Chinese Soviet Revolution, having its rich historic source, cannot be wiped out and cannot be conquered by the enemy. The transformation of the central Soviet area, the Hunan-Kiangsi Soviet area and the Chekiang-Kiangsi Soviet area into guerrilla areas is but a partial setback in the overall Soviet revolution. Such a setback is not enough to make us display alarm and panic about the progress of the Chinese Soviet Revolution. In practice, it will not be possible even for the Kuomintang and imperialism to contemplate temporarily stopping the advance of the Soviet revolution. The victories of the Fourth Front Army and the 26th Army Corps, the brisk activities of the Central Red Army in the three provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan, and the revolutionary struggle of the worker-peasant masses throughout the country testify that the entire Chinese Soviet Revolution is advancing.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau pointed out that the past errors of the party in its military leadership are but partial errors when viewed from the standpoint of the party's entire line. This kind of error is not
enough to make us become dejected and discouraged. The party has courageously exposed this kind of error and educated itself to it. It has learned how to even better lead the revolution and battle to complete victory. The party has not been weakened, but strengthened, after exposing such errors.

The enlarged session of the Political Bureau calls on all comrades to oppose with the determination of a Bolshevik, all right-leaning opportunism of alarm and panic, dejection and discouragement, and, foremost, to oppose the line of pure defense. The enlarged session of the Political Bureau even more urgently calls on all comrades to unite to a man around the CCP Central Committee and struggle to the end for the CCP Central Committee's general line. Victory will inevitably be ours.


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