DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

7 July 1941

[Text] Countrymen and resistance war officers and soldiers of the entire nation!

The sacred war of our great nation of China to resist the Japanese bandits and defend the nation has been fought for exactly 4 years. The arrival of the 5th year of the resistance war coincides with the serious changes in the international situation. Hitler, Germany's insane fascist leader, has launched a gigantic attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government is leading its 200 million people and several-million-men Red Army in a great war to smash the fascist aggression.

Countrymen, officers and soldiers! The nature of the antifascist war of the Soviet Union is identical with that of our resistance war. Both are just wars to defend independence, safeguard freedom, and resist aggression. Meanwhile, like the Japanese fascists who are attacking China, the German fascists are aggressive, enslaving, and unjust. Therefore, China and the Soviet Union stand on the same front, sharing the successes and failures, the fortunes and misfortunes.

Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, sympathy for the Soviet Union has rapidly spread to the entire world, and the people of China feel an even greater concern. Primarily, the Soviet Union is a socialist state supporting the oppressed nations. In our 4 years of resistance war, the one [nation] which has helped us most is the Soviet Union. Next, the war between the Soviet Union and Germany directly affects China's resistance war. If Hitler succeeds in the Soviet Union, China will face a serious crisis. Therefore, all the people of China know that the war waged by the people of the Soviet Union is in defense not only of the Soviet Union but also of China and the freedom and independence of all nations. The success or failure of the Soviet Union is that of China, as well as of democracy and freedom, independence and liberty, universal principles and justice, and science and light. Thus, Hitler is the enemy not only of the Soviet Union but also of all free nations, especially China. For this reason,
overthrowing Hitler is the task of the people of China as well as the people of the United States and all nations. Without doubt, fascist Hitler's insane aggression will only hasten his destruction, as the enemies of fascism vise up throughout the world. A powerful antifascist aggression front is forming throughout the world. This is an era of great struggle between the fascist and antifascist fronts throughout the world, and the battle between the two has been joined.

In order to court Japan, consolidate the fascist alliance, and resist China, the Soviet Union, England and America, the fascist countries of Europe openly recognize China's renegade Wang Ching-wei. The devil's claws of Hitler and Mussolini are stretching toward the Pacific. That fascism is the public enemy of China's 450 million people and all mankind has been completely revealed. Meanwhile, trapped in China's quagmire, fascist Japan competes with England and America in the south. Its economy is deteriorating, and its people are dissatisfied. If it should tear up its neutrality pact with the Soviet Union and make the great Soviet Union an enemy, the day of its destruction and collapse will become more imminent. However, the more urgent the situation, the harder it is to block its reckless determination to carry out its plans. While the dangers of war with the Soviet Union have increased, it will never abandon its policy to destroy China, and its ambition to march south against England, America, the Netherlands and Australia still exists. The threat of the fascist alliance in the world increases simultaneously in the west and the east. Only a firm struggle built on the foundation of an antifascist international united front will check the conflagration and stem the tide. All ideas of gloating over the misfortunes of others and hoping for a windfall are manifestations of superficiality and ignorance. As for repeating the mistakes of Chang Po-lun or following in the footsteps of Wang Ching-wei, the so-called appeasement policy and surrender line are the most stupid and inferior measures and should never be considered by China and the democratic nations of Europe and America. The Chinese people will always firmly oppose a Far Eastern Munich.

The sacred resistance war of the great nation of China is not only for the purpose of averting China's perdition but is also helpful to the international resistance against aggression. In the past 4 years the soldiers and civilians of the entire country have been exerting themselves in the resistance war, disregarding the sacrifices and difficulties, filling the front ranks of the fallen, rallying over and over again, and paying a tremendous price. After many difficulties they have been able to deter the enemy bandits, win the admiration of the world, lay the foundation for national recovery, and create the embryo of a new China. These are all the results of our unity above and below, the joint military-civilian effort, the cooperation of the parties and factions, and the aid of friendly nations, worthy of our joyful celebration and special notice.

Nevertheless, enemy aggression is just beginning, not ending, and those plotting against us include the vicious fascist alliance, Nanking's puppet regime serving as the tiger's claw, and the pro-Japanese elements inside. Politics has not stabilized, the people's living conditions have deteriorated,
and public opinion has not been expressed. All kinds of alarming dark shadows have the tendency of becoming more aggravated. What is even more strange is that anticommunism has become a policy, and the term "alien party" has appeared in writing. Military discipline and military orders are borrowed as excuses to hit the most positive of the resistance war troops. Thus, the southern Anhwei incident occurred, and the New 4th Army was disbanded. Secret service agents act outrageously, and illegal arrests are innumerable. As a result, the morale of the resistance war has been destroyed and the new spirit of the early period of the war demolished. In regard to all such dark sides, if they are not eliminated, the achievement of the resistance war of 4 years may be abandoned, the soldiers and civilians of the whole nation may feel lost, and international sympathy will have no substance to which to attach itself. These are what should cause our countrymen deep concern and alarm.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party feels that now, at the beginning of the 5th year of the resistance war, when changes are occurring in the international situation, is an excellent opportunity for us to discard the old and arrange the new. The people of the entire nation must perform many important fighting tasks. From foreign affairs to internal administration, there must be new reforms and innovations before we can adapt to the current situation, refresh the senses of our countrymen, and attain the goal of the resistance war and national construction. This party respectfully proposes the following:

(1) Support the international antifascist front; promote the unity of China, the Soviet Union, England, America, and all other antifascist states and nations; resist the fascist alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan; support the correct action of the National Government to sever relations with Germany and Italy and to prepare new steps.

(2) Reinforce the struggle against the puppet regime of renegade Wang; purge his remnants; consolidate the anti-Japanese camp.

(3) Intensify the reorganizing and training of all National troops; strengthen frontline coordination of all units; supply the troops behind enemy lines with provisions and ammunition; actively counterattack the enemy.

(4) Strengthen the political, economic, and cultural establishments of all resist-Japan bases with government aid, so that such bases will persevere in the enemy rear, making it impossible for the enemy to move its troops west, north, or south.

(5) Strengthen the cooperation among the anti-Japanese parties and factions; readjust the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; solve the New 4th Army issue; recognize the legitimate activities of all anti-Japanese parties and factions; stop arresting Communist Party members and all patriotic elements; eliminate internal frictions; cultivate the resistance war strength.
(6) Grant freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association to all patriotic people; activate the wisdom and strength of the people; resist the enemy bandits.

(7) Reform the political structure; dismiss the corrupt and the greedy; promote the enlightened people; purge the concealed pro-Japanese elements in government organs and eliminate the enemy's fifth column.

(8) Prohibit corrupt and greedy officials from hoarding, speculating, and manipulating the national economy; enforce grain balancing and price stabilization in order to give the people relief.

(9) Reform the conscription system; prohibit blackmail, bribery, coercion, and abuse; replace it with political mobilization to encourage the people to go to the frontline in order to benefit the resistance war.

(10) Readjust the relationship between the central and the local governments; rely on local talents and rally the minorities in order to consolidate the rear.

This party feels that the above points constitute the basic policy for today's internal affairs and foreign diplomacy. If they are implemented, there will be a brand-new atmosphere in the entire nation, all difficulties will be surmounted, and there will be a firm foundation for the victory of the resistance war and national construction.

The Chinese Communist Party wishes to reiterate: This party's adherence to the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front never varies; it wishes to unite with the Chinese Kuomintang, all patriotic parties and factions, and all patriotic people to the final end and to struggle for the common goal of the resistance war and national construction. In regard to the three principles of democracy and the national reconstruction outline, this party is the most sincere and firmest follower. It will carry out the declaration of 22 September 1937, without the slightest hesitation. The 8th Route and New 4th armies are always a part of the National Army, performing the resistance war tasks most loyally and courageously, resisting and counterattacking more than half of the enemy forces, recovering large areas of lost territory, and building many resistance bases in the enemy rear. In these resistance bases we have gradually introduced the three principles of democracy. We have implemented the three-thirds system of a democratic government under which the parties and factions and the classes and strata cooperate and the human, political, and property rights of all anti-Japanese classes and strata (including the landlords and capitalists) are guaranteed; we have implemented the rural policy, reducing rents and interest on the one hand and enforcing rent and interest payments on the other; we have implemented the labor policy, improving the workers' life on the one hand and strengthening labor discipline on the other; we have implemented the economic policy, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce and improving the people's living conditions; we
have implemented the culture policy, wiping out illiteracy and ignorance and improving the national spirit. All these serve as proof that the Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard in defending the nation, a revolutionary political party whose words and deeds are one, the model of unity in the resistance war, and the example of arduous struggle. Meanwhile, the enemy, renegade Wang, and the pro-Japanese faction concentrate their aims on this party, wishing to destroy and eliminate it, because they know that its existence constitutes the greatest obstacle to their plan to destroy China. If the Communist Party is not eliminated, it will be impossible to destroy China. What is strange is that some of those in the country who are still fighting the resistance war feel the same way as the enemy in their intent to slander, betray, and destroy this party, calling it a bandit army and a cabal and devoting their full effort to its destruction and suppression. In the face of a powerful enemy, why are they so anxious to destroy their own countrymen? Truly it is beyond understanding! We hope that such phenomena will be rapidly eliminated and the condition of the early period of the resistance war resumed, turning hostility into harmony, changing mutual friction into mutual aid, and all concentrating on the state and the nation. Then the future of the resistance war will become bright, and the 5th year of the war will bring unity, progress, and victory. This is what this party prays for.

Countrymen, officers and soldiers! The 5th year of the resistance war is the decisive year of the destiny of the world as well as that of China. Everyone must become aware, unite and strive with an extraordinary effort, adhere to the banner of China's national liberation, stand on firm ground and struggle forward, and, in coordination with the antifascist struggles of the people of the various nations, seek our complete victory. The Chinese Communist Party fully believes that, as long as we persevere in our effort and make no mistakes, our goal can be attained, and the final victory will belong to us.

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Down with the fascist slaves!

Aid the Soviet Union!

Long live the victory of the resistance war!

Long live the antifascist front of the whole world!

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

7 July 1941

°Chieh-Fang Jih-Pao, 7 July 1941


6080

CSO: 4005
REFUTING HO YING-CH'IN

9 July 1941

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 9 July--In his article on the 4th year of the resistance war published by the CENTRAL PRESS AGENCY, Ho Ying-ch'in still claimed: "The New 4th Army disobeyed orders, refused to move and intended to sabotage the resistance war situation and destroy the anti-Japanese front; it was therefore ordered to be disbanded." The spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee stated:

Ho Ying-ch'in, the hidden leader of the pro-Japanese faction, was the ringleader in the incident of disbanding the New 4th Army and the one whom the Chinese Communist Party Central once requested the National Government to punish. The whole world knows that the New 4th Army consisted of loyal and courageous troops in the resistance war before the southern Anhwei incident and that its 100,000 men continued to fight the enemy north and south of the Yangtze after the southern Anhwei incident. After the southern Anhwei incident occurred, precisely because army commander Yeh T'ing and deputy commander Hsiang Ying followed orders to move north and encountered an ambush in the Mao-lin area. Therefore, the action of 13 January to wipe out the southern Anhwei troops of the New 4th Army and the order of the Military Commission of 17 January to disband the said army were both reactionary and counterrevolutionary measures confounding the right and wrong and contrary to the interest of the resistance war. They will not escape the censure of public opinion in generations to come. A folk ballad of southern Anhwei states: "Military discipline, military discipline--eliminate the dissenters; orders, orders--Japan is pleased." It truly hits the nail on the head. At the beginning of the 5th year of the resistance war, all soldiers and civilians in the nation demand a stronger national unity, and Committee Chairman Chiang also declared the necessity of "loyal and sincere unity." Treacherous and shameless, Ho Ying-ch'in had the audacity to utter such defamations, which are detrimental to unity and beneficial to the Japanese bandits. He is truly as heartless as Ch'en Shu-pao! When it comes to "sabotaging the resistance war situation and destroying the anti-Japanese front," the whole country knows that it is none other than the pro-Japanese Ho Ying-ch'in. With Ch'in Kuai in power, Yueh Fei had
to die. With Ho Ying-ch'in inside the resist-Japan front, the loyal and courageous New 4th Army had to be disbanded. If he continues to usurp an important position, the resistance war situation and the resist-Japan front will be destroyed. Therefore, we eagerly hope that the National Government will take the resistance war standpoint, dismiss Ho Ying-ch'in, and promptly solve the New 4th Army issue in order to promote unity and the resistance war. We hope and pray for it.

CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 10 July 1941

6080

CSO: 4005
RESOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION AND STUDY

1 August 1941

[Text] (1) Though our party's study of the history and society of China and the international situation in the past 20 years has been advancing gradually, increasing our knowledge, it is still extremely inadequate. We get the rough outlines without seeking thorough understanding, and we consider ourselves correct. Subjectivism and formalism still exist to a serious extent in the party. Since the resistance war our party has made great progress in understanding Japan, domestic economic and political relations and social conditions, and subjectivism and formalism have diminished. But what we understand is still roughhewn and sketchy, without systematic and detailed comprehension. Subjectivism and formalism have not completely disappeared. The gravity of the damage to revolutionary work in the past 20 years resulting from subjectivism and formalism in the thinking and method of a number of comrades and the lack of ample knowledge in all aspects has not been fully realized by the leading organs of the party and all the comrades. In regard to the internal and external environment of their own work area, whether in the aspect of social, economic and political relations, or of the enemy and the counterfeit government, or of work, some responsible local comrades are lacking in a systematic and detailed understanding. Many comrades in the party do not understand the principle that there is no right to speak without investigation, or the fact that systematic and detailed social investigation constitutes the foundation for determining policies. They still do not know that the fundamental task of a leading organ is to understand conditions and master the policies and that, if the conditions are not understood, the policies inevitably will be wrong. They still do not know how detailed are Japanese imperialism's investigation and study of China. They still do not know that the subjectivist work style of rough outlining and regarding oneself as right is the first manifestation of impure party essence, while seeking the truth through the facts and close linking of theory and reality constitute the minimum attitude of a party member with a strong party essence. Ours is now a large political party with a great revolutionary mission. Its every word and every act affect the future of the state and society. We must vigorously prevent emptiness and superficiality, wipe out the subjectivist work style,
and adopt concrete methods. From the Central to each and every party member, we must reinforce our investigation and study of history, of the environment, and of the concrete conditions inside and outside the country, the province, the county, and the district before we can effectively rally the revolutionary strength of all classes in the nation and overthrow the control of Japanese imperialism.

(2) In regard to the method of investigation and study, the following are examples: First, collect all kinds of newspapers, publications, and books on politics, military affairs, economics, culture, and social class relations issued by our enemies, our friends, and ourselves for extracting, editing, and studying. Second, invite experienced persons to hold investigation meetings of three to eight persons and study typical instances of the issues of a township, ward, county, city, town, army, division, plant, store, or school (such as the land, labor, vagrant, and guild issues). To start from typical instances is the most concrete method, proceeding from one typical instance to another. Third, in the rural village stress the detailed investigation of the living conditions, political needs, and mutual relations of the landlords, rich peasants, merchants, middle peasants, poor peasants, hired help, handicraft workers, and vagrants; in the city stress those of the compradore and large bourgeois class, national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, proletariat, the masses of poor people, and vagrant masses. Fourth, collect material by utilizing all types of cadres and delegates meetings. Fifth, write biographies of famous figures. Assessing the tremendous influence of the leading figures in China's society, studying the different aspects of such figures, and compiling the information into biographies constitute an important link in the study of all of China. Inside the anti-Japanese front, biographies of several hundred to several thousand words should be written on capitalists and landowners with assets of 50,000 yuan or more, officers of the rank of regimental commander and above, officials of the rank of county magistrate and above, responsible persons of all the parties and factions at the county level and above, famous scholars, cultured persons, journalists, religionists, and social activists well known inside and outside the county, and foreign activists living in China in order to clarify their background and interests and decide on the appropriate steps to cooperate with them against Japan. In regard to the leaders of guilds scorned by society, head tramps, bandit chiefs, and famous performers and courtesans, if they have any good point worthy of recording, we should also clarify them so that they will contribute to the national liberation cause. In regard to the important enemy bandits and traitors and the important elements serving as their henchmen, as they are the objectives of our current struggle there is an even greater need to understand them fully in order to attain the goal of knowing oneself and the others and winning all battles. The writing of the biographies should be assigned to the comrades of the district and county committees. The contents of the biographies must be factual, without any distortion due to personal bias or prejudice. Sixth, interview individuals verbally, either sending someone to do so or asking the interviewees to appear, including the cadres, workers, peasants, cultured persons, sympathizers, merchants, officials, tramps, and captives. Seventh, collect and study county, prefectural, and provincial records, family records, and maps.
(3) In regard to the working cadres and students of the cadre training schools, we must conduct education on clarifying the objective conditions (enemies, friends, and ourselves). We must encourage those comrades who excel in clarifying the objective conditions quantitatively and qualitatively and criticize those who prefer empty discussions divorced from reality. We must encourage those who understand the conditions and pay attention to policies and criticize those who do not understand the conditions and pay no attention to policies. In this way the trend of understanding conditions and paying attention to policies will be closely linked with that of learning Marxist-Leninist theories. In studying we must oppose the trend of disregarding reality and only memorizing the text, as well as the undesirable phenomenon of disconnecting the study of Marxist-Leninist truths and principles from the clarification of China's social conditions and the solution of the issue of its revolution. We must encourage the cadres and students to read newspapers and guide them in the method of newspaper reading and in the analysis of every change in the current situation. We must furnish the cadres and students with practical information on all kinds of conditions inside and outside the country, the province, and the county and make the teaching and studying of such information and forming conclusions into a regular course of study, assigning the necessary time required and giving tests.

° CHIEH-FA OH JIH-PAO, 8 September 1941


6080
CSO: 4005
STATEMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON A RECENT INTERNATIONAL EVENT

19 August 1941

[Text] Concerning the declaration of Roosevelt and Churchill and the Moscow conference to be held soon, the Chinese Communist Central makes the following announcement:

The joint declaration of the U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill of 14 August and the proposal for a three-power conference in Moscow constituted a momentous event of a world historical significance, opening a new stage in world history. The joint declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference showed the determination of England and America to smash fascism. Such determination is completely favorable to the Soviet Union, to England and America, to China, and to the world. The greatest danger in the past and at present is the profascist reactionary faction inside England and America which attempts to accept a fascist peace contrary to the will of the people, but now the declaration has rejected such a peace. Or, there are those who advocate watching the fire from across the river and letting the Soviet Union shoulder the burden of wiping out fascism alone, in order to reap the benefit in the future, but the proposal to hold a Moscow conference for the concrete distribution of war tasks and war resources is a blow to such a negative endeavor. As long as England and America admit "the necessity of disarming the aggressor nations," advocate "the final collapse of Nazism," and agree to share the war tasks and war resources, the victory of the Soviet Union, England, and America and of China and the whole world is assured. The fact that the Soviet Union observed the treaty while Germany tore it up and attacked the Soviet Union, mentioned in Stalin's famous speech of 3 July, constituted a long-term political factor, and this factor is actually the foundation of military victory. This truth has been completely proven in the Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference. The joint declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference demonstrated especially the determination of America to participate in the sacred war against fascist aggression, and it shows that the great fighting front against fascist aggression in the whole world has been completed politically. The Moscow conference will complete it organizationally. The fascist aggression
front is already in a state of isolation, and the failure of fascism is already decided. Such a situation was impossible before the outbreak of the European war in the fall of 1939, although at that time the Soviet Union and the people of the whole world vigorously advocated an anti-fascist front to safeguard international security, the Munich policy, detrimental to themselves as well as others, still existed in England and America. Only after the cruel lessons of war was this erroneous policy changed. In regard to the direct factor, it was the result of the courageous struggle of the Soviet people. The Red Army halted the German offensive and gave Roosevelt and Churchill the courage to hold the meeting and publish the declaration. It was also the result of the courageous struggles of the people of England and America. Such struggles hit the profascist reactionaries inside their own countries and gave Roosevelt and Churchill the strength to refuse the temptation of a fascist peace, publish the declaration for human justice, and decide on a firm alliance of England, America, and the Soviet Union, the three great powers, which is a policy with political foresight. It was also the result of the courageous struggles of the people of China. China stopped the attack of Japan's fascist bandit army and supplied England and America with the courage to declare the disarming of all aggressor nations. Japan was not mentioned in the declaration. Article 4 of the declaration hinted at the possibility of trade with and supply of raw materials to Japan, and Article 7 implied permitting Japanese immigration. It shows that they were still trying to court Japan's status quo faction, demonstrating their willingness to compromise. Article 2 of the declaration opposed territorial changes by force, Article 3 advocated the restitution of rights to those countries deprived of them, and Article 8, especially, admitted the necessity of disarming all aggressor nations. All of these points are actively anti-Japanese. In sum, the people of China welcome the joint declaration of England and America and the three-power conference soon to be held in Moscow. The Chinese people believe that they are the international foundation for winning liberation from the fascist threat, not only for the people of England, America, and the Soviet Union, but also for the people of the whole world and of China. The tasks of the Chinese people are to persevere in unity and the resistance war, overcome the reactionary elements inside the anti-Japanese front which are attempting to destroy unity and the resistance war, and actively organize a counteroffensive against the Japanese bandits. An enemy fifth column exists inside China, made up of pro-Japanese and pro-German factions. Contrary to the national interest and the interest of mankind, they advocate anticommunism for the purpose of responding to Hitler's "anti-Bolshevik crusade" and clearing the way for Japanese fascism. At this time, when worldwide antifascist unity is being forged, if such a fifth column remains unaware of the situation and continues its criminal activities against the communists, the people, the nation and mankind, it will be abandoned by the entire country and the whole world. We believe that, as long as the people of the whole nation reinforce their endeavors and purge the fifth column, we will be able to consolidate our unity, persevere in the resistance war, and realize the counteroffensive. China has the qualifications to participate in the world antifascist front and become an effective force. The
destiny of all of China and all of mankind is linked with this fight
against fascism, and the parties and factions in China must handle skill-
fully this rare opportunity, rally the people of the entire country, and
unanimously strive toward the good and the progressive. This is what our
Communist Party members eagerly hope for.

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

19 August 1941

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 20 August 1941

* "Reference Materials on the History of the Chinese Revolution," Vol 4,
Chinese People's University, 1957

6080
CSO: 4005
NOTE ON 'THE LONG MARCH OF LU CHUNG-TS'AI'

26 August 1941

[Text] This is a report of actual facts, written in simple and concise language by Comrade Kao K'o-lin, which is worthy of study by everyone. Today we must sweep aside the writing style of "1,000 words instantly when putting pen to paper, but 10,000 li away from the subject matter," the "boastful talks," and subjectivism and formalism. Comrade Kao K'o-lin's report was written in one evening after a three-man investigation meeting. His investigation meeting was successful, and so was his report. We need this kind of writing, not the stereotyped "boastful talks" or party "eight-legged essays."

Mao Tse-tung

26 August

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 14 September 1941

6080
CSO: 4005
MESSAGE MOURNING CHANG CHI-LUAN FROM POLITICAL COUNCIL MEMBERS IN YENAN

September 1941

[Text] Upon the death of the People's Political Council member Chang Chi-luan, former chief editor of TA KUNG PAO, the various circles in Chunking have decided to hold a memorial meeting on the 26th of this month. The five Political Council members of the Chinese Communist Party in Yenan sent a wire of sympathy. The full text is as follows:

To the memorial meeting for Mr Chang Chi-luan: Mr Chi-luan always persevered in unity and the resistance war in the various sessions of the Political Council and made his contributions to the state. Upon hearing of the shocking news of his death, we are deeply grieved. We send this wire to express our sorrow: Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wu Yu-chang and Lin Tsu-han.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 22 September 1941

6080
CSO: 4005
COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG ADDRESSES EASTERN ANTIFASCIST MEETING, CALLING ON ALL NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN UNITY

30 October 1941

[Text] The central agenda for the 4th and 5th days of the Antifascist Nationality Conference called for the delegates to continue making reports and analyses for members of their respective nationalities. The meeting of the 29th consisted of the reports of Vietnamese delegate Hoang Than Quang, Tibetan delegate (Sang Yueh-hsi), Taiwan delegate Ts'ai Ch'ien, Mongolian delegate We Lan-fu, Moslem delegate (Ma Yen), Northeast delegate Yu Ping-yan, and Dutch Indonesian delegate (A-li-a-han). The 30th was the last day for special reports. After reading the congratulatory cables from various sources, the Overseas Chinese League delegate first made his report. He gave a concrete account of the distribution of Overseas Chinese in East Asia, their economic situation, and their great contributions in labor production. "They took the risk of leaving their father country and courageously wandered to all areas, and they struggle continuously for their own livelihood and the glory of their father country. Currently, when the fascist wild tide sweeps over the whole world, the Overseas Chinese will form antifascist strongholds in all areas!" He ended the report by substantiating his conclusion with concrete facts. Thai delegate (Ma-na) was the second person to make a statement: "Thailand is currently under the sword of Japanese aggression. Japan has now completely discarded the false friendship of the past. The false friend of the past is the true enemy of today." When he discussed current conditions in Thailand, he revealed the conspiracies carried out by Japan, such as "corrupting the bureaucrats, provoking the feelings of the government and the people, disrupting relations between the Thais and the Chinese, creating animosity between the Thais and the British and American residents, inducing Thai students to study in Japan, and instigating Thailand to attack Vietnam." Finally, he enumerated the desires of the Thai people: "Internally, they wish to unite all minorities and all classes to resist Japan, rally the foreign residents in Thailand, especially the Chinese, and build an antifascist front. Externally, they wish to unite all nations in the East for joint struggles, participate in the world antifascist front, and render aid to the Soviet Union." There followed the reports of Miao delegate (Sha-wa-chi-kai) and Yi delegate (Mo-han). Old worker Chu Pao-t'ing congratulated the meeting
on behalf of the Staff and Workers Association. He pointed out that the path of Japan's workers and peasants was to overthrow fascism together! He then said that old workers in the Soviet Union did not ask for old-age benefits or holidays but worked at a high intensity, that the British workers were making more tanks, that the American workers were intensifying national defense production, and that the Chinese workers also disregarded all difficulties and toiled incessantly. "I advocate building a great workers' antifascist alliance, a great peasants' antifascist alliance, a merchants', a students'..." His story-telling style of reporting made everyone roar with laughter.

During the rest period, Comrade Mao Tse-tung braved a fine rain and arrived suddenly. He was cheered wildly by the entire meeting. Full of energy and very alert, he strode to the rostrum after a few words with the reporters and addressed the meeting:

"This meeting will be successful. The reports and discussions today will be very productive. That the various nationalities can unite, rise, and jointly handle Japanese imperialism is an excellent phenomenon. I feel that the main goal of the meeting is unity, promoting the unity of the nationalities and smashing fascism together. That Japan and Hitler can succeed for a time is because they seize upon our weak point. Our weak point is disunity, which exists in China, in East Asia, and in the whole world."

After making a profound explanation of the history of the past, he pointed out:

"Currently, because China is united, it is able to wage the resistance war. But our unity is still inadequate, because some people make a show of resisting Japan while sabotaging unity behind the scenes. Those of another type fight the war and cause friction at the same time. These two types of people are different: The former consists of traitors; the latter includes those ignorant of the general situation. Yanan is a place where unity is stressed. Here there are Moslem temples, associations to promote Mongolian culture, minority academies... Here it is possible to hold an antifascist nationality meeting."

He then discussed the situation in the future:

"Hereafter there will be bigger battles to fight. The fascists have great ambitions, still possess the strength, and will launch more insane aggressions. Hitler lashes out indiscriminately in face of the great unity of England, America, and the Soviet Union. Naturally, difficulties always exist in war. Therefore, there will still be a difficult period in the struggles against fascism. This point must be clearly realized by all. Now the difficulties are only 50 or 60 percent; 100-percent difficulty is still to come. This meeting is very meaningful. Meetings are going on in Moscow and the Far East. Our meeting is also for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties, while the fascists are utilizing them. In my view, the more areas the fascists occupy, the greater will be the danger they run, just
as it was for Napoleon, Alexander of Macedonia, Mongolia.... Today, as long as we unite, it will not be difficult to tear off the arms and legs of fascism. Japan wants to invade the north and the south. Most likely it will come.... Currently we have three united fronts: China's Anti-Japanese National United Front, the ABCD front in the East, and the concerted action of England, America, and the Soviet Union. With these three united fronts, fascism will be smashed. We must understand the conditions and overcome the difficulties, fearless and confident. The revolutionary people are live; they have life in history. Fascism will perish. The struggles of the masses must undergo difficulties before victory.

In conclusion, he informed everyone:

"Fascism will soon die. Our people are in the period of youth and vigor. Today the struggle against fascism throughout the world requires practical work, studying the problems, intensifying learning.... Even planting a little more millet will help. Fascism has no soul, but we do. By holding hands tightly, uniting, and aiding one another, we will squeeze fascism to death. I wish the meeting success, stressing equality and friendly unity."

After some 15 minutes, Comrade Mao Tse-tung concluded his speech amidst a standing ovation.

Finally, Jewish delegate Miss (Yeh-hua Sang-po-ko-lan-te) made a statement. She said:

"The 20 million Jewish people in the world all recognize Hitler as their sworn enemy. We wish, by our firm struggles, to eliminate this group of pests to mankind!"

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 31 October 1941

6080
CSO: 4005
COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG DELIVERS A RADIO SPEECH

7 November 1941

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 7 November--The following is the text of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's radio speech today:

As the Chinese Communist Party has pointed out time and again, mankind's task throughout the world today is to unite and resist fascism, while that of the Chinese people is to unite and resist Japanese aggression. Currently, both types of unity must be greatly reinforced.

From the standpoint of mankind, we feel that England and America must do everything to supply the Soviet Union with more planes and tanks, to aid China with more funds and weaponry, and to devote a greater effort to helping the people of all nations trampled by Germany and Italy in their uprisings. America should declare war on Germany without hesitation. It is a step which is absolutely impossible to avoid and which should not be avoided. The greater the delay, the more American ships will be sunk by German bombing. Meanwhile, America absolutely must not be deceived by Japan's conspiracies or reach any compromise with it. America must, together with China and England, check Japanese fascism by force. Apparently our hopes coincide with those of the majority of the people of England and America. What is regrettable is that some people who do not understand the general principles exist in the governments and congresses of these two nations, thus blocking the realization of the people's will. Therefore, the people of England and America must strive to overcome such epochal obstacles and push the world antifascist struggles to a higher stage.

China's situation is also at the turning point for further progress. Though the Japanese fascists are preparing to advance north and south simultaneously, whatever path they choose, it is inevitable that they will march west to destroy China. After encountering defeat on the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border and in Ch'ang-sha and Cheng-chou, Japan is preparing to launch a new offensive against China. The people and troops of the entire nation must defend each and every resist-Japan battlefield and smash the enemy's conspiracy to attack. The people of the whole nation must unite even more successfully, support the National Government to persevere in the resistance war, and
prepare all conditions for a counteroffensive in order to promptly oust the Japanese bandits from China. Our Communist Party members have always appealed for greater unity. On this eve of the enemy's new offensive, improving the relations among all sides in the resistance war stronghold becomes an even more urgent need. We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will make prompt decisions and adopt all necessary measures toward this goal. We believe that, as long as the whole nation truly unites, Japan's attack will be halted, the preparations for a counteroffensive will be achieved, and the goal of ousting the enemy will be realized.

CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 7 November 1941

6080
CSO: 4005
DIRECTIVE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE PACIFIC ANTI-JAPANESE FRONT

9 December 1941

[Text] (1) As stated in the declaration of this party on the Pacific war, the war fought by England, America, and the Pacific nations against Japan is a just and liberating war, and their victory over Japan is the victory of democracy and freedom. Therefore, the central task of the people of China, all Overseas Chinese, and the South Sea nations is to build and develop an extensive anti-Japanese and antifascist united front of the Pacific nations. The components of this united front must include the governments, parties and factions, and the people of all classes and strata of all nations resisting Japanese aggression, the antiwar people in Japan, and the people of its colonies, including Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This united front must be an alliance of the lower level as well as the upper, of the people as well as the governments. It must be embodied in an anti-Japanese military alliance of China, England, America, and other Pacific nations and built on the close cooperation between the suzerain governments and the native states. It must improve the political and economic positions of the native states, organize their people, raise their positivity, and launch guerilla warfare in all Japanese-occupied areas. It will be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits without these factors.

(2) The Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party have an especially important role in regard to the united front of England and America. On the one hand, in cooperation with England and America, eliminating the Japanese bandits is an essential prerequisite to the liberation of the nation of China; on the other hand, domestic unity, improving its political and military affairs, actively hampering and hitting the enemy, and actively preparing a strategic counteroffensive on the part of China are the important conditions for England and America to defeat the Japanese bandits. For this reason, the Chinese Communist Party must, in all kinds of situations, sincerely and frankly cooperate with the British and the Americans in order to raise the resistance war strength of England and America and improve the resistance war conditions of China.

(3) Overseas Chinese work must be vigorously launched in the South Seas and in England and America. Their policy of Overseas Chinese work must be to unite all Overseas Chinese, including all classes and strata and all parties
and factions among them, so that they will wage an anti-Japanese struggle together, propagandize and support the unity and resistance war of their fatherland, and support and participate in all the anti-Japanese measures and actions of the local governments. We must rectify the ultraleftist tendency among the Overseas Chinese and some Communist Party members, asking them to cooperate with the local Chinese embassies and consulates and Kuomintang units. However, in regard to the conduct of the pro-Japanese and pro-German elements in sabotaging the unity of the Overseas Chinese and hampering the work of resisting Japan, we must firmly, but suitably, oppose it.

(4) We must vigorously launch guerilla warfare in enemy-occupied areas in South China, Hainan Island, Vietnam, and all enemy-occupied areas in the South Seas, take concerted military actions, wherever possible, with all the resist-Japan friendly armies and nations such as England and America, and win their support in all aspects. The policies followed by the guerilla must be compatible with the requirements of the anti-Japanese united front. We must prevent and rectify all types of leftwing tendencies.

(5) In regard to our work in the South Sea areas, we must establish connections with the local communist parties, help them rectify the leftwing tendencies, and extensively launch the work of a united front.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 13 December 1941


6080
CSO: 4005
DECISION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE YENAN CADRE SCHOOL

(This decision is applicable in all resist-Japan bases)

Passed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo

17 December 1941

[Text] (1) The basic defects of the Yenan Cadre School are the dislocation of theory and reality and of learning and application, as well as serious subjectivism and dogmatism. Such defects are mainly manifested as follows: The students are made to learn large quantities of abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism, with no attention, or almost no attention, given to their substance or to their application in China's concrete environment. To remedy such defects, we must stress the point that the goal of the study of Marxist-Leninist theories is to give the students the ability to apply theories correctly in solving the practical problems of China's revolution, not to memorize and recite the principles in the books. First, we must make the students distinguish the words and the substance of Marxism-Leninism. Next, we must make them understand the substance (not looking at the words and getting the meaning, but knowing the meaning in their minds). Third, we must make them acquire the ability to apply the substance to China's concrete environment and discard all formal and empty studying. For this reason, besides correctly teaching the theories of Marxism-Leninism, we must increase their education in China's history and conditions and party history and policy, so that they will learn both the theoretical and the practical and link the two vividly. Cadres at the district committee level and above in the party and at the regimental level and above in the army (after having solved their cultural problems) must use the history of the Soviet Communist Party as the basic text for learning Marxism-Leninism, paying special attention to the concrete application of the fundamental viewpoints of dialectic materialism and historical materialism (not large quantities of their abstract principles) in order to overcome the extremely undesirable defects of subjectivism and dogmatism.

(2) The absence of clear provisions of their own concrete goals on the part of the various schools is also one of the defects. Therefore, it is provided that
(a) The Central Research Institute serves as an advanced research organ to train the party's theoretical cadres.

(b) The Central Party School serves as an advanced and intermediate school to train practical work cadres of the party at the district committee level and above and political work cadres of the army at regimental level and above, all possessing certain independent working abilities.

(c) The Military Academy serves as an advanced and intermediate school to train military work cadres at the regimental level and above, all possessing certain independent work abilities.

(d) The Yenan University, the Lu Hsun Art School, and the Natural Science Academy serve as schools to train all types of party and nonparty advanced and intermediate political, cultural, scientific, and technical talents.

The curricula, textbooks, and methods of teaching of the above schools must be compatible with their concrete goals.

(3) For the purpose of strengthening the concrete guidance of the schools and linking the education of such schools with the practical work units of the Central, it is decided that the Central Research Institute is directly subordinated to the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Party School to the Central Party School Management Committee, the Military Academy to the Military Commission Staff Department, and the Yenan University, Lu Hsun Art School, and Natural Science Institute to the Central Cultural Commission. The superior organs in charge of the schools must consider the work of the schools under them an important part of their duties. The Central Propaganda Department must, together with the particular superior organs in charge, conduct unified planning, inspection, and supervision of the curricula, teachers, textbooks, and funds of the schools.

(4) For the purpose of realizing the concrete goals of the schools and deriving the maximum benefit from the party's limited energy and financial abilities, the schools must follow the principle of quality rather than quantity when recruiting students. The schools and their superior organs must reexamine the student components. All those incompatible with their concrete goals must be assigned work or transferred.

(5) Improving the quality of teachers is a determining factor for the success of a school. The education of cadres at the district committee and regimental level and above must be under the personal guidance of the Central Committee members and the responsible comrades of the various organs of the Central. The existing teachers must be individually re-examined and handled according to the new standards. The Central Propaganda Department must render practical aid to the specialized teachers of the schools and raise their quality. Their political and material treatment must be improved.
(6) It will be impossible to learn Marxist-Leninist theories without a relatively high cultural level. All the old cadres of worker-peasant origin at the county and battalion levels and above whose cultural level is too low but who need to and can learn must first take supplementary culture courses. Such supplementary courses must not be limited to the number of words to be learned, but must include the ability to read and write, knowledge of history and geography, social political knowledge, and natural sciences. The criterion for organizing the cultural classes is the cultural level of the students, not their work positions.

(7) The curricula of the schools of a specialized nature (such as military, political and legal, fiscal and economic, natural science, cultural and art, normal education, and medicine) must consist mainly of the theoretical and the practical relevant to the specialization. The ratio of cultural, political, and specialized subjects must be determined according to the conditions of the schools. Generally speaking, specialization subjects must constitute 50 percent of the curriculum (80 percent in schools where supplementary cultural courses are not required), cultural subjects 30 percent, and political subjects 20 percent. The abnormal situation of overemphasizing political subjects at the expense of all others must be firmly rectified.

(8) All comrades in charge of school education work must conscientiously study the content and methods of teaching and the principle of unifying theory and practice in the content and methods. In the methods of teaching, the pattern of enlightening, studying, and experimenting must be firmly adopted in order to develop the initiative and creativity of the students, and the empty pattern of injecting and coercing must be firmly abolished. In teaching, the practical material of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region and its adjacent areas must be fully utilized by means of all kinds of investigations and studies.

(9) In regard to the teaching and study of Marxism-Leninism, the erroneous way of stressing the form rather than understanding the substance, and emphasizing inanimate learning rather than application, must be firmly rectified. The school authorities and the teachers must give their full attention to enable the students to learn to understand the substance of Marxism-Leninism and its concrete application to China's environment. Whether the student has truly understood is determined by his ability to apply what he has learned. Application means analyzing China's history and the current concrete issues and summarizing China's revolutionary experiences with the spirit and method of Marxism-Leninism, so that the students form a habit of such application and become skillful in analyzing issues and guiding practice with the spirit and method of Marxism-Leninism after leaving school.

(10) In regard to political textbooks, CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO documents of the Central, and material published by the departments and commissions of the Central must be fully utilized. The necessary texts and supplementary reading material must be systematically compiled and printed or reprinted. The
Central Propaganda Department must, together with the publishing and fiscal organs, formulate the 1942 publication and budget plans relating to education for approval and promulgation by the Central.

(11) In regard to the students' living and the educational facilities of the schools, the necessary improvements to existing conditions must be made.

(12) The school administrative organ must follow the principle of being compact and efficient. The task of the party branch in the school is to assure the completion of the education plan and to rectify the incorrect situation of the party branch and the school administration being on the same level. The party branch may make suggestions regarding school administration via the party line, but it must not do so out of interference. In schools of the nature of the united front, the workstyle of party members monopolizing everything must be rectified.

(13) The academic trend of free thinking, seeking the truth through the facts, diligent study, observance of discipline, voluntary selfgovernment, and uniting and helping one another must be built in the school, while subjectivism, sectarianism, seeking the high and the far, arbitrariness and blind following, bragging, considering oneself correct, and the bad habit of learning superficially without profound understanding must be firmly opposed. The faculty and staff must serve as models in building the desirable academic trend.

(14) This decision is applicable in Yanan, but all the basic principles contained herein are also applicable in the resist-Japan bases.

* CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 20 December 1941


6080
CSO: 4005
RESOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAND POLICY IN RESIST-JAPAN BASES

Passed by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo

28 January 1942

[Text] Since the beginning of the resistance war, the land policy of our party introduced in the various resist-Japan bases is the land policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and of reducing rents and interest while enforcing their payment. Since its implementation in the resist-Japan bases the policy has won the support of the broad masses, united the people of all classes and strata, and aided the resistance war behind the enemy lines. In all areas where the implementation of reduced rents and interest and their payment is relatively general, conscientious and thorough, the positivity of the masses in the anti-Japanese struggle and democratic construction is relatively high, normal work conditions are maintained, the social living order is stabilized, and the base is relatively consolidated. Nevertheless, the policy has not been generally, conscientiously and thoroughly implemented in many areas. In some bases only a part of the area has implemented rent and interest reduction, while in other parts it is merely considered a propaganda slogan and no decree has been issued, let alone implemented. Or, although the government has promulgated a decree formally reducing rents and interest, the policy actually has not been conscientiously implemented, creating the situation of reduction in words only, without enforcement. In such areas the positivity of the masses is not developed, and they cannot be truly organized to create a fervent resist-Japan base. Such resist-Japan bases cannot be consolidated and, unable to withstand the enemy onslaught, they turn into weak areas. Then, in other areas certain leftist errors have occurred. Although the errors have occurred only in part of the areas and have been mainly rectified after the Central directives, they still require the attention of the comrades of these areas. When the resistance war is entering a more difficult period, all bases are requested to launch even more vigorously the positivity of the broad masses in resisting Japan and in production and to rally even more vigorously all the resist-Japan classes and strata in order to persevere in a long-term struggle in the enemy rear. After carefully studying the experiences of the various areas, the Central has made a summary decision of our
party's land policy. The concrete method of implementing the land policy is attached hereto as supplements for adoption by all areas. It is hoped that the comrades of all areas will study and conscientiously implement them.

(1) Recognize the peasants (including hired help) as the basic strength in resisting Japan and in production. Therefore, party policy is to aid the peasants, reduce feudal exploitation by the landlords, enforce rent and interest reduction, and guarantee the civil, political, land, and property rights of the peasants in order to improve their life and raise their positivity in resisting Japan and in production.

(2) Recognize the fact that the majority of the landlords are anti-Japanese and the fact that a part of the enlightened gentry supports democratic reform. Therefore, party policy only helps the peasants by reducing feudal exploitation but does not eliminate feudal exploitation or attack the enlightened gentry supporting democratic reform. Thus, after rent and interest reduction is enforced, payment of rent and interest must also be enforced; after the civil, political, land, and property rights of the peasants are guaranteed, those of the landlords must also be guaranteed in order to rally the landlords to resist Japan unanimously. Only in the case of traitor elements who absolutely refuse to repent is the policy of eliminating their feudal exploitation adopted.

(3) Recognize the fact that in China today the capitalist production pattern is a relatively progressive one, while the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, is a relatively progressive social component and political strength. The production pattern of the rich peasants has a capitalist essence, and the rich peasants are the rural bourgeoisie and an indispensable force in resisting Japan and in production. The petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the rich peasantry not only wish to resist Japan but also desire democracy. Therefore, party policy is not to undermine capitalism and the bourgeoisie, or the rich peasantry and its production, but on the condition of suitably improving workers' life, to encourage capitalist production and rally the bourgeoisie and to encourage rich peasant production and rally the rich peasantry. Nevertheless, the middle and poor peasants are dissatisfied over that part of the exploitation of the rich peasants with a feudal essence. Therefore, when rent and interest reduction is introduced in the rural village, the rent and interest of the rich peasants must also be reduced. But thereafter the payment of rent and interest must be enforced, and the civil, political, land, and property rights of the rich peasants must be guaranteed. In regard to those landlords who farm their land according to the capitalist pattern (the so-called operating landlords), their treatment is the same as that of the rich peasants.

(4) The above three basic principles are the starting point of our party's Anti-Japanese National United Front and its land policy. As shown us by the experiences of the past 4 years, only by adhering to these principles will we consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front, correctly handle
the land issue, rally the entire people behind the national resistance war, and completely isolate the Japanese bandits. Any ultraleftwing or ultrarightwing, one-sided tendency will make it impossible to attain our goal.

(5) On the rural united front, the conflicts between the landlords and the peasants, such as the former's opposition or obstruction of the latter's demand for democracy and a decent living, must be suitably handled according to the above principles. The rational demands of both sides must be satisfied, but both sides must subordinate themselves to the interest of the national resistance war as a whole. When handling rural disputes, party and government work personnel must not take the side of either the peasants or the landlords; they must adopt the policy of reconciling the interests of both parties according to the above principles.

(6) The three-thirds system of political power is a rational political form to reconcile the internal relations of the anti-Japanese classes. This system must be firmly, conscientiously, and generally implemented in the Consultative Council and the government systems. The idea that the three-thirds system is merely a means to appease those outside the party is incorrect.

(7) Government decrees must make provisions for both sides, neither favoring nor overburdening. On the one hand the landlords must generally reduce rents and interest; they must not resist or refuse to carry it out. On the other hand the peasants must fulfill their obligation to pay rent and interest; they must not resist or refuse to pay. On the one hand the landlords retain their land and property ownership and, according to law, have the right to sell or mortgage their land, use it as collateral, or dispose of it in any other way. On the other hand, when making such disposals the landlords must give consideration to the peasants' livelihood. All contracts on land and loans must be entered into voluntarily by both sides. At the end of the contractual period, either side has the right to discontinue the contract.

(8) In regard to funds for the resistance war, except for those who are absolutely impoverished, people of all classes must pay to the government according to the progressive principle, neither favored not overburdened; they may not refuse to pay.

(9) The implementation of rent and interest reduction constitutes the prerequisite for improving agricultural production, while agricultural production is the major production in the resist-Japan bases. Therefore, party and government work personnel must devote their maximum effort to its development. The government must make large amounts of agricultural loans in order to solve the financial difficulties of the peasants.

(10) The main task of the Agricultural Relief Association before rent and interest reduction is implemented, is to help the government to enforce the decree reducing rents and interests. After the implementation of rent and interest reduction its task is mainly to help the government settle rural disputes and develop agricultural production. It does not replace
government decrees with its own decisions or replace the government with itself. In the settlement of rural disputes, the means of arbitration, not dictatorial decision, must be adopted. In the development of agricultural production, all members of the Agricultural Relief Association must be mobilized to produce an exemplary and leadership effect.

(11) Reducing rents and interest and guaranteeing the civil, political, land, and property rights of the peasants constitute the first aspect of our party's land policy, yet many areas in the bases have not generally, conscientiously and thoroughly implemented rent and interest reduction. The reason is either the landlord's refusal to implement it or the indifferent bureaucratic attitude of party and government work personnel. Therefore, party and government work personnel of all bases must make a strict reexamination of their own work, send men to the villages to inspect the extent of implementation, conduct a careful investigation and study, generally summarize the experiences of the various areas, publicize instances of correct implementation, and criticize instances of bureaucratism. We must know that a big gap often exists between issuing slogans and decrees and implementing them. If bureaucratism is not severely rejected and rightwing viewpoints opposed, it will be impossible to implement the slogans and decrees.

(12) Payment of rent and interest and guaranteeing the civil, political, land, and property rights of the landlords constitute the second aspect of our party's land policy, yet leftwing errors of neglecting this aspect have occurred in the bases. The reason is either a lack of understanding of our party's land policy on the part of the peasants or a lack of understanding, or complete misunderstanding, of it on the part of party and government work personnel. To prevent a repetition of such errors in the future, party policy must be clearly explained to party members and the peasant masses so that they will know that our party's land policy in the Anti-Japanese National United Front is fundamentally different from that of the civil war period and will refrain from restricting themselves to narrow present benefits, but instead link present and future benefits and the partial benefit and that of the entire nation. We must convince the peasants that, after implementing rent and interest reduction and guaranteeing their civil, political, land, and property rights, we will enforce rent and interest payment and guarantee the same rights to the landlords. Similarly, on the issue of rent and interest reduction and guaranteeing the civil, political, land, and property rights of the peasants, we must convince the landlords not to restrict themselves to the narrow present benefit but consider the benefit of the future and the entire nation.

* CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 6 February 1942

6080
CSO: 4005 103.
SUPPLEMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAND POLICY IN RESIST-JAPAN BASES

6 February 1942

[Text] In view of the different conditions in the various bases, and even in the same base, a uniform system in regard to the concrete method of solving the land issue cannot be followed. The Central has provided the principles for unified implementation in its resolution on the land policy, while these supplements propose the concrete method based on such principles for adoption by the various areas. In regard to the items listed in these supplements, all those compatible with the practical conditions of the particular areas must be firmly implemented; in regard to items which are incompatible with the local conditions and require modification, the various areas may modify them, but they must report such modifications to the Central and obtain its approval.

(Supplement I) On the Issues of Land Rent and Tenancy Rights

(1) In all areas where rents have not been reduced, the amount of rent must be lowered by 25 percent (25-percent rent reduction) in principle. In other words, the amount of rent must be reduced by 25 percent compared with that before the beginning of the resistance war; this is applicable to public, private, and tenancy land and land farmed in partnership, whether in forms of cash, payment in kind, payment by labor, or fixed amount. In regard to the different forms of partnership farming, the landlord's share must not be uniformly specified as not more than 40 or 60 percent. It must be decided according to the labor, plow animal, farm tools, fertilizer, seed, and food grain contributed by the owner and the tenant and reduced by 25 percent from the existing rental. In guerilla areas and in the vicinity of enemy-occupied areas, the reduction may be somewhat less than 25 percent. It should be a reduction of 20, 15, or 10 percent for the purpose of activating the positivity of the peasants in resisting Japan and rallying the various classes and strata in the war.

(2) Land rent is uniformly paid after the harvest. The lessor may not ask the lessee to pay in advance or demand any extra compensation.
(3) Where the entire or greater part of the crop is destroyed due to natural disaster or human calamity, fixed rent (iron rent) may be exempted or reduced.

(4) Rent arrears for many years must be canceled.

(5) The owner and tenant are both responsible for public grain and public funds according to the progressive principle. The landlord is responsible for the land tax.

(6) Where the land rent is to be paid in paper currency and a dispute arises due to its devaluation, the government must summon both parties to a meeting to settle it, and the paper currency rental, in part or in whole, may be changed to payment in kind.

(7) In areas where such reconciliation organs as rental evaluation committees have been formed, the meeting must be participated in by the peasant, the landlord, and the government, but the government has the right to make the final decision.

(8) Where there is a permanent tenancy right by contract or by usage, such right must be preserved. Where there is no such right, it must not be provided by coercion. However, both sides may be encouraged to form a relatively long-term contract, such as for 5 years or more, in order to enable the peasant to settle down and develop production.

(9) In regard to land under no permanent tenancy right or land where the contractual period has expired, the lessor has the freedom of disposal according to the contract, including transferring, mortgaging, selling, farming by himself, and hiring help to farm. Nevertheless, during the resistance war period the landlord must give consideration to the livelihood of the tenant when repossessing the land, and he must notify the tenant of his intention to repossess 3 months before the harvest. Where the tenant is extremely impoverished, the government must summon both sides to reach an accommodation, either by extending the tenancy period or by returning only a part of the tenancy land.

(10) Where the owner wishes to lease, mortgage, or sell the land upon the expiration of the tenancy contract, the original tenant has priority to lease, take the mortgage, or buy according to the terms set forth by the owner.

(11) Where the lessor sells the land under permanent tenancy right or before the contract has expired, the existing lessee has the right to continue his tenancy, and the new owner may not lease the land to anyone else before the expiration of the term.

(12) Where the lessee fails to cultivate the land for 2 years for no valid reason, or where he intentionally fails to pay rent though able to do so, the lessor has the right to repossess.
(Supplement II) On the Issue of Debts

(1) Interest reduction is a necessary policy dealing with the loan relations formed before the resistance war in answer to the demands of the debtors as well as for rallying the creditors to resist Japan. Fifteen percent should be used as the standard to compute interest. Where the interest exceeds the principal by 100 percent, the interest will be canceled and only the principal repaid. Where it exceeds the principal by 200 percent, both interest and principal will be canceled. As for the amount of interest on loans made after the beginning of the resistance war, the people must be left to handle the matter themselves according to local social and economic relations. The government must not set the interest rate too low, as it may discourage loan making and become unfavorable to the people's livelihood.

(2) The creditor may not rescind the loan contract due to interest reduction; the debtor may not refuse to pay interest after such reduction. The creditor has the right to sue for payment according to law.

(3) In regard to the loan relations formed after the beginning of the resistance war, where the debtor does not pay the interest or principal when due, the creditor has the right to dispose of the collateral according to the contract. Where there is a dispute, it will be handled by the government. Where one form of collateral is used to secure several loans, the proceeds from its sale are distributed according to the chronological order of the contracts and the ratio of the loans. Where the collateral is land (land collateral), it is similarly handled.

(4) Where the land has been mortgaged but has not yet turned into a sale, the mortgagor may redeem it by paying the amount of the existing mortgage. He cannot change the terms of sale and offer another piece of land. Where the mortgage has turned into a sale, there may be no redemption. Disputes due to paper currency devaluation at the time of mortgage redemption will be settled by the government.

(5) In regard to the loan relations formed after the beginning of the resistance war, where, due to natural disaster, human calamity, or other irresistible causes, the debtor is unable to fulfill the contract, he may apply to the government for relief, either by reducing the interest or by forgiving the interest but repaying the principal.

(6) Where a debtor repays his debt with paper currency and a dispute arises due to its devaluation, the government will settle it appropriately.

(Supplement III) On the Handling of Certain Special Land Cases

(1) The land belonging to a traitor guilty of heinous crimes must, as punishment, be confiscated, placed under government control, and leased to the peasants to farm. Where they have not participated in the traitorous activities, or where their misdeeds are minor, the family members of the traitor are not included in this provision.
(2) The land of a traitor under coercion must not be confiscated, in order to show leniency and seek his repentance. Where no one is in charge of the land, the government will take charge on behalf of the absentee owner, lease it to the peasants to farm, and restore it to the owner when he returns home and resists Japan.

(3) In case of a landlord who has fled, regardless of where he has gone, his land must not be confiscated. Where no one is in charge of the land, the government will take charge on his behalf, lease it out for cultivation, save the rental receipts, and pay the land tax and deliver the public grain on his behalf. Upon his return, the land and the rental receipts to which he is entitled will be returned to him.

(4) "Hidden" land which has never been taxed on the contract, or which has never been taxed, must not be confiscated, but the owner will be ordered to pay the tax and deliver the grain within a time limit. Where he fails to do so within the time limit. Where he fails to do so within the time limit, the government will punish him appropriately.

(5) In the case of clan or association land, the members of the clan or association will organize a management committee to manage it and use the receipts for the public welfare of the particular clan or association.

(6) School land will be preserved for educational purposes, and the government or the local residents will organize an education fund management committee to manage it.

(7) Church land (land belonging to Christian, Buddhist, Moslem, Taoist, or other religious organizations) will not be disturbed.

(8) Public wasteland will be distributed by the government to the dependents of resistance war soldiers, refugees, and poor people for reclamation, and the ownership will also be transferred to them. Tax on the land will be reduced or exempted for a specific period of time.

(9) In the case of private wasteland, regardless of whether it was never reclaimed or was left uncultivated, the owner will have the first chance to reclaim it. Where the owner is unable to do so, the government may find others to reclaim it and reduce or exempt the tax within a specific period of time. The ownership remains with the original owner, but the person reclaiming the land has a permanent tenancy right.
COMMENTS BY YENAN OBSERVER

6 February 1942

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 6 February—How to solve the land issue in China during the resistance war has been a momentous issue arousing the concern of patriots and economists. The "Resolution on the Land Policy in Resist-Japan Bases" passed by the Chinese Communist Central on 28 January has given a satisfactory answer. The resolution starts out from three basic principles: (1) The peasants are the basic strength in resisting Japan and in production and must be given aid. (2) The majority of China's landlords are anti-Japanese, and a part of the enlightened landlords also supports democratic reform, and they should be rallied. (3) The rich peasants and the petty and national bourgeoisie are relatively progressive strengths in China today, and the rich peasant economy of a capitalist essence must be encouraged. Therefore, the resolution stresses the need for reduced rents and interest on the part of the landlords and their payment on the part of the peasants. It further provides that the government must satisfy the reasonable demands of both the peasants and the landlords, guarantee the civil, political, land, and property rights of both sides, and thoroughly realize the famous "three-thirds system" in its political power components. The land issue is the most fundamental and serious social problem in China today. The Chinese Communist Party is the political party which has solved, and is still in the process of solving, China's land issue. The resolution will be enforced in the various resist-Japan bases in North and Central China now under its control. Without doubt, it will have a tremendous influence in the political life and public opinion of all areas in the nation. A Yenan observer points out:

It is not only the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front advocated by the Chinese Communist Party and the embodiment of the new democracy in the economic aspect, but the first realization of Mr Sun Yat-sen's land and peasant policies on this vast land. The major newspapers and periodicals in Chungking are publishing series of articles on the land issue. The Ninth Central General Meeting of the Kuomintang in December last year decided to form a land committee. The publication of the resolution by the Chinese Communist Central at precisely this time will serve that committee as an excellent reference. A point of special interest is that, in the
supplements to its resolution, the Chinese Communist Central provides for
rent reduction based on the principle of a 25 percent reduction from the
rental agreed upon before the beginning of the resistance war, and this is
no different from the 25 percent reduction advocated by the majority of the
Kuomintang. The reduction of 37.5 percent of the total grain harvest volume
promulgated by the National Government on 30 March 1930, to be enforced on
1 March 1936, and the regulations to protect tenant farmers promulgated by
its Internal Affairs Ministry in 1932 were both reiterations of the same
theme. Though such decrees were supported by the broad peasants, just people,
and many disciples of the three principles of democracy, it is regrettable
that, until after the start of the resistance war, the Chinese Communist
Party has been the only one to implement them firmly. The Chinese Communist
Central feels that, in order to rally all classes in the nation, launch a
strategic counteroffensive, and thoroughly defeat the Japanese bandits, in
addition to military and political reforms, only the adoption of a rational
land policy will win the support of the peasant masses and attain the goal.

"Resolution of the Chinese Communist Central on the Land Policy in
Resist-Japan Bases"

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CSO: 4005
YENAN COMMENTATOR PREDICTS THAT JAPANESE BANDITS WILL BE SMASHED IN TWO YEARS

6 February 1942

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 6 February—According to the Hai-t'ung [3189 6639] NEWS AGENCY, the NEW SHEN PAO, Chinese-language edition of an official newspaper of the Japanese Army in Shanghai, said that there is really no need for China and Japan to fight each other and that Chiang Kai-shek is responsible for the present erroneous policy. With the exception of the Communist Party, the paper said, all circles in China consider peace the best policy. Right now, peace is the only way to save China from following in the footsteps of the Ming Dynasty, the paper added. The Yenan commentator refutes this viewpoint as follows:

With the exception of traitors, all Chinese people think that the war of resistance is the best policy. Today there is no alternative to the war of resistance to save China from perishing. The Japanese fascists know that there is a Communist Party in China now, but they should also know that there was no Communist Party in China at the end of the Ming Dynasty. At that time there was no Kuomintang, nor a Soviet Union, nor a Winston Churchill, nor a Roosevelt. That is why the Manchus were able to overrun the Ming Dynasty. The Japanese bandits can never conquer China today. As long as there is a single Communist Party member, the Japanese will never be allowed to succeed in their intrigues. After all, we have patriotic people and patriotic political parties all over China. In addition, we have the formidable Soviet Union and the powerful Great Britain and the United States as our allies. The victory of the Japanese bandits in the South Pacific is but an overture to their collapse. Accompanying their victory is the dispersion and dissipation of their strength. The short legs of the Japanese bandits have been stretched far and will be stretched even farther. The farther they are stretched, the thinner they will become. It will take only 2 years for the Japanese to be smashed. All people in China are vigilant toward the Japanese bandits' enticements to surrender. We must persist in the war of resistance for another 2 years. In 2 years, not only Japan, but also fascism as a whole will collapse.

* CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 6 February 1942
CELEBRATING THE 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RED ARMY

18 February 1942

[Text] Today, 18 February, is the 24th anniversary of the Red Army of the Soviet Union. This day reminds us of the birth of the Red Army. It was born during the German imperialist attack on Leningrad. Today the Red Army is again engaged in a life-or-death struggle against a fascist German invasion. The Red Army this year is not only many many times stronger than it was at the time of its birth, but also much stronger than it was before 22 June last year. Now the Red Army is at the greatest peak of its strength in its history. Through 8 months of combat the Red Army has proven to be strongest army in the world. When the world is divided into a fascist front and an antifascist front and the two fronts are engaged in a final decisive battle, the Red Army becomes the hope of the absolute majority of mankind. This anniversary of the Red Army is a day celebrated by all mankind. The Chinese people are more enthusiastic in celebrating this day because the Red Army has been a staunch supporter of China's national liberation since 1925. During the last 5 years of the war of resistance against Japan the Red Army has given us the greatest encouragement and assistance. China expects the Red Army to be its main helper in defeating Japan. The Red Army is now launching successful counterattacks against Hitler's invasion forces, which, although still in Soviet territory, are not far from their day of collapse. In the near future the Japanese fascists may attack the Soviet Union, and the Red Army must be prepared to fight two enemies. But we fully believe that if the Japanese fascists dare to embark on that adventure, they will certainly be defeated. On the basis of many factors, we can predict that Hitler will be defeated in 1 year and Japanese fascism in 2 years. These factors are the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and China and all antifascist peoples of the world; the Soviet Union is the model for all these countries. The history of the Red Army tells us an indisputable truth: only an armed force united with the masses of the people is an unconquerable force. We must publicize and learn this truth and strengthen the antifascist war according to this truth so as to hasten the arrival of the antifascist victory. This is the mission of all the people of China and the people all over the world while they celebrate the 24th anniversary of the Red Army.

CIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 23 February 1942
CENTRAL LINK IN CURRENT WORK TO HAVE BETTER TROOPS AND SIMPLER ADMINISTRATION

23 August 1942

[Text] It has been a long time since the CCP Central Committee adopted the policy of better troops and simpler administration. If we examine how this policy is carried out at various anti-Japanese bases, we will see that some areas are earnestly implementing this policy and have attained remarkable achievements. This fact proves that the Central Committee's policy is suitable to the local situations at various bases and can be carried out. At the same time, we also see that in certain areas and certain departments this policy is carried out reluctantly, passively, and, therefore, not thoroughly. A few areas still do what they used to do without making a move to implement the policy, in disregard of the Central Committee's decision. They regard their areas or departments as exceptions. The reason these areas cannot implement the policy of better troops and simpler administration and regard themselves as exceptions, we think, is a problem of understanding, or a lack of understanding of the meaning of this policy. Therefore, to insure a thorough implementation of the policy of better troops and simpler administration, it is necessary to explain the meaning of this policy.

Why should the Central Committee propose this policy?

First, 5 years of war of resistance has resulted in an irregular border between our anti-Japanese bases and enemy-occupied territory. The enemy relies on railways, highways and strategic points to surround us, while we rely on the vast rural area to surround the enemy. A situation of mutual surrounding has developed, and a see-saw battle is going on. The rapid development of guerilla warfare behind enemy lines during the early stages of the war of resistance is over. The problem from now on is how to conserve our own forces, overcome difficulties and endure hardship. Whoever survives this serious crisis will eventually win. As the enemy is currently engaged in a cruel mopping-up campaign as well as gradual encroachment, the shrinking of our bases and the attrition of our manpower and financial resources are inevitable. Therefore, we must gird ourselves and adapt to this changed situation. Only thus can we continue our war of resistance. The purpose of this necessary retrenchment is to conserve our own forces, overcome the difficulties, and, at the same time, prepare ourselves for a counterattack in the future. The present retrenchment serves great developments in the future.
Second, as fighting behind the enemy lines is frequent, the frontline is not fixed. The troops and organizations are highly mobile. Just as big organizations are not permissible under these circumstances, so too many non-combatants in armed units are not permissible because they hamper troop movements. Therefore, we must retrench to suit the needs of the war. We must understand that organizations and armed units are formed to carry out a certain task, not just for the sake of the organizations and armed forces. If the emphasis is on quantity during the development of an organization or an armed unit, then the emphasis should be on quality during the time of retrenchment. We should attach more value to quality than to quantity. If we still cling to our old practice, unwilling to change, we are genuine dogmatists!

Third, during this cruel war our military bases are shrinking in size, and we face increasing difficulties in manpower and material resources. In many economically backward villages the people's wealth is rather limited. Therefore, in each base only a certain percentage of the population can be detached from production. This percentage should not be too high. Otherwise a contradiction will occur which can be best described as "the pond is too small for the fish." The purpose of the enemy's "triple atrocity" policy toward our bases is to destroy our conditions of survival in an attempt to "drain the pond and then catch the fish." Retrenchment is directed precisely at this clever policy of the enemy.

On the basis of the three understandings stated above, the Central Committee proposed a long time ago that the number of people detached from production should not exceed 3 percent of the total local population. After proposing the policy of better troops and simpler administration, the Central Committee also proposed that the development of our main armed forces be suspended. In the future, the emphasis of military construction should be shifted to the strengthening of local armed units and the development of militia not detached from production. This is a consistent policy, a policy suitable for our bases behind the enemy. All bases must thoroughly carry out this policy.

The meaning of the policy of better troops and simpler administration and the Central Committee's persistent advocacy of this policy is still not understood by all the comrades in our bases. As a result, this policy is not being carried out thoroughly. At the same time, there are some comrades who have either incorrect or one-sided understanding. These views are also harmful to the implementation of the policy of better troops and simpler administration.

Some people say: Although our armed unit or organization is topheavy, with a large number of people at the high levels and not enough people at the lower levels, we should look forward to the future! Our armed units and organizations will develop in the future!

We think that this opinion is wrong. Future development is a matter for the future. We should put our emphasis on resolving today's problems! If we do not think of a way to overcome today's difficulty, there is no future to speak of. If we keep imagining about the future without seeing the facts before us, this kind of "farsightedness" cannot resolve any realistic problem.
Some people say: The Central Committee is right in proposing the policy of better troops and simpler administration, but the situation in our armed unit or organization is tolerable and not as serious as you estimate. Why not let us maintain the status quo? We shall resolve this problem when the situation becomes serious. Why should we rush things!

This kind of opinion is also wrong. The trend of development of the situation behind the enemy lines in the last 2 years plainly tells us that the expected serious situation will definitely come, and has already come in some areas. The change in the situation behind the enemy lines is no longer a matter of estimate but a vivid fact. If we do not alert ourselves to the changes or actively take appropriate measures to cope with the changes, we will be caught short when something suddenly happens. This kind of farsightedness, adoption of a policy in advance and always taking the initiative to reduce possible losses to the revolutionary force, is an art of Bolshevik leadership. If we do not make an effort and let everything run its natural course, we are also wrong, because this view is politically nearsighted.

Some people think: During the war of resistance we should follow the policy of Han Hsin [7281 0207]—"the more troops the better." Why should we implement the better troops policy? Of course, we sometimes need more troops to beat the enemy. But there should be a limit to "more," and the number of troops cannot be increased without limit. The crux of the problem is whether our material and financial resources are sufficient to support them. If we ignore this elementary problem of survival and keep building up the armed units, the result will be that the manpower, material and financial resources of our bases will be exhausted and our bases will be hard to defend. Therefore, we are for "quality troops" rather than "more troops." We oppose the theory of "more troops."

Some people think: The work in our military base is heavy. Bigger organizations and more cadres are needed to do a good job. As we feel that the number of cadres is insufficient everywhere, how can we talk about "simpler administration"? It is true that some areas and some departments are not adequately staffed and should be strengthened. On the other hand, is it not true that there is a "forest" of organizations with complicated systems and superfluous personnel? The central problem of simpler administration lies in adjustment of organization, adjustment of cadres, retrenchment of organizations, and reduction of superfluous personnel in order to increase working efficiency and expedite the solution of problems. Therefore, we are for "simpler administration" rather than "complicated administration." We oppose "complicated administration."

All the above views have the same old weakness of one-sidedness. If a person persists in his viewpoints without taking the overall situation into consideration, he may justify his arguments and may even sound reasonable. If we give the overall situation careful thought, these arguments are plainly inadequate.
Only the policy of better troops and simpler administration is a policy resulting from careful consideration of the overall situation, suitable for the actual situation behind the enemy lines today and capable of taking care of future developments. We are Marxists and Leninists. We must resolve problems practically. Any one-sided view toward any problem will quite likely lead to the error of subjectivism. Implementation of the policy of better troops and simpler administration, first of all, requires thorough understanding. Only after a real understanding of this policy can we earnestly, voluntarily and gladly implement this policy thoroughly.

The policy of better troops and simpler administration is indeed a central link in all the work at various bases now. Implementation of this program must be reflected in all phases of work. All administrative, military, financial and economic work should be reconsidered in light of this overall policy.

Meanwhile, implementation of the policy of "better troops" and "simpler administration" should be linked with such specific work as economy of civilian power, cultivation of civilian power, development of production, self-reliance, austerity and antiwaste.

The areas behind enemy lines are in a harsh war environment. The situation changes rapidly, and more often than not very suddenly. If the leadership organizations and cadres cannot foresee the trend of development, make instant decisions, or voluntarily change the policies, then we will be unable to cope with the situation or even suffer unexpected losses when we find ourselves in an adverse situation.

Finally, it must be pointed out again that the policy of better troops and simpler administration is a correct policy for overcoming present difficulties and striving for greater development in the future. It is a policy that takes care of the future as well as the present. It is a positive policy, not a negative policy. It is certain that Japanese imperialism will be defeated. It is also certain that we shall witness greater development in the future. During this difficult period from now until the time to counterattack, our rank and file should be streamlined and better trained so that our victory and future development will be further guaranteed.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 23 August 1942

1004
CSO: 4005
CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON UNIFYING PARTY LEADERSHIP IN ANTI-JAPANESE BASES AND READJUSTING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS

Adopted by the CCP Central Committee Politburo

1 September 1942

[Text] Since the war of resistance, the party leadership at various anti-Japanese bases has been generally unified, and the relationships among party, political, military and mass organizations have been basically united. As a result, we have sustained a situation of hard struggle for several years and coordinated well with the nation's war of resistance. However, due to the poison of subjectivism and factionalism and the lack of understanding about certain political viewpoints and organizational relationships, there is some disharmony in certain areas in the relationships among party, political, military and mass organizations (actually the relationships among party member cadres in party, political, military and mass organization systems). Such disharmonious phenomena include an insufficient spirit of unity, uncoordinated action, each unit running its own business, insufficient respect for local party and government authorities on the part of armed units, lack of distinction between party and government functions, independence of party members in government units, monopoly of mass organizations by party members, selfish departmentalism, parochialism, etc. These phenomena of disharmony jeopardize the defense and construction of anti-Japanese bases and hamper the further progress of our party toward Bolshevism. The construction of anti-Japanese bases and implementation of democracy require unity of leadership in each base. The cruelty of the mopping-up campaign of the Japanese bandits, the tightening of the blockade line, the communication difficulties between upper and lower levels, and the increasing local and guerilla warfare characteristics of the war of resistance demand more flexibility in the relationship between the upper and lower echelons in various systems. As each district (each military district or each military subdistrict) becomes more independent in its activities and unified leadership of such activities should be further broadened and strengthened, organizations in each district should closely coordinate with each other without giving the enemy any opportunity to take advantage of our weakness. The Central Committee has made the following decisions:

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(1) The party is the vanguard of the proletarian class and the highest form of proletarian organization. It should lead all other organizations, such as the armed units, government and mass organizations. Unified leadership in anti-Japanese bases should be exhibited by the existence of a unified party committee (or central political bureau, branch political bureau, district party committee, and local party committee) to provide overall leadership in each base. Therefore, it is decided that the representative organization of the Central Committee (the Central Political Bureau or branch political bureau) and the party committees at various levels (district party committee or local party committee) are the highest organizations in each area to provide unified leadership over all party, government, military, and people's work. The former party, government and military committees in various areas should be abolished (the establishment of these party, government and military committees was necessary and correct during the period the anti-Japanese bases were being established). The nature and the membership of party committees must be changed. The party committee at various levels should not be just a party committee to lead local work. It should be the unified leadership organization (not just a joint conference) for all the party, government, military and mass organization activities in that particular area. Therefore, it should include essential, responsible party member cadres from the party, the government, and the armed forces (the standing committee of the party committee should also include responsible cadres from the party, the government and armed units). Such committees should not be made up entirely or mostly of party workers. The work of these party committees should cover all aspects, such as the discussion and investigation of party, government, military, and mass work. Their work should not be limited to local work only.

(2) All resolutions, decisions or directives of the representative organizations of the Central Committee, district party committees and local party committees must be unconditionally executed by lower-level party committees, same-level military and political committees for the party, youth corps and armed units, the political department of armed units, and all party and youth corps members in mass organizations. The superior and subordinate relationships among organizations in government, armed unit and mass organization systems still exists. The resolutions, directives and orders of higher-level government or military organizations and the decisions of higher-level mass organizations (before the promulgation of such resolutions, directives and orders, the important part of the document should be presented by responsible party members of such organizations to a same-level party committee for approval or should have previously been agreed upon by responsible persons of party committees, but not all documents need approval) should be unconditionally executed not only by lower-level government, armed unit and mass organizations but also by lower-level party committees. Such resolutions, directives and orders should not be violated or shelved on the excuse that no instructions were received from a higher-level party committee. If a lower-level party committee has any differing opinion on the resolution of a higher-level government, armed unit or mass organization, reports may be made to a higher-level party committee. If internal disputes occur within
party committees in resolving specific problems according to the resolution of higher-level organization, the principle of the minority obeying the majority should be followed. Even when the responsible persons of government, armed unit and mass organizations do not agree with the opinion of the majority, they must execute the decisions of same-level party committees, but they may submit their dissenting opinion to their respective superior organization.

(3) The Central Political Bureau and the branch political bureaus are designated representative organizations of the CCP Central Committee. Members of district party committees and local party committees are elected by a joint meeting of representatives from armed units and local party organizations with the approval of superior organizations. District party committees and local party committees should include cadres from local party organizations, party cadres from armed units, and responsible party and youth corps members from government organizations. Whether the main armed force should participate in the county party committee is to be decided according to local conditions. County party committees (without the participation of the main force units) and district party committees should include responsible persons from local party, armed unit and government organizations. Comrades who can administer all phases of party, government, military and civilian work should be selected to serve as secretaries of party committees at various levels. Thus, party committee secretaries should understand not only party affairs but also military and government work. Secretaries of district party committees are selected by branch political bureaus of the Central Committee and approved by the Central Committee. Secretaries of local party committees are nominated by district party committees and approved by branch political bureaus and the Central Political Bureau. In order to unify leadership over local party activities and party activities in the armed units, secretaries of branch political bureaus, district party committees, and local party committees will concurrently serve as members of political committees for military districts and subdivisions (division or brigade), and deputy secretaries will be appointed to manage party work. If the political committees of military districts or subdivisions are designated as branch political bureaus, then secretaries of district and local party committees may serve as alternate members of the political committees to manage the work in armed units only. Secretaries of branch political bureaus, district party committees, and local party committees should handle all phases of work. Aside from serving concurrently on the political committee, they should not undertake other specific work concurrently. In special cases where secretaries of party committees do not have to serve concurrently as members of political committees, or members of political committees do not have to serve concurrently as secretaries of party committees, approval must be obtained from a higher party committee or the Central Committee. The military-political committees and political departments in armed units constitute a part of the party committee on the same level (the Central Political Bureau, branch political bureaus, district party committees and local party committees). They have the same prerogatives and obligations as other departments (such as the organization department and the propaganda department). Although they
are not subordinate to other departments or committees, they are different from other departments or committees in that they maintain a leadership and subordinate relationship among themselves. Military policies (such as troop expansion, principles of army building, political work, etc.) and major policies concerning military actions (such as strategic and tactical plans to counter enemy mopping-up campaigns and postmortems on the plans) should be turned over to party committees for discussion, but specific military actions are decided by the commanding officer who is also a member of the political committee (party committee secretary). (The final decision of the commanding officer and the political committee on military actions are made according to the regulations governing political work). Unlimited democratic discussions will only lead to the failure of military actions. The appointment and release of essential personnel in armed units is administered by military organizations according to existing regulations.

(4) The main forces are armed units under the leadership of the party. They are the cornerstone for the construction of anti-Japanese bases and for sustaining the struggle. They should regard the consolidation and defense of their respective bases as their foremost task. The main forces belong to the nation, but they also belong to a locality. In the past there was some leadership disunity in some anti-Japanese bases, caused mainly by lack of an accurate and unified understanding on the part of certain leadership comrades of the main forces regarding the establishment and defense of the bases. As a consequence, some of their policies (such as the local armament and troop expansion problem in their military construction policy, and the unified revenue collection and unified expense disbursement problem in their economic and financial policy) took care of the interests of the main forces themselves only and overlooked coordination with the entire work in the respective bases; they even caused disputes with local party and government organizations. In some districts, party and government leadership organizations do not have an in-depth understanding of the principle that everything is subordinated to the needs of war. They have not fulfilled their responsibilities as they should in regard to the replenishment of manpower, the guarantee of food and material supply, care for the family members of wounded anti-Japanese soldiers, and struggle against desertions. Hence the relationship between the armed forces on the one hand and local party and government organizations on the other is strained. In the future, in implementing the unified leadership policy in each base, aside from making the local party committee the leadership party organization in various places, we must correct the ideological and policy mistakes on the party of leaders of certain main forces and leaders of certain local party and government organizations. We must carry out the Central Committee's policies concerning our bases and the military committee's directives concerning military construction. In the future, the main military force must carry out the resolutions and decisions of party committees at various levels and the decrees of government organizations at various levels. The main military force should also carry out the decisions of lower-level party committees and lower-level government organizations (such as county, district, and township government organizations) in places where the main force is stationed. If the main military force does not
agree with these decisions, reports may be submitted to higher-level party committees and higher-level government organizations. All should constantly keep in touch with and help each other. Military measures taken by main military force, such as troop movements, deployments, and martial law, should be observed by local party, government, and civilian organizations. The main military force is responsible for the protection of party, government and mass organizations. If the latter suffer any undue losses due to the negligence or indifference of the armed units, the responsible persons of the armed units should be punished. If there is any dispute in the future, solutions should be sought locally through mutual discussion, and reports on the dispute and its solution should be submitted to a higher organization. Reporting on disputes to a higher organization without trying to seek a local solution through discussion is objectionable.

(5) The political power system (political council and government) is a system of power organization. Their decrees and orders are compulsory in nature. The relationship between party committees and the political power system must be clearly defined. Monopoly of the work of the political power system by party committees, the mixing of the function of party organizations with that of government organizations, disobedience to party committee decisions, and conduct in violation of party discipline on the part of party member cadres in political power system organizations must be corrected. In order to carry out the three-thirds system, party leadership over political power system organizations should be limited to matters concerning principles, policies and general programs. The party should not interfere with or monopolize the work of political power organizations. Lower-level party committees have no authority to change or refuse to execute the decisions and decrees of higher-level political council or government organizations. Party organizations and party members should set themselves as examples for executing the decrees of political council and government organizations. The party should undertake political work to enhance the prestige of the political council and the government. Party cadres and party members who violate the laws and orders of the government should be severely punished by party organizations. Party leadership over the work of political council and government organizations may be exercised through party members and youth corps members. Party committees and party organizations have no authority to command political council or government organizations directly. Party and youth corps organizations must obey the party committee at the same level. However, the working style of the party and the youth corps must be drastically improved. These organizations should not compel people outside the party to obey. Instead, they should convince them and embark on political work. In the event the party and youth corps fail to convince the majority of the political council and the government and their suggestions are rejected, then the minority must obey the majority without violating the principle of democratic centralism. If party and youth corps comrades disagree with the opinion of the party committee at the same level and fail to firmly execute the decisions of the party committee, this constitutes conduct in violation of party discipline and should be reprimanded and punished. The party must send capable cadres to work in political councils and government, and the phenomena of overlooking political power system work and keeping cadres in party
organizations should be corrected. Under the three-thirds system, the number of party members working in the political power system should be reduced, but their quality should be improved. Party members and cadres working in the political power system must obey the resolutions, decisions, and discipline of the party committee, the party and the youth corps. They should not take advantage of their position to engage in free action. Here it should be pointed out in particular that party leadership over the political power system under the three-thirds system depends upon the consistency of the words of party member cadres in the political power system with their deeds and their absolute obedience to the party's decisions. Therefore, the tightening of party discipline among party members and party member cadres in the political power system is of great significance. Care should be exercised in transferring party members from the political power system. Before the transfer, the party member concerned should tender his resignation to the political power organization. The relationship between the armed forces and the government must be improved. Armed units should conduct educational programs to support the government. Government organizations should guarantee provisions and transportation for the armed units. Leaders of armed units should be elected to the government and political council. Armed units should be models in respecting political power organizations and in executing laws and orders. Unlawful activities of soldiers should be severely punished by military organizations. Aside from expressing their opinion to the political council and the government in their capacity as citizens, government committee members, or political council members, all soldiers and military organizations have no right to interfere with the internal work of the political council and the government. Political organizations in armed units should help the government as much as possible.

(6) Mass organizations are bodies voluntarily organized by the masses themselves. The party, government and armed units should not directly interfere with the activities of mass organizations. Party leadership over mass organizations should be exercised through party members, the party and youth corps. The loss of identity between party and mass organizations, or party monopoly of mass organizations, must be corrected. Wherever possible, more than half of the committee members of mass organizations should be nonparty members. The problem of party or youth corps members in government is the same as the problem of party or youth corps members in mass organizations. The government should respect the independence of mass organizations, give necessary help to mass organizations, and ask mass organizations to carry out government laws and orders. Mass organizations should apply for registration with the government according to the law in order to obtain their legal status. If mass organizations violate government laws, they may be punished or even suspended. Otherwise, the government should not interfere with the work of mass organizations. Mass organizations should rally the people to support the government and armed units and to help mobilization work for the war of resistance. But mass organizations are not political power organizations. They cannot take the place of the government in arresting, trying or sentencing people. Armed units and mass organizations should help each other, not interfere with each other.
(7) In guerrilla warfare areas, because of their special characteristics, unified leadership should not only be clearly defined but also established, if necessary, among party, government, military and mass organizations. Party committees and government and mass organizations in guerrilla warfare areas may be combined with the military commanding organizations or political organizations of armed units. Cadres of party, government and mass organizations should undertake definite duties in regular armed units or guerrilla units (such as serving as commanders or deputy commanders, or as members of party committees in the armed forces, or taking up work in the political department of armed units). During military engagements they should take part in the work of regular armed units or guerrilla units. Between military engagements they should carry on their work in connection with their original positions (such as party committee secretaries, county magistrates, or chairmen of labor unions).

(8) Unified leadership is reflected in the mutual relationships among party, government, and mass organizations on the same level as well as in the relationship between organizations at higher and lower levels. Strict implementation of the principle that all lower-level organizations should obey higher-level organizations and that all party organizations should obey the Central Committee is of decisive significance in the party's unified leadership system. In implementing any system or policy, leadership organizations in various bases must follow the directions of the Central Committee. In resolving new problems which concern the entire nation, the entire party or the entire armed forces, instructions must be sought from the Central Committee, and no organization should introduce new ideas, make decisions by themselves, or endanger the unity of party leadership (with the exception of problems of local nature and decisions which do not violate those of higher organizations or the Central Committee). Halfhearted execution of the resolutions, decisions, orders and instructions of the Central Committee by lower-level party, government, military and mass organizations, ostensible obedience to cover up violations, or failure to seek instructions from higher-level organizations and the Central Committee before resolving new problems which involve principles and which by their nature should not have been resolved as isolated cases are manifestations of "impurity" in party character and destruction of unified leadership.

Here we wish to again remind leadership comrades of party, government, military and mass organizations that responsible party members of party committees and various organizations should not make any public declarations, talks, or broadcasts concerning the entire country, the entire party and the entire armed forces without the permission of the Central Committee. The texts should be examined in advance by the party committee at the same level or appropriate persons of the party or youth corps. The main points of public announcements to be issued by responsible persons above the level of members of branch political bureaus or above the level of division commanders must be reported or cabled to the Central Committee in advance. No broadcasts should be made by local organizations, and all broadcasts should be made only by the HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY in Yenan. A responsible high-echelon cadre
of the party should realize how he violates the organizational principles
of the party and jeopardize the unity of the party if he expresses his own
political opinion in public without the concurrence of equal-level or higher-
level organizations!

(9) In order to unify the leadership in our bases and improve the relation-
ships among party, government, military and mass organizations, education
programs should be conducted, the three undesirable working styles should
be rectified, and the poison of subjectivism and sectarianism should be
eliminated among party member cadres in party, government, military and mass
organizations. According to the decision of the Central Committee and Comrade
Mao Tse-tung's report, cadres should be educated at cadre meetings to be
aware of the overriding interest and to given heed to the overall situation.
Cadres should be called upon to criticize each other and to criticize them-
selves so that they will know the overall situation without any local or
departmental bias and know the correct relationship between the entity and
the locality, between higher-level and lower-level organizations, and between
their locality and other localities. Educational work in party, government,
military and mass organizations should be strengthened in order to enable
all comrades to know the importance of unified leadership and the revolution-
ary orders and decrees in our bases. Here we should particularly warn the
cadres in the armed units that whenever there is disharmony among party,
government, military and mass organizations, it is usually the cadres from
armed units who should bear a greater part of the responsibility, because
they are armed and are apt to act on their own, slight party and government
organizations, disregard discipline, act freely and destroy the interest of
the masses. Therefore, military and political cadres in armed units must
constrain their subordinates, examine themselves, and appeal to their sub-
ordinates to support the party leadership, support the government, and
resolutely execute the decisions of the party and the laws of the government.
Meanwhile, some viewpoints held by certain party members and cadres which
are not in conformity with facts should be corrected. These persons think
that only the work of party committees or party organizations is called
party work. Actually, any work done by party members or party cadres, be
it political, military, mass, economic, technical or cultural is party work.
Work of party organizations is only a part of the party's work (party affairs
work). Obedience to party leadership means obedience to the party line,
party policies, resolutions, decisions instructions and discipline. Some
party members give lip service to or distort the meaning of obedience to
party leadership and do not seriously study or execute the party line,
policy, resolution, decision, instruction and discipline. This kind of
attitude is wrong.

(10) The strengthening of leadership unity in various anti-Japanese bases
is for the purpose of more smoothly conducting the war against the Japanese
bandits. "Everything is subordinate to the war" is the supreme principle of
unified leadership. It should be explained to everybody in the party that
if our armed units are weakened, and if the war is lost, then our bases
will no longer be able to exist, and all party, government, military and
mass organizations will collapse. Therefore, party committees, government
and mass organizations and all the people have the obligation to support the armed forces and strengthen their combat capability. The party committees and government and mass organizations have the responsibility to resolve at any time such problems as the recruitment of troops; supply and transportation of food, clothing and ammunition; provision of barracks for the troops; transportation, nursing, and care for the wounded, sick and disabled persons; and special care for the family members of anti-Japanese soldiers. Indifference to these problems is extremely wrong and harmful. Members of the armed forces should also understand that without the coordination of party, government and mass organizations, armed units cannot sustain the war of resistance even for a single day. Therefore, education should be strengthened in the armed forces so that all members of the armed forces will care for their bases, economize on manpower and material resources, respect party and government organizations, strengthen military discipline, and give party, government and mass organizations all necessary assistance. Troop recruitment, materiel replenishment, transportation, and care for the family members of anti-Japanese soldiers should be handled according to government laws and regulations. Uncoordinated action can only jeopardize the war of resistance and harm the armed units themselves.

(11) On the basis of the principle of this decision and actual local conditions, leadership organizations in various bases should establish relevant regulations in detail in the form of government laws, army regulations, party and youth corps rules, and mass organization regulations to resolve many specific problems in connection with unified leadership. These rules and regulations, once established, should be reported to the Central Committee.

* "Rectification Documents," Hong Kong New Democracy Press, 1949
YENAN OBSERVER ON STALIN'S TALK

8 October 1942

[Text] HSIN-HUA NEWS AGENCY, Yenan, 8 October--Commenting on Stalin's talk with American correspondents on 4 October, the Yenan observer said:

"This talk of Stalin's is of tremendous significance. Not only will it enhance confidence in victory in the minds of all people in the allied countries, but it will also greatly benefit the unity of the allied countries and the great task of winning the war over fascism."

Concerning the second front, the observer said:

"The opening of a real second front is tantamount to a death sentence for Hitler. This is an inescapable duty of the allied countries and a priority duty more important than material aid to the Soviet Union. As far as timing is concerned, this is the most opportune moment to open the second front. If this moment is missed, it will be a great strategic blunder on the part of the allied countries. The timely opening of a second front by the allied countries is the key to victory."

The observer dismissed the rumors spread by German and Japanese news agencies following Stalin's talk as their habitual tricks and not worth commenting on. The unity of the allied countries will be further strengthened because of the defense of Stalingrad and Stalin's talk. The days of fascist arrogance are gone forever. For the aggressors, their demise is only a matter of time, the observer said.

° CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO, 9 October 1942

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CSO: 4005
CCP COMMENTS ON THE 10TH PLENARY SESSION OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEE

November 1942

[Text] Concerning the declaration issued by the 10th Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee and the report of the Ad Hoc Research Committee, a reporter of this newspaper [CHIEH-FANG JIH-PAO] went to see the spokesman of the CCP Central Committee and sought his opinion. His reply is as follows:

We share the plenary session's intention to persist in the war of resistance and strengthen unity. For instance, the declaration said: "Before the final victory we must endure the most difficult and most severe battles in order to annihilate the enemy and permanently cut off the roots of all evil, adhere to the essence of the principles of self-reliance, and take into consideration the most difficult situations in our calculations." "Today we should all the more stand fast with all our loyalty and courage and concentrate all the efforts of our 450 million people on combat." "Externally, we must help and cooperate with each other in order to carry out the universal principle of equality for all mankind. Internally, we must unite with each other and demonstrate our resolution to be sincere without any disagreement." There must be a nationwide sincere unity before we can shoulder the unprecedentedly difficult mission." These words are all right. From this we can see that on the most important external and internal policies the opinions of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party are basically the same. The 10th Plenary Session should be congratulated for this gesture. Since the beginning of the war of resistance, the Communist Party, the 8th Route Army, and the New 4th Army have always stood on the foremost front of the war in defense of their motherland. Although isolated behind the enemy lines under conditions of extreme shortages of money and equipment, suffering from hunger and blockade, and facing tremendous difficulties, they have always obeyed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's order to cling to their defense line without retreating a step. Generalissimo Chiang has said: "All people, no matter whether they come from the north or the south or whether they are young or old, have the responsibility to defend their land in the war of resistance." Adhering to this instruction, Communist Party members and people behind the enemy lines organized guerrilla bands and coordinated with our main forces to resist the enemy army. They have
been able to persist in the war effort for 5 1/2 years, to keep their strength as formidable as the Great Wall, and to resist the attack of 15 enemy divisions, which is about half of all the enemy forces in China. That they are able to do so is not without reason. As to the administration of various anti-Japanese bases, they formulated many measures based entirely on Dr Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, Generalissimo Chiang's "Outline for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction," and the basic laws of the National Government, with special consideration for the opinions of local people. These measures have resulted in a harmonious relationship among the people, which is helpful to the war effort and to winning the war. The Chinese Communist Party issued a declaration, "To Meet the National Crisis Together," on 22 September 1937. The following four points were enumerated in that declaration: "1) Dr Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles are needed for China today, and our party is willing to struggle for their thorough implementation; 2) abolish all policies of violence and all communist movements for the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime, and stop the policy of forcibly confiscating the land of landlords; 3) abolish the existing soviet government and carry out people's rights policies in order to achieve unity in the form of government throughout the country; 4) abolish the name and identification of the Red Army and reorganize it as the People's Revolutionary Army, subject to the control of the Military Commission of the National Government and ready to take up frontline responsibilities in fighting the Japanese." We have observed what we stated 5 years ago without any infractions. Not only shall we do our best to observe these four points during the war of resistance, but we are prepared to continue to observe these four points after the conclusion of the war of resistance. This is with a view to seeking a sincere unity with the Kuomintang and other political parties and all strata of people throughout the country for fulfilling the epoch-making mission of the war of resistance and national reconstruction. The items listed in the Ad Hoc Research Committee's report are not any different in basic spirit from the four points contained in the aforementioned CCP declaration. As to the attitude toward the Communist Party, the report of the Ad Hoc Research Committee, after enumerating various demands, declared: "The Government treats everybody equally. Not only will it not discriminate against anybody, but it will safeguard the rights and freedoms to which its citizens are entitled." This pronouncement is what we have been earnestly demanding for many years. Now that we have this clear declaration, we feel greatly elated. In short, all the viewpoints taken by the Chinese Communist Party are based on the principle of the united anti-Japanese national front. Anything in the interest of unity for the war of resistance will be sincerely carried out without exception. This policy will be firmly adhered to and never changed. We sincerely hope that the Kuomintang leaders will understand our sincerity for the interest of the country and the people in order to attain further cooperation. If so, although the enemy is strong, it will be chased out of our territory, and a strong, prosperous and independent Republic of China will be successfully built before long.

* Rectification Documents, 1949
